1185 AAAMMMPPPTTTIIIAAACCC MM aa tt ee rr ii aa ll E A S E Wade Babcock, AMPTIAC Technical Staff Jerome Persh, Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), former Staff Specialist for Materials and Structures, Office of the Director Defense Research and Engineering (OSD/DDR&E/Advanced Technology) Safeguarding America’s Critical Technologies (and Avoiding Personal Risk) An Introduction to Export Control and Critical Technology Restrictions All DOD re s e a rch e rs, both those emp l oyed by the Fe d e ra l the Commerce Control List (CCL) and International Traffic in Arms Government and those from the industrial base, become familiar with Regulations (ITAR) administered by the Departments of Commerce and the regulations concerning classified documents and technologies State, respectively. The MCTL is also used as a reference tool for eval- early in their career. Use of safes, secure buildings and rooms, proper uating potential technology transfers and for determining whether tech- handling, labeling and storage are all part of the day-to-day world of nical reports and scientific papers are eligible for public release. (For dealing with classified information. But how much do you know about a more detailed history of export controls and the MCTL, see the export control regulations and the control of data and technologies accompanying sidebar History of Export Control Regulations.) The cur- that, while not classified, are still vital to the warfighting superiority of rent, public edition of the MCTL is on the Internet (http://www. the U.S.? dtic.mil/mctl) and is continually updated as progress is made on the For instance, suppose an engineer develops an improved process- technologies described in the basic document. For government and ing method for high temperature ceramics that enables near net shape contractor personnel with access to the Defense Technical Information manufacture of complex parts. A paper is prepared which details the Center’s STINET, a more complete version of the MCTL is available. production method and various materials used, and is presented at a The MCTL provides a codification of what DOD believes to be crit- Materials Research Society (MRS) conference. Forty people are in ical to the military superiority of the U.S. In combination with sound attendance during this particular session, and the paper is published in technical judgment, the list may be used to assess whether a proposed the proceedings of the conference. Does this engineer realize that a transaction permits a technology transfer allowing potential adver- law may have been broken? saries access to technologies whose specific performance levels are The Department of Defense is congressionally mandated to main- at or above the characteristics identified as militarily critical. The list pro- tain a list detailing those critical technologies that help maintain the vides guidance, but is not an export control list in-and-of-itself. The superiority of U.S. armed forces. Technologies on this list are consid- MCTL should be used for initial guidance on the dissemination of crit- ered for integration into the Department of Commerce’s export control ical technologies, and can provide input to export control policy. lists, such that proliferation may be limited. In the example above, the engineer, in a public forum, presented a processing method that may Critical Technologies in Action produce components with performance characteristics which provide Within the Defense community, there are various mechanisms set up to a competitive military edge over our adversaries. Since this hypotheti- control proliferation of critical technologies. The most obvious are the cal critical information is now available in the conference proceedings, procedures for dealing with classified materials, but less obvious are adversary nations could utilize that engineer’s work to leap ahead of those intended to protect what are called critical technologies. their current levels of capability. In this fashion, critical technology was The first and last line of defense for protection of critical technolo- allowed to fall into the hands of potential enemies, thus enabling them gies is the researcher. Initial decisions about what to publish, what talks to stay abreast of our military capabilities to give, and who to talk to, represent the first step in protecting data. The Defense Department, through the Defense Threat Reduction The next step is divisional management and/or the Public Affairs Agency (DTRA), presently maintains a program called the Militarily Office of specific bases or labs (for government personnel). Contractor Critical Technologies Program (MCTP), whose primary purpose is to personnel follow their own company-specific internal procedures. The prepare the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). This list, as decision on whether to allow something to be published or presented specified by the 1979 Export Administration Act, is part of the mecha- in a public forum is ultimately left up to an individual that has the admin- nism which seeks to identify technologies critical to U.S. interests. It pro- istrative authority to control release of technology. They will often utilize vides candidate inputs and technical justification for items placed on the assistance of senior technical staff in making complex decisions. The AMPTIACQuarterly, Volume 6, Number 2 11 Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 000002002 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number Safeguarding Americas Critical Technologies (and Avoiding Personal Risk) An Introduction to Export Grant Number Control and Critical Technology Restrictions Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Babcock, Wade; Persh, Jerome Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number AMPTIAC Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) DOD Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 5 M a t e r i a l E A S E Table 1. The Three-part Militarily Critical Technology List Weapons Systems Technologies(WST) provides details of those critical technologies whose performance parameters are at or above the min- imum level necessary to ensure continuing superior performance of U.S. military systems. These technologies are selected from the population of technologies that are militarily significant (i.e., they provide measurable advantage to U.S. military systems or enhanced threats posed by potential adversaries). Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMD) [only available in STINET] addresses those technologies required to develop, integrate, or employ bio- logical, chemical, or nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. Technical subsections are included which cover means of delivery, information systems, biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, as well as nuclear weapon effects. Hybrid combinations of advanced and older effective technologies and innovative uses of other technologies that provide threatening weapons capabilities are also included in this section. One of the most critical issues regarding the technologies discussed in Part II is that they become militarily effective even when not developed to their full capa- bility. Developing Critical Technologies(DCT) identifies those critical technologies that provide new or superior performance or maintain superior capability more affordably and support one or more of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) warfighting objectives outlined in the JCS Joint Vision 2020. It also takes cognizance of the Secretary of Defense Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and defense plans. The technologies included are can- didates for militarily critical technologies, international cooperative programs, and national and international export control. Because of its com- plexity, it is being issued section by section. Some example sections cover aeronautics, armaments and energetic materials, directed and kinetic energy technologies, lasers, optics, nuclear technology, sensors and signature control technologies. Materials and processing technologies are also covered specifically; examples include armor/antiarmor, electrical, optical, high temperature and high strength structural materials. Table 2. Example Material Classes Included in the Weapons Systems Technologies and the Developing Critical Technologies Sections of the MCTL. Metallics Non-Metallics Advanced Aluminum and Magnesium Alloys, Ceramic Matrix Composites (CMCs), Polymer Matrix Composites (PMCs), Tungsten, Copper, Tantalum, Molybdenum Structural Carbon-Carbon Composites and Depleted Uranium (Monolithic) Discontinuously Reinforced Metal Optical, IR Coatings, Non-linear Optics Matrix Composites (DRMMCs) Advanced Titanium, Titanium Matrix Composites (TMC) Various Composites Designed for Kinetic Energy Absorption to Resist and Titanium Aluminide Composites Fragmentation or Impede Shock Wave Transmission Gamma Titanium Aluminide Low Thermal Expansion Structures Advanced Intermetallic Alloys High-Thermal Conductivity Structures Ultralightweight Metallic Materials and Structures Silicon Carbide, Titanium Diboride, Boron Carbide, Advanced Monolithic Ceramics Nanocrystalline Materials and Structures Metallic-Organic Laminates 12 The AMPTIACQuarterly, Volume 6, Number 2 AMPTIAC AD VA N C E D MAT E R I A L S A N D PR O C E S S E S TE C H N O L O G Y For researchers at accredited institutions of higher learning trolled under the ITAR is up to 10 years imprisonment, a fine of performing fundamental research, there is a blanket exemption $1,000,000, or both (22 U.S.C. 2778). Companies found to from the requirements of export control. According to the amend- export information controlled under the Export Administration ed Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Title 22, Parts 123 and Regulations (commonly called the CCL referred to above,) can 125, these institutions do not have to register the export of data also be fined up to $1,000,000, or five times the value of the or equipment produced solely for, or from, fundamental research. export, whichever is greater. An individual named in such an This policy has shifted back and forth from full and open disclo- action can be imprisoned for up to 10 years, fined up to sure to restricted release over the past 40 years, and currently $250,000, or both. (50 U.S.C. 2410). Companies cited for there is congressional pressure to limit the exemption as it is cur- export control violations are typically barred from obtaining rently written. The main exception to the exemption is when an export licenses for at least three years, and can potentially be academic researcher initially agrees to information restrictions as barred from doing any business with the government. a condition of doing the research. The MCTL was developed as a th re e - p a rt document, Beyond individual researchers and their departments, DOD Weapons Systems Technologies (WST), Weapons of Mass has various mechanisms for controlling release of information D e st ruction (WMD) and Developing Critical Te ch n o l o g i e s including service-level offices and specific, joint-service offices set (DCT). Each section addresses a major area of technology vital up for selected technology areas. These coordinating offices tend to the security and warfighting capability of the United States (see to focus on particularly sensitive technology areas such as low Table 1). Areas of greatest concern to the AMPTIAC community observables (signature reducing technologies) or directed energy like high performance materials, advanced materials processing (lasers, etc.). If a technology is controlled, there are criminal and methods and improved manufacturing techniques are covered in civil penalties for their unauthorized dissemination, thus making both the WST and the DCT (see Table 2). Please note that Tables the offender personally liable for the act. Additionally, companies 1 and 2 address the broad materials classes that contain some who develop technologies (whether with government funding or critical technologies. Whether or not a material is deemed critical not) are responsible for their control and can also be held crimi- is entirely dependent upon its performance characteristics. For nally and civilly liable for unauthorized technology transfers. example Table 2 denotes tungsten as being addressed in the I n a p p ro p ri a te tra n s fer of te chnology is not limited to papers , MCTL. However, this material is only deemed critical when it is j o u rnal articles, pre p a red ta l ks and lectures, but can also include processed in such a way that it has an elongation greater than p a tents and sales of te ch n o l o g y. In the case of defe n s e - re l a te d 3%, a yield strength greater than 1250 MPa, an ultimate tensile p a tents, the Pa tent and Tra d e m a rk Office (PTO) rev i ews each strength greater than 1270 MPa, and a density greater than 17.5 application for innova t i ve meri t; then it is assessed by va ri o u s g/cm3. The reader is referred to the MCTL itself to determine the recognized ex p e rts within DOD. These ex p e rts will make re c- critical performance indicators for other materials of interest. ommendations about whether the te chnology is critical. If it is, It should be emphasized that the MCTL is not a control list; it then a patent may not be gra n ted, thus keeping the te ch n o l o g y is a list of technologies that are of particular military importance. out of the public re c o rd. When a U.S. comp a ny wishes to sell However, for a number of reasons (e.g., worldwide availability, i d e n t i fied critical te chnology to another U.S. comp a ny, multi- controllability, etc.), some critical technologies listed on the MCTL national comp a ny, or fo reign comp a ny, the sale must be are not subject to export controls. For the convenience of the rev i ewed by DOD. The laws va ry, depending on the specifics of reader, the MCTL lists the control status of the MCTL entries. e a ch case, but basically the U.S. gove rnment has the right to As DOD researchers or engineers working with new materi- stop a pending sale. Congressional action would be re qu i red to als, processing methods, and manufacturing techniques, it is our ove rride this decision. responsibility to use sound judgment and protect the safety of our The Departments of State and Commerce also maintain lists uniformed services on the field of battle. The case studies follow- of countries that are automatically considered off limits for release ing on the next page will more fully illustrate some of the consid- of critical technologies. There are six countries on this list, includ- erations involved when dealing with critical or potentially critical ing Iraq, Iran, Cuba, North Korea, Libya and the Sudan. While technologies. export of critical technologies may be allowed to most other For more information about the Militarily Critical Technologies countries, export to the nations on this list is out of the question. Program, please consult the MCTL website … www.dtic.mil/mctl The penalty for unlawful export of items or information con- or make inquiries via email at [email protected]. The AMPTIACQuarterly, Volume 6, Number 2 13 M a t e r i a l E A S E 14.8 GHz signal. The team has also devel- oped computer code that enables this mate- HYPOTHETICAL CASE STUDIES: rial and similar compositions to be modeled The following hypothetical examples are meant to provide the reader with real- world examples of critical technology questions and issues. These should only be and accurately predicts the signal attenua- used as guidance in the consideration of critical technology issues and in no way tion characteristics. Experimental validation supersede the guidance provided by the MCTL, or the departments of Defense, of the results is carried out at a Navy lab. Commerce or State. In cases where the control status of a technology is not clear, The principle investigator on the project is control information can be obtained from the Department of Commerce, Bureau of invited to speak at an international confer- Industry and Security (formerly the Bureau of Export Administration), by requesting ence in Belgium hosted by NATO. a Commodity Classification. (www.bxa.doc.gov or (202) 482-4811) This case illustrates one of the more elusive aspects of critical technologies: academic research. The US Government has shifted its Case 1 Case 2 policy on academic freedom and release A researcher at an Army lab working with A scientist at an Air Force lab develops a of 6.1 Fundamental Research results to the titanium diboride (TiB ), develops an armor composite superconductor with a cross sec- 2 public. At times university researchers have s a n d w i ch st ru c t u re of th ree Ti B p l a te s tional area of approximately 35 square 2 been restricted, and at other times they between a front and back plate of woven micrometers. Its critical temperature (T), c have had large amounts of freedom to dis- carbon fiber cloth impregnated with epoxy below which the material functions as a cuss any Basic Research. The current stance resin. The TiB plates are 99% dense. This superconductor, is 30K with no imposed 2 (as of March, 2002) allows a significant structure is then mounted to a Nomex hon- magnetic field, but will remain supercon- level of academic freedom, but there is con- eycomb backing surface and tested in a ducting with an imposed magnetic field of gressional pressure to limit it. The MCTL standard impact regimen with a fragment- up to 1 Tesla. The composite is fabricated in specifically calls out performance of signa- simulating projectile at various velocities. lengths up to 40 meters. The scientist wants ture reducing materials and systems, as well The material preparation and specifics on to publish the results in a technical journal. as the associated test procedures, simula- thickness of each plate in the system, as well This example does not fall within the specif- tion software, and test hardware (WST, as test results are detailed in a paper to be ic parameters outlined in the MCTL (WST, Section 16, Signature Contro l presented at an unclassified conference. Section 11.2, Electrical Mate ri a l s ) . Technologies). The parameters of signal Acc o r ding to the MCTL, (Weapons System s H oweve r, sound engineering judgment attenuation outlined above fall above the Tec hnologies {WST}, Section 11.1, Armo r should be used to ascertain the implications “tripwire” values set forth in this section, thus and Anti-armor Mater ials) ceramics with that this innovation has on the science. For for non-academic re s e a rch e rs this wo rk grea t er than 98% the o r etical density, in lay- instance, does divulging this information would re qu i re evaluation by the DOD e red st ru c t u res specifi c a l ly intended fo r enable adversaries to leap ahead of cur- before it could be disseminated or export- ab s o r ption of kinetic energy , are militar il y rent capabilities? Or does specific informa- ed. Academic researchers should address cr itical. Tit anium diboride is specific a l l y cited tion in the intended publication enable fur- this to their sponsor or other appropriate as a mater ial of special inter es t, as well as ther innovation that would place U.S. supe- officials. Low-observable and counter-low- the arran g ement of layer ed str uc t u r es as riority at risk? observable (LO/CLO) technologies have de s c r ibed above. This paper describes a their own offices within each service that tec hnology which, though perhaps not clas- Case 3 a re responsible for rev i ew of pote n t i a l si f ied, defin i t el y falls into the categ o r y of mil- A university team working on a Navy pro- export issues in this field. Contact informa- it ar il y critical, and is poten t i a l l y subject to ject develops a foam material that has tion and procedures on this topic can be exp o r t control. Dissemination of this infor ma - embedded semiconducting cera m i c found in the MCTL, Section 16. tion without proper clearance could ver y whiskers. Five millimeters of this foam is well be illegal. Check the MCTL column found to attenuate 6 dB of a radiant 1.7 Case 4 “C o n t r ol Regimes” to deter mine whether the MHz noise signal. With additional modifi- A defense contra c tor develops a light- pa r ticular mater ial is control l e d . cations, the foam can attenuate 20 dB of a weight, 125-cm mirror, which has potential 14 The AMPTIACQuarterly, Volume 6, Number 2 AMPTIAC application to an orbital surveillance satellite. AD VA N C E D MAT E R I A L S A N D PR O C E S S E S TE C H N O L O G Y A British company expresses interest in adapt- ing the mirror for use in an orbiting astronom- ical observatory to be launched by France's History of Export Control Regulations Arianne. The concepts of export control and militarily critical technologies have been part of America for most of its history. In 1774, the First Continental Congress declared illegal the importation The parameters as described are somewhat of British goods as well as the export of goods to Britain. Since that time, the United States has tricky to evaluate. If a radiation reflectance imposed export controls for a variety of reasons through numerous executive and legislative level were quoted, it could be evaluated actions. Several laws still in effect today (with modifications) were enacted soon after World against the values in the MCTL, but the size of War II. For example, the Export Control Act of 1949 gave the U.S. Department of Commerce the mirror and the statement that it is “light- (DOC) the responsibility of administering and enforcing export controls on dual-use items and, weight” also require attention. The MCTL calls for the first time, defined three reasons for the imposition of these controls: national security, for- out (in WST, Section 17.2, Optronics) that low eign policy, and short supply. area density space optics with apertures The DOC’s Bureau of Industr y and Security (for me r ly the Bureau of Export Adm i n i s tr ation or greater than 1 meter are critical. This technol- BXA) is responsible for issuing Export Adm i n i s tr ation Regulations (EARs), which define the tec h- ogy should be treated as if it were a critical nical param e ter s for issuing exp o r t licenses. This listing is ref er red to as the Commerce Control technology until a review by DOD has been Li s t (CCL) and some may find its length and ext en s i v e use of tec hnical ter ms intimidating. The p e rfo rmed. For any te chnology that is de tailed listing of tec hnical param e ter s in the CCL establishes precise, objective crit er ia tha t deemed critical and regulated by the CCL, should (in most cases) enable one to ascertain the approp r ia t e control status. Broa d e r , more ITAR, or other specific control regime, the su b j e c t i v e crit er ia would cause exp o r ter s and re- e xp o r ter s to be more dependent upon DOC company developing the mirror is responsible in t er pr etations and rulings. Moreo ver , much of the CCL’s detail is deriv ed from multilater al l y for controlling the technology, even if there ad o p t ed lists. This specificity serves to enhance the unifor mity and effec t i v eness of inter na t i o n a l were no government funds used in its devel- co n t r ol practices and to prom o te a “level playing fie l d . ” The detailed pres e n t ation of elements opment. In cases of unclear or developing (e.g., licensing and exp o r t clearance proc e d u r es) enables the exp o r ter to find in one place what technologies, a determination of commodity he/she must know to compl y with pertinent req ui r ements. Of special impo r tance is the detai l e d jurisdiction may be desirable. Information on li s ting of License Exception crit er ia, which enable the exp o r ter to deter mine qui c kl y, and with this procedure may be obtained through the co n f idence, whether he/she needs to obtain an exp o r t license. Fin a l l y, some of the EAR’s detai l Department of State. is specific a l l y aimed at avoiding loopholes and permitting effec t i v e enfor ce m e n t . Almost 20 years after enacting the Export Control Act, Congress enacted the Arms Export Case 5 Control Act (AECA) in 1968. This legislation established the International Traffic in Arms An Army researcher develops a CAD-based Regulations (ITAR), which the Department of State (DOS) Office of Defense Trade Controls simulation suite that predicts final shapes of (DTC) administers. The ITAR includes the United States Munitions List (USML), which defines ceramic castings. No new materials were articles and services related principally to national defense and for which licenses are required. developed, nor was the fabrication method In 1979 Congress enacted the Export Administration Act (EAA), which superseded the altered. A number of multinational ceramic 1949 Export Control Act. The EAA required the Department of Defense (DOD) to produce the manufacturing companies have heard of the Militarily Critical Technologies List (MCTL). The language states: software and are interested in applying it for “The Secretary of Defense bears primary responsibility for developing a list of militarily critical everything from engine components to bio- technologies . . . . The Secretary (of Commerce) and the Secretary of Defense shall integrate medical parts. items on the list of militarily critical technologies into the control list . . . with all deliberate speed. . . . The Secretary of Defense shall establish a procedure for reviewing the goods and tech- While the list of MCT does not specifically nology on the list of military critical technologies on an ongoing basis.” name CAD-based simulation software pack- The basic purpose of the MCTL is to define technologies that are critical for continued U.S. mil- ages, it does address rapid prototyping soft- itary superiority. The list is used primarily to provide technical justification and rationale for new ware. For this case, where the software would proposals and to ensure the continuation of specific technology controls enforced under U.S. be used to significantly reduce manufacturing regulations and other multinational agreements. It is also used as a reference tool for evaluat- development efforts, lower costs of manufac- ing potential technology transfers and for determining whether technical reports and scientific turing through reduced waste and rejects, and papers are eligible for public release. speed development of novel parts, it could The fi rst ve rsion of the MCTL was published in 19 81. Since then the list has been definitely be judged militarily critical. This u p d a ted seven times and is curre n t ly published as an unclassified document (alth o u g h technology should be evaluated before it is some parts are limited dist ribution). The current edition of the MCTL is on the Inte rn et exported. (http://www.dtic.mil/mctl) and is continually being updated as progress is made on the tech- nologies described in the basic document. Moreover, the Internet has provided the opportu- nity for more people to comment on proposed changes. The AMPTIACQuarterly, Volume 6, Number 2 15