U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ROLES IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE General Studies by HEINZ P. DINTER JR., MAJ, USA B.S., University of Massachusetts, Lowell, Massachusetts, 1987 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2001 Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE THESIS APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: MAJ Heinz P. Dinter Jr. Thesis Title: U.S. Army Special Forces Roles in Asymmetric Warfare Approved by: , Thesis Committee Chair Jerold E. Brown, Ph.D. , Member LTC Alan C. Lowe, M.M.A.S. , Member COL (Ret.) William W. Mendel, M.A. Accepted this 1st day of June 2001 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES ROLES IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE, by MAJ Heinz P. Dinter Jr., 122 pages. The U.S. National Security Strategy is the basis of a preventive solution through global engagement, which fosters international interoperability and cooperation to defeat complex asymmetric threats. The study examined how U.S. Army Special Forces (SF) can advance this interoperability and cooperation, and identified three evolving roles; Strike Force, Warrior Diplomats, and Global Scouts. As they transition into the 21st century, the central research question is: will U.S. Army Special Forces need to redefine themselves in terms of mission, doctrine, training, or organization as a result of their evolving roles conditioned by an asymmetric threat environment? The study examined the relevance of core, collateral, and emerging missions. It concluded that basic SF doctrine remains sound, but the changing environment and evolving roles of SF will call for a certain amount of refinement. Tactics, techniques, and procedures will change as new technologies are introduced into SF organizations, but emphasis on the human element remains essential, and SF core competencies and warrior skills must be preserved. The study concluded with recommendations to preserve the relevance and efficiency of SF as the premier mechanism for extending U.S. influence in a world of increased global interaction, required to meet security needs. iii TABLE OF CONTENTS Page APPROVAL PAGE ....................................................................................................... ii ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. iii CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................. 1 2. THE ASYMMETRIC CHALLENGE .............................................................. 18 3. THE U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY AND ASYMMETRIC COUNTERS ..... 36 4. EXAMINING THE ROLES AND RELEVANCE OF U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES................................................................ 62 5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS............................................ 94 APPENDIX A. OPERATIONAL TERMS............................................................................... 106 BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................ 111 INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST................................................................................ 116 iv CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION Given the U.S. supremacy in conventional forces and advanced weaponry, few potential opponents will deliberately seek a direct military confrontation with the United States. Instead, future adversaries who resort to some sort of military action against the United States will probably employ asymmetric strategies involving innovative yet affordable weapons and tactics designed to weaken U.S. resolve and impede the employment of its conventional military capabilities. A future opponent might employ nonconventional weapons (chemical, biological, or nuclear), terrorism, or even information warfare attacks against military or civilian targets on American or foreign territory to deter or impede U.S. intervention in a regional conflict.1 Throughout history adversaries have sought to gain the advantage over one another. Often, opponents found they did not possess the means to gain the advantage over their enemies. For whatever reason, resources or technology, they found themselves inferior to their enemy. This imbalance meant an alternate or “asymmetrical” tactic would have to be utilized that would result in gaining an advantage that would otherwise be unachievable through traditional or conventional methods. These nonstandard tactics were derived from attempts to negate the other side's current advantages in technology, equipment, or organizational ability. Asymmetric warfare exploits the “Achilles heel” of an opponent. The simple timing of an attack, when the complacency of your opponent leaves him unwary and unprepared physically or geographically, will always result in a devastating form of achieving goals through asymmetry. 1 In 9 A.D., the Teutoburger Wald (Teutoburg Forest) was the scene of a significant battle in German history. The Roman Emperor Augustus decided to create the new province of Germania, stretching from the Rhine to the Elbe Rivers. In what amounted to a strategic blunder by the superpower of the day and a well-timed “asymmetric” attack, three Roman Legions under the general Publius Quintillius Varus, were annihilated in the forest by Teutonic tribes. These tribes had been clandestinely unified and organized by Arminius, the first German national hero. As a result of the battle, Rome lost all possessions east of the Rhine River, which became the northeastern boundary of the Roman Empire2. This event sends an enduring message to modern day superpowers on the significance of understanding an opponent's motivations and convictions, and fully comprehending the means available at which he can achieve his goals. The Roman Emperor Augustus decided, in 9 A.D., that the time had come to make Germania a full-fledged Roman province under the direct control of a Roman governor. He was convinced that such an expansion of Roman Empire lands was necessary to enhance Roman national security by protecting against excursions by barbarian tribes residing both in Germania and the lands east of the Elbe River. The combination of natural resources, agricultural potential, and strategic space made Germania quite attractive as a Roman province. One important resource Germania possessed in abundance was high quality iron, an important material even then. Thus, the newly acquired province would help to advance Roman “national prosperity.” The task of gaining the new province for the Roman Empire fell on the newly designated Roman governor of the future province of Germania, Publius Quintilius Varus. However, Augustus badly overestimated Roman influence with the Teutonic tribes. They were completely unwilling to accept the Roman provincial “status.” This miscalculation at the strategic level passed down to the operational level for resolution.3 The Teutonic tribes east of the Rhine were fiercely independent. Warriors by nature, they strongly opposed domination by anyone. As a result of the Roman efforts to 2 subjugate Germania, the great Teutonic leader and a young prince of the Cherusci tribe, Arminius, emerged and secretly united many of the quarreling Teutonic tribes to resist the Roman advance.4 Unfortunately for the Romans, Arminius gave every indication of being in league with them; even signing an alliance that gave him Roman citizenship and even the honor of being a Roman knight. Arminius set the trap for the Roman disaster by employing deception. He arranged for Varus to receive false reports indicating that a supposed rebellion was emerging among some Teutonic tribes. Varus, at this point, decided to march on these “rebels” with enough force to either intimidate them into submission, or smash the resistance. Arminius even escorted Varus across the Rhine and traveled with him and the Roman force for a while as they marched northward. Arminius' plan for the Romans consisted of a massive ambush in a confined area of the Teutoburg Forest, through which he knew they would have to march.5 He combined his knowledge of the Roman mode of operation with a disinformation plan. Since his force would be much smaller and not as well equipped as the Romans, his attack would have to be asymmetrical in nature. His employment of personnel in a nonlinear manner, during less than ideal environmental conditions, altered the battlefield and negated the Roman advantage in military strength, organization, and equipment. The advantage he sought to gain against the empirically stronger Roman force, would come when the Romans would be the most vulnerable to attack. His attack took advantage of dominating terrain that negated the “symmetry” of the Roman columns and would degrade their ability to engage. Arminius took advantage of the element of 3 surprise, as the attack would come at night. His “timing” of the asymmetric attack would amplify its devastating effects. Basically, the Romans would not know what hit them. The initial combat took place in an area known as the Niewedder Senke, a narrow gap between some mountainous terrain and a large marsh. The Teutons, with some knowledge of ambush tactics, improved the engagement area by constructing walls and trenches to further inhibit the Roman ability to maneuver. The whole area was covered by thick forest making it an ideal large force ambush site. Varus moved his entire force into the Niewedder Senke in a long column six kilometers in length. The movement was difficult due to the undergrowth and even more so when it started to rain. The leather and wool clothing of the Romans became soaked with rain and weighed them down. Just as the lead element of the column reached the narrowest point of the Niewedder Senke, a thunderstorm struck. So did the Teutons. The Romans were completely surprised by the sudden attack by screaming savages leaping out of the dark woods and striking them through the sheets of rain. Punctuated by flashes of lightning and thunderclaps, the Romans must have thought they walked straight into the mouth of hell. The heavily wooded area offered the Romans little room to form ranks for a counterattack--a normal reaction of Roman legions on the march. The legions tried to form a defensive perimeter that also failed due to the obstacles employed by the Teutons and the sheer exhaustion of the Romans. The six companies of Teuton auxiliaries soon deserted. The unarmed logistics group was slaughtered with their animals. The situation slipped from desperation to despair. In the end the Romans simply threw away their arms and awaited their fate. Varus committed suicide by falling on his sword.6 4 The result was three Roman legions and three cavalry regiments, a force of about 10 percent of the Roman Army’s strength, completely annihilated. Teutonic losses are unknown, but were probably light. To add to the psychological effect and to dishonor the Romans, the Teutons stripped the fallen Romans of everything of value and left their bodies unburied. Some bodies were decapitated and their heads nailed to trees. The head of Varus was sent back to a Roman official of the Rhine who forwarded it to Augustus.7 After Teutoburg Forest, a Rhine-Danube defensive line would become the permanent northern boundary of the Roman Empire until it disintegrated several centuries later under marauding hordes of barbarians. The strategic defeat of the (Roman) superpower of the time sends a cautionary message to the last remaining superpower, the United States, today. The faulty judgment of political leaders and military commanders has been central to historic miscalculations that have often shaped the course of history, and should be examined today for lessons that may be applicable to future conflicts. Some of the gravest miscalculations come as a superpower strives to advance its national interests and objectives. Today, that translates into operations dealing with insurgency and pacification or peacekeeping. The United States has an oceanic source of intelligence products; however, these estimates concentrate on potential enemy “characteristics and capabilities.” They rarely address true enemy intentions derived from his convictions or motivations, especially those that well-up from deep cultural, ethnic, and religious reservoirs of sentiment that result in fierce reactions to superpower actions. The full range of intentions that an opponent could elect to manifest, even if such decisions are not entirely logical or rational within the system of a superpower, should be taken into consideration.8 5 The United States emerged as the world's last remaining superpower after the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991. The U.S. faces some of the same challenges as the Romans did in 9 A.D. The U.S. must not only identify emerging threats to its national security and vital interests, its leaders must also strive to fully understand the true intentions of a potential opponent. They must also identify the various means he may employ against U.S. intentions to further his own agenda. In doing this, our own vulnerabilities must be analyzed to best derive preventative methods that counter new threats. The U.S. maintains a military advantage not enjoyed by most other countries. Our technologically superior military is vital for the advancement and sustainment of our national interests. The U.S. defense budget, at over $280 billion for fiscal year 2000, is several times larger than the combined spending of the countries generally perceived as the most likely future adversaries: China, Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, Syria, and Yugoslavia. No potential opponent comes close in advanced conventional weaponry (cruise missiles, stealth aircraft, laser-guided munitions, navigation, surveillance, target acquisition, and communications systems). Even the Pentagon predicts that a peer competitor will not emerge until around 2010, and most analysts consider that possibility as unlikely.9 The obviously wide advantage maintained by the U.S. in military strength can easily turn into a false sense of security. As the Romans discovered in the Teutoburg Forest in 9 A.D., true convictions that motivate adversaries into action may not be fully understood. They may feel threatened by superpower interests being promoted as an initiative that is “allegedly” in their best interest. They 6