ASSESSING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S ENHANCED BRIGADE CONCEPT: SEARCHING FOR READINESS AND RELEVANCE A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies by RICHARD G. GREENE JR., MAJ, USA Bachelor of Arts, Loyola College, Baltimore, Maryland, 1989 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2003 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE FormApprovedOMBNo. 0704-0188 Publicreportingburderforthiscollectionofinformationisestibatedtoaverage1hourperresponse,includingthetimeforreviewinginstructions,searchingexistingdatasources,gatheringandmaintainingthedataneeded,andcompleting andreviewingthiscollectionofinformation.Sendcommentsregardingthisburdenestimateoranyotheraspectofthiscollectionofinformation,includingsuggestionsforreducingthisburdertoDepartmentofDefense,Washington HeadquartersServices,DirectorateforInformationOperationsandReports(0704-0188),1215JeffersonDavisHighway,Suite1204,Arlington,VA22202-4302.Respondentsshouldbeawarethatnotwithstandinganyotherprovisionof law,nopersonshallbesubjecttoanypenaltyforfailingtocomplywithacollectionofinformationifitdoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber.PLEASEDONOTRETURNYOURFORMTOTHEABOVEADDRESS. 1.REPORTDATE(DD-MM-YYYY) 2.REPORTTYPE 3.DATESCOVERED(FROM-TO) 06-06-2003 thesis 05-08-2002to06-06-2003 4.TITLEANDSUBTITLE 5a.CONTRACTNUMBER ASSESSINGTHEARMYNATIONALGUARD'SENHANCED 5b.GRANTNUMBER SEARCHINGFORREADINESSANDRELEVANCE 5c.PROGRAMELEMENTNUMBER Unclassified 6.AUTHOR(S) 5d.PROJECTNUMBER Greene,Jr.,Richard,G 5e.TASKNUMBER 5f.WORKUNITNUMBER 7.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAMEANDADDRESS 8.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONREPORT USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege NUMBER 1ReynoldsAve ATZL-SWD-GD FortLeavenworth,KS66027-1352 9.SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAMEANDADDRESS 10.SPONSOR/MONITOR'SACRONYM(S) , 11.SPONSOR/MONITOR'SREPORT NUMBER(S) 12.DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYSTATEMENT A1,AdministrativeorOperationalUse 06-06-2003 USArmyCommandandGeneralStaffCollege 1ReynoldsAve Ft.Leavenworth,KS66027-1352 13.SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES 14.ABSTRACT TheArmy'sEnhancedBrigadeswerecreatedintheearly1990stocorrectreadinessdeficienciesdiscoveredintheunsuccessfulmobilizationof ArmyNationalGuardcombatunitsforthePersianGulfWar.Accordingtonationalleaders,theUSmilitarycannotprosecuteamajorcombat operationwithoutthem.CriticshaveconsistentlyquestionedcurrentEnhancedBrigadereadinessandtheirrelevancetoUSmilitarystrategy. ToimproveEnhancedBrigadereadiness,theArmyhasinstitutedanumberofintegrativeprograms;theseincludetheTrainingSupportXXII program,theBosniaTaskForce,integrateddivisions,andothers.Despitethecommitmentofconsiderableresources,onlyverymodest improvementinpremobilizationreadinesshasbeenrealizedandtheseunitsarestillfarlessreadythantheArmydesires.Additionally, EnhancedBrigadesareroutinelydeployedtoperformtasksoutsideoftheirroleintheNationalMilitaryStrategy.Insteadoffocusingon readinessforMajorRegionalConflicts,EnhancedBrigadesareconductingpeaceoperationsinEuropeandtheMiddleEast,whilebearingthe burdenofongoingHomelandSecurityoperations.ThisthesiswillprovideaninvestigationintohoweffectivetheArmyhasbeeninbringing EnhancedBrigadestorequiredreadinesslevelsandkeepingtheseunitsrelevanttotheUSmilitary'sroleinaccomplishingnationalstrategic objectives. 15.SUBJECTTERMS EnhancedBrigades;Army;NationalGuard;PersianGulfWar;Readiness;TrainingSupportXXIIProgram;BosniaTaskForce;Mobilization; Peacekeeping;PeaceOperations;Homelandsecurity;NationalStrategy 16.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOF: 17.LIMITATION 18. 19.NAMEOFRESPONSIBLEPERSON OFABSTRACT NUMBER Buker,Kathy SameasReport [email protected] (SAR) 73 a.REPORT b.ABSTRACT c.THISPAGE 19b.TELEPHONENUMBER Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified InternationalAreaCode AreaCodeTelephoneNumber 9137583138 DSN 5853138 StandardForm298(Rev.8-98) PrescribedbyANSIStdZ39.18 MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Major Richard G. Greene Jr. Thesis Title: Assessing the Army National Guard's Enhanced Brigade Concept: Searching for Readiness and Relevance Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chairman LTC (R) Dwain L. Crowson, MA , Member LTC Tony D. Baker, MA , Member, Consulting Faculty COL William D. Waff, D.Min. Accepted this 6th day of June 2003 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT ASSESSING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD'S ENHANCED BRIGADE CONCEPT: SEARCHING FOR READINESS AND RELEVANCE by Major Richard G. Greene Jr., 61 pages. The Army's Enhanced Brigades were created in the early 1990s to correct readiness deficiencies discovered in the unsuccessful mobilization of Army National Guard combat units for the Persian Gulf War. According to national leaders, the US military cannot prosecute a major combat operation without them. Critics have consistently questioned current Enhanced Brigade readiness and their relevance to US military strategy. To improve Enhanced Brigade readiness, the Army has instituted a number of integrative programs; these include the Training Support XXII program, the Bosnia Task Force, integrated divisions, and others. Despite the commitment of considerable resources, only very modest improvement in premobilization readiness has been realized and these units are still far less ready than the Army desires. Additionally, Enhanced Brigades are routinely deployed to perform tasks outside of their role in the National Military Strategy. Instead of focusing on readiness for Major Regional Conflicts, Enhanced Brigades are conducting peace operations in Europe and the Middle East, while bearing the burden of ongoing Homeland Security operations. This thesis will provide an investigation into how effective the Army has been in bringing Enhanced Brigades to required readiness levels and keeping these units relevant to the US military's role in accomplishing national strategic objectives. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ........................................................................... ii ABSTRACT .................................................................................................. iii ILLUSTRATIONS ......................................................................................... iv CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1 2. REVIEW OF LITERATURE ................................................................ 13 3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY ........................................................... 21 4. ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 28 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 56 REFERENCE LIST ........................................................................................ 63 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ..................................................................... 66 CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT....................... 67 iv ILLUSTRATIONS Figure Page 1. Army Enhanced Brigades......................................................................... 11 2. Reserve Duty MOS Qualification.............................................................. 35 3. Army AC/RC Integration Programs.......................................................... 39 4. Current Area of Responsibility and Subordinate Units of 4th TSB, 91st TSD.................................................................................. 42 5. Location and Alignment of Integrated Divisions and Enhanced Brigades...... 52 v CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION The militia is certainly an object of primary importance, whether viewed in reference to the national security, to the satisfaction of the community, or to the preservation of order. George Washington Importance and Scope Throughout its history, the United States Army has assigned significant warfighting functions to the Army National Guard (ARNG). ARNG units have been mobilized and deployed for every major operation undertaken by the United States military since 1941. American citizen-soldiers have performed their wartime duties in a consistently exemplary manner. Today, ARNG units are at their historical best, and are comparable or superior to the active duty forces of most other nations (Gross 1997, 2). Essentially all of the ARNG's warfighting capability is resident in combat arms units referred to as enhanced separate brigades. By many accounts, the Army has struggled to maintain the training readiness of enhanced separate brigades during peacetime. The purpose of this thesis is to investigate the following question: have Department of the Army programs, policies, and initiatives implemented to maintain the readiness and relevance of the ARNG’s enhanced separate brigades been successful? The scope of this research project will encompass facts, opinions, and analysis concerning the ARNG's enhanced separate brigades. While the ARNG and United States Army Reserve (USAR) contain a wide array of other units and headquarters, this thesis will focus exclusively on enhanced separate brigades. The conclusions and 1 recommendations concerning enhanced separate brigades will be drawn from premobilization training and post mobilization training assessments, reports of enhanced separate brigade performance while deployed, and observations made by individuals and agencies involved in leading, training, administrating, and overseeing the ARNG. Key Terms Any investigation of eSBs requires an understanding of a number of specific key terms: Enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB): a brigade-sized combat arms organization assigned to the ARNG which is manned, trained, and equipped to deploy oversees ninety days after mobilization, to participate in mid or high-intensity warfare, under the command of a Unified Combatant Commander. Currently, the ARNG maintains mechanized infantry, light infantry, and armored eSBs. Premobilization Training: Training conducted before an ARNG unit is alerted and mobilized for deployment. Normally, ARNG are required to demonstrate proficiency in crew and platoon-level tasks while in a premobilization status. Postmobilization Training: Training conducted after an ARNG unit is alerted and mobilized for a combat deployment. ARNG units are required to demonstrate proficiency in company, battalion, and brigade level tasks before being certified for deployment. Inactive Duty Training (IDT): Premobilization training periods conducted monthly by ARNG units. Annual Training (AT): An annual premobilization training period, during which ARNG units are evaluated on crew and platoon level task proficiency. 2 Training Support Brigades (TSB): Multi-component Army units whose officers and non-commissioned officers develop IDT and AT training programs for battalions assigned to ARNG eSBs. Members of TSBs are tasked to teach, coach, and mentor ARNG leaders, and evaluate the performance of ARNG units. Major Regional Conflict (MRC): As described in the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), one of two potential regional dangers DOD believes will confront the US between now and 2015. First among these is the threat Iran and Iraq pose to the free flow of Middle Eastern oil. Next is the threat North Korea presents to South Korea because of its increasingly dire economic condition and its large military presence close to the South Korean border (CBO 1997). The most recent DOD strategy documents also refer to MRCs as Major Combat Operations (MCOs). Total Force Concept: An enduring policy, adopted by the DOD in the early 1970's, that restructured the military into a homogenous whole comprised of active duty, ARNG, and USAR forces (Behan 2002, 3). The policy sought to field a credible deterrent and reaction force on active duty, while reaping the fiscal benefits of maintaining 50 percent or more warfighting capability in a less-expensive reserve status. The Department of the Army has supported the Total Force policy with its Total Army concept. Lane Training: A process for training company-size and smaller units on collective tasks (and prerequisite soldier and leader individual tasks and battle drills) supporting a unit's Mission Essential Task List (METL) (Army 1996). The process consists of planning, execution, and assessment phases. US Army units use lanes training to increase and evaluate proficiency. 3 Background The ARNG, eSBs, and National Military Strategy In 1997, the Clinton Administration described the ARNG's current role within the American National Military Strategy (NMS). The NMS stated: The Reserve Components, in addition to being essential participants in the full range of military operations, are an important link between the Armed Forces and the public. Mobilization of the Reserve Components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will. Guardsmen and reservists are not only integrated into war plans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. National Guard and other Reserve Component elements also provide the NCA with a strategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expand our Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rotational base to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the Active Component. (Shalikashvili 1997) In September of 2001, the Bush Administration used the 2001 QDR to introduce the tenets of a new National Security Strategy. Shifting the focus of military planning away from preparing for two MRCs in Northeast and Southwest Asia, to building a portfolio of capabilities that is robust across the possible continuum of possible military operations. Of the role of Reserve component forces, the QDR stated, DOD will continue to rely on reserve Component forces to support this strategy. The QDR specifies eight of the Army's eighteen combat divisions will be provided by the ARNG; with fifteen ARNG brigades identified as enhanced brigades (Rumsfeld 2001, 17, 21, 23). The Total Force Policy Despite such clear definition, the Department of the Army has struggled in its attempts to train and maintain an ARNG that fulfills these strategic requirements. Conceptually, today's ARNG of today grew from the end of Selective Service conscription enacted to provide troops to fight in Vietnam during the 1960s and early 4