Urban Combat: Is the Mounted Force Prepared to Contribute? A Monograph by Major Scott T. Kendrick Armor School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 00-01 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited Abstract URBAN COMBAT: IS THE MOUNTED FORCE PREPARED TO CONTRIBUTE? by Major Scott T. Kendrick, USA, 56 pages. The world’s growing population is becoming increasingly urbanized. If recent interventions and peacekeeping efforts by the military are indications of future deployments, then the US Army must realize the likelihood of conducting military operations on urban terrain (MOUT). Urban combat is violent, destructive, and filled with ambiguity. Only well prepared and trained units will succeed in combat in the urban environment. As the Army seeks direction in organizing and preparing itself for the next war, armor and mechanized maneuver units, or the “mounted forces” have to grasp the complexities of urban combat and then decide what skills its junior leaders will need in order to accomplish the mission in future conflicts. This monograph asks whether or not the mounted force is prepared to contribute to the next urban combat operation. The monograph compares the current and evolving doctrinal guidance, unit training and leadership development philosophies with the relevant lessons learned from recent cases of high intensity urban combat. Ultimately, the monograph seeks to define the critical skills that mounted force leaders will need to master to succeed in future urban environments. The monograph examines and analyzes four main areas. One, the paper reviews three examples of contemporary high intensity urban combat in order to understand the complexities and difficulties of urban warfare. Two, the monograph reviews current US Army doctrine and the guidance concerning MOUT. Three, the paper reviews Army unit training and leadership development philosophy. Four, it compares eclectically the mounted force’s doctrine, training, and leader development with the future requirements and emerging demands of mounted leaders operating in the urban environment. This monograph seeks to evaluate the capability of the mounted force to exceute urban combat operations. The monograph concludes that the mounted force as whole is not ready to contribute to the next high-intensity urban conflict. The mounted force’s professional culture must recognize the probability of future high-intensity urban combat. In order to prepare, the mounted force must adapt not only its organizational structure, but collective unit training, and leadership development philosophy as well. i Table of Contents Page I. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1 II The Nature of MOUT and Urban Combat ……………………………………..….7 The Battle of Hue City………………………………………………………….8 The Battle of Suez City………………………………………………………..15 The Battle of Grozny…………………………………………………………..25 Conclusions…………………………………………………………………….32 III. Current Doctrine and Analysis……………………………………………………..32 IV The Requirements and Demands of Leadership in Urban Combat………………...44 Current Leader Development Philosophy……………………………………..45 Command and Control of Decentralized Operations………………………….47 Understanding the effects of Noncombatant Population.……………………..48 Integrating Forces into effective Combined Arms Teams……………………..50 Understand and Manage Rules of Engagement………………………………..50 V. Analysis: Comparison of Doctrine, Training, and Leader Development with Future Requirements……………………….……………………………………….52 VI Conclusions and Summary…………………………………………………………55 Bibliography…………………………………………………………………………...58 ii Chapter I Introduction In the future, the US Army will conduct the majority of its missions in the urban environment. The reasons for this shift are threefold: first, the increasing urbanization of populations across the globe, second, the current national military strategy's focus on shaping the international environment through stability and support operations, and third, the likelihood that future threats will emerge from or center their operations in large cities.1 "There is a paradigm shift in third world countries from rural subsistence based economies to uncontrolled urbanization. The expected results of such a shift include over population, rapid urban expansion, and civil unrest in many regions of the world."2 Furthermore, during the next fifty years the earth’s population will increase from five and one-half billion to more than nine billion.3 Many optimists hope that new resource technologies and free market development will help world stability. “They fail to note that, as the National Academy of Sciences has pointed out, 95 percent of the population increase will be in the poorest regions of the world, where governments show little ability to function, let alone to implement even marginal improvements."4 Most of the world's population will eventually live in large urban areas because of economic opportunity. As a result, one can reasonably expect the problems of tomorrow to emanate from these urban centers. The current National Military Strategy focuses on three tenets: shape, respond and prepare. This national strategy places an increased emphasis on stability and 1 Sean J. A. Edwards, Mars Unmasked: The changing Face of Urban Operations, (Rand, Santa Monica, CA 2000), 1. 2 Lapham, Curtis A. MAJ, Colossus on Main Street: Tactical Considerations of Heavy Armor and Future MOUT Doctrine, (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1996), 4. 3 Robert D. Kaplan, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering the Dreams of the Post Cold War, (Random House, NY 2000), 22. 4 Ibid. 1 support operations (SASO). Recently, America’s national leaders have tasked the Army to both shape the environment and respond to regional crises. The Army has promoted stability through peacetime military engagement and deterrence. The shaping portion of the NMS deters aggression by developing international relationships and assisting those institutions that reduce and prevent conflict. The Army's role in this strategy is to assist in the mitigation and neutralization of the causes of war and threats to stability.5 Typically, these post-Cold War missions center on urban areas with large populations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo. The respond portion of the NMS requires the Army to operate and succeed across the full spectrum of crises. Recently, the Army’s involvement has been in small- scale contingency operations (SSC). Some examples of these SSCs are Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo. These small-scale contingency operations have required the Army to operate amongst a large population in urban terrain. In the future, the Army can anticipate not only peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations in urban areas, but high intensity conflict as well.6 The Army's doctrine states that, "MOUT is expected to be the future battlefield in Europe and Asia with brigade and higher level commanders focusing on these operations."7 Future threats will operate from urban terrain in order to negate US technological advantages, subject US forces to asymmetric attacks, and gain worldwide exposure. Potential adversaries will see urban warfare as a feasible asymmetric approach to combating the US military. There is a worldwide perception that the American public has unreal expectations of modern warfare and an extremely low tolerance for casualties. "Such 5 Department of Defense, CJSC, National Military Strategy. (Washington, D.C., United States Government Printing Office, 1997), 11-17. 6 Ibid. 7 Department of the Army, FM 90-10-1 An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built up Areas, (Washington, DC:, United States Government Printing Office, 1993), 1-1. 2 sensitivity becomes an Achilles heel because inflicting sufficient number of American casualties has the potential to undermine U. S. domestic political support."8 Therefore, military operations on urban terrain or MOUT present potential adversaries with both physical and political cover. The physical cover of urban terrain limits the effectiveness of tanks, attack helicopters, fire support, intelligence sensors, and communications, and therefore negates or mitigates US tactical and technical advantages. The political cover is provided by the with strict rules engagement imposed when fighting an enemy operating among noncombatants, the need to preserve, fragile city infrastructure to support a large noncombatant population both during operations and to ensure post combat success, and the presence of the international media that will accompany any United States operation in the future. This political cover can potentially neutralize the US will to operate aggressively and effectively in urban terrain. Taken together, both these types of cover help to aid the adversary’s chances for success.9 Due to these changes in the world, the future employment of US forces, across the continuum of conflict in urban terrain is unavoidable and inevitable. Warfare in urban terrain is chaotic and violent. Most of the critical decisions and decentralized actions occur at the lowest levels of organization. Urban warfare is extraordinarily destructive. In WW II, during the battle of Stalingrad, some maneuver divisions suffered as much as fifty- percent combat losses in less than two weeks.10 In Vietnam, during the Tet offensive, the daily casualty rates for U. S. Marines in Hue exceeded those of the most vicious days fighting during the assault of Okinawa in WWII.11 Urban warfare is vague and ambiguous. In many instances during the battle of 8 Edwards, Mars Unmasked, xi. 9 Ibid. 10 Russell W. Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies, The American Military and the Impending Urban Operations Threat., (Santa Monica, CA RAND 1998), 1. 11 Ibid., 2. 3 Grozny, the Russian forces found it difficult to determine the adversaries from the noncombatants. Urban operations are extremely difficult to command and control. In the battle of Suez City, the Israelis discovered that warfare in cities requires flexible plans, solid SOPs, and a clear commander’s intent. After the Yom Kippur War, the Israelis learned to train in the same posture as they fight, such as maneuvering with the hatches closed to survive Egyptian sniper fire. In urban operations, US and allied forces are constrained by rules of engagement (ROE) while the enemy often operates without regard for the effects on the local populace and collateral damage. In Hue City, the NVA and Viet Cong systematically murdered over 2000 noncombatants. In the urban environment, war is truly hell. Therefore, US forces operating in urban terrain will require enormous resources, unique preparation, and rigorous training in order to be successful12 Success in urban warfare requires that leaders be competent and units prepared for this most arduous and complex of environments. The branch specific schools and centers as well as the Army's professional education and training system focus primarily on scenarios fashioned in the image of the Cold War to develop the leadership skills of junior and field grade leaders. Today's mounted warriors need a broader skill set to succeed in the ambiguous conflicts of the post-Cold war era. Not only do mounted force leaders have to know how to train combined arms units, but also have to master emerging requirements such as fighting highly decentralized operations governed by stringent ROE. Additionally, leaders have to understand how information operations (IO), the dynamics created by the presence of noncombatants and the role of the media can effect their operations on the urban battlefield. Mounted force leaders must make correct decisions quickly and instinctively in rapidly changing situations that define urban combat. They must understand that their execution of tactical operations can have 12 Many of the contemporary authors such as Glenn and Edwards, describe urban combat as the worst environment in which to fight 4 far-reaching strategic affects. The armored and mechanized force must be mentally prepared, doctrinally trained, and organizationally postured to conduct combat operations in this environment. Current US doctrine states that, unless specifically directed to conduct operations in an urban environment, mounted forces should avoid or bypass urban areas in the offense and clear them with infantry later.13 As a result, the Army has trained its mounted force leaders to avoid urban areas because it reduces the speed of attacks or pursuits, restricts maneuver, and negates the direct fire standoff and survivability of contemporary platforms. Yet, because of the changing nature of societies around the world and the concurrent migration toward urban centers, the key terrain on future battlefields is becoming predominantly urban. Furthermore, the future threat will try to reduce the US advantages in technology, weapons lethality, and protection by basing their operations in urban and restricted terrain, seeking to draw US forces into an urban battle at the earliest opportunity.14 If the mounted force is to contribute, then it will have to fight in this environment or two basic reasons. First, for the foreseeable future, the mounted force will constitute at least 50% of the maneuver force and, if commanders are to apply overwhelming combat power, then armored and mechanized forces will have to fight in urban terrain. Second, the mounted force may not have an enemy willing to fight in open terrain, because our potential opponents will undoubtedly choose not to challenge the US where its strengths lie. Future threats may attempt to void our advantages by fighting in urban terrain. If the Army of tomorrow is to force a decision and serve as a viable tool to impose the nation’s will, it must conduct operations against adversaries and their bases of support, which will be in cities. Armor and mechanized forces conducting MOUT will have to be capable of 13 Department of the Army, FM 90-10 Military Operations in Urban Terrain, (Washington, D.C: United States Government Printing Office, 1979), 1-1. 14 Edwards, 2. 5 executing across the full spectrum from peacekeeping operations to high intensity conflict. The transition from one part of the spectrum to another may occur quickly if not instantaneously. Urban terrain is where tomorrow’s battles or operations to prevent conflict will take place. The mounted force’s leadership and organizations have to be mentally ready, taught through specific and detailed doctrine, and prepared through relevant and realistic training. Consequently, this monograph seeks to answer the question: Is the mounted force prepared to contribute to the next urban combat operation? The framework of review, investigation and analysis in this monograph will examine four focus areas. First, the reader must understand the necessity of preparing for operations in the urban environment. Current trends indicate that the US Army will operate in a MOUT environment in the future more often than in the past. Second, the paper reviews three examples of high intensity urban combat in order to derive a deeper appreciation of urban warfare's complexities and difficulties. Third, the monograph reviews current US Army doctrine and the guidance concerning MOUT. Fourth, the monograph undertakes an examination of Army unit training and leadership development philosophy. Finally, the monograph compares doctrine, training, and leader development with the future requirements and emerging demands of mounted leaders operating in the urban environment. This paper seeks to evaluate the ability of the mounted force to contribute in future urban combat operations. The monograph compares the current and evolving doctrinal guidance, unit training and leadership development philosophies with the relevant lessons learned from recent cases of high intensity urban combat. The purpose is to determine if Army doctrine addresses the current requirements and is evolving to support the future demands of leaders and units as they prepare for future urban operations. The author will examine the Army’s current and evolving doctrine from its 6 capstone document FM 100-5, Operations, through the more focused FM 90-10-1, An Infantryman's Guide to Combat in Built-up Areas, in order to determine the efficacy and relevance of current and projected doctrine. An examination of contemporary experiences of high intensity urban combat, including the battles of Hue, Suez, and Grozny, serve as the basis for the evaluation of emerging doctrine and the requirements for leaders and units executing urban operations. The Army has a solid history of incorporating the lessons learned from previous experiences of combat and conflict. However, some respected authors, such as Russell Glenn see a less than bright future for the Army as it prepares for the next war. Glenn writes: “...in the area of urban warfare it [the US Army] seems to be overlooking the lessons of history, current readiness shortfalls, and a future that offers not the potential but the assurance of both international and domestic urban operations."15 The ultimate purpose of this monograph is to examine the skills mounted leaders will need to master in order to be successful in the urban battles of the future. The author also hopes to foster a professional discussion on the need to prepare the Army’s future leaders for operations in urban terrain in order to preclude Mr. Glenn's assertions from becoming reality. Chapter II The Nature of MOUT and Urban Combat The traditional, possibly soon to be considered classical, vision of warfare is one of large conventional forces opposing each other with tanks and infantry, supported by engineers, artillery, attack aviation, and close air support. In this concept of war, which has dominated US army doctrine and military thought since World War II, combined arms forces engage each other over open, rolling or at least terrain unencumbered by 15 Glenn, Marching Under Darkening Skies, 1. 7