Counterinsurgency and Operational Art: Is the Joint Campaign Planning Model Adequate? A Monograph by MAJ Thomas Erik Miller United States Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas AY 02-03 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL MAJ Thomas Erik Miller Title of Monograph: Counterinsurgency and Operational Art: Is the Joint Campaign Planning Model Adequate? Approved by: _________________________________________ Monograph Director Richard D. Newton, MMAS _________________________________________ Professor and Director Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D. Academic Affairs, School of Advanced Military Studies _________________________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Program ii Abstract COUNTERINSURGENCY AND OPERATIOANL ART: IS THE JOINT CAMAPIGN PLANNING MODEL ADEQUATE? by MAJ Thomas Erik Miller, USA, 90 pages. The United States has conducted or supported more than a dozen counterinsurgencies in the 20th century. The emerging strategic environment indicates that the US will be involved with counterinsurgencies in the future and there appears to exist operational shortfalls in the knowledge, planning, and execution of counterinsurgency. To manage the increasing complexity of the counterinsurgency environment, a coherent planning model based in operational art is needed in order to achieve ultimate success. The joint campaign planning model may provide an appropriate means to bridge these shortfalls. The counterinsurgency environment is defined through an examination of the current operating environment and the nature of insurgency. Counterinsurgency theory and current US doctrine are evaluated in order to demonstrate that operational shortfalls exist. Operational art and campaign planning are examined and discussed to provide a basis of evaluation of planning shortfalls. Two historical case studies, the Philippines, 1948-1954, and El Salvador, 1980-1992, are presented to illustrate and analyze counterinsurgency doctrine and campaign planning methodologies and their relative success or failure in the overall conduct of the counterinsurgencies. There is a significant body of knowledge on campaign design that can be applied to counterinsurgency. The joint campaign planning model provides an appropriate outline. There is an immediate need to reexamine US counterinsurgency doctrine in terms of operational art to address shortfalls. The challenge remains to define an integrated operational concept which fully articulates persuasive and coercive elements, through the application of all the elements of national power, into campaign design. iii Acknowledgments I would like to thank GEN (RET) Frederick Woerner, Jr and COL (RET) John Waghelstein for their time and invaluable insights. Their contributions increased my understanding of the conflict in El Salvador and significantly improved this work. Additionally, my monograph director, Richard Newton, provided outstanding support, guidance, and mentorship. His expertise and advice were invaluable in the completion of this monograph. Shortcomings in this work are attributable to the author alone. My sincerest thanks also go to my family (Susan, Isabelle, and Traveller) for their unending patience and perseverance. Truly, without the wholehearted and loving support and sacrifice of my wife Susan, this work could not have been completed. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS............................................................................................................................v TABLE OF FIGURES...............................................................................................................................vii INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................1 The Counterinsurgency Environment...................................................................................................2 Describing The Current Environment..............................................................................................3 The Evolving Nature Of Insurgency................................................................................................7 Definitions................................................................................................................................................9 THEORETICAL AND DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS....................................................................11 Operational Art.......................................................................................................................................11 The Roots of Operational Art..........................................................................................................11 The Levels of War.............................................................................................................................12 Integration in US Doctrine...............................................................................................................13 The Campaign and Operational Design.............................................................................................14 The Joint Campaign Planning Model.............................................................................................17 Counterinsurgency.................................................................................................................................18 Counterinsurgency Theory and Literature.....................................................................................19 US Counterinsurgency Doctrine.....................................................................................................24 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................26 THE HUKBALAHAP IN THE PHILIPPINES.....................................................................................27 Background.............................................................................................................................................27 Demographic and Geographic Overview of the Philippines.......................................................27 Historic Perspective..........................................................................................................................28 The Philippines Communist Party and the Huks..........................................................................29 Ramon Magsaysay............................................................................................................................32 The Conduct of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in the Phillipines.........................................33 First Phase: Imminent Collapse.......................................................................................................33 Second Phase: Seizing the Initiative and Defeating the Huks....................................................35 The United States’ Strategic Objectives for the Philippines...........................................................39 The Campaign Plan in the Philippines................................................................................................39 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................42 EL SALVADOR, 1981-1992....................................................................................................................42 Background.............................................................................................................................................43 Demographic and Geographic Overview of El Salvador............................................................43 Historical Perspective.......................................................................................................................43 The Road to Insurgency...................................................................................................................44 The Conduct of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in El Salvador..............................................46 Analysis of Campaign Planning in El Salvador................................................................................50 The Woerner Report (1981).............................................................................................................51 The National Campaign Plan (1983)...............................................................................................54 Unidos Para Reconstruir (1986).....................................................................................................57 Conclusions............................................................................................................................................58 COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY CAMPAIGNS...................60 Similarities..............................................................................................................................................60 Criticality of US Advisory Assistance and Aid............................................................................60 Use of Aid as Leverage to Promote US Strategic Goals..............................................................61 The Effect of Honest, Free Elections.............................................................................................62 Protracted Nature of the Conflicts..................................................................................................63 v Dissimilarities.........................................................................................................................................63 Emergence of a Leader.....................................................................................................................63 Reintegration of Insurgents into Society and the Respect of Human Rights...........................64 Political Power of the Armed Forces..............................................................................................65 External Support of the Insurgency................................................................................................66 Immediate Strategic Guidance.........................................................................................................67 Conclusion..............................................................................................................................................67 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS................................................................................68 General Conclusions.............................................................................................................................68 Specific Conclusions.............................................................................................................................68 Integrated Campaign Plan at the Operational Level.....................................................................68 Operational Art for Counterinsurgency.........................................................................................69 Long Term Commitment..................................................................................................................70 Aid for Access and Leverage...........................................................................................................70 Recommendations.................................................................................................................................71 Further Study of Counterinsurgency in Terms of Operational Art............................................71 Situational Understanding of the Operational Environment.......................................................71 Defining Progress in Counterinsurgency.......................................................................................72 Victory in Counterinsurgency.........................................................................................................72 Effects-Based Operations for Counterinsurgency........................................................................73 The Future of Counterinsurgency Campaign Planning....................................................................74 Appendix A: The Facets of Operational Art..........................................................................................75 Appendix B: Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model.....................................................76 BIBLIOGRAPHY.......................................................................................................................................77 vi TABLE OF FIGURES Figure 1: The Facets of Operational Art.................................................................................................75 Figure 2: Internal Defense and Development Strategy Model............................................................76 vii INTRODUCTION Here, on 26 July 1972 the Royal Thai Army burned all its American textbooks. From this dates our victory over the communists. [Inscription over the incinerator in the Royal Thai Army Headquarters ]1 The United States (US) has conducted or supported more than a dozen counterinsurgencies in the 20th century. The current global war on terrorism might also be viewed as a counterinsurgency (COIN) since it involves the military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, informational and civic actions of the US employed to protect the legitimacy of its political community, political system, authorities and policies from an overt threat applying political resources and violence.2 The emerging strategic environment indicates that the US will be involved with counterinsurgencies in the future and there appear to exist operational shortfalls in the knowledge, planning, and execution of COIN. The nature of COIN is complex. Politics and policy generally play a primary role. Counterinsurgencies involving the United States inherently include multinational and interagency players, and the military typically plays a supporting role.3 The nature of insurgency continues to evolve and adapt as well. To manage the increasing complexity of the COIN environment, a coherent planning model is needed in order to achieve ultimate success. This model must link strategic aims with tactical actions. The joint campaign planning model may provide an appropriate means to bridge these shortfalls. Do sound frameworks exist in current joint or service doctrine (and subsequently in practice) for COIN and campaign planning, or is it necessary to “burn the books” like the Thais in order to find success? Perhaps operational COIN planning previously existed, but is a skill that needs to be relearned. As aptly stated in an early issue of Combat Information, a training bulletin 1 Stuart Slade, “Successful Counter-insurgency: How Thais Burnt the Books and Beat the Guerillas,” Internal Security & CO-IN, an editorial supplement to International Defense Review 22, (October 1989): 21. 2 Joint Publication 1-02. Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. (23 March 1994 as amended through 1 September 2000), 112; Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency & Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Dulles: Brassey’s (US), Inc., 1990), 13. 1 used to pass US Army lessons learned during the Korean War,4 American doctrine was generally sound but, “The one great lesson that can be learned…is that these [US doctrine, tactics, techniques, organization and equipment] must be applied with vigor, imagination and intelligence.”5 This monograph examines whether the current joint campaign planning model adequately addresses existing operational shortfalls in COIN planning. To answer this question, the COIN environment is defined through an examination of the current operating environment and the nature of insurgency. COIN theory and current US doctrine are evaluated in order to demonstrate that operational shortfalls exist. Operational art and campaign planning are examined and discussed to provide a basis of evaluation of planning shortfalls. Two historical case studies (The Philippines, 1948-1954, and El Salvador, 1980-1992) are presented in order to illustrate and analyze COIN doctrine and campaign planning methodologies and their relative success or failure in the overall conduct of the counterinsurgencies. The final result of this research is general and specific conclusions on the adequacy of the current campaign planning model for COIN and recommendations for improvement or modification of the process. The Counterinsurgency Environment There has been a quiet revolution in strategy over the last half-century, moving with the same speed but much less visibility than the breakthroughs in military technology. This revolution is in the theory and practice of low-intensity warfare, as the rise and perfection of revolutionary war demonstrate. If there is anything distinctively new about the post-World War II environment, it can be found at the extreme ends of the conflict spectrum, in nuclear strategy as well as LIC [Low Intensity Conflict]. -Thomas A. Grant6 3 Joint Publication 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War. (16 June 1995), I-2, I-6. 4 Jay Luvaas, “Lessons and Lessons Learned: A Historical Perspective,” in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, ed. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985), 66. 5 Office of the Chief of Army Field Forces, Fort Monroe, Virginia. Combat Information, Training Bulletin No.5, 27 September 1951, 1; quoted in Jay Luvaas, “Lessons and Lessons Learned: A Historical Perspective,” in The Lessons of Recent Wars in the Third World, Volume I, ed. Robert E. Harkavy and Stephanie G. Neuman (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1985), 51-72, 66. 6 Thomas A. Grant, “Government, Politics, and Low-Intensity Conflict,” in Low-Intensity Conflict: Old Threats in a New World, ed. Edwin G. Corr and Stephan Sloan, Westview Studies in Regional Security, ed. Wm. J. Olson (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), 258. 2 This section provides a brief overview of the current and emerging security environment and significant factors that create and sustain opportunity for insurgency. The evolving and adaptive nature of insurgency is also examined with particular emphasis on the modern era and evolutionary changes since the end of the Cold War. Describing The Current Environment Flux in the strategic environment caused by the end of the Cold War, combined with other accelerators, like population growth and urbanization, globalization and the information revolution to mention but a few, has created a world that has seen an increase of massive proportions and numbers in US military deployments and interventions in military operations other than war (MOOTW) (or in its current and reemergent US Army incantation, stability operations7 and support operations). In fact, US policy makers appear to be taking a new and significantly Clausewitzian view of the threat and use of force “as an integral part of political strategy” versus the more traditional use of force only as last resort.8 Many of these deployments were in support of COIN (if not necessarily in name, at least in definition). With ongoing foreign internal defense (FID) operations worldwide, there are significant indications that the pace of these deployments will not decrease, but in fact, increase. Some of the effects of the fall of the Soviet Union were a loosening of internal and external political and social controls in formerly Soviet aligned countries, and an increase in the availability of modern weaponry, mainly from former Eastern Bloc nations, in return for needed hard currency. There is also a growing trend to recognize national/ethnic determinism over state sovereignty. Thus, the international community generally favors interventions supporting ethnic 7 The term stability operations was used by the US Army to cover the same general range of operations in the late 1960’s, appearing in the 1968 edition of FM 100-5 Operations as well as having its own manual, FM 31-23 Stability Operations, which was issued in 1967. 8 James A. Winnefeld and others, Intervention in Intrastate Conflict: Implications for the Army in the Post- Cold War Era (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, MR-554/1-A), 40. 3