United States Marine Corps Command and Staff College Marine Corps University 2076 South Street Marine Corps Combat Development Command Quantico, Virginia 22134-5068 MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES OPERATION RÖSSELSPRUNG AND THE ELIMINATION OF TITO, 25 MAY 1944: A FAILURE IN PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF MILITARY STUDIES AUTHOR: Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre, Canadian Army Academic Year 2001-2002 Mentor: Doctor Richard L. DiNardo Approved: __________________ Date: _______________________ Mentor: Lieutenant-Colonel Jon S. Lehr, USA Approved: __________________ Date: _______________________ REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE FormApprovedOMBNo. 0704-0188 Publicreportingburderforthiscollectionofinformationisestibatedtoaverage1hourperresponse,includingthetimeforreviewinginstructions,searchingexistingdatasources,gatheringandmaintainingthedataneeded,andcompleting andreviewingthiscollectionofinformation.Sendcommentsregardingthisburdenestimateoranyotheraspectofthiscollectionofinformation,includingsuggestionsforreducingthisburdertoDepartmentofDefense,Washington HeadquartersServices,DirectorateforInformationOperationsandReports(0704-0188),1215JeffersonDavisHighway,Suite1204,Arlington,VA22202-4302.Respondentsshouldbeawarethatnotwithstandinganyotherprovisionof law,nopersonshallbesubjecttoanypenaltyforfailingtocomplywithacollectionofinformationifitdoesnotdisplayacurrentlyvalidOMBcontrolnumber.PLEASEDONOTRETURNYOURFORMTOTHEABOVEADDRESS. 1.REPORTDATE(DD-MM-YYYY) 2.REPORTTYPE 3.DATESCOVERED(FROM-TO) 01-07-2002 Studentresearchpaper xx-xx-2001toxx-xx-2002 4.TITLEANDSUBTITLE 5a.CONTRACTNUMBER OperationRosselsprungandtheEliminationofTito,25May1944:AFailureinPlanning 5b.GRANTNUMBER andIntelligenceSupport 5c.PROGRAMELEMENTNUMBER Unclassified 6.AUTHOR(S) 5d.PROJECTNUMBER Eyre,WayneD.; 5e.TASKNUMBER 5f.WORKUNITNUMBER 7.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONNAMEANDADDRESS 8.PERFORMINGORGANIZATIONREPORT USMCCommandandStaffCollege NUMBER 2076SouthStreet MCCDC Quantico,VA22134-5068 9.SPONSORING/MONITORINGAGENCYNAMEANDADDRESS 10.SPONSOR/MONITOR'SACRONYM(S) USMCCommandandStaffCollege 11.SPONSOR/MONITOR'SREPORT 2076SouthStreet NUMBER(S) MCCDC Quantico,VA22134-5068 12.DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITYSTATEMENT APUBLICRELEASE , 13.SUPPLEMENTARYNOTES 14.ABSTRACT Seereport. 15.SUBJECTTERMS 16.SECURITYCLASSIFICATIONOF: 17.LIMITATION 18. 19.NAMEOFRESPONSIBLEPERSON OFABSTRACT NUMBER EM114,(blank) PublicRelease [email protected] 59 a.REPORT b.ABSTRACT c.THISPAGE 19b.TELEPHONENUMBER Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified InternationalAreaCode AreaCodeTelephoneNumber 703767-9007 DSN 427-9007 StandardForm298(Rev.8-98) PrescribedbyANSIStdZ39.18 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE FORM APPROVED - - - OMB NO. 0704-0188 public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters services, directorate for information operations and reports, 1215 Jefferson davis highway, suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the office of management and budget, paperwork reduction project (0704-0188) Washington, dc 20503 1. AGENCY USE ONLY (LEAVE BLANK) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED STUDENT RESEARCH PAPER 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5. FUNDING NUMBERS OPERATION RÖSSELSPRUNG AND THE ELIMINATION OF N/A TITO, 25 MAY 1944: A FAILURE IN PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT 6. AUTHOR(S) Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre, Canadian Army 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER USMC COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE NONE 2076 SOUTH STREET, MCCDC, QUANTICO, VA 22134-5068 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER: SAME AS #7. NONE 11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES NONE 12A. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12B. DISTRIBUTION CODE NO RESTRICTIONS N/A 13. ABSTRACT (MAXIMUM 200 WORDS) Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG was a Second World War German operation conducted in Bosnia, which aimed at eliminating the leadership of the Partisan movement, namely Marshal Josip-Broz Tito. It failed due to mediocre intelligence support and inadequate tactical level planning. Intelligence shortfalls were rooted primarily in poor German inter-organization relations and cooperation, including the sharing of intelligence, which resulted in missed opportunities and a failure to pinpoint Tito’s location with sufficient precision. Given the quality of intelligence provided, the plan for the airborne assault did not include sufficient flexibility for the execution of contingencies. There are three major conclusions that are applicable to contemporary operations. Firstly, the degree of intelligence certainty is critical in determining both the size of the force and the extent of the objective area in a direct action raid. Secondly, there is a requirement for contingency planning in these operations. Finally, it is vital that different intelligence organizations that are pursuing a similar goal, especially in the same theatre of operations, cooperate to the greatest extent possible. 14. SUBJECT TERMS (KEY WORDS ON WHICH TO PERFORM SEARCH) 15. NUMBER OF PAGES: 59 Operation Rosselsprung Operation Knight’s Move 16. PRICE CODE: N/A Second World War parachute operations 17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT 18. SECURITY 19. SECURITY 20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE: ABSTRACT UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED DISCLAIMER THE OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS EXPRESSED HEREIN ARE THOSE OF THE INDIVIDUAL STUDENT AUTHOR AND DO NOT NECESSARILY REPRESENT THE VIEWS OF EITHER THE MARINE CORPS COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE OR ANY OTHER GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY. REFERENCES TO THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOREGOING STATEMENT. QUOTATION FROM, ABSTRACTION FROM, OR REPRODUCTION OF ALL OR ANY PART OF THIS DOCUMENT IS PERMITTED PROVIDED PROPER ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IS MADE. TABLE OF CONTENTS Page Executive Summary…………………………………………………………………..1 Introduction…………………………………………………………………………...2 Background…………………………………………………………………………....3 Analysis of Failure…………………………………………………………………...24 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………………..43 Annex A - Excepts from XV Mountain Corps Operation Order …………………....49 Bibliography……………………………………………………………………..…..52 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Title: OPERATION RÖSSELSPRUNG AND THE ELIMINATION OF TITO, 25 MAY 1944: A FAILURE IN PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT Author: Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre, Canadian Army Thesis: Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG failed due to mediocre intelligence support and inadequate tactical level planning. Discussion: Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG was a Second World War German operation conducted in Bosnia, which aimed at eliminating the leadership of the Partisan movement, namely Marshal Josip-Broz Tito. It was a direct action raid, which involved an airborne (parachute and glider) assault by 500 SS Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Battalion on the suspected site of Tito’s Headquarters and a subsequent linkup with the German XV Mountain Corps converging from all directions. Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG failed due to mediocre intelligence support and inadequate tactical level planning. Intelligence shortfalls were rooted primarily in poor German inter-organization relations and cooperation, including the sharing of intelligence, which resulted in missed opportunities and a failure to pinpoint Tito’s location with sufficient precision. Given the quality of intelligence provided, the plan for the airborne assault did not include sufficient flexibility for the execution of contingencies. Conclusions: There are three major conclusions from the failure of this operation that can be applied to contemporary operations of a similar nature: The first deals with tactics to be employed in the face of uncertain intelligence. The degree of intelligence certainty is critical in determining both the size of the force and the extent of the objective area in a direct action raid. The second is the requirement for contingency planning. Contingency planning provides commanders with flexibility once an operation has commenced to deal with the unexpected, and is especially vital in the face of uncertain intelligence. The third, and probably most critical, concerns the importance of interagency intelligence cooperation. It is vital that different intelligence organizations that are pursuing a similar goal, especially in the same theatre of operations, cooperate to the greatest extent possible. 1 OPERATION RÖSSELSPRUNG AND THE ELIMINATION OF TITO, 25 MAY 1944: A FAILURE IN PLANNING AND INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT By Lieutenant-Colonel Wayne D. Eyre Study and discussion of terrorist and other rogue organizations that use asymmetric means to achieve their aims has gained currency in the last decade, and has become extremely topical since the attacks of 11 September 2001. Military ‘special operations’ to eliminate the upper echelons of these organizations, generally conducted against irregular opponents and in environments of complex terrain containing a hostile or ambivalent civilian population, are becoming the norm. Operations of this type, however, are not new and lessons drawn from history can prove invaluable in their planning and execution. Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG (‘Knight’s Move’ in English and named after the special movement qualities of the chess piece) was a Second World War German operation in Bosnia aimed at eliminating the leadership of the Partisan movement, namely Marshal Josip-Broz Tito. It was a direct action raid, which involved an airborne (parachute and glider) assault by 500 SS Fallschirmjäger (Parachute) Battalion on the suspected site of Tito’s Headquarters and a subsequent linkup with the German XV Mountain Corps converging from all directions. One can garner very relevant lessons from the failure of this operation to apply to the present and future. Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG failed due to mediocre intelligence support and inadequate tactical level planning. Intelligence shortfalls were rooted primarily in poor 2 German inter-organization relations and cooperation, including the sharing of intelligence, which resulted in missed opportunities and a failure to pinpoint Tito’s location with sufficient precision. Given the quality of intelligence provided, the plan for the airborne assault did not include sufficient flexibility for the execution of contingencies. As background, this paper will discuss the rise of the Partisans and German counter-Partisan operations in general and the planning and execution of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG in detail. It will then examine the reasons for failure, and finally, it will draw several conclusions that are relevant for contemporary operations. BACKGROUND In the West this operation has been thought historically insignificant, since it did not succeed and its actions were greatly overshadowed during this period by both the fall of Rome and, moreover, the Normandy invasion. Furthermore, fifty years of Yugoslav Communist propaganda aimed at elevating the status of Tito and drafting history in the most favorable terms for the Partisan movement, coupled with inaccurate reports from wartime German and British sources, have colored events. In support of the aim stated above, as a precursor this paper will clarify the historical events of Operation RÖSSELSPRUNG and the actions leading up to it as part of the background discussion. The Rise of the Partisan Threat Popular resistance to the occupation of Yugoslavia by the Germans and Italians emerged shortly after the incredibly rapid, yet by then characteristic, defeat of the country 3 by two German armies and supporting Italian, Hungarian and Bulgarian forces in April of 1941. Yugoslavia was partitioned amongst the victors, and an extremely nationalist, Fascist government, the Ustachi, was established in Croatia. The Germans commenced to exploit the resource and labour potential of the country, while concurrently the Ustachi, tacitly supported by the Italians, began a campaign of terror that was to foreshadow the genocidal atrocities of the 1990s. “In such an atmosphere, it was not long before active resistance began.”1 The first resistance organization to gain preeminence was the predominantly Serb- based Chetnik movement (sometimes known as the Royalists), led by Draza Mihailovic. The Chetniks focused on returning the exiled Serbian King Peter to power and reestablishing Royal Yugoslavia. Although primarily based in Serbia, they had reach throughout Yugoslavia, especially in the Serb populated areas of Bosnia and the Krajina region of Croatia (a region abutting the western Bosnian border). Initially focused on fighting the Axis occupiers, their military actions quickly became directed at destroying Tito’s Partisans and the situation took on the trappings of a civil war. They actively collaborated with the Germans to fight Tito’s forces, or more often than not, preferred to wait passively in the mountains hoping for the Allies to drive the invaders out after the Germans destroyed the Partisans. Quickly tiring of internal strife and the Chetniks’ lack of action against the Axis, the Allies dropped all meaningful support for them by the end of 1943, and ceased all contact with them by the spring of 19442. 1 R d’Arcy Ryan, The Guerilla Campaign in Yugoslavia (Camberley: Strategic and Combat Studies Institute, 1994), 3. 2 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History, Volume 1 (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975), 474. 4