Jd/ /j The Fighter Support Experimerttal (FS-X) Aircraft ~rA Ar~alysis f,c Ever~ts Arid Decisior, ,cr'F cesses Rac, ul C. Cordeaux NWC Cornrflittee Six NATIONAL ~'LN~FZ.B UNIVERSITY YRA,~BIL LAICEPS COLLECTIONS Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED 1991 2. REPORT TYPE - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER The Fighter Support Experimental (FS-X) Aircraft. An Analysis of 5b. GRANT NUMBER Events and Decision Processes 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National War College,300 5th Avenue,Fort Lesley J REPORT NUMBER McNair,Washington,DC,20319-6000 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT see report 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 14 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 I tlr rod uct i .~ro The development of natiorlal security policy is a complex process which results from the input, ratiorlalizatior~s, and decisiorls of major players in positior~s at the highest levels of goverrlmerlt. Decisic, slr which emerge do riot rJecessarily follow expected formal decision rnakir~g procedures, but are the resolutiorl of a variety of competirlg forces. These forces reflect riot c°nly the "invitatiorl to struggle" that the framers of the Corlstitutiorl arlticipated, particularly betweerJ the executive arld legislative brarlches of governrnent, but also sigriificarlt corttributions from the "bureaucracy °° . The recer~t Fighter Support-Experimer~tal (FS-X) codevelopmerlt agreement betweer, the U.S. arid Japarl provides a good example for analysis of this .lr.:,renrolrehp The FS-X involves military, ilmroJr I itary, bureaucrat ic, arld political elemerJts, the final orchestratiorl of which has yet to be played out. This paper will trace a selected, but irnportar, t, series of actions by FS-X stake holders ~ri U.S.-Japarlese relatiorls during the late 1980s. An effort will be rnade ,ot explain how the decision process furlctic°r|ed by highlighting the irlfluer|ces n,c the decisiorl makers arid the mariner ~ri which conflict was resolved or abrogated tri formulatir~g policy. In ,cc rlclusic0n, I'II attempt to categorize the policy decisiorl process using a series of cor, ceptual rnodels developed by Graham T. Allison. I The Allison models provide a logical framework to assess the impact of the "bureaucratic perspective" on policy developmerJt and cc0rlstitute an additiorlal rnecharlism to gairs irlsight into the r~ational security decisiorJ prcicess. .I • i " I ¸ ~i'i "i - "i Backqrc, ,ru d. The Japanese Air Self Defer, se Force (ASDF) is equipped with two groups of fighters. F4EJs ,ra d FlSs are desigr, ed for air to air superiority while the F-I fighter support aircraft is desigr, ed to primarily cour, ter seaborr, e landing ,ri vasior, forces. 2 The F-I, Japan's first dornestically produced fighter aircraft, was ,ri itially ,ri troduced ,ri the di~,r 1970s. Shortly thereafter, it was ,rsra ourJced by the Japar, Defer, se Ager, cy (JDA) that plar, ,r irJg for a replacer,ler~t aircraft would be initiated because the F-Is would wear ,z, ut ,ra d become ,-,bsolete by the ,re d of the 1990s. 3 Begir, ,r ,ri g fri the late 1970s U.S. aircraft mar, ufacturers ,ru successful ly tried ,-,t market the U.S. F-15 ,ra d F-16 aircraft for direct sale r,c licer, sed productior, in Japar, as replacements for the agir, g F-I. But Ar,lericar, defer, se c,-mlpanies tel,r stiff resistarlce from the Japar, ese Defer, se Ager~cie's preferer, ce for- buyir, g Japar, ese. 4 From the start, it was apparer, t that the Japar, ese war, ted to develop their" owr, replacemer, t. The deploymer, t of the new aircraft, labeled the Fighter Support-Experimer, tal (FS-X), was scheduled to begir, ,ri 1997, ,ra d its selectior, required a reevaluatior, of Japan's strategy ,ri the char, gir, g r~lilitary erzvironn~er, t of East Asia. For the Japanese, the FS-X was a major ,ru dertaking because it would replace ,ra entire class of fighter support. m,:,rF ,ra industrial ,ra d strategic point of view, there were importarst cor, siderations ,ri the Japar, ese decisior, for domestic development. The Japanese ,ri ter, ded the FS-X to drive the growth of the cour, try's aerospace ,ri dustry for the rest of the cer, tury. It was anticipated that over 100 F-Is would be replaced ,ra d that Japar,'s biggest deferJse contractor, Mitsubisi Heavy Industries, would be selected as the prir,le contractor. 5, 6 2. ." II II I Originally the FS-X development was a unilateral Japanese issue, and, until 1985, American involvement was somewhat limited. However, in 1985 the U.S. Aerospace industry appealed to the Departments of Defense and Cornmerce for assistance in penetrating the Japanese market for the new support fighter. The Defense Department (DOD) increased its efforts to influence Japan to consider an existing U.S. fighter r,c to enter into a codevelopment agreement using a U.S. aircraft as a base to fulfill unique Japanese requirements. In October 1987 the Japanese agreed to build the FS-X based on a modification of the American F-16. Defense Secretary Carlucci and Defense Minister Karawa approved the outline of an FS-X Memorandum f,c Understanding (MOU) in June 1988. The MOU was signed by DOD and the Japanese Degense Agency (JDA) in November 1988. In basic terms the MOU stipulated that Japan ,cw uld assurne all development costs. The U.S. would receive approxirnately %)'(4 of the development work with roughly an equivalent share f,c product ,ci .n 7 ,rI February 1989, as a result of pressure concernir, g the trar, sfer f,c critical U.S. aerospace technologies to the Japanese, President Bush directed a review of the FS-X MOU. Critics of the deal feared that it would result ,ri a giveaway of Americar, technology to Japan. They emphasized that Japan's ultimate objective was not military, but cornmercial. The FS-X deal would help Japan achieve its goal of launching an aerospace industry that r,light well take jobs and profits from the United States. Suggestions were r,lade to Tokyo by the White ,cH use on the need to clarify the FS-X agreer,ler, t. In April 1989 the U.S. received the assurances from the Japanese that the Bush Administration sought. 8 The MOU was presented to Congress for review in May 1989, . and n,c May 19, 1989, the Senate narrc, wly appr,-,ved the FS-X MOU by a et,-,v of 52 ,-,t 47. In July, the House sought to stiffen the terms of the MOU and brokered a Joint Resolution that would ,z,rp" hibit the export of certain technol,-,gy, defense articles, and defense services in cor, nection with the codevelopment and coproduction f,-, the FS-X aircraft with Japan. "9 President Bush vetoed the the resc, lution stating that it was unnecessarily restrictive to protect the interests of the United States, inconsistent with the ArrJls Control Export Act, and that certain provisions ur~constitutionally infringed on the ,z,p wers of the Executive. In Septernber 1989, the Congress failed to r,luster sufficient ,cv tes to override the President's .,-_,tev Over the ,z,c urse of approximately ten years, the FS-X ,z,rp ject instigated significant controversy among various U.S. goverrmler, t players, and Japanese as well. The United States raloved from a position zf supportive interest, to pressuring the Japanese into a codevelopr~lent ,z,rp gram, to secc, nd guessing the terms of the deal. Who were the "stake holders" and what were factors which drove the policy makir~g process? U.S. Aerospace IndustrE- American defense industries have long experience with the Japanese Defense Agency's penchant ,cf r buying Japanese. In the past 15 years, ir~lports have only accounted for about 10% of Japanese defense procurement spending. In the case of the FS-X, the Japanese government nlinistries and their client industries were even firmer than usual in closing out ,z,f reigners. Although dorJlestic production f,c the FS-X was the favored position of the Japanese policy rslakers, consideration was given to an option to explore three foreign candidate aircraft. . m i i I I III The candidates were McDonrlel Aircraft C0-mlpany (F-18), General Dynar,lics (F-16), ,ra d the Tornado, which was developed by a European cor~sortiunl f,c Britain, West Germany, and Italy. But the prospects looked poor for McDonnel Douglas ,ra d Ger, eral Dynanlics, and ,rJ 1985 the U.S. aer,-,space industry appealed to the Secretaries f,-, Defense and ,z,C ecrel,rnr for help. Further influencing the situation was ,ra early congressional opponent f,c the all-Japanese FS-X, Senator John Danforth of Missouri--the home state of both General Dynamics and McD,-Jnnel Douglas. 10 Through the long debate ,-,vet the FS-X, the U.S. aerospace industry supported the FS-X agreements negotiated with Japan. With an eye ,-,t ,z,rppa xir,lately $2.5 billion zf work during the life zf the prograrn, industry's mot ivati,-,n to challenge the terr~Is of the deal with Japan was I OW. DeDartnlents f,c Deferise and State. DOD's prir,lary focus ,ri the FS-X program was to support the basic security needs f,c Japari and ,rial,r tain the bilateral security ,rel,regirarra ts between Japar, and the U.S. DOD recogr, ized the strong support for a dcmlestic Japanese replacement for the F-I Although DOD expressed firm belief that current off-the-shelf U.S. fighters could, with little modification, fulfill Japanese security requirer,ler, ts, it became ,ri creasir, gly clear that U.S. candidate fighters were in a losing battle against a Japanese developed FS-X. ,rI 1986, DOD drafted a broad policy statement, coordinated with the State Departr,ler, t, which reflected support of Japan's initiatives to ir,lprove its defense posture by develc, ping a new fighter. The policy also supported the interests f,c U.S. ,ri dustry within the confines of judicious technology transfer. While DOD argued that Ar,lericar, aircraft were the most cost effective and readily .5 • .. /. , . ..... . i i. i ¸ i i " i'" I ¸ I I available solutic°n to Japan's aircraft needs, the Japanese failed to respond to attempts by Secretaries of Defense Weinburger and Carlucci to influence the procurement of U.S. planes. Finally, after quiet, high-level discussions, Japan agreed to codeveloprnent and coproduction with the U.S. of the FS-X based on General Dynamics F-16. The Defense Departrnent, with its history of cooperation with the Japanese Defense Agency saw little danger in the FS-X program. Pentagon planners indicated that the Japanese would learn little from the aging F-16 airframe. At the same time, the Pentagon expected to gain valuable technology from Japan on new phased array radar and composite wing engineering. But intrinsic to both the State and Defense Department's position was the bilateral military and foreign policy values that govern U.S. relations with an ally. Implicit, but not explicit, was the understanding shared by both the Departments of Defense and State that it would not be in the best interests of the U.S. to link emerging trade deficit issues with the FS-X developmer~t program. ii _De_partrnent of Commerce. While the Pentagon believed it had negotiated a memorandum with Japan that protected U.S. interests, the Commerce department did not. One of the key concerns expressed by Commerce was whether the technical knowledge transferred to Japan under the FS-X project would be sufficient to allow Japan to narrow the gap with the U.S. in commercial aerospace production. The Comrnerece Department charged that the technology transfer would give the Japanese sufficient design and integration data to create an independent capability which might ultirnately challenge U.S. G. m I I I m "J| I preeminence in the field. Additional concerns were raised regarding the vagueness of the language in the original MOU which specified the follow on production share for American industry. 12 Pressure from Commerce Secretary, Robert A. Mosbacher, and U.S. Trade Representative, Carla Hills, to stop the sale outright resulted in a modified DOD plan which was presented to President George Bush. The modifications guaranteed U.S. participation in the ultinlate production of the FS-X as well as set lir~lits on the extent of technology transferred to Japan. The Departr,lent of cor~inlerce focused on twin issues of corJlpetitiveness and an eroding U.S. industrial base to press its position with both the Executive branch and Congress under the context of threats to r~ational security objectives. 13 The Pentagon argued that the issue of vital American technology transfer had been debated before and that Commerce was rJlerely seeking added turf. Nevertheless, President Bush agreed ,ot give Conlmerce an expanded role in future military production contracts and the adr~linistration sought and received "clarifications" lJrorf the Japanese which effectively restructured the DOD FS-X mernorandur,1. Congressional Concerns. By early 1987, pressures were r,lounting for a U.S. solution to the FS-X issue. Ironically, this shift was not due to military-strategic deliberations by the defense ccmlnlunity in Washington, but rather because of a change in the international monetary envirormlent. The appreciation of the yen noticeably lowered the purchase price of foreign aircraft. The call for a non-Japanese FS-X again echoed from Ar~lerican rJlilitary industries and the U.S. Congress where the huge bilateral trade ir~ibalance . I I I III III i i i had targeted Japan for r~lajor trade restricting legislation. Because the U.S. trade deficit with Japan was not decreasing, sorne congressmen began to link security issues with economic problerJls, and derJlanded that increased military imports by Japan be used to offset the trade ir~Ibalance. Although the Japanese initiated a number of diplorJlatic efforts to dissociate the FS-X issues from political pressures and reach a consensus in Washington based on military-strategic considerations, further trade related problems were to influence the decision process. In May, 1987, the U.S. House of Representatives approved legislation targeted at Japan for alleged nlicrochip dur~iping against Anlerican producers. The package nlandated retaliations against U.S. trading partners for predatory trading practices. A number of ranking U.S. Senators let it be known to Prime Minister Nakasone's special envoy, former Foreign Minister Abe, that recently inlposed trade sanctions were syr,lbolic in nature and that "the decision to purchase your new aircraft from the U.S. would be taken, in particular, as a sign of good will by Japan, and as a tangible guarantee of a corJtinuation of our close security relationship. "14 The idea of linkage was a serious new concern brought to the fore by the FS-X issue. In the past, economic and political issues were carefully separated 1~rorf security matters. Japanese-Artlerican security ties were generally excellent. But linking FS-X construction to the trade deficit reflected the frustration among nlany legislators that Japan had refused to throw open its doors to American goods. According to California democrat Mel Levine, a mer~ber of the House Foreign Affairs Conlrnittee, the U.S. shouldn't help Japan build its own jet fighter when "the U.S. builds the best quality, best priced jet fighters in the world. Japan should buy the product 1~rorf us. °'15 .