ARCHIVE Cc/f n NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE ZHOU EN-LA1 AND THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES CORE COURSE I ESSAY LTC JOHN H. MCDONALD JR./CLASS OF '96 FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY SEMINAR C DR TERRY DEIBEL COL WILLIAM ANGERMAN i Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1996 2. REPORT TYPE 00-00-1996 to 00-00-1996 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Zhou En-Lai and the Normalization of Relations with the United States 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J. REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 12 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 MCDONALD, J. It 1s highly lronlc, and yet Instructive, that the seeds for ending almost a quarter century of bitterness between China and the US were sown in the late '60s during the height of the Cultural Revolution and after the election of the foremost antl- Communist of the ‘5Os, Richard M Nixon, as President of the United States. The casual observer might have expected the situation to worsen, especially in light of continuing differences over Taiwan and Vietnam. Yet less than three years after his inauguration, Nixon made his now-famous trip to Belling What brought about this dramatic change? Thy did ideology, so long the stumbling block between any improvement in US-China relations, suddenly fade from the forefront of the dlallogue? Quite simply, the lnternatlonal balance of power appeared to the Chinese leadership to be entering a period of uncertainty and change Ideological considerations, never unimportant, took a back seat a more basic vital interest-- survival of China as a nation. The case study of Zhou En-La1 and the normalization of relations with the Unlted States 1s a classic example of balance-of-power diplomacy in actlon. From Zhou's perspective, the late '60s saw significant change in the international environment. The United States and China had a history of vltrlollc relations that dated back to the '40s and the US decision to support Chlang Kai-Shek during the Chinese Civil War. The low point occurred in late 1950 with 1 MCDONALD, J. Chinese intervention against the US in the Korean War Continued US support for the Nationalist regime in Taiwan throughout the ‘50s and Chinese support for North Vietnam in the ‘60s prevented any improvement in the relationship. But Zhou saw a different US in 'the late '60s--one torn by dissent over the war in Vietnam and racial strife Perhaps, he also saw an opportunity for improved relations as the US sought to find an ‘honorable" way to disengage from Vietnam and resolve its internal disputes. China's relations with the other superpower, the Soviet Union were never as close as the myth of monolithic Communism that held US policy in its grip during the ‘50s and '60s suggested. Stalin's failure to provide meaningful support to the CCP during the Chinese Civil War and the very limited support it provided during the early '50s combined with Mao's resistance to Soviet direction on ideological grounds to keep the relationship distant and cool Mao broke openly with the USSR in 1956 and the ideological split widened throughout the ‘60s. By 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency observed that "the USSR and China are now two separate powers whose interests conflict on almost every issue." :Gaddis, p 210: Chinese concern over Soviet ‘social imperialism" grew throughout the '60s and was heightened by events such as Soviet support for India in border clashes with China's ally Pakistan, support for Lon No1 in Cambodia, stationing of a large military contingent in Egypt, the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the establishment of the Soviet 2 MCDONALD, J. navel base at Cienfuegos in Cuba A series of border clashes along the Ussuri River in 1969 and veiled Soviet threats about preemptive attacks brought Sine-Soviet relations to a new low Two other nations play key roles in the changing international environment of the late ‘60s: Japan and India The miraculous growth of the Japanese economy and the Sato government's reaction to the Nixon Doctrine of "Asianization" caused Zhou to become concerned about rising Japanese militarization and the possibility of a Tokyo-Taipei alliance China's long-standing dispute with India over the border regions in the Himalayas took on increased importance as the Soviet-India relationship grew. Zhou may have sensed an change in the international environment which saw Soviet influence on the ascent, American influence on the decline and regional powers moving towards alliances that might not be In China's best interests. In Nye's terms, a shift from a balance of power between the US and USSR to possible Soviet hegemony may have caused Zhou to move towards improving US-Chinese relations. Domestically, China was lust emerging from the upheaval of the Cultural Revolution in the late ‘60s. Initiated by Mao to reinvigorate a Chinese Communist Party apparatus that had lost its revolutionary zeal in the comforts of bureaucratic power, it soon proved difficult for Mao and Zhou to keep under control: It was a magnificent abstraction which waged undifferentiated struggle against ‘modern revisionism", ‘imperialism" and "reaction". As ‘infantile disorder 3 MCDONALD, J. on the left" it represented ‘all struggle and no alliance" (Keith, p 185) Mao, the revolutionary theorist, was probably more comfortable with the course of events, but Zhou, the pragmatist, certainly had an ideological tightrope to walk, balancing the demands of the Revolution with the realities of international politics He came under fire from the radical elements of the Party, particularly the Defense Minister Lin Piao, but was close enough to Mao and enough of an ideologue to survive the attacks of the extreme left Zhou and Mao concluded as the Cultural Revolution drew to a close, that Soviet "social imperlallsm" was "the more serious internal threat to Mao's revolution". Zhou was able to convince Mao that China's interest lay In the dlrectlon of both struggle and alliance, and normalization of relations with the US became part of their "united front" strategy as the decade drew to a close. The election of Richard Nixon in 1968 and the continuing US inability to solve its Vietnam problem afforded Zhou an opportunity to move towards reestablishing relations with the US Although Kennedy was inclined to support normalization of relations with Communist China for foreign policy reasons, he was unable or unwilling to pay the domestic political price. :Gaddls, p 230) Johnson felt likewise constrained: I knew that Harry Truman and Dean Acheson had lost theLr effectiveness from the day that the Communists took over in China. I believed that the loss of China had played a large role in the 4 MCDONALD, J. rise of Joe McCarthy.(Quoted in Gaddrs, P 242.) Nixon, however, had unimpeachable credentials as an anti- Communist and, in a 1967 article in Forelcm, had concluded . . . taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cher- ish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There 1s no place in this small planet for a bllllon of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. (Nixon, p 137 1 This openness towards rapprochement with China, combined with a penchant for behind-the-scenes diplomacy, made the Nixon- Kissinger team the perfect partner for Zhou Zhou recognized the vital national interests of China were its security as a nation state and the continuance of the socialist march towards communism in China. Other mayor interests included the support of the advance of socialism towards communism outside of China and the economic prosperity of China Xhlle seeking improved relations with the US as a counterweight to the USSR, he also sought to maintain freedom of action for China Zhou saw China's future as tied to neither the US nor the USSR, but instead as the leader of the nonaligned nations of the Third World.(Kelth, pp. 195 and 198:. I'hlle security against Soviet "hegemonlsm" was primary, Zhou never abandoned the other interests. Like Bismarck a century earlier, Zhou sought to be the fulcrum between other great powers; unlike 5 * . MCDONALD, J Blsmarck, he maintained his flexibility by avoiding ‘entangling alliances" The Chinese plan of action was based upon Mao's notion of "dual tactics" within a ‘united front" strategy. This: . required "both unity and independence" and distinctions made "between the primary enemy and secondary enemy and between the temporary allies and indirect allies". On the issue of shifting polltlcal alignments, Mao had stated, "This united front 1s neither all alliance and no struggle, nor all struggle and no alliance, but combines alliance and struggle".(Keith, p 198: Xhlle Zhou attempted to improve relations with the US as a counterweight to Soviet ‘social rmperlallsm", he ‘did not wish to precipitate a break in state-to-state relations with the Soviets". (Keith, p 202) To do so would have placed China in a dependent position for US support. Additionally, Zhou had to insure he could adequately Justify his "flexible application of principle" to other communist and nonaligned small states such as Albania and Algeria as well as against charges levied by domestic rivals such as Defense Minister Lin Piao. Zhou employed several tools of policy to achieve his goal of normalized relations The earliest contacts with the Nixon admlnlstratlon were through their respective embassies in Poland After these bogged down due to US military operations in Cambodia in 1970 and Laos in 1971, diplomacy moved from the official to the unofficial domain with the visit of the US table tennis team to Belling in April 1971 After the US responded by further 6 MCDONALD, J. relaxation of trade and travel restrictrons for private citizens, Zhou shifted diplomacy back to the official state-to-state arena An invitation for an American envoy to visit Belling was passed through the Pakistani Ambassador. Kissinger's secret visit in July 1971 allowed he and Zhou to agree upon the agenda for the improvement of US-Chinese relations. The two decided upon a focus of confidence-building while placing the main issues of difference--Taiwan and Vietnam--upon the back burner Xhile consensus building continued in private diplomatic discussions, Zhou continued to attack US imperialism in public diplomacy, both in the slogans and posters for Chinese consumption as well as grist for the American public in the visit of Huey Newton and 59 other Americans and the 9 August interview with columnist James Reston China's admission to the United Nations in October provided another forum for Chinese diplomacy, particularly in Its relations with the Third World. During the negotiations with Nixon and Kissinger, Zhou inslsted that their differences not be hidden and the Shanghai Communique be given an "untruthful appearance". Initially hesitant, Kissinger eventually concurred: "A statement of differences would reassure allies and friends that their interests had been defended; if we could develop some common positions, these would then stand out as the authentic convictions of principled leaders" :Kissinger, p. 782) This was 7 MCDONALD, J. particularly important for Zhou's ‘selling" of this initiative to the Chinese Communists and their Third World cohorts. Zhou also moved to improve relations with Japan after the fall of the Sato government by signing a Joint communique in which China renounced all reparations claims from W-W.11 in return for Japanese recognition of the Peoples' Republic of China as the sole legal government and of Taiwan as an "inalienable part of the PRC".(Keith, p 203 1 Finally, while clearly engaged in balance-of-power diplomacy with the US, Zhou successfully integrated his high-mlnded \\five principles of peaceful coexistence" into US-Chinese relations. Zhou's ‘dual tactics" proved to be highly successful, and his policy of normalization of relations with the US continued after the fall of Nixon and the death of both Mao and himself He was able to restore the geopolitical equilibrium between the us, the USSR and the Third World [read China) without losing any freedom of actlon. China continued to espouse its ideological line while moving into expanded economic and political interaction with the West The public airing of differences with the West in the Shanghai Communique allowed him to withstand charges of treason from domestic hard-liners such as Lin Pao as well as foreign communist leaders in Albania and Vietnam. On the negative side, the isolation of Taiwan has had an unexpected result the emergence of Taiwan as an economic power on the world as well as regional stage. The cutting of the s