189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 1 Forum Strategic No.188 pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea ity in their own budding relations with Iran. To United States might also work on limited topics opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass January 2002 not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a be sure, they are not likely to support a policy of shared concern, support Iran for member- destruction? Other recent titles in the closer relationship with NATO or reassurances of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem ship in the World Trade Organization, and These are choices for U.S. policymakers in Institute for National Strategic Studies regarding American development of missile with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties expand Track II-type measures to include pursuit of Al Qaeda and its support networks. Strategic Forum series National Defense University defenses more important for Russia than selling to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants, They are factors that the United States needs to nuclear technology and expertise to Iran? security arrangement that would preclude a intellectuals, students, and academicians. consider as it weighs the merits of seeking Would China respond to expanded access to U.S presence in the Gulf. Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly normalization of relations with Iran, which is, U.S.-Iran Relations: markets or technology? Can North Korea afford Recommendation: Be prepared to offer another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that after all, an imperfect democracy with a reli- to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and expanded security guarantees and, if neces- it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapproche- giously based legal and political system. Once John F. Reichart other Middle Eastern countries that are looking sary, a smaller presence. How we identify the ment. This could work to Iranian and Ameri- our staunch friend, it has been our greatest Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: Normalization in the Future? to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed can advantage. America cannot choose which enemy in the region. Above all, it shares with A Neglected Challenge evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot the United States certain common interests and halts proliferators. There is, however, the dis- based international terrorists—will determine identify the good versus the bad or the demo- enemies—including Iraq and some forms of (No. 187, December 2001) by Judith S. Yaphe tinct danger that we will pay in influence or the size and shape of our presence through the cratically elected versus the undemocratically Islamic extremism, such as were exemplified treasure and that the suppliers will continue to selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business, by the Taliban in Afghanistan—that could provide the proscribed goods and services. U.S. policy could also aim not ours. What is important is that the contacts provide a bridge to greater regional security. Joseph McMillan Recommendation: Maintain strong be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our at renewing dialogue mysterious middlemen with their own agendas. Notes U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Anthony C. Zinni Key Points The Burden of History the Grand Ayatollah to the offices of the with Iran while at the 1Amy Waldman,The New York Times, December 10, Strategic Consensus A Military for the 21stCentury: Lessons Supreme Leader, a cleric chosen by Khomeini partners in the war against global terrorism Since the establishment of the Islamic that support for the war does not excuse weapon same time seeking to Conclusions 2001, A10. (No. 186, November 2001) from the Recent Past Since World War II, few countries have Republic of Iran in 1979, the United States has to serve for life, and to the secular (but still proliferation or assistance to Iran in building minimize the value of conduit2 fMoro sati dIr aton iPaanl esshtiinpimanen ftasc ttoio snusp opplyp oHsiezdb atoll athhe— petahcee (No. 181, July 2001) been of greater strategic concern to tried to find a framework for understanding clerical) president, both of whom lacked the NBC or long-range missile capabilities. Iran has always raised hard choices for process—are delivered by air through Damascus. Michael E. Marti the United States than Iran. Whether as this enigmatic country. America defended its charisma and credentials of a Grand Ayatollah. Option 4: Provide additional military Iran’s acquiring uncon- the United States, and more so than ever since 3Iran began its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in China: Making the Case for Eugene B. Rumer and a dependable friend and preeminent regional commitments to help an ailing Shah in exile In addition, Iran began looking toward the aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf ventional weapons September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created particular a nuclear capability, under the Shah in the 1970s, at Realistic Engagement Richard D. Sokolsky partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has but was ill prepared to deal with the crises that Gulf and Europe for commercial contacts, Arab governments to deter capricious behav- an opportunity to engage some governments roughly the same time that Iraq embarked on its NBC acquisi- (No. 185, September 2001) Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations occupied a special place in U.S. security raged in and around Iran in the 1980s: U.S. financial investment, and diplomatic networks. ior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf next decade. An international agreement to with whom the United States has long been at tKioonre aefnfo-drtess.i gIrnaend’ sS acucqdu misiitsisoilness ,i nacs lwudelel Rasu csshieamn-i caanld a Nndo rbthiologi- (No. 180, April 2001) thinking. It exerts influence on a range of diplomats were held hostage in Tehran for 444 Meanwhile, U.S. containment of Iran became odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to important policy issues—from the Middle more institutionalized. Iran was to be kept in will be required for some time. The desire to assure international access to the Strait of cal weapons. Russia is building at least one and possibly as many Kori N. Schake days, militant clerics tried to export revolution- reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced Hormuz might ease American concerns about U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound as three nuclear power plants at Busheyr and is providing Do European Union Defense Initiatives Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler East peace process to post-Taliban ary Islamic governance across the Gulf, and isolation under sanctions until it renounced against the political and deterrent value of a Iranian plans to close the strait to international friends that could be inconsistent with other, nuclear training and technology to Iranian scientists. Iran’s Threaten NATO? Revising the Two-Major Theater Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear Iraq invaded Iran, ostensibly to stave off a support for international terrorism, stopped longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives. newest missile—the Shahab-3—has a range of 1,200 kilome- weapons capability within the next decade, opposing the Middle East peace process, and visible American military presence in the Gulf. shipping, though the negotiability and impact Should cooperation in the war on global terror- ters, putting targets in Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf (No. 184, August 2001) War Standard it could become a significant factor driving Shiah Islamist tidal wave. ceased efforts to acquire weapons of mass Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a of a measure would need close study. within its reach. See Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe,The (No. 179, April 2001) During this period, U.S. policy toward Iran ism override objections to a regime’s lack of U.S. and regional government policies on destruction. Iran responded with demands that much stronger regional power would add to the Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington, M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and was relatively uncomplicated. Iran under the democratic standards, suppression of dissent proliferation. the U.S. military pull out of the Gulf, repay incentives for proliferation by suggesting that an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). Richard D. Sokolsky Richard D. Sokolsky mullahs had tilted the balance of power in the and human rights, or repression of minority 4Key elements here are alleged Iranian support for the Since September 11, there has been Iran the money owed it from the time of the the United States will reduce its presence in U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dia- Regional Conflicts with Strategic Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Gulf by threatening its neighbors, encouraging groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same cate- Khobar Towers terrorists, who may have fled to Iran after that much speculation in both countries about the Revolution and under dispute at the Hague, response to governments acquiring nuclear logue with Iran while at the same time seeking gory as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a operation in 1996, and the safe haven Iran accorded the Lebanese Consequences Control Policy possibility of a new opening in relations. Like antiregime liberation groups, and supporting and stop trying to subvert its government. weapons capability; maintaining a determined to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring putative U.S. partner that does not support Hizballah terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah and his cohorts, (No. 183, July 2001) (No. 178, February 2001) America, Iran wants an Iraq without Saddam terrorist groups determined not only to over- Most European governments publicly presence would demonstrate to Iran that the unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy who orchestrated U.S. and Kuwaiti airplane hijackings and U.S. throw so-called anachronistic regimes but also international terrorism but is burdened by a Hussein, Afghanistan under a stable govern- criticized American policy as too restrictive but United States takes its security commitments has inhibited some countries and companies history of questionable human rights practices and European hostage takings in Lebanon in the 1980s. John C. Holzman M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky ment, and Central Asia absent Russian con- to eliminate foreign presence from the region privately hoped that it would continue so that seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their from doing business in and providing loans to by targeting American, British, and French and suppression of religious and political A Golden Opportunity: The Next The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: trol of borders and resources. Yet dramatic Europe could avoid unwanted competition. security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rap- Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of interests. Iran was branded a pariah and em- minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations Issues for the New Adminstration breakthroughs in U.S.-Iran relations appear Their response was critical dialogue, which prochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its engagement of other governments with Iran is bargoed from receiving outside military or now an adversary, stained by a history of sup- (No. 182, July 2001) (No. 177, February 2001) unlikely. Iran’s reformist and conservative they viewed as a means to trade and recover partners in the GCC are consumers of security, diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking investment assistance. This policy would later porting international terrorism. Moreover, camps may be actively debating whether assets while engaging the Iranians in discus- vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would be called containment. In the 1980s, it meant indicators of popular unrest—including stu- For on-line access to Strategic Forum,go to: rapprochement with the United States is in sion on disagreeable issues, including some neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of seem more productive than trying unilaterally helping Iraq in the 8-year war, reflagging Gulf dent demonstrations comparing the mullahs to http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html Tehran’s future, but no signs indicate that the human rights cases, the status of the Iranian Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that to sustain the current containment. shipping, banning arms sales to Iran, and the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling conditions for achieving normalcy would be opposition in Europe, and the Middle East threatening neighbors cannot be ignored. Recommendation: Tone down rhetori- trying to free nearly two dozen Western popular yearnings for political change so minimally acceptable to Washington. peace process. Critical dialogue, however, fell Memories fade fast in this region, however, and cal references to Iran as a rogue state. Ac- hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorist factions strong that they are not being suppressed by U.S. options must encompass several victim to ineffectual Iranian and European most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to knowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by factors that shape decisionmaking in today’s in Lebanon. U.S. efforts to find a “moderate” diplomacy, as well as to revelations in a Ger- reertau—rn bteof othree Bpaoglihcideasd o’sf ian sviamsipolne ro, fd iKsutawnatit and preegrcioenptailo fnosr uanmd (gnivoitn tgh eit G aC vCo)i cwe oiunl da anlelwow fWroomul dth aen S Aumpreermicea nL epaodleicry a tnhda tt hpeu bplriecsliyd eennt-. bsFtoorroa kitnesfg,o ymr,m odanetofiegonrnas eop nhp soN, lDaicnUyd ,P arrenepdso snr tvasit sioointn tanhlae mt iWoilneitabal r ssyie tsect ruaartti:etygy. mofrtoehmmer bt shecirssh ocolofa utrhnset ar yNn daa ntsidop neaacblir aoDlaiesdfte.s nT ishnee n Uoapntiiionvneioarnsl isst,ye c caousnr cwitlyue asllif ofaansisrs, Isreanns: uths ea mrisoen go fl ePaedrseirasn o nna ftoioreniaglnis amn,d t hsee ccuorni-ty Ithraanni aan “ lreaaddicear lw” iwthe rweh momet wit ictho uslcdo rdne.al rather mersa nh acdo uarptproroovmed t hteartr osernisito or pIerraantiiaonn sl einad- al before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the Iran the political, economic, and strategic http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are issues, the weakness of President Mohammad After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in c couraged or offered moral support to the gov- Europe. This development led to the i Gwuilll fn inot ictsh iamngaeg eif. Tanhdis wcohmenp lIaracenn ccryo pssreosb tahbely iunntderearscctioorne tIhraaqt ’ist csoenektisn, uwehdi lies oallastoio sner. vIitn agl stoo elervnemraegnet iinn dTeeahlrinang wgaitihn ath ree gUinmitee dst iSltla ctaeps aabnlye pJhotrtoipnd:tu/ /Ccwehwsie Jwfso. diontfit c SF.tmoarficfl;/e dt hQoecu tajroriutnerern/lajyelf lco/jarf nqth _bepe uC abhcsac/iirenmsdsaeenxd .oh aft mtt:h.e ttahhgoees nveic eoyw fo tsfh otehf ect ohFneet dDrieebrpuaatlo rGrtmso vaeennrdtn omdfo eD nnetof.et nnseec eosrs aanryil yo trheeflrect Ktoh raetafomrmi i,n f ethaers f aocf ee nocf icrcolnesmeervnat,t iavned o ab sbtiaacsles 1a9tt8it9u,d Iirnaanl bshegifatsn— a spormocee spse orcf eipntsitbitlue,t isoonmael and iinstdeirc Atmli eFnatl loafh Iinatne lalingde,n icne Min- Critie s nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf would set the agenda and terms of engagement of significant internal repression? Should the INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE toward self-sufficiency in defense posture. imperceptible, especially to the American eye. turn, Iran’s refusal to 1 er governments are aware that their security ties on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode American policy can open a door, but Tehran The focus of power shifted from the person of 1 S war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies allow the return of to the United States allow them greater flexibil- make demands based on a nuclear status. The Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor must decide if and when to walk through it. 9/ s e - t u No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 6 No. 188, January 2002 s s o s P I Panel 5 Panel 6 Panel 1 Report Documentation Page Report Date Report Type Dates Covered (from... to) 00 Jan 2002 N/A - Title and Subtitle Contract Number Strategic Forum U.S.-Iran Relations: Normalization in the Future Grant Number Program Element Number Author(s) Project Number Task Number Work Unit Number Performing Organization Name(s) and Address(es) Performing Organization Report Number Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University 20319-5066 Sponsoring/Monitoring Agency Name(s) and Sponsor/Monitor’s Acronym(s) Address(es) Sponsor/Monitor’s Report Number(s) Distribution/Availability Statement Approved for public release, distribution unlimited Supplementary Notes The original document contains color images. Abstract Subject Terms Report Classification Classification of this page unclassified unclassified Classification of Abstract Limitation of Abstract unclassified UU Number of Pages 6 189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 2 European Union ambassadors to Tehran. October, Khatami condemned Osama bin . . . Or Deliberate peace process, he repeated official criticism of which ended the war with Iraq; the creation of concessions to reformists.Conservative cler- beyond; and must have an enhanced capability this formulation, Iran would have to cut all have to be given to defining appropriate dual- Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new Laden and his supporters as extremists and Ambiguity? Israel, which he said was “founded on terror the Council of Expediency to determine whether ics—with their hold on the judiciary, military, to defend against any threat of military aggres- ties to Lebanon’s Hizballah, an organization use technology. Acquiescence to a pipeline and unconventional weapon systems and the terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only and killings.” He called for recognition of the laws were in accordance with Islam and to rule and security services—continue to trump sion. To achieve this degree of capability and that it helped to create, as well as Hamas, project to carry Central Asian energy resources long-range missiles needed to deliver them. communicate with perceived opponents How much should we read into these rights of Palestinians, including the right of all over Islamic law to preserve the state; and the Khatami’s efforts to appoint a more liberal self-sufficiency, Iran must build its own mili- Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other global Is- would be an important signal of American Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997, through carnage and destruction.” He said signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Irani- refugees to return to their land, the creation of revision of the constitution to allow government or to pursue reform with arrests of tary industries, reconstitute a modern military lamist groups determined to use violence to awareness of Iran’s economic needs. It also Iran made no discernible progress in extend- that there were no barriers to cultural or ans in the public and private sectors are debat- a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, Khamenei—not a Grand Ayatollah—to suc- reformists, especially those who support force, and rely minimally on foreign suppliers. realize their political ambitions.4Iran’s senior could reduce or avoid Iranian dependence on ing relations with Europe or its neighbors, and economic ties with the United States and, in ing whether there should be an opening to and the right of all the people of Palestine— ceed Khomeini. As noted above, power has Khatami, newspaper closures, and public This includes acquiring nuclear weapons to leaders may have stopped targeting U.S. per- Chinese investment in the energy sector of its the United States remained anathema. When an interview with The New York Times, America. Some scholars and analysts believe Muslim, Christian, and Jew—to decide their become more centered in the hands of the floggings. Khatami’s inability or unwillingness compensate for military weakness and relative sonnel and facilities directly in recent years, economy. Conversely, broadening the dialogue Khatami won his first landslide electoral hinted that Iran could accept whatever settle- that the reformists and conservatives are deeply own future. Supreme Leader and president since 1989. The to push for reforms alienates many supporters, strategic isolation. If Iraq or Israel has nuclear, but American efforts to persuade Iran not to on Iran with Europe beyond NBC weapons and presidential victory in 1997, America was still ment Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians divided over this issue, while others, including The seemingly softer statements of emphasis on the religious and revolutionary but it is not clear that a disaffected electorate biological, or chemical (NBC) capabilities, support militants opposed to the Arab-Israeli missile issues could help create conditions for locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s Iranian experts, claim that even the conserva- Khatami and Rafsanjani notwithstanding, definition of Iranian actions and policies has would be prepared to challenge the regime. then so must Iran. Tehran also probably views peace process and not to pursue a nuclear eventually moving beyond the Iran-Libya rogue state whose behavior had to be modified right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we tives favor normalizing relations with the Iranian actions display more continuity than shifted to a somewhat less aggressive, more Many Iranians are war-weary and fearful of nuclear weapon systems as the only way to weapons program have had no discernible Sanctions Act, which was renewed by Congress before it could be accepted back into the inter- United States. They just do not want Khatami change. Tehran has not changed its basic nationalist version of Iranian governance and another revolutionary upheaval that would be reach strategic parity with Israel or the United effect. A change in Iranian leadership is un- for 5 years in summer 2001. national community. and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed, policies on opposing the U.S. military presence policy. National interest shapes foreign and unlikely to resolve their opposition to any States, a balance that it could not achieve likely to change these policies or end suspicions Option 2: Promote greater clearly, Iranians in the Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down in the Persian Gulf or Central Asia or on Israel domestic policies, although few Iranians seri- government strictures. through a conventional arms buildup.3 of American behavior. Nor is it clear that if Iran transparency.Iranian leaders, for the most Since September 11: public and private sectors what even he may acknowledge to be an in- and the peace process. Abdullah Nuri, a promi- ously propose dismantling the rule of the cler- Iranians genuinely fear encirclement Based on the foregoing analysis, we took some of these steps, the United States part, assume that the United States maintains a evitable process—the normalization of rela- nent pro-Khatami supporter, was jailed for, ics—vilayat-e faqih—entirely. Khatami repre- by the United States.Iran’s leaders—whether should be careful not to overplay the theme of large military force in the Gulf to monitor Missed Opportunity. . . are debating whether tions with Washington. among other things, questioning Iran’s contin- sents a transition phase as Iranians attempt to reformist or conservative, Persian nationalist or gridlock in explaining Iranian foreign policy Iran, not Iraq. They also assume that America The attacks on the World Trade Center there should be an Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and there- ued hostility to Israel. If Khatami’s rhetoric on Islamic extremist—view the world with trepida- behavior, as if some kind of resolution to the sanctions have delayed is intent upon militarizing relations with and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confus- opening to America fore decisions on foreign policy gestures or Israel has seemed more accommodating than tion. They see their country as encircled by real reformist-conservative struggle would suddenly but not denied Iran the Central Asia (where our military-to-military ing reactions in Iran. President Khatami of- moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort Khamenei’s, elements under his command conservative clerics and potential enemies: Iraq, which used chemi- transform the country’s attitudes toward the contacts with the new republics of the former ability to acquire fered his condolences to the families of the Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on have pursued and continue to pursue a policy continue to trump cal weapons against Tehran in the 8-year war; world beyond its borders. In fact, this analysis Soviet Union are highly visible). To prevent victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his will respect the wishes of the Palestinian social and cultural life and personal freedoms, much more consistent with Khamenei’s pro- Khatami’s efforts to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which host would argue that the contrary is true: that on unconventional weapon Iran from misinterpreting U.S. intentions and expression of sympathy to the mayor of New nation.” Khatami and former president or advance a more progressive foreign policy nouncements. In particular, Iran is directly and the U.S. military presence and deny their Shiah many strategic issues, what is often portrayed capabilities activities, especially in the Persian Gulf, Ameri- York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of since his first election in 1997, his conservative materially supporting Hamas and the Palestin- appoint a more liberal communities full rights; Pakistan, which is as gridlock more nearly approximates a con- can military activities should be as transparent signed the book of condolences opened at the comment before, and the formulation is critics—those labeled hard-liners outside ian Islamic Jihad, both of which claim respon- government or to pursue occasionally involved in hostile skirmishes with sensus shared by opposing camps—and not a as possible, consistent with the requirement for Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi Iran—have countered by closing reformist sibility for the spate of suicide bombings in reform Iran on their mutual border and has encour- dispute between them. would agree to begin the process of normaliza- operational security. Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous leader Saddam Hussein and deemed accept- newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters, Israel over the past several months. That such aged anti-Iranian activity in Afghanistan; and This is not to deny the possibility of de- tion. Certainly, Tehran would not venture down Recommendation: Employ confidence- demonstrations and chanted pro-American able in Western eyes. including the mayor of Tehran and a parlia- attacks—including the attack on teenagers at the Central Asian republics, once pro-Soviet, bates over foreign policy within the country. this path without clearindications of recogni- building measures,such as help in maritime slogans, in contrast to the standard, orches- Three final events have drawn attention to mentarian who denounced the conservative- a pizzeria in Tel Aviv—are clearly terrorism resolve the dilemma of how to effect change in now a source of economic opportunity, sectar- Many Iranians might be asking questions such tion and corresponding actions by Washington. mine clearance, an incidents-at-sea agreement, trated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s repre- dominated judiciary as undemocratic; and and not resistance to enemy occupation as the the system without changing systems. ian risk, and U.S. bases. Above all, the United as the following: What price has been paid for Several policy options might influence and joint rescue exercises; the gradual inclu- parliamentarians, including the head of the sentative to the United Nations, Mohammed calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in propaganda portrays could make it difficult for Iran’s leaders agree broadly on how States and Israel are viewed as enemies, with supporting Palestinian extremist organizations, Iran as the debate progresses in Iran and Amer- sion of Iran in regional security discussions; reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami Tehran or Washington to reach common best to defend the country’s national inter- Washington seen as keen to place pro-American such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic ica. These options are not mutually exclusive. and greater transparency in U.S. military Nabavi, called for normal relations with all several senators and representatives, including and reformist politicians were talking of condo- ground on either issue. As if to underscore this ests, territorial integrity, security, and inter- regimes in Baghdad and Kabul and to milita- Jihad? What has Iran gained from its long Option 1: Reshape containment.U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf/Central Asian countries except Israel. He previously had staunch supporters of Israel, raising specula- lences and the celebration of the “dialogue of point, in early January, Israel captured a boat national influence.The consensus includes rize Central Asia, while Israel is a nuclear- involvement in Lebanon? How close can containment policy placed sanctions on Iran region. Apply the success of the 6+2 Afghan expressed strong anti-American sentiments. tion that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S. civilizations” at the United Nations this year, carrying arms to the Palestinian Authority that Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Khatami, armed power determined to control Muslim Tehran get to the Arab autocrats of the Persian that include embargoes on trade and military security group to other regional security issues Probably most striking was the Iranian officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s For- Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject were allegedly supplied by Iran and its Expediency Council head Hashemi-Rafsanjani, holy places. They especially resent being kept on (or is it Arabian?) Gulf without diminishing its procurement and penalties for those providing involving Iranian and American interests. This response to an American letter of October 7, eign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the Lebanese surrogate, the militant wing of and other senior officials. Substantively, it the Department of State list of state sponsors of ties to and credibility with the regional Shiah investment and development assistance to Iran. would not amount to a security pact or Iran’s which assured Tehran that the United States point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Pow- United States. On October 12, for instance, he Hizballah. Details are sketchy, but the shipment spans Khatami’s call in 1997 for a dialogue of terrorism and worry that some influential communities? What does Iran risk by sponsor- Scholars and policy analysts disagree on the inclusion in an arrangement similar to the would respect Iranian airspace and territorial ell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2 accused America of “dragging the planet into could have been arranged by Iranian militant civilizations between the Islamic and non- Americans want regime change in Iran instead ing Islamic activism in Central Asia? Could it impact of sanctions, but one thing is clear: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or North integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S. Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently, global war” and hinted that those who even elements determined to embarrass Khatami in Islamic worlds, who and what should deter- of improved relations. Regardless of where they cost Iran Russian assistance in building new sanctions, including the arms embargo and Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); instead, it military personnel forced to land on Iranian Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former suggest dialogue should be removed from their the eyes of the United States.2 mine Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban, stand on the political spectrum, these leaders weapon programs and acquiring advanced efforts to block foreign loans to and investment could mean a new venue where tensions might territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser posts. He warned that “any negotiation with opposition to Israel and the peace process and share a common view of the threats to Iranian technology? Iran surely is not immune to the in Iran, have delayed but not denied Iran the be reduced without risk of military confronta- agreed to assist American pilots downed on to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently America is against the nation’s interest.” The Influences on Iranian support for Palestinian aspirations, and even security and of the kinds of measures necessary problem of having to resolve potentially con- ability to acquire unconventional weapon tion. The more predictable and transparent the Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of secretary general of the Expediency Council— judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no the conciliatory gestures made toward America to protect Iran. flicting priorities but certainly would attempt to capabilities, expertise, and technology. In fact, United States is in its military posture in the Decisionmaking food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan acknowledged that the two countries shared a Iranian official pursues relations with the since September 11. It also probably extends to Self-sufficiency shapes Iran’s strategic do so within the scope of its core concerns. low oil prices and domestic economic woes Gulf and the more continuity in policy before refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Hu- common interest in Afghanistan. According to United States. In thinking about the gridlock that char- decisions regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear and military thinking.Many Iranians, in- probably did more damage to the Iranian and after Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, manitarian cooperation had actually begun The New York Times,Rezai further suggested In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in acterizes the Iranian decisionmaking process, capability and acquisition of weapons of mass cluding some among the Revolutionary Guard, Charting a Way Ahead economy than did U.S.-imposed sanctions. the less value there will be to Iran in acquiring in late summer 2001 under United Nations thatbetter relations might be possible if the New York in October were more nuanced and we must keep in mind several factors that destruction, though that consensus is cloaked assume that eventually they will have to fight Moreover, demands for domestic spending on nuclear weapons. [UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for United States were to take the first step.1 balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he decisively influence Tehran’s view of its role in in ambiguity. As we have seen in the past, Iraq again and alone—just as they did from U.S. policy toward Iran sets the bar for subsidies, job creation, and economic infra- Option 3: Leverage NBC suppliers.If the opening of the UN General Assembly in called for an end to the bombing campaign in world affairs and the threat that it faces: Iran’s clerical leaders prefer a posture of calcu- 1980 to 1988—and that Iran must be able to normalization well above any level that Tehran structure in years of low oil prices did not preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons is Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that Nationalism is reemerging as a defin- lated ambiguity, whereas the United States defend itself. To meet challenges to its security, is likely to meet in the near future. America preclude spending on NBC technology. a top policy priority, then U.S. policy should the United Nations—and not the United ing element in the Islamic Republic.The era prefers contacts that are clear and transparent. Iran’s leaders believe that the country must be insists that Iran end its involvement in interna- Recommendation: Maintain military look for ways to prevent or discourage suppliers States—determine the post-Taliban govern- of revolutionary Islam as the driving force in Political gridlock in Tehran reveals the independent and self-sufficient in strategic and tional terrorism, foreswear opposition to the sanctions, drop economic sanctions.Encour- from making material and training available to Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National ment. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was the Republic is over. It ended with Iran’s accept- weakness of President Khatami and the tactical terms; must reassert Iran’s traditional Arab-Israeli peace process, and cease trying to age foreign investment in Iran’s domestic and Iran. This, of course, raises the difficult ques- Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East ance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, determination of conservatives not to make role of regional hegemon in the Gulf and acquire weapons of mass destruction. Under economic infrastructure. Special attention will tion of what price America may be prepared to via e-mail to [email protected]. No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 3 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 4 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 2 European Union ambassadors to Tehran. October, Khatami condemned Osama bin . . . Or Deliberate peace process, he repeated official criticism of which ended the war with Iraq; the creation of concessions to reformists.Conservative cler- beyond; and must have an enhanced capability this formulation, Iran would have to cut all have to be given to defining appropriate dual- Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new Laden and his supporters as extremists and Ambiguity? Israel, which he said was “founded on terror the Council of Expediency to determine whether ics—with their hold on the judiciary, military, to defend against any threat of military aggres- ties to Lebanon’s Hizballah, an organization use technology. Acquiescence to a pipeline and unconventional weapon systems and the terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only and killings.” He called for recognition of the laws were in accordance with Islam and to rule and security services—continue to trump sion. To achieve this degree of capability and that it helped to create, as well as Hamas, project to carry Central Asian energy resources long-range missiles needed to deliver them. communicate with perceived opponents How much should we read into these rights of Palestinians, including the right of all over Islamic law to preserve the state; and the Khatami’s efforts to appoint a more liberal self-sufficiency, Iran must build its own mili- Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other global Is- would be an important signal of American Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997, through carnage and destruction.” He said signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Irani- refugees to return to their land, the creation of revision of the constitution to allow government or to pursue reform with arrests of tary industries, reconstitute a modern military lamist groups determined to use violence to awareness of Iran’s economic needs. It also Iran made no discernible progress in extend- that there were no barriers to cultural or ans in the public and private sectors are debat- a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, Khamenei—not a Grand Ayatollah—to suc- reformists, especially those who support force, and rely minimally on foreign suppliers. realize their political ambitions.4Iran’s senior could reduce or avoid Iranian dependence on ing relations with Europe or its neighbors, and economic ties with the United States and, in ing whether there should be an opening to and the right of all the people of Palestine— ceed Khomeini. As noted above, power has Khatami, newspaper closures, and public This includes acquiring nuclear weapons to leaders may have stopped targeting U.S. per- Chinese investment in the energy sector of its the United States remained anathema. When an interview with The New York Times, America. Some scholars and analysts believe Muslim, Christian, and Jew—to decide their become more centered in the hands of the floggings. Khatami’s inability or unwillingness compensate for military weakness and relative sonnel and facilities directly in recent years, economy. Conversely, broadening the dialogue Khatami won his first landslide electoral hinted that Iran could accept whatever settle- that the reformists and conservatives are deeply own future. Supreme Leader and president since 1989. The to push for reforms alienates many supporters, strategic isolation. If Iraq or Israel has nuclear, but American efforts to persuade Iran not to on Iran with Europe beyond NBC weapons and presidential victory in 1997, America was still ment Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians divided over this issue, while others, including The seemingly softer statements of emphasis on the religious and revolutionary but it is not clear that a disaffected electorate biological, or chemical (NBC) capabilities, support militants opposed to the Arab-Israeli missile issues could help create conditions for locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s Iranian experts, claim that even the conserva- Khatami and Rafsanjani notwithstanding, definition of Iranian actions and policies has would be prepared to challenge the regime. then so must Iran. Tehran also probably views peace process and not to pursue a nuclear eventually moving beyond the Iran-Libya rogue state whose behavior had to be modified right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we tives favor normalizing relations with the Iranian actions display more continuity than shifted to a somewhat less aggressive, more Many Iranians are war-weary and fearful of nuclear weapon systems as the only way to weapons program have had no discernible Sanctions Act, which was renewed by Congress before it could be accepted back into the inter- United States. They just do not want Khatami change. Tehran has not changed its basic nationalist version of Iranian governance and another revolutionary upheaval that would be reach strategic parity with Israel or the United effect. A change in Iranian leadership is un- for 5 years in summer 2001. national community. and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed, policies on opposing the U.S. military presence policy. National interest shapes foreign and unlikely to resolve their opposition to any States, a balance that it could not achieve likely to change these policies or end suspicions Option 2: Promote greater clearly, Iranians in the Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down in the Persian Gulf or Central Asia or on Israel domestic policies, although few Iranians seri- government strictures. through a conventional arms buildup.3 of American behavior. Nor is it clear that if Iran transparency.Iranian leaders, for the most Since September 11: public and private sectors what even he may acknowledge to be an in- and the peace process. Abdullah Nuri, a promi- ously propose dismantling the rule of the cler- Iranians genuinely fear encirclement Based on the foregoing analysis, we took some of these steps, the United States part, assume that the United States maintains a evitable process—the normalization of rela- nent pro-Khatami supporter, was jailed for, ics—vilayat-e faqih—entirely. Khatami repre- by the United States.Iran’s leaders—whether should be careful not to overplay the theme of large military force in the Gulf to monitor Missed Opportunity. . . are debating whether tions with Washington. among other things, questioning Iran’s contin- sents a transition phase as Iranians attempt to reformist or conservative, Persian nationalist or gridlock in explaining Iranian foreign policy Iran, not Iraq. They also assume that America The attacks on the World Trade Center there should be an Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and there- ued hostility to Israel. If Khatami’s rhetoric on Islamic extremist—view the world with trepida- behavior, as if some kind of resolution to the sanctions have delayed is intent upon militarizing relations with and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confus- opening to America fore decisions on foreign policy gestures or Israel has seemed more accommodating than tion. They see their country as encircled by real reformist-conservative struggle would suddenly but not denied Iran the Central Asia (where our military-to-military ing reactions in Iran. President Khatami of- moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort Khamenei’s, elements under his command conservative clerics and potential enemies: Iraq, which used chemi- transform the country’s attitudes toward the contacts with the new republics of the former ability to acquire fered his condolences to the families of the Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on have pursued and continue to pursue a policy continue to trump cal weapons against Tehran in the 8-year war; world beyond its borders. In fact, this analysis Soviet Union are highly visible). To prevent victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his will respect the wishes of the Palestinian social and cultural life and personal freedoms, much more consistent with Khamenei’s pro- Khatami’s efforts to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which host would argue that the contrary is true: that on unconventional weapon Iran from misinterpreting U.S. intentions and expression of sympathy to the mayor of New nation.” Khatami and former president or advance a more progressive foreign policy nouncements. In particular, Iran is directly and the U.S. military presence and deny their Shiah many strategic issues, what is often portrayed capabilities activities, especially in the Persian Gulf, Ameri- York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of since his first election in 1997, his conservative materially supporting Hamas and the Palestin- appoint a more liberal communities full rights; Pakistan, which is as gridlock more nearly approximates a con- can military activities should be as transparent signed the book of condolences opened at the comment before, and the formulation is critics—those labeled hard-liners outside ian Islamic Jihad, both of which claim respon- government or to pursue occasionally involved in hostile skirmishes with sensus shared by opposing camps—and not a as possible, consistent with the requirement for Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi Iran—have countered by closing reformist sibility for the spate of suicide bombings in reform Iran on their mutual border and has encour- dispute between them. would agree to begin the process of normaliza- operational security. Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous leader Saddam Hussein and deemed accept- newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters, Israel over the past several months. That such aged anti-Iranian activity in Afghanistan; and This is not to deny the possibility of de- tion. Certainly, Tehran would not venture down Recommendation: Employ confidence- demonstrations and chanted pro-American able in Western eyes. including the mayor of Tehran and a parlia- attacks—including the attack on teenagers at the Central Asian republics, once pro-Soviet, bates over foreign policy within the country. this path without clearindications of recogni- building measures,such as help in maritime slogans, in contrast to the standard, orches- Three final events have drawn attention to mentarian who denounced the conservative- a pizzeria in Tel Aviv—are clearly terrorism resolve the dilemma of how to effect change in now a source of economic opportunity, sectar- Many Iranians might be asking questions such tion and corresponding actions by Washington. mine clearance, an incidents-at-sea agreement, trated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s repre- dominated judiciary as undemocratic; and and not resistance to enemy occupation as the the system without changing systems. ian risk, and U.S. bases. Above all, the United as the following: What price has been paid for Several policy options might influence and joint rescue exercises; the gradual inclu- parliamentarians, including the head of the sentative to the United Nations, Mohammed calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in propaganda portrays could make it difficult for Iran’s leaders agree broadly on how States and Israel are viewed as enemies, with supporting Palestinian extremist organizations, Iran as the debate progresses in Iran and Amer- sion of Iran in regional security discussions; reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami Tehran or Washington to reach common best to defend the country’s national inter- Washington seen as keen to place pro-American such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic ica. These options are not mutually exclusive. and greater transparency in U.S. military Nabavi, called for normal relations with all several senators and representatives, including and reformist politicians were talking of condo- ground on either issue. As if to underscore this ests, territorial integrity, security, and inter- regimes in Baghdad and Kabul and to milita- Jihad? What has Iran gained from its long Option 1: Reshape containment.U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf/Central Asian countries except Israel. He previously had staunch supporters of Israel, raising specula- lences and the celebration of the “dialogue of point, in early January, Israel captured a boat national influence.The consensus includes rize Central Asia, while Israel is a nuclear- involvement in Lebanon? How close can containment policy placed sanctions on Iran region. Apply the success of the 6+2 Afghan expressed strong anti-American sentiments. tion that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S. civilizations” at the United Nations this year, carrying arms to the Palestinian Authority that Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Khatami, armed power determined to control Muslim Tehran get to the Arab autocrats of the Persian that include embargoes on trade and military security group to other regional security issues Probably most striking was the Iranian officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s For- Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject were allegedly supplied by Iran and its Expediency Council head Hashemi-Rafsanjani, holy places. They especially resent being kept on (or is it Arabian?) Gulf without diminishing its procurement and penalties for those providing involving Iranian and American interests. This response to an American letter of October 7, eign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the Lebanese surrogate, the militant wing of and other senior officials. Substantively, it the Department of State list of state sponsors of ties to and credibility with the regional Shiah investment and development assistance to Iran. would not amount to a security pact or Iran’s which assured Tehran that the United States point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Pow- United States. On October 12, for instance, he Hizballah. Details are sketchy, but the shipment spans Khatami’s call in 1997 for a dialogue of terrorism and worry that some influential communities? What does Iran risk by sponsor- Scholars and policy analysts disagree on the inclusion in an arrangement similar to the would respect Iranian airspace and territorial ell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2 accused America of “dragging the planet into could have been arranged by Iranian militant civilizations between the Islamic and non- Americans want regime change in Iran instead ing Islamic activism in Central Asia? Could it impact of sanctions, but one thing is clear: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or North integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S. Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently, global war” and hinted that those who even elements determined to embarrass Khatami in Islamic worlds, who and what should deter- of improved relations. Regardless of where they cost Iran Russian assistance in building new sanctions, including the arms embargo and Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); instead, it military personnel forced to land on Iranian Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former suggest dialogue should be removed from their the eyes of the United States.2 mine Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban, stand on the political spectrum, these leaders weapon programs and acquiring advanced efforts to block foreign loans to and investment could mean a new venue where tensions might territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser posts. He warned that “any negotiation with opposition to Israel and the peace process and share a common view of the threats to Iranian technology? Iran surely is not immune to the in Iran, have delayed but not denied Iran the be reduced without risk of military confronta- agreed to assist American pilots downed on to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently America is against the nation’s interest.” The Influences on Iranian support for Palestinian aspirations, and even security and of the kinds of measures necessary problem of having to resolve potentially con- ability to acquire unconventional weapon tion. The more predictable and transparent the Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of secretary general of the Expediency Council— judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no the conciliatory gestures made toward America to protect Iran. flicting priorities but certainly would attempt to capabilities, expertise, and technology. In fact, United States is in its military posture in the Decisionmaking food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan acknowledged that the two countries shared a Iranian official pursues relations with the since September 11. It also probably extends to Self-sufficiency shapes Iran’s strategic do so within the scope of its core concerns. low oil prices and domestic economic woes Gulf and the more continuity in policy before refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Hu- common interest in Afghanistan. According to United States. In thinking about the gridlock that char- decisions regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear and military thinking.Many Iranians, in- probably did more damage to the Iranian and after Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, manitarian cooperation had actually begun The New York Times,Rezai further suggested In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in acterizes the Iranian decisionmaking process, capability and acquisition of weapons of mass cluding some among the Revolutionary Guard, Charting a Way Ahead economy than did U.S.-imposed sanctions. the less value there will be to Iran in acquiring in late summer 2001 under United Nations thatbetter relations might be possible if the New York in October were more nuanced and we must keep in mind several factors that destruction, though that consensus is cloaked assume that eventually they will have to fight Moreover, demands for domestic spending on nuclear weapons. [UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for United States were to take the first step.1 balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he decisively influence Tehran’s view of its role in in ambiguity. As we have seen in the past, Iraq again and alone—just as they did from U.S. policy toward Iran sets the bar for subsidies, job creation, and economic infra- Option 3: Leverage NBC suppliers.If the opening of the UN General Assembly in called for an end to the bombing campaign in world affairs and the threat that it faces: Iran’s clerical leaders prefer a posture of calcu- 1980 to 1988—and that Iran must be able to normalization well above any level that Tehran structure in years of low oil prices did not preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons is Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that Nationalism is reemerging as a defin- lated ambiguity, whereas the United States defend itself. To meet challenges to its security, is likely to meet in the near future. America preclude spending on NBC technology. a top policy priority, then U.S. policy should the United Nations—and not the United ing element in the Islamic Republic.The era prefers contacts that are clear and transparent. Iran’s leaders believe that the country must be insists that Iran end its involvement in interna- Recommendation: Maintain military look for ways to prevent or discourage suppliers States—determine the post-Taliban govern- of revolutionary Islam as the driving force in Political gridlock in Tehran reveals the independent and self-sufficient in strategic and tional terrorism, foreswear opposition to the sanctions, drop economic sanctions.Encour- from making material and training available to Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National ment. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was the Republic is over. It ended with Iran’s accept- weakness of President Khatami and the tactical terms; must reassert Iran’s traditional Arab-Israeli peace process, and cease trying to age foreign investment in Iran’s domestic and Iran. This, of course, raises the difficult ques- Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East ance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, determination of conservatives not to make role of regional hegemon in the Gulf and acquire weapons of mass destruction. Under economic infrastructure. Special attention will tion of what price America may be prepared to via e-mail to [email protected]. No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 3 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 4 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 2 European Union ambassadors to Tehran. October, Khatami condemned Osama bin . . . Or Deliberate peace process, he repeated official criticism of which ended the war with Iraq; the creation of concessions to reformists.Conservative cler- beyond; and must have an enhanced capability this formulation, Iran would have to cut all have to be given to defining appropriate dual- Meanwhile, Iran continued its quest for new Laden and his supporters as extremists and Ambiguity? Israel, which he said was “founded on terror the Council of Expediency to determine whether ics—with their hold on the judiciary, military, to defend against any threat of military aggres- ties to Lebanon’s Hizballah, an organization use technology. Acquiescence to a pipeline and unconventional weapon systems and the terrorists, a “cult of fanatics who...could only and killings.” He called for recognition of the laws were in accordance with Islam and to rule and security services—continue to trump sion. To achieve this degree of capability and that it helped to create, as well as Hamas, project to carry Central Asian energy resources long-range missiles needed to deliver them. communicate with perceived opponents How much should we read into these rights of Palestinians, including the right of all over Islamic law to preserve the state; and the Khatami’s efforts to appoint a more liberal self-sufficiency, Iran must build its own mili- Palestine Islamic Jihad, and other global Is- would be an important signal of American Until Khatami’s election as president in 1997, through carnage and destruction.” He said signals, if that is what they are? Clearly, Irani- refugees to return to their land, the creation of revision of the constitution to allow government or to pursue reform with arrests of tary industries, reconstitute a modern military lamist groups determined to use violence to awareness of Iran’s economic needs. It also Iran made no discernible progress in extend- that there were no barriers to cultural or ans in the public and private sectors are debat- a Palestinian state with its capital in Jerusalem, Khamenei—not a Grand Ayatollah—to suc- reformists, especially those who support force, and rely minimally on foreign suppliers. realize their political ambitions.4Iran’s senior could reduce or avoid Iranian dependence on ing relations with Europe or its neighbors, and economic ties with the United States and, in ing whether there should be an opening to and the right of all the people of Palestine— ceed Khomeini. As noted above, power has Khatami, newspaper closures, and public This includes acquiring nuclear weapons to leaders may have stopped targeting U.S. per- Chinese investment in the energy sector of its the United States remained anathema. When an interview with The New York Times, America. Some scholars and analysts believe Muslim, Christian, and Jew—to decide their become more centered in the hands of the floggings. Khatami’s inability or unwillingness compensate for military weakness and relative sonnel and facilities directly in recent years, economy. Conversely, broadening the dialogue Khatami won his first landslide electoral hinted that Iran could accept whatever settle- that the reformists and conservatives are deeply own future. Supreme Leader and president since 1989. The to push for reforms alienates many supporters, strategic isolation. If Iraq or Israel has nuclear, but American efforts to persuade Iran not to on Iran with Europe beyond NBC weapons and presidential victory in 1997, America was still ment Yasser Arafat and the Palestinians divided over this issue, while others, including The seemingly softer statements of emphasis on the religious and revolutionary but it is not clear that a disaffected electorate biological, or chemical (NBC) capabilities, support militants opposed to the Arab-Israeli missile issues could help create conditions for locked into a containment mindset: Iran was a agreed upon. If all Palestinians accept Israel’s Iranian experts, claim that even the conserva- Khatami and Rafsanjani notwithstanding, definition of Iranian actions and policies has would be prepared to challenge the regime. then so must Iran. Tehran also probably views peace process and not to pursue a nuclear eventually moving beyond the Iran-Libya rogue state whose behavior had to be modified right to exist, he told the interviewer, then “we tives favor normalizing relations with the Iranian actions display more continuity than shifted to a somewhat less aggressive, more Many Iranians are war-weary and fearful of nuclear weapon systems as the only way to weapons program have had no discernible Sanctions Act, which was renewed by Congress before it could be accepted back into the inter- United States. They just do not want Khatami change. Tehran has not changed its basic nationalist version of Iranian governance and another revolutionary upheaval that would be reach strategic parity with Israel or the United effect. A change in Iranian leadership is un- for 5 years in summer 2001. national community. and the reformists to get the credit. Indeed, policies on opposing the U.S. military presence policy. National interest shapes foreign and unlikely to resolve their opposition to any States, a balance that it could not achieve likely to change these policies or end suspicions Option 2: Promote greater clearly, Iranians in the Khamenei’s strategy might be to slow down in the Persian Gulf or Central Asia or on Israel domestic policies, although few Iranians seri- government strictures. through a conventional arms buildup.3 of American behavior. Nor is it clear that if Iran transparency.Iranian leaders, for the most Since September 11: public and private sectors what even he may acknowledge to be an in- and the peace process. Abdullah Nuri, a promi- ously propose dismantling the rule of the cler- Iranians genuinely fear encirclement Based on the foregoing analysis, we took some of these steps, the United States part, assume that the United States maintains a evitable process—the normalization of rela- nent pro-Khatami supporter, was jailed for, ics—vilayat-e faqih—entirely. Khatami repre- by the United States.Iran’s leaders—whether should be careful not to overplay the theme of large military force in the Gulf to monitor Missed Opportunity. . . are debating whether tions with Washington. among other things, questioning Iran’s contin- sents a transition phase as Iranians attempt to reformist or conservative, Persian nationalist or gridlock in explaining Iranian foreign policy Iran, not Iraq. They also assume that America The attacks on the World Trade Center there should be an Nevertheless, Iranian politics—and there- ued hostility to Israel. If Khatami’s rhetoric on Islamic extremist—view the world with trepida- behavior, as if some kind of resolution to the sanctions have delayed is intent upon militarizing relations with and the Pentagon evoked contrary and confus- opening to America fore decisions on foreign policy gestures or Israel has seemed more accommodating than tion. They see their country as encircled by real reformist-conservative struggle would suddenly but not denied Iran the Central Asia (where our military-to-military ing reactions in Iran. President Khatami of- moves—are in virtual gridlock. For every effort Khamenei’s, elements under his command conservative clerics and potential enemies: Iraq, which used chemi- transform the country’s attitudes toward the contacts with the new republics of the former ability to acquire fered his condolences to the families of the Khatami has made to loosen the restrictions on have pursued and continue to pursue a policy continue to trump cal weapons against Tehran in the 8-year war; world beyond its borders. In fact, this analysis Soviet Union are highly visible). To prevent victims, and the mayor of Tehran sent his will respect the wishes of the Palestinian social and cultural life and personal freedoms, much more consistent with Khamenei’s pro- Khatami’s efforts to the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, which host would argue that the contrary is true: that on unconventional weapon Iran from misinterpreting U.S. intentions and expression of sympathy to the mayor of New nation.” Khatami and former president or advance a more progressive foreign policy nouncements. In particular, Iran is directly and the U.S. military presence and deny their Shiah many strategic issues, what is often portrayed capabilities activities, especially in the Persian Gulf, Ameri- York shortly after the attacks. Iranian officials Hashemi-Rafsanjani had made this type of since his first election in 1997, his conservative materially supporting Hamas and the Palestin- appoint a more liberal communities full rights; Pakistan, which is as gridlock more nearly approximates a con- can military activities should be as transparent signed the book of condolences opened at the comment before, and the formulation is critics—those labeled hard-liners outside ian Islamic Jihad, both of which claim respon- government or to pursue occasionally involved in hostile skirmishes with sensus shared by opposing camps—and not a as possible, consistent with the requirement for Swiss Embassy, which oversees U.S. interests in similar to one made in the 1980s by Iraqi Iran—have countered by closing reformist sibility for the spate of suicide bombings in reform Iran on their mutual border and has encour- dispute between them. would agree to begin the process of normaliza- operational security. Iran. Students held apparently spontaneous leader Saddam Hussein and deemed accept- newspapers; arresting Khatami supporters, Israel over the past several months. That such aged anti-Iranian activity in Afghanistan; and This is not to deny the possibility of de- tion. Certainly, Tehran would not venture down Recommendation: Employ confidence- demonstrations and chanted pro-American able in Western eyes. including the mayor of Tehran and a parlia- attacks—including the attack on teenagers at the Central Asian republics, once pro-Soviet, bates over foreign policy within the country. this path without clearindications of recogni- building measures,such as help in maritime slogans, in contrast to the standard, orches- Three final events have drawn attention to mentarian who denounced the conservative- a pizzeria in Tel Aviv—are clearly terrorism resolve the dilemma of how to effect change in now a source of economic opportunity, sectar- Many Iranians might be asking questions such tion and corresponding actions by Washington. mine clearance, an incidents-at-sea agreement, trated “Down with the U.S.” Several Iranian potential Iran-U.S. connections. Iran’s repre- dominated judiciary as undemocratic; and and not resistance to enemy occupation as the the system without changing systems. ian risk, and U.S. bases. Above all, the United as the following: What price has been paid for Several policy options might influence and joint rescue exercises; the gradual inclu- parliamentarians, including the head of the sentative to the United Nations, Mohammed calling for opposing U.S. initiatives in propaganda portrays could make it difficult for Iran’s leaders agree broadly on how States and Israel are viewed as enemies, with supporting Palestinian extremist organizations, Iran as the debate progresses in Iran and Amer- sion of Iran in regional security discussions; reformist Second of Khordad Party, Behzad Hadi Nejad-Hosseinian, met in October with Afghanistan and Central Asia. While Khatami Tehran or Washington to reach common best to defend the country’s national inter- Washington seen as keen to place pro-American such as Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic ica. These options are not mutually exclusive. and greater transparency in U.S. military Nabavi, called for normal relations with all several senators and representatives, including and reformist politicians were talking of condo- ground on either issue. As if to underscore this ests, territorial integrity, security, and inter- regimes in Baghdad and Kabul and to milita- Jihad? What has Iran gained from its long Option 1: Reshape containment.U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf/Central Asian countries except Israel. He previously had staunch supporters of Israel, raising specula- lences and the celebration of the “dialogue of point, in early January, Israel captured a boat national influence.The consensus includes rize Central Asia, while Israel is a nuclear- involvement in Lebanon? How close can containment policy placed sanctions on Iran region. Apply the success of the 6+2 Afghan expressed strong anti-American sentiments. tion that Tehran may be ready to extend U.S. civilizations” at the United Nations this year, carrying arms to the Palestinian Authority that Supreme Leader Khamenei, President Khatami, armed power determined to control Muslim Tehran get to the Arab autocrats of the Persian that include embargoes on trade and military security group to other regional security issues Probably most striking was the Iranian officials an invitation to visit Iran. Iran’s For- Supreme Leader Khamenei continued to reject were allegedly supplied by Iran and its Expediency Council head Hashemi-Rafsanjani, holy places. They especially resent being kept on (or is it Arabian?) Gulf without diminishing its procurement and penalties for those providing involving Iranian and American interests. This response to an American letter of October 7, eign Minister Kemal Kharazi made a special firmly and clearly the idea of dialogue with the Lebanese surrogate, the militant wing of and other senior officials. Substantively, it the Department of State list of state sponsors of ties to and credibility with the regional Shiah investment and development assistance to Iran. would not amount to a security pact or Iran’s which assured Tehran that the United States point of shaking Secretary of State Colin Pow- United States. On October 12, for instance, he Hizballah. Details are sketchy, but the shipment spans Khatami’s call in 1997 for a dialogue of terrorism and worry that some influential communities? What does Iran risk by sponsor- Scholars and policy analysts disagree on the inclusion in an arrangement similar to the would respect Iranian airspace and territorial ell’s hand before a meeting of the UN 6+2 accused America of “dragging the planet into could have been arranged by Iranian militant civilizations between the Islamic and non- Americans want regime change in Iran instead ing Islamic activism in Central Asia? Could it impact of sanctions, but one thing is clear: Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) or North integrity and asked for assistance for any U.S. Committee on Afghanistan. Most recently, global war” and hinted that those who even elements determined to embarrass Khatami in Islamic worlds, who and what should deter- of improved relations. Regardless of where they cost Iran Russian assistance in building new sanctions, including the arms embargo and Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); instead, it military personnel forced to land on Iranian Mohsen Rezai—a leading conservative, former suggest dialogue should be removed from their the eyes of the United States.2 mine Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban, stand on the political spectrum, these leaders weapon programs and acquiring advanced efforts to block foreign loans to and investment could mean a new venue where tensions might territory or who escaped to Iranian soil. Iran head of the Revolutionary Guard Corps, adviser posts. He warned that “any negotiation with opposition to Israel and the peace process and share a common view of the threats to Iranian technology? Iran surely is not immune to the in Iran, have delayed but not denied Iran the be reduced without risk of military confronta- agreed to assist American pilots downed on to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and currently America is against the nation’s interest.” The Influences on Iranian support for Palestinian aspirations, and even security and of the kinds of measures necessary problem of having to resolve potentially con- ability to acquire unconventional weapon tion. The more predictable and transparent the Iranian soil and to allow transshipment of secretary general of the Expediency Council— judiciary even set up a body to ensure that no the conciliatory gestures made toward America to protect Iran. flicting priorities but certainly would attempt to capabilities, expertise, and technology. In fact, United States is in its military posture in the Decisionmaking food and humanitarian supplies for Afghan acknowledged that the two countries shared a Iranian official pursues relations with the since September 11. It also probably extends to Self-sufficiency shapes Iran’s strategic do so within the scope of its core concerns. low oil prices and domestic economic woes Gulf and the more continuity in policy before refugees in northwestern Afghanistan. (Hu- common interest in Afghanistan. According to United States. In thinking about the gridlock that char- decisions regarding Iran’s pursuit of nuclear and military thinking.Many Iranians, in- probably did more damage to the Iranian and after Iran crosses the nuclear threshold, manitarian cooperation had actually begun The New York Times,Rezai further suggested In contrast, Khatami’s remarks while in acterizes the Iranian decisionmaking process, capability and acquisition of weapons of mass cluding some among the Revolutionary Guard, Charting a Way Ahead economy than did U.S.-imposed sanctions. the less value there will be to Iran in acquiring in late summer 2001 under United Nations thatbetter relations might be possible if the New York in October were more nuanced and we must keep in mind several factors that destruction, though that consensus is cloaked assume that eventually they will have to fight Moreover, demands for domestic spending on nuclear weapons. [UN] aegis.) During his visit to New York for United States were to take the first step.1 balanced, at least in style. In his UN speech, he decisively influence Tehran’s view of its role in in ambiguity. As we have seen in the past, Iraq again and alone—just as they did from U.S. policy toward Iran sets the bar for subsidies, job creation, and economic infra- Option 3: Leverage NBC suppliers.If the opening of the UN General Assembly in called for an end to the bombing campaign in world affairs and the threat that it faces: Iran’s clerical leaders prefer a posture of calcu- 1980 to 1988—and that Iran must be able to normalization well above any level that Tehran structure in years of low oil prices did not preventing the proliferation of NBC weapons is Afghanistan as soon as possible and urged that Nationalism is reemerging as a defin- lated ambiguity, whereas the United States defend itself. To meet challenges to its security, is likely to meet in the near future. America preclude spending on NBC technology. a top policy priority, then U.S. policy should the United Nations—and not the United ing element in the Islamic Republic.The era prefers contacts that are clear and transparent. Iran’s leaders believe that the country must be insists that Iran end its involvement in interna- Recommendation: Maintain military look for ways to prevent or discourage suppliers States—determine the post-Taliban govern- of revolutionary Islam as the driving force in Political gridlock in Tehran reveals the independent and self-sufficient in strategic and tional terrorism, foreswear opposition to the sanctions, drop economic sanctions.Encour- from making material and training available to Judith S. Yaphe is a senior research fellow in the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National ment. Yet, lest anyone think that Khatami was the Republic is over. It ended with Iran’s accept- weakness of President Khatami and the tactical terms; must reassert Iran’s traditional Arab-Israeli peace process, and cease trying to age foreign investment in Iran’s domestic and Iran. This, of course, raises the difficult ques- Defense University. Please direct any questions or comments to Dr. Yaphe at (202) 685–2224 or forward them suggesting a softer policy on the Middle East ance of UN Security Council Resolution 598, determination of conservatives not to make role of regional hegemon in the Gulf and acquire weapons of mass destruction. Under economic infrastructure. Special attention will tion of what price America may be prepared to via e-mail to [email protected]. No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 2 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 3 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 4 Panel 2 Panel 3 Panel 4 189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 1 Forum Strategic No.188 pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea ity in their own budding relations with Iran. To United States might also work on limited topics opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass January 2002 not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a be sure, they are not likely to support a policy of shared concern, support Iran for member- destruction? Other recent titles in the closer relationship with NATO or reassurances of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem ship in the World Trade Organization, and These are choices for U.S. policymakers in Institute for National Strategic Studies regarding American development of missile with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties expand Track II-type measures to include pursuit of Al Qaeda and its support networks. Strategic Forum series National Defense University defenses more important for Russia than selling to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants, They are factors that the United States needs to nuclear technology and expertise to Iran? security arrangement that would preclude a intellectuals, students, and academicians. consider as it weighs the merits of seeking Would China respond to expanded access to U.S presence in the Gulf. Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly normalization of relations with Iran, which is, U.S.-Iran Relations: markets or technology? Can North Korea afford Recommendation: Be prepared to offer another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that after all, an imperfect democracy with a reli- to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and expanded security guarantees and, if neces- it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapproche- giously based legal and political system. Once John F. Reichart other Middle Eastern countries that are looking sary, a smaller presence. How we identify the ment. This could work to Iranian and Ameri- our staunch friend, it has been our greatest Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: Normalization in the Future? to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed can advantage. America cannot choose which enemy in the region. Above all, it shares with A Neglected Challenge evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot the United States certain common interests and halts proliferators. There is, however, the dis- based international terrorists—will determine identify the good versus the bad or the demo- enemies—including Iraq and some forms of (No. 187, December 2001) by Judith S. Yaphe tinct danger that we will pay in influence or the size and shape of our presence through the cratically elected versus the undemocratically Islamic extremism, such as were exemplified treasure and that the suppliers will continue to selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business, by the Taliban in Afghanistan—that could provide the proscribed goods and services. U.S. policy could also aim not ours. What is important is that the contacts provide a bridge to greater regional security. Joseph McMillan Recommendation: Maintain strong be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our at renewing dialogue mysterious middlemen with their own agendas. Notes U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Anthony C. Zinni Key Points The Burden of History the Grand Ayatollah to the offices of the with Iran while at the 1Amy Waldman,The New York Times, December 10, Strategic Consensus A Military for the 21stCentury: Lessons Supreme Leader, a cleric chosen by Khomeini partners in the war against global terrorism Since the establishment of the Islamic that support for the war does not excuse weapon same time seeking to Conclusions 2001, A10. (No. 186, November 2001) from the Recent Past Since World War II, few countries have Republic of Iran in 1979, the United States has to serve for life, and to the secular (but still proliferation or assistance to Iran in building minimize the value of conduit2 fMoro sati dIr aton iPaanl esshtiinpimanen ftasc ttoio snusp opplyp oHsiezdb atoll athhe— petahcee (No. 181, July 2001) been of greater strategic concern to tried to find a framework for understanding clerical) president, both of whom lacked the NBC or long-range missile capabilities. Iran has always raised hard choices for process—are delivered by air through Damascus. Michael E. Marti the United States than Iran. Whether as this enigmatic country. America defended its charisma and credentials of a Grand Ayatollah. Option 4: Provide additional military Iran’s acquiring uncon- the United States, and more so than ever since 3Iran began its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in China: Making the Case for Eugene B. Rumer and a dependable friend and preeminent regional commitments to help an ailing Shah in exile In addition, Iran began looking toward the aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf ventional weapons September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created particular a nuclear capability, under the Shah in the 1970s, at Realistic Engagement Richard D. Sokolsky partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has but was ill prepared to deal with the crises that Gulf and Europe for commercial contacts, Arab governments to deter capricious behav- an opportunity to engage some governments roughly the same time that Iraq embarked on its NBC acquisi- (No. 185, September 2001) Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations occupied a special place in U.S. security raged in and around Iran in the 1980s: U.S. financial investment, and diplomatic networks. ior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf next decade. An international agreement to with whom the United States has long been at tKioonre aefnfo-drtess.i gIrnaend’ sS acucqdu misiitsisoilness ,i nacs lwudelel Rasu csshieamn-i caanld a Nndo rbthiologi- (No. 180, April 2001) thinking. It exerts influence on a range of diplomats were held hostage in Tehran for 444 Meanwhile, U.S. containment of Iran became odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to important policy issues—from the Middle more institutionalized. Iran was to be kept in will be required for some time. The desire to assure international access to the Strait of cal weapons. Russia is building at least one and possibly as many Kori N. Schake days, militant clerics tried to export revolution- reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced Hormuz might ease American concerns about U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound as three nuclear power plants at Busheyr and is providing Do European Union Defense Initiatives Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler East peace process to post-Taliban ary Islamic governance across the Gulf, and isolation under sanctions until it renounced against the political and deterrent value of a Iranian plans to close the strait to international friends that could be inconsistent with other, nuclear training and technology to Iranian scientists. Iran’s Threaten NATO? Revising the Two-Major Theater Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear Iraq invaded Iran, ostensibly to stave off a support for international terrorism, stopped longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives. newest missile—the Shahab-3—has a range of 1,200 kilome- weapons capability within the next decade, opposing the Middle East peace process, and visible American military presence in the Gulf. shipping, though the negotiability and impact Should cooperation in the war on global terror- ters, putting targets in Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf (No. 184, August 2001) War Standard it could become a significant factor driving Shiah Islamist tidal wave. ceased efforts to acquire weapons of mass Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a of a measure would need close study. within its reach. See Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe,The (No. 179, April 2001) During this period, U.S. policy toward Iran ism override objections to a regime’s lack of U.S. and regional government policies on destruction. Iran responded with demands that much stronger regional power would add to the Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington, M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and was relatively uncomplicated. Iran under the democratic standards, suppression of dissent proliferation. the U.S. military pull out of the Gulf, repay incentives for proliferation by suggesting that an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). Richard D. Sokolsky Richard D. Sokolsky mullahs had tilted the balance of power in the and human rights, or repression of minority 4Key elements here are alleged Iranian support for the Since September 11, there has been Iran the money owed it from the time of the the United States will reduce its presence in U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dia- Regional Conflicts with Strategic Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Gulf by threatening its neighbors, encouraging groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same cate- Khobar Towers terrorists, who may have fled to Iran after that much speculation in both countries about the Revolution and under dispute at the Hague, response to governments acquiring nuclear logue with Iran while at the same time seeking gory as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a operation in 1996, and the safe haven Iran accorded the Lebanese Consequences Control Policy possibility of a new opening in relations. Like antiregime liberation groups, and supporting and stop trying to subvert its government. weapons capability; maintaining a determined to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring putative U.S. partner that does not support Hizballah terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah and his cohorts, (No. 183, July 2001) (No. 178, February 2001) America, Iran wants an Iraq without Saddam terrorist groups determined not only to over- Most European governments publicly presence would demonstrate to Iran that the unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy who orchestrated U.S. and Kuwaiti airplane hijackings and U.S. throw so-called anachronistic regimes but also international terrorism but is burdened by a Hussein, Afghanistan under a stable govern- criticized American policy as too restrictive but United States takes its security commitments has inhibited some countries and companies history of questionable human rights practices and European hostage takings in Lebanon in the 1980s. John C. Holzman M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky ment, and Central Asia absent Russian con- to eliminate foreign presence from the region privately hoped that it would continue so that seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their from doing business in and providing loans to by targeting American, British, and French and suppression of religious and political A Golden Opportunity: The Next The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: trol of borders and resources. Yet dramatic Europe could avoid unwanted competition. security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rap- Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of interests. Iran was branded a pariah and em- minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations Issues for the New Adminstration breakthroughs in U.S.-Iran relations appear Their response was critical dialogue, which prochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its engagement of other governments with Iran is bargoed from receiving outside military or now an adversary, stained by a history of sup- (No. 182, July 2001) (No. 177, February 2001) unlikely. Iran’s reformist and conservative they viewed as a means to trade and recover partners in the GCC are consumers of security, diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking investment assistance. This policy would later porting international terrorism. Moreover, camps may be actively debating whether assets while engaging the Iranians in discus- vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would be called containment. In the 1980s, it meant indicators of popular unrest—including stu- For on-line access to Strategic Forum,go to: rapprochement with the United States is in sion on disagreeable issues, including some neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of seem more productive than trying unilaterally helping Iraq in the 8-year war, reflagging Gulf dent demonstrations comparing the mullahs to http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html Tehran’s future, but no signs indicate that the human rights cases, the status of the Iranian Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that to sustain the current containment. shipping, banning arms sales to Iran, and the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling conditions for achieving normalcy would be opposition in Europe, and the Middle East threatening neighbors cannot be ignored. Recommendation: Tone down rhetori- trying to free nearly two dozen Western popular yearnings for political change so minimally acceptable to Washington. peace process. Critical dialogue, however, fell Memories fade fast in this region, however, and cal references to Iran as a rogue state. Ac- hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorist factions strong that they are not being suppressed by U.S. options must encompass several victim to ineffectual Iranian and European most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to knowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by factors that shape decisionmaking in today’s in Lebanon. U.S. efforts to find a “moderate” diplomacy, as well as to revelations in a Ger- reertau—rn bteof othree Bpaoglihcideasd o’sf ian sviamsipolne ro, fd iKsutawnatit and preegrcioenptailo fnosr uanmd (gnivoitn tgh eit G aC vCo)i cwe oiunl da anlelwow fWroomul dth aen S Aumpreermicea nL epaodleicry a tnhda tt hpeu bplriecsliyd eennt-. bsFtoorroa kitnesfg,o ymr,m odanetofiegonrnas eop nhp soN, lDaicnUyd ,P arrenepdso snr tvasit sioointn tanhlae mt iWoilneitabal r ssyie tsect ruaartti:etygy. mofrtoehmmer bt shecirssh ocolofa utrhnset ar yNn daa ntsidop neaacblir aoDlaiesdfte.s nT ishnee n Uoapntiiionvneioarnsl isst,ye c caousnr cwitlyue asllif ofaansisrs, Isreanns: uths ea mrisoen go fl ePaedrseirasn o nna ftoioreniaglnis amn,d t hsee ccuorni-ty Ithraanni aan “ lreaaddicear lw” iwthe rweh momet wit ictho uslcdo rdne.al rather mersa nh acdo uarptproroovmed t hteartr osernisito or pIerraantiiaonn sl einad- al before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the Iran the political, economic, and strategic http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are issues, the weakness of President Mohammad After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in c couraged or offered moral support to the gov- Europe. This development led to the i Gwuilll fn inot ictsh iamngaeg eif. Tanhdis wcohmenp lIaracenn ccryo pssreosb tahbely iunntderearscctioorne tIhraaqt ’ist csoenektisn, uwehdi lies oallastoio sner. vIitn agl stoo elervnemraegnet iinn dTeeahlrinang wgaitihn ath ree gUinmitee dst iSltla ctaeps aabnlye pJhotrtoipnd:tu/ /Ccwehwsie Jwfso. diontfit c SF.tmoarficfl;/e dt hQoecu tajroriutnerern/lajyelf lco/jarf nqth _bepe uC abhcsac/iirenmsdsaeenxd .oh aft mtt:h.e ttahhgoees nveic eoyw fo tsfh otehf ect ohFneet dDrieebrpuaatlo rGrtmso vaeennrdtn omdfo eD nnetof.et nnseec eosrs aanryil yo trheeflrect Ktoh raetafomrmi i,n f ethaers f aocf ee nocf icrcolnesmeervnat,t iavned o ab sbtiaacsles 1a9tt8it9u,d Iirnaanl bshegifatsn— a spormocee spse orcf eipntsitbitlue,t isoonmael and iinstdeirc Atmli eFnatl loafh Iinatne lalingde,n icne Min- Critie s nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf would set the agenda and terms of engagement of significant internal repression? Should the INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE toward self-sufficiency in defense posture. imperceptible, especially to the American eye. turn, Iran’s refusal to 1 er governments are aware that their security ties on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode American policy can open a door, but Tehran The focus of power shifted from the person of 1 S war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies allow the return of to the United States allow them greater flexibil- make demands based on a nuclear status. The Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor must decide if and when to walk through it. 9/ s e - t u No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 6 No. 188, January 2002 s s o s P I Panel 5 Panel 6 Panel 1 189-773_SF188.qxd 2/6/02 9:22 AM Page 1 Forum Strategic No.188 pay to convince Russia, China, and North Korea ity in their own budding relations with Iran. To United States might also work on limited topics opposing the proliferation of weapons of mass January 2002 not to continue aiding Iran. For example, is a be sure, they are not likely to support a policy of shared concern, support Iran for member- destruction? Other recent titles in the closer relationship with NATO or reassurances of preemptive strikes to lessen their problem ship in the World Trade Organization, and These are choices for U.S. policymakers in Institute for National Strategic Studies regarding American development of missile with Iran. On the other hand, even as their ties expand Track II-type measures to include pursuit of Al Qaeda and its support networks. Strategic Forum series National Defense University defenses more important for Russia than selling to Iran expand, they will not join Iran in a contacts with lower-level Iranian civil servants, They are factors that the United States needs to nuclear technology and expertise to Iran? security arrangement that would preclude a intellectuals, students, and academicians. consider as it weighs the merits of seeking Would China respond to expanded access to U.S presence in the Gulf. Afghanistan’s future after the Taliban is clearly normalization of relations with Iran, which is, U.S.-Iran Relations: markets or technology? Can North Korea afford Recommendation: Be prepared to offer another such issue. Baghdad will perceive that after all, an imperfect democracy with a reli- to forego profits from missile sales to Iran and expanded security guarantees and, if neces- it is the target of a new Iranian-U.S. rapproche- giously based legal and political system. Once John F. Reichart other Middle Eastern countries that are looking sary, a smaller presence. How we identify the ment. This could work to Iranian and Ameri- our staunch friend, it has been our greatest Adversary Use of NBC Weapons: Normalization in the Future? to upgrade weapons capabilities? There is no regional security threat—an NBC-rearmed can advantage. America cannot choose which enemy in the region. Above all, it shares with A Neglected Challenge evidence to suggest that leveraging suppliers Iraq, a resurgent and nuclear Iran, regionally Iranians with whom it will deal. We cannot the United States certain common interests and halts proliferators. There is, however, the dis- based international terrorists—will determine identify the good versus the bad or the demo- enemies—including Iraq and some forms of (No. 187, December 2001) by Judith S. Yaphe tinct danger that we will pay in influence or the size and shape of our presence through the cratically elected versus the undemocratically Islamic extremism, such as were exemplified treasure and that the suppliers will continue to selected leaders of Iran. That is Iran’s business, by the Taliban in Afghanistan—that could provide the proscribed goods and services. U.S. policy could also aim not ours. What is important is that the contacts provide a bridge to greater regional security. Joseph McMillan Recommendation: Maintain strong be clear and unambiguous and not brokered by counterproliferation policy. Make clear to our at renewing dialogue mysterious middlemen with their own agendas. Notes U.S.-Saudi Relations: Rebuilding the Anthony C. Zinni Key Points The Burden of History the Grand Ayatollah to the offices of the with Iran while at the 1Amy Waldman,The New York Times, December 10, Strategic Consensus A Military for the 21stCentury: Lessons Supreme Leader, a cleric chosen by Khomeini partners in the war against global terrorism Since the establishment of the Islamic that support for the war does not excuse weapon same time seeking to Conclusions 2001, A10. (No. 186, November 2001) from the Recent Past Since World War II, few countries have Republic of Iran in 1979, the United States has to serve for life, and to the secular (but still proliferation or assistance to Iran in building minimize the value of conduit2 fMoro sati dIr aton iPaanl esshtiinpimanen ftasc ttoio snusp opplyp oHsiezdb atoll athhe— petahcee (No. 181, July 2001) been of greater strategic concern to tried to find a framework for understanding clerical) president, both of whom lacked the NBC or long-range missile capabilities. Iran has always raised hard choices for process—are delivered by air through Damascus. Michael E. Marti the United States than Iran. Whether as this enigmatic country. America defended its charisma and credentials of a Grand Ayatollah. Option 4: Provide additional military Iran’s acquiring uncon- the United States, and more so than ever since 3Iran began its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction, in China: Making the Case for Eugene B. Rumer and a dependable friend and preeminent regional commitments to help an ailing Shah in exile In addition, Iran began looking toward the aid or other security guarantees to the Gulf ventional weapons September 11. Clearly, the attacks have created particular a nuclear capability, under the Shah in the 1970s, at Realistic Engagement Richard D. Sokolsky partner or as an implacable enemy, Iran has but was ill prepared to deal with the crises that Gulf and Europe for commercial contacts, Arab governments to deter capricious behav- an opportunity to engage some governments roughly the same time that Iraq embarked on its NBC acquisi- (No. 185, September 2001) Normalizing U.S.-Russian Relations occupied a special place in U.S. security raged in and around Iran in the 1980s: U.S. financial investment, and diplomatic networks. ior by Iran. A U.S. military presence in the Gulf next decade. An international agreement to with whom the United States has long been at tKioonre aefnfo-drtess.i gIrnaend’ sS acucqdu misiitsisoilness ,i nacs lwudelel Rasu csshieamn-i caanld a Nndo rbthiologi- (No. 180, April 2001) thinking. It exerts influence on a range of diplomats were held hostage in Tehran for 444 Meanwhile, U.S. containment of Iran became odds. By the same token, they raise the risk to important policy issues—from the Middle more institutionalized. Iran was to be kept in will be required for some time. The desire to assure international access to the Strait of cal weapons. Russia is building at least one and possibly as many Kori N. Schake days, militant clerics tried to export revolution- reduce force vulnerability needs to be balanced Hormuz might ease American concerns about U.S. policy of Faustian bargains with newfound as three nuclear power plants at Busheyr and is providing Do European Union Defense Initiatives Hans Binnendijk and Richard L. Kugler East peace process to post-Taliban ary Islamic governance across the Gulf, and isolation under sanctions until it renounced against the political and deterrent value of a Iranian plans to close the strait to international friends that could be inconsistent with other, nuclear training and technology to Iranian scientists. Iran’s Threaten NATO? Revising the Two-Major Theater Afghanistan—and when it acquires nuclear Iraq invaded Iran, ostensibly to stave off a support for international terrorism, stopped longer-term U.S. policy interests and objectives. newest missile—the Shahab-3—has a range of 1,200 kilome- weapons capability within the next decade, opposing the Middle East peace process, and visible American military presence in the Gulf. shipping, though the negotiability and impact Should cooperation in the war on global terror- ters, putting targets in Turkey, Israel, Iraq, and the Persian Gulf (No. 184, August 2001) War Standard it could become a significant factor driving Shiah Islamist tidal wave. ceased efforts to acquire weapons of mass Pulling back U.S. forces as Iran becomes a of a measure would need close study. within its reach. See Kori N. Schake and Judith S. Yaphe,The (No. 179, April 2001) During this period, U.S. policy toward Iran ism override objections to a regime’s lack of U.S. and regional government policies on destruction. Iran responded with demands that much stronger regional power would add to the Option 5: Promote limited dialogue. As Strategic Implications of a Nuclear-Armed Iran (Washington, M. Elaine Bunn, David E. Mosher, and was relatively uncomplicated. Iran under the democratic standards, suppression of dissent proliferation. the U.S. military pull out of the Gulf, repay incentives for proliferation by suggesting that an adjunct to a reshaped containment posture, DC: National Defense University Press, 2001). Richard D. Sokolsky Richard D. Sokolsky mullahs had tilted the balance of power in the and human rights, or repression of minority 4Key elements here are alleged Iranian support for the Since September 11, there has been Iran the money owed it from the time of the the United States will reduce its presence in U.S. policy could also aim at renewing dia- Regional Conflicts with Strategic Renovating U.S. Strategic Arms Gulf by threatening its neighbors, encouraging groups? Granted, Iran is not in the same cate- Khobar Towers terrorists, who may have fled to Iran after that much speculation in both countries about the Revolution and under dispute at the Hague, response to governments acquiring nuclear logue with Iran while at the same time seeking gory as Russia, Uzbekistan, or China (that is, a operation in 1996, and the safe haven Iran accorded the Lebanese Consequences Control Policy possibility of a new opening in relations. Like antiregime liberation groups, and supporting and stop trying to subvert its government. weapons capability; maintaining a determined to minimize the value of Iran’s acquiring putative U.S. partner that does not support Hizballah terrorist mastermind Imad Mughniyah and his cohorts, (No. 183, July 2001) (No. 178, February 2001) America, Iran wants an Iraq without Saddam terrorist groups determined not only to over- Most European governments publicly presence would demonstrate to Iran that the unconventional weapons. U.S. sanctions policy who orchestrated U.S. and Kuwaiti airplane hijackings and U.S. throw so-called anachronistic regimes but also international terrorism but is burdened by a Hussein, Afghanistan under a stable govern- criticized American policy as too restrictive but United States takes its security commitments has inhibited some countries and companies history of questionable human rights practices and European hostage takings in Lebanon in the 1980s. John C. Holzman M. Elaine Bunn and Richard D. Sokolsky ment, and Central Asia absent Russian con- to eliminate foreign presence from the region privately hoped that it would continue so that seriously and signal to the Gulf States that their from doing business in and providing loans to by targeting American, British, and French and suppression of religious and political A Golden Opportunity: The Next The U.S. Strategic Posture Review: trol of borders and resources. Yet dramatic Europe could avoid unwanted competition. security is not the price of a U.S.-Iran rap- Iran, but our ability to dictate the terms of interests. Iran was branded a pariah and em- minorities). Iran is different: once a friend, it is Steps in U.S.-Indian Relations Issues for the New Adminstration breakthroughs in U.S.-Iran relations appear Their response was critical dialogue, which prochement. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and its engagement of other governments with Iran is bargoed from receiving outside military or now an adversary, stained by a history of sup- (No. 182, July 2001) (No. 177, February 2001) unlikely. Iran’s reformist and conservative they viewed as a means to trade and recover partners in the GCC are consumers of security, diminishing rapidly. A new course of seeking investment assistance. This policy would later porting international terrorism. Moreover, camps may be actively debating whether assets while engaging the Iranians in discus- vulnerable to attack from larger, more powerful greater, albeit limited, contact with Iran would be called containment. In the 1980s, it meant indicators of popular unrest—including stu- For on-line access to Strategic Forum,go to: rapprochement with the United States is in sion on disagreeable issues, including some neighbors. The memory of Iraq’s invasion of seem more productive than trying unilaterally helping Iraq in the 8-year war, reflagging Gulf dent demonstrations comparing the mullahs to http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/h6.html Tehran’s future, but no signs indicate that the human rights cases, the status of the Iranian Kuwait should be sufficient reminder that to sustain the current containment. shipping, banning arms sales to Iran, and the Taliban—suggest that the regime is stifling conditions for achieving normalcy would be opposition in Europe, and the Middle East threatening neighbors cannot be ignored. Recommendation: Tone down rhetori- trying to free nearly two dozen Western popular yearnings for political change so minimally acceptable to Washington. peace process. Critical dialogue, however, fell Memories fade fast in this region, however, and cal references to Iran as a rogue state. Ac- hostages held by pro-Iranian terrorist factions strong that they are not being suppressed by U.S. options must encompass several victim to ineffectual Iranian and European most Arabs have an overwhelming desire to knowledging Iran’s strategic weight and threat arrests, trials, public floggings, or warnings The Institute for National Strategic Studies publishes The Strategic Forum series presents original research by factors that shape decisionmaking in today’s in Lebanon. U.S. efforts to find a “moderate” diplomacy, as well as to revelations in a Ger- reertau—rn bteof othree Bpaoglihcideasd o’sf ian sviamsipolne ro, fd iKsutawnatit and preegrcioenptailo fnosr uanmd (gnivoitn tgh eit G aC vCo)i cwe oiunl da anlelwow fWroomul dth aen S Aumpreermicea nL epaodleicry a tnhda tt hpeu bplriecsliyd eennt-. bsFtoorroa kitnesfg,o ymr,m odanetofiegonrnas eop nhp soN, lDaicnUyd ,P arrenepdso snr tvasit sioointn tanhlae mt iWoilneitabal r ssyie tsect ruaartti:etygy. mofrtoehmmer bt shecirssh ocolofa utrhnset ar yNn daa ntsidop neaacblir aoDlaiesdfte.s nT ishnee n Uoapntiiionvneioarnsl isst,ye c caousnr cwitlyue asllif ofaansisrs, Isreanns: uths ea mrisoen go fl ePaedrseirasn o nna ftoioreniaglnis amn,d t hsee ccuorni-ty Ithraanni aan “ lreaaddicear lw” iwthe rweh momet wit ictho uslcdo rdne.al rather mersa nh acdo uarptproroovmed t hteartr osernisito or pIerraantiiaonn sl einad- al before an Islamic Iran sought to remake the Iran the political, economic, and strategic http://www.ndu.edu/inss/press/ndup2.html. INSS also and recommendations expressed or implied within are issues, the weakness of President Mohammad After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in c couraged or offered moral support to the gov- Europe. This development led to the i Gwuilll fn inot ictsh iamngaeg eif. Tanhdis wcohmenp lIaracenn ccryo pssreosb tahbely iunntderearscctioorne tIhraaqt ’ist csoenektisn, uwehdi lies oallastoio sner. vIitn agl stoo elervnemraegnet iinn dTeeahlrinang wgaitihn ath ree gUinmitee dst iSltla ctaeps aabnlye pJhotrtoipnd:tu/ /Ccwehwsie Jwfso. diontfit c SF.tmoarficfl;/e dt hQoecu tajroriutnerern/lajyelf lco/jarf nqth _bepe uC abhcsac/iirenmsdsaeenxd .oh aft mtt:h.e ttahhgoees nveic eoyw fo tsfh otehf ect ohFneet dDrieebrpuaatlo rGrtmso vaeennrdtn omdfo eD nnetof.et nnseec eosrs aanryil yo trheeflrect Ktoh raetafomrmi i,n f ethaers f aocf ee nocf icrcolnesmeervnat,t iavned o ab sbtiaacsles 1a9tt8it9u,d Iirnaanl bshegifatsn— a spormocee spse orcf eipntsitbitlue,t isoonmael and iinstdeirc Atmli eFnatl loafh Iinatne lalingde,n icne Min- Critie s nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the Arab Gulf would set the agenda and terms of engagement of significant internal repression? Should the INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES PUBLICATION DIRECTORATE toward self-sufficiency in defense posture. imperceptible, especially to the American eye. turn, Iran’s refusal to 1 er governments are aware that their security ties on the basis of Iran’s behavior before it tries to Stephen J. Flanagan James A. Schear Robert A. Silano William R. Bode American policy can open a door, but Tehran The focus of power shifted from the person of 1 S war on global terrorism supercede U.S. policies allow the return of to the United States allow them greater flexibil- make demands based on a nuclear status. The Director Director of Research Director of Publications General Editor must decide if and when to walk through it. 9/ s e - t u No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 5 No. 188, January 2002 Strategic Forum 6 No. 188, January 2002 s s o s P I Panel 5 Panel 6 Panel 1