NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND JAPAN: A Strategy for the 21st Century file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (1 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 2001 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-2001 to 00-00-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER U.S. National Security and Japan: A Strategy for the 21st Century 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The original document contains color images. 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 23 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY D. JEAN GARDNER COURSE NUMBER 5604 THE GEOSTRATEGIC CONTEXT PROFESSOR DR. MELVIN A. GOODMAN, COURSE DIRECTOR DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY AND JAPAN: A Strategy for the 21st Century Introduction One cannot underestimate the level of importance of the multifaceted alliance between the world’s two largest and most technologically advanced economies – the U.S. and Japan. With shared democratic values and principles, both have much to gain – or lose – with a shift in the balance of power in Asia. This paper examines the U.S.-Japan alliance in the context of U.S. national security interests, threats to those interests, opportunities to increase U.S. national security in the region, and a strategy for the 21st century in this regard. U.S.-Japan Alliance Post-Cold War file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (2 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY The absence of a sustained effort by the U.S. and Japan to engage on common security themes in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, coupled with a growing sense of economic competition and hostility between the two countries, marked the late 1980s and early 1990s. The contrast between a close security partnership and an intense economic rivalry always has made for a difficult coexistence, but during this period, balance was lost with far more time spent on economic issues than on the potential conduct of the alliance in a crisis.[1] In the U.S.-Japan alliance, there has been a traditional reticence to explicitly examine security inside Japan. Historically, the delineation of roles and missions has been defined as follows: the U.S. takes care of Japan’s security, and in exchange, Japan asks no questions. For much of the U.S. national security apparatus, nothing could be more comfortable than an ally that provides bases and generous host-nation support, and does not want to be consulted.[2] But, Japanese attitudes about security are in flux today, and recurring public and private questions exist about the long-term viability of the alliance as it is currently file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (3 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY structured. The U.S.-Japan alliance has been and continues to be the main pillar of Japanese security policy. Japan has developed ground, air and maritime forces whose equipment and capabilities dove-tail with those of the U.S. Japan has the most technologically advanced and most powerful air and naval forces in East Asia, but remains dependent on the U.S. to cover critical gaps in its defenses. And, Japan is almost devoid of a power projection capability. American bilateral relations with Japan ensure that America’s military, political and economic interests are protected. The extended nuclear deterrence offered to its ally and the presence of U.S. forces in Japan permit Japan to maintain its peace constitution, to eschew the development of an offensive military force, and to feel secure in a nuclear age without an arsenal of nuclear weapons. Japanese concern about regional threats to its security, worries about its place in the U.S. security strategy, and anxiety about recent blows to its regional leadership have resulted in a small and gradual shift by Japan to more assertive nationalism. At present, this trend has cross-cutting, but generally favorable, implications for U.S. security interests. Recent events in neighboring countries have underscored to both Japanese and American planners and policymakers that the U.S. forward military presence in Asia remains crucial to the region’s stability, and that the U.S.- file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (4 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Japan alliance is critical to that role. Japan’s National Security Environment Asia enjoys the dubious and unprecedented distinction of having every major threat to peace and stability, including the still highly militarized division of the Korean peninsula, the increasingly unpredictable nature of the cross-strait situation between China and Taiwan, and the dangerous nuclear rivalry between India and Pakistan. The threat previously posed to Japan by the ballistic missiles and naval and air forces of the former Soviet Union has been replaced by a number of new and more complex security challenges. Although these threats may be of a lower magnitude than the previous risk of becoming the object of Soviet aggression or a target in a U.S.-Soviet nuclear exchange, in some ways they appear to have a higher probability of materializing. Moreover, the new sources of potential threat have emerged at a time when Japan’s national self-confidence has been shaken by nearly a decade of economic stagnation, a highly fluid political situation, and an inadequate institutional structure for crisis management and strategy formulation[3] file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (5 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY In the latter part of the 1990s, Japan experienced three “security shocks”.[4] The first of these was the Chinese missile tests over the Taiwan Strait in 1995 and 1996, leading Japan to doubt China’s commitment to a no-first-use policy, while acutely heightening its perception of China’s missile threat. (A recent intelligence report also revealed that the number of Chinese coastal-deployed M-9s and shorter- range M-11x has been and will be increasing dramatically over the next five years.) The second shock concerned the North Korean test launch of the Taep’odong 1, which was lobbed over Japanese territory, and was a rude awakening that North Korea’s missile program had progressed farther than either the U.S. or Japan had imagined. The third shock two-fold: nuclear testing by India and then Pakistan in 1998 and the U.S. Senate’s decision not to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the fall of 1999 -- both very powerful issues for the Japanese as citizens of the only country to have ever suffered a nuclear attack. These shocks have had a psychological impact on the Japanese, which will most certainly tangibly influence the direction of the Japanese perspective on the U.S.-Japan alliance. Japan has a long-standing legal determination that self-defense can be exercised only at the lowest possible level, and it bans the possession of weapons characterized as offensive, as well as participation in collective security file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (6 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY arrangements. The aforementioned “security shocks,” coupled with the recent collapse of single party dominance and the emergence of a more complex Japanese security environment, have prompted a perceptible shift in the outlook of Japanese officials, legislators, the media, and the general public regarding defense issues, and have made defense policymaking an intensely political process. Thus far Japan has responded cautiously and with continuing deference to the post- World War II “peace” constitution.[5] During the past two years, movement towards a more assertive and more nationalistic security posture has gained momentum. For example, Japan and the U.S. agreed in September 1997 on measures to enhance Tokyo’s ability to provide logistical and other non-combat support to U.S. forces in the event of a regional crisis. Japan also has taken limited steps to increase its own self-defense capability, and has made a concerted effort to promote military exchanges, consultation and confidence-building with China, South Korea, and other regional states. (However, the concrete sources of friction between Japan and its Asian neighbors have been exacerbated by the legacy of Japan’s past aggression toward those neighbors.)[6] In late May 1999, Japanese legislation was passed that allowed for a number of important enhancements to the support that could be provided to U.S. forces in a file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (7 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY variety of regional crises or conflict situations (e.g., joint planning with U.S. forces for meeting a range of contingencies with Japan having the necessary legal authority to fulfill its obligations under the resultant plans). The combination of rising security-mindedness and continuing vestiges of anti- military sentiment now prevailing suggests a future U.S.-Japan security relationship that is potentially stronger, but also is likely to be more complex and difficult to manage. The passage of the Defense Guidelines legislation by the Diet underscores the continuing importance that Japan attaches to the U.S. connection, but also signals a substantial shift of the parameters of the debate in the direction of a more active defense posture.[7] U.S. National Security Interests with Respect to Japan Japan has played and can continue to play an indispensable role as a base for U.S. air operations, a rear area for ground troops and naval forces, and a source of non-lethal war material. For example, some of the most important U.S. bases in the western Pacific are located in Okinawa. These include Kadena Airbase that supports strategic airlift operations to East Asia and even the Middle East, two- thirds of a division-size Marine Expeditionary Force, and Futenma Marine Air file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (8 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM] NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY Station that has runways and parking aprons of sufficient size to accommodate the large cargo planes that would deliver helicopters from the U.S. in an emergency. Okinawa is the only location in the western Pacific that is within flying range of the Korean peninsula by CH-53 helicopters. The northern part of the island provides unique opportunities to maintain the readiness of U.S. forces in the region, including ranges at which American forces in the Pacific can conduct live firing exercises.[8] Threats to U.S. National Security with Respect to Japan The spread of nuclear weapons, North Korea’s ballistic missile programs, growing piracy in principal shipping routes, China’s rising military power and regional influence, and regional instability (e.g., political turmoil in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries) directly and indirectly threaten both U.S. and Japanese economic, political and financial interests. An additional threat arises from the Asian financial crisis that began in July 1997, significantly deepening anxiety about regional stability and weakening the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Another potentially serious threat to U.S. national security in the region derives from further deterioration of the U.S.-Japan alliance. file:///C|/digitized%20NWC%20papers/n015604a.htm (9 of 23) [3/21/2002 1:51:53 PM]