c- I ARCHIVE COPY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE THE 1997 U. S. NSS: STR4TEGY OR WISH LIST? PETER Ibf VANGJELKLASS OF 1998 COURSE NUbfBER 5601 SEMINAR J FACULTY SEMINAR LEADER Dr Sandra O’Leary FACULTY ADVISOR LTC Mark Englzsh Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. 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THIS PAGE 8 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 The Clinton 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS) claims to estabhsh a blueprint for U S Natronal Securrty for the 21” century Although rt attempts to break the Cold War strategrc paradigm of contamment, it falls short of provrdmg an effective construct for executing strategy m the “new world disorder “’ The White House product reads more like a corporate annual report than a document wrth strategic vision There are mconslstencies wrthm the document’s strategic logic that are likely to cause confusron and hamper rmplementatron To be effective, a strategy must follow a framework and present a logic that enables rt to “hang together ” This coordmatron and calculation of means and ends is dependent upon a strategic vision that 1s clear and consistent A coherent national security strategy should contam clear definitions and priormzatron of goals, interests, and objectives It should develop a plan for employmg all the tools of statecraft m accordance \vrth those pnormzed interests and objectives Fmally, an Integrated NSS should be based upon well-reasoned assumptrons and consideration of its ramrficatrons on other nations’ cultures and securny concerns ’ One cannot examme the 1997 NSS without first addressmg the context m which rt 1s developed The nature of the democratic system poses umque drfficulties for strategists They do not plan m a vacuum Modem day technologies deluge them \vith mformatron, commentarres and crmcrsms The U S polmcal system and government bureaucracy further convolute the strategy development process, mf%smg campaign promises and “pork barrel” pohtlcal issues Private corporatrons and lobbyrsts also elbow therr way mto the process Issues become blurred and, ultimately, the NSS runs the risk of becoming a marketmg tool--a consensus document that ’ Terry L Delbel, “Strategies Before Contamment,” InternafzonaiSecurzty 16,4 (Sprmg 19923 80 * These pomts are extracted from COL Reed’s mtroductory lecture to Course 560 1 on 19 August 1997 has lost its punch wrth respect to strategic interests and objectives Unfortunately, the 1997 NSS has fallen prey to this phenomenon It attempts to please everyone Interests. Goals. or Obiectives? What are the U S vital national interests? It seems that every conceivable Interest is mcluded m the NSS, however, rt IS difficult to sort through the rhetonc and distill those interests which are truly vital In addressmg natronal interests, the NSS uses a plethora of terms There are “securrty mterests” m Russia, ~‘overarchmg interests” m Chma, “endurmg Interests” m the Middle East and “principal security concerns” m the Western Hemisphere Because these terms are used Interchangeably, the NSS overlooks a key step in the strategy development process-n fails to clearly delineate and prrormze national interests As a result, It IS incumbent upon the reader to determme then relative rmportance Among the many phrases used to describe Interests, perhaps “core objectives” and “fundamental needs” come closest to rdentifymg our vital national interests The chart below illustrates this point I CORE OBJECTI\‘ES FUSDAMENTAL h-EEDS I Provide security wrth effectrve drplomacy and Protect the hves and safety of Americans mrhtary forces that are ready to fight and wm Bolster economic prospenty Mamtam sovereignty of U S with Its values. mstrtutrons and territory intact Promote democracy abroad Ensure prosperity of the nation and its people Although we are not privy to the assumptrons and issues that surfaced durmg the development of the NSS, economrc prosperity seems to be our most important vital Interest Desprte an msrstence that democracy is the fundamental underpmnmg of the NSS, the theme of economrc prosperity permeates the document, both as a vrtal mterest and m the pervasive use of the economrc tools of statecraft to achieve desired ends With more than 75 references to economrc prosperrty and stab&y, a more apt title for the NSS might be “Economrcs ‘R’ US ” It appears we are w;lllmg to subordinate the Ideals of democracy and human rights to a dnve for free markets and economrc prosperrty One has only to look at our Chma pohcy and foreign aid reductron rmtratrves m developmg Thud World countnes to substantrate this assessment Failure to Establish Resourcim Priorities The 1997 NSS lists SIX strategic pnormes to advance our core national objectives, but makes no effort to outlme how resources will be allocated m support of those priorities It proposes the Admrmstratron’s “wish hst” (I e , desirable objectives) but falls to assess the relative costs’feasrbrhty of the objectives One is led to believe that the U S still has the capabrhty to “do It all ” The KSS hedges on Its commitment to resourcmg its objectives by using rhetonc such as multrlateral operatrons, alhances, and burden sharmg It never makes the tough choices The lack of prrontlzatron of Interests and obJectIves leads to the danger of OLe r- cormmttmg tools of statecraft, wrth urgent, non-vital objectrves slphonmg resources from vital. long-term objectives In short, by managmg our resources m an ad hoc manner, we could mortgage our ability to meet future needs U S operations m Somaha serve as an example of resource expendrture for no apparent gam In reahty, there 1s significant evidence which demonstrates that the tools of U S statecraft, while substantral, are inadequate to accomplish all the rmtratives outlmed m the 1997 KSS There are msufflcrent means to support the ends For example, studres conducted by independent organizations rndrcate that it 1s doubtful the U S mrhtary could fight and wm another operation similar to Desert Storm, let alone two major regional conflrcts (MRCs) at opposrte ends of the globe Funds for more than 27 major deployments durmg the past 18 months have been diverted from Servrce trarmng and maintenance funds, causmg dwndlmg morale and readmess statistics 3 With further manpower and fiscal reductions programmed for the defense budget, the Admrmstratron will be forced to rely on other tools, which may not demonstrate the same degree of resolve, to accomplish its objectives The economrc tools of statecraft are expected to shoulder the major burden--perhaps too great a load--in support of the 1997 NSS Where mrhtary force may have been the pnmary tool of choice early m the Clmton Admimstratron, economic tools clearly have assumed preemmence The 1997 NSS touts them as a panacea for mtematronal as well as domestic concerns An example IS the overuse of bilateral trade agreements (m spite of our stated commitment to ensure free and open markets) to forward polmcal and domestic objectives These agreements could back us mto a comer at the mtemattonal trade bargammg table and prevent us from making long term progress Finally, the NSS states that rt must strengthen the dtplomattc tools requued to meet future secunty challenges. Farlure to place a resource pnority on dtplomacy has resulted m a sigmficant reductron m the State Department budget and the ehmmatron of the USIA as a separate entity wth a vrable missron of promotmg democracy abroad ’ It appears that CBS may continue to play a srgnificant role m influencing priormes for U S foreign pohcy m the absence of clearly pnontrzed and properly resourced objectives 3 Steven Metz, “why Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy‘?”i lhhtary Rewew 78 (January-February 1997) 187 4 Laurence D Wohlers, “Amenca’s Pubhc Diplomacy Deficit,” NWC Student Paper (1997) 3 FIawed Assunmtions-Ineffective Stratem In general, the 1997 NSS does a fairly decent job of projectmg end states ~~7thu s goal of economrc prosperity It has not fared as well wrth its goal to promote democracy Perhaps the reason can be traced to a flawed assumption m the NSSthat the desire of other nations for economrc prosper@ ~11 overnde their cultural concerns. Because of this assumptton, the NSS blmds itself to potential adverse rarmficatlons of promotmg democracy abroad It fails to acknowledge a different perspectrve of democracy proJectron because rt has ahgned democracy with economic prospenty Democracy projectron 1s nsky busmess Other nations may not tolerate a U S rekmdlmg of the “Lvhrte man’s burden” or, more appropriately, “Mamfest Destiny *’ Acceptance of democracy may Involve radical changes m lifestyle, government and/or culture The costs may be too great for nations to accept The U S could be perceived as rmperlahstrc and/or opportunistic--promoting democracy only m those countnes where rt has an economrc or polmcal interest The dilemma for the U S , the proponent of democracy, would then be to Just@ why rt Intervened m Somaha and Ham, yet not m Lrbena The consequences of value proJectron may cost our natron the very thmgs it IS attemptmg to gam (1 e , markets and alliances) Objective assessment, early m the process, of the rannfications of promotmg the “Amencan Way” would have alerted planners to the possrbrhty of a rebuff of democracy. and a more culturally sensmve, low-key approach could have been developed. Perhaps a better tactrc would have been to present the U S as a shrmng example of polmcal and economrc freedom (as m John Winthrop’s “City on a Hill”), allowvmg other nations to adopt those aspects of democracy that fit their particular culture and tradmons 5 The 1997 NSS IS well-mtentioned One must acknowledge that it is difficult to develop strategy durmg a period of transition where the focus of the Amencan people is clearly on domestic concerns Authors and critics are quick to lament the absence of strategy, but they offer little m the way of recommendations The MS can be credited for pushmg beyond lsolatlomst impulses and advocatmg an engagement pohcy It may be argued that the 1997 MS is the best it can be at this point m time given the domestic pressures and the democratic bureaucracy However, strategy should not be based upon the current state of pohtlcal affairs. nor the whims of various Interest groups, but should be developed usmg a logical framework that mcorporates vision m achieving the vital interests of the nation The 1997 SSS fails to clearly define Interests and set priorities FVithout a clear delmeation of the ends, the means become overused and OLe rextended The result 1s the absence of a coherent strategy where non-vital obJectives take priority over vital objectives without considermg the consequence to the national interest ’ Terry L Delbel, “Strategies Eefore Contamment,” internatmzal Securrty 16,4 (Sprmg 1992) 97 6 BIBLIOGRAPHY A Natzonal SeczrrztyS trategy for a Xew Centmy Washington, D C The White House, May 1997 Delbel, Terry L . “Strategies Before Contamment ” Internatzonal Securzty 16,4 (Spring 1992) 79- 102 Metz, Steven, ‘%%y Aren’t Americans Better at Strategy?” Mzlztary Revzew7 8 (January-February 1997) 187-l 90 Wohlers, Laurence D , “America’s Pubhc Diplomacy Deficit ” NWC Student Paper, 1997