N~C ~P ENGAGEMENT: A NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR THE 19Q0s COLONEL JIM SMITH Report Documentation Page Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number. 1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED 1992 N/A - 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Engagement: A National Strategy for the 1990’s 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION National Defense University National War College Fort McNair REPORT NUMBER Washington, DC 20319 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S) 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT NUMBER(S) 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release, distribution unlimited 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE UU 31 unclassified unclassified unclassified Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18 Forty five years ago, George Kennan walked these same halls. In the years since his professorship at the National War College, Kennan's theory of containment has guided American foreign policy through the turbulence of the Cold War--a long struggle that in all appearance ends with America the victor. The Gold War Is now history; containment (as It pertalns to preventing the spread of Communist Ideology) served us well, but it too has quietly slipped into retirement. Amid the groundswe of debate over a "new world order," defense expenditures and America's role In the post-Cold War world, we should, perhaps, turn back the clock and look at George KennanZs year at Fort McNalr. Kennan and his contemporaries faced a slmlar set of circumstances as do the architects of American national strategy today. The United States, victor in World War If, was faced with the dilemma of how to shape a national strategy for the future. Kennan's forum for debate was the National War College, an institution that was "intended as the senior establishment for Inservlce training in the problems of national policy, military and polltical."(l: 306) Hls charter was not |mlted to classroom Instruction, as he understood his mission to have a much broader scope. Kennan and his contemporaries (notably Hardy Dlllacd, Sherman Kent and Bernard Brodie) felt that they could "contribute in a way that no previous Institution could do to the thinking about problems of national policy that was going on all over Washington in that winter of transition and uncertalnty."(1: 306) Kennan's legacy was in defining a post-World War I natlona strategy for the United States, He examined American interests In the post-war world and saw conflict with the Soviet Union as the dominant threat to American Interests. Containment, the natlona strategy go arise from hls thinking, Is best defined In his own words from the famous "X-Article": In the light of the above, It will be clearly seen that the Soviet pressure against the free Institutions of the Western world Is something that can be contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy, but which cannot be charmed or talked out of exlstence.(1-35~) Even though Kennan himself disclaimed responslbiIIty for containment as ti was applied In later years, American national strategy was, nonetheless, influenced for the next 45 years by hls thinking. The United States faces a slmiIar dilemma today, as victor of the Cold War, trying to address its leadership challenge In world affairs. With the breakup of the Soviet 2 Union, the world has changed, calling for a new national strategy upon which the US can focus Its economic, poItlcal and military thinking. Thls essay proposes a post-Cold Wa~ national strategy of engagement to replace containment as a framework for national strategic thlnklng. ENGAGEMENT DEFINED Engagement is a national strategy of global Involvement. It recognizes the need to define American national interests but also acknowledges the existence of national interests on the part of other countries and recognizes the potential for enhancing both sets of Interests slmultaneousy. In this regard, engagement argues that American national strategy must now be interest-based rather than based primarily on balance of power. Engagement sees the existence of a political evolution wlth two fundamental characteristics: a gradual yet definite move toward regional and world security systems and the continued presence of dangers and threats to peaceful resoutlon of conflict. The key task for American strategy Is to sustain and build upon the positive effects of regional economic and poItlcal development, while maintaining an effective military force to respond to both traditional and non-traditlonal threats. 3 The con~alnment strategy of the last 45 years effectively countered the spread of world Communism, but tI produced many foreign policy mistakes by failing to recognize considerations other than balance-of-power. In an effort to balance regional power to contain Soviet expansion, containment sought to provide soutlons--power balance was an end in itself. America's changing leadership position in the post-Cold War era demands that it consider the interests of other nations; engagement argues for an ongoing process of resolution. Thls process also will provide a framework for success in the attainment of other nationa Interests, such as improved human rights conditions. Finally, recognizing a myriad of potential conflicts Into which the United States might be drawn, American national strategy must provide the foundation for a capabilitles-based national military strategy and a force structure capable of projecting power to control the scope of conflict. One's projection for the future Is heavily dependent on their view of the past and the present. Any discussion of future national strategy must necessarily have as its foundation a clear view of the world in Its current condition. What is proposed as a "new world order" in 992 must be analyzed in an evolutionary context: the stage In the world's political development must be identified and 4 used as a point of depacture to assess continuity and change. POLITICAL EVOLUTION Consider national security on an historical continuum. At one end, we find Thucydides addressing the causes of war and the interaction of nation-states. While his words still carry great meaning, the affairs of Cormyra and Corinth have largely escaped ai but the well lntentloned researcher. nO the other hand, imagine the most futuristic example of the interplay among natlons--the Federation of Planets--which for those of us raised as Trekkles, represents the same Interaction among peoples of far off galaxies as that which we now experience in reai-llfe conflict here on earth. Does the world of Sparta and Athens bear any similarity to that championed in our Imaginations by James T. Kirk? Perhaps It does, if one focuses on planet Earth as a point of refecence In both examples. In the case of Athens and Sparta, the Peoponnesian Wars represented a long, bloody conflict between two coaitlons. But ooklng back with a 2400 year hindsight, one wonders what all the fighting was about; after all, most of the warring factions now comprise what Is modern Greece--a single entity that through history has either absorbed or accepted differing ethnic or geographlcalIy separate entities. Thus, the 5 political evolutionary ppoce~8--throu~h economic, 8ocia anO polltlca Interactlon--ha~ produced political unity where numerous factions have previously existed. Now think, for a moment, of the Image of planet Earth as depicted on Star Trek--a single entity whose sons and daughters, having long dismissed their parochial differences, form the crew of a combat vessel of power projection Into the vast expanse of space. The power politics of planet Earth that we address today must seem as remote to them as do the affairs of Thucydides to us. Greece of 431 B.C. represents a microcosm of the world today. Slmilary, natlona security affairs in a broad sense represent nothing more than the political evolutlon of mankind. This concept of poItlca evolutlon adheres to the premise that democracies are less prone to flght wars among themselves. Peaceful coexistence is the hlstorlca outcome of long term commitment to common objectives. For example, Western Europe, the scene of almost continual military conflict for over 800 years, now boasts economic and polltlcal cooperation that |n Fears past would not have been posslbe--not just military alliances, but genuine cooperation. Western Europe represents the latest step in the evolution of the poltical man. This evolution is based on the contention that, over time, people wll migrate toward political systems that foster individual freedom, 6 provide for rule of law, ensure economic prosperity and respect ethnic and cultural differences. The preceding argument focused on the positive aspects of politlca evoutlon and suggested optimism for the future. There is, however, an unavoidable reality to the ent|~e spectrum of political endeavor: was and conflict have always existed as a pac~ o{ the p~oceoo, It hdo n0vo~ been enough just to want peace, because someone has always been preparing for war. The aforementioned evolution is not predetermined: the well-belng of mankind Is ensured only If civilization survives. Thls essay suggests two fundamentals to continue the evolutionary process: on-golng engagement to Identify and diffuse the causes of conflict and an effective military force to respond when conflict Is inevitable. THE WORLD TODAY If one is to build upon the concept of polItlca evolution, one must first identfy what stage the world Is in its development. In one sense, the positive changes are astounding; as one historian wrote, "Roosevelt! Thou shouldst be |vlng at this hour!"(8:23) In Latin America, every country except Cuba and Haiti has gravitated toward democracy. The Middle East witnessed the demise of the major destabllzlng factor in the region; for the first tlme since Camp David, serious ta|ks are underway between Arabs 7 anO Israeli8 to reach unde~stanOinQ and po68iDle ~olution~ to key regional proDlems. The collapse of the Sovlet Unlon means an end to the Cold War and permits the growth of democFatIc states In the former Soviet Union and In Eurasia. Western Europe, through the European Community, Is being transformed Into a single integrated market. Security patterns in Asia have changed to patterns of confict resolution; the ASEAN states represent successful progress toward economic growth and polltlca stability. Throughout the world, the evoutlon toward reg|onal stablity through security communities that focus on economic and po|tlcal Interdependence appears to be at its most advanced stage of development, at least in relative terms. A key reason for optimism lles nI the knowledge that world Communism, the greatest ~eoent threat to world staDl|ty, Is now bankrupt. Indeed, major, trad|t|onal "threats" to staDillty, partlculary those that affect Amerlcan national secur|ty, are hard to flnd. The breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War suggest to many an end to major conflict because the only tradltlona threat left is mlitant nationalism. While this nationalism continues to be a Oestablllzlng force In places such as Yugoslavia, ireland, Armenia and the West Bank, many here in the United States vlew the threat to American natlona security and national Interests as minima. 8