Clausewitz, Complexity, and Custer: An Analysis of Decision Making in a Nonlinear System A MONOGRAPH BY Major Steven M. Leonard Ordnance School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 00-01 Approved for Public Release Distribution is Unlimited REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE 1. REPORT DATE 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (FROM - TO) (DD-MM-YYYY) master's thesis xx-xx-2000 to xx-xx-2001 01-01-2001 4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER Clausewitz, Complexity, and Custer: An Analysis of Decision Making in a Nonlinear System 5b. GRANT NUMBER 5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER Unclassified 6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER Leonard, Steven M. ; Author 5e. TASK NUMBER 5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER 7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER ADDRESS USA Command and General Staff College School of Advanced Military Studies 1 Reynolds Ave. Fort Leavenworth , KS 66048 9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S ACRONYM(S) NAME AND ADDRESS 11. SPONSOR/MONITOR'S REPORT NUMBER(S) , 12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT A PUBLIC RELEASE , 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT Decision making in combat is one of the core competencies most valued in leaders. Much effort is dedicated to the analysis of decision-making models, processes, and methodologies in order to develop skills that enable leaders to make qualitatively better decisions under duress. However, little attention is directed toward the study of decision-making with respect to complexity, the fundamental environment of combat. In addressing a legendary tale of military failure, this monograph synthesizes historical analysis, classical theory, and contemporary science. Rather than revisit an argument worn by time, the intent of this document is to overlay the elements of complexity theory onto a map of history, then present the problem from the perspective of the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to resolve whether the defeat of the U.S. 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn was due to a ?logic of failure? brought on by George Armstrong Custer?s inability to recognize and predict the behavior of the complex nature of the environment of combat. The first section of the monograph examines the historical events leading to the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Chapter Two proceeds into a comparative analysis of the complex metaphors presented in On War while the third chapter details the effects of decision-making in a complex system. Finally, Chapter Four addresses the ?logic of failure? that defined the chain of events eventually leading to Custer?s defeat. The monograph conclusions presented in Chapter Five bring together the elements of complexity present in the environment of battle and resolves the basic research question. In developing an appreciation for the challenges inherent to decision- making in a complex environment, the reader will ultimately earn respect for the contemporary relevance of molding classic theory to modern science. This monograph also provides readers with a new paradigm for analyzing military defeat: the complex decision-making system, examined in detail in Chapter Four. 15. SUBJECT TERMS decision-making; complex systems; U.S. 7th Cavalry; Little Big Horn; combat 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON LIMITATION OF PAGES Burgess, Edwin OF 56 [email protected] ABSTRACT Same as a. REPORT b. c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER Report Unclassifi ABSTRACT Unclassifie International Area Code ed Unclassifie d (SAR) d Area Code Telephone Number 913 758-3171 DSN 585-3171 Disclaimer The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author(s) and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. ii Contents Page TITLE PAGE.......................................................................................................................I DISCLAIMER....................................................................................................................II ABSTRACT.......................................................................................................................IV INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1 The Path of War.............................................................................................................3 The Statesman and The Patriot......................................................................................5 The Vision......................................................................................................................6 CLAUSEWITZ, COMPLEXITY, AND NONLINEARITY.............................................11 DECISIONS IN BATTLE.................................................................................................17 Breaking the Paradigm.................................................................................................18 Terry’s Plan..................................................................................................................20 A Change of Plan.........................................................................................................22 On to the Crow’s Nest..................................................................................................23 Attack!..........................................................................................................................24 Reno Repulsed.............................................................................................................26 Benteen, Come Quick!.................................................................................................27 The Defense of Reno Hill.............................................................................................29 Custer’s Fate................................................................................................................31 DECISIONS IN A COMPLEX SYSTEM.........................................................................35 CONCLUSIONS................................................................................................................43 BIBLIOGRAPHY..............................................................................................................47 iii Abstract Decision making in combat is one of the core competencies most valued in leaders. Much effort is dedicated to the analysis of decision-making models, processes, and methodologies in order to develop skills that enable leaders to make qualitatively better decisions under duress. However, little attention is directed toward the study of decision- making with respect to complexity, the fundamental environment of combat. In addressing a legendary tale of military failure, this monograph synthesizes historical analysis, classical theory, and contemporary science. Rather than revisit an argument worn by time, the intent of this document is to overlay the elements of complexity theory onto a map of history, then present the problem from the perspective of the Prussian military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz. Ultimately, this monograph seeks to resolve whether the defeat of the U.S. 7th Cavalry at the Little Big Horn was due to a “logic of failure” brought on by George Armstrong Custer’s inability to recognize and predict the behavior of the complex nature of the environment of combat. The first section of the monograph examines the historical events leading to the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Chapter Two proceeds into a comparative analysis of the complex metaphors presented in On War while the third chapter details the effects of decision-making in a complex system. Finally, Chapter Four addresses the “logic of failure” that defined the chain of events eventually leading to Custer’s defeat. The iv monograph conclusions presented in Chapter Five bring together the elements of complexity present in the environment of battle and resolves the basic research question. In developing an appreciation for the challenges inherent to decision-making in a complex environment, the reader will ultimately earn respect for the contemporary relevance of molding classic theory to modern science. This monograph also provides readers with a new paradigm for analyzing military defeat: the complex decision-making system, examined in detail in Chapter Four. v Chaper 1 Introduction I think and think for months and years. Ninety-nine times, the conclusion is false. The hundredth time I am right. —Albert Einstein In the early morning hours of June 27, 1876, Brigadier General Alfred H. Terry cautiously led a column of infantry and cavalry into the valley of the Little Big Horn River in the Montana Territory. When the lead elements of the 2nd U.S. Cavalry Regiment entered the valley, they found the remnants of the largest gathering of Indians ever witnessed on the Great Plains of North America. Smoke billowed across the rolling hills and the air was rank with the stench of decaying flesh. Debris, dead and wounded animals, discarded possessions, and abandoned lodge poles littered the area. Terry, the commander of the Department of the Dakota, was certain his force had dispersed the hostiles, until his chief of scouts reported the discovery of the bloated, mutilated corpses of more than 200 officers and men of Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s 7th Cavalry.1 In all, more than 250 troopers of Custer’s command fell that day: 210 with the flamboyant “boy general” and another 47 four miles upstream with Major Marcus Reno and Captain William Benteen.2 For the 15,000 Sioux and Cheyenne gathered in the 1 valley, the battle represented the apex of the Indian Wars, and would eventually bring a tragic, anticlimactic end to one of the most colorful periods in American history. Historical analysis of the battle tends to remain blame focused, categorized as either realist or fatalist. With the former, Custer and his reputed insatiable zeal for glory were responsible for the defeat. The fatalist school, according to historian Andrew Ward, “divides in turn into three primary groups: those who blame Reno for retreating, those who blame Benteen for not leading the . . . rescue, and those who simply blame the unprecedented and unanticipatable size of the forces arrayed against [Custer].”3 However, what if Custer’s demise at Little Big Horn was the fault of no single event or individual in particular, but the result of something far more complex and, therefore, unpredictable? In 1989, University of Bamberg psychology professor Dietrich Dörner coined the term “Logic of Failure” to describe situations where linear, cause-and-effect decision methodology proves disastrous in fundamentally complex environments. Rational decisions made by equally rational individuals result in tragically unforeseen circumstances due to the complexity inherent to specific systems; human nature relies on basic causal relationships to facilitate decision making in simpler, linear systems. 4 Yet, what exactly differentiates linearity from nonlinearity, especially with respect to decision-making? In a linear system, the effects of a decision exhibit proportionality – the decision (input) results in an effect (output) that is proportional in scale and scope – and superposition – output may be reduced for analysis without affecting the nature of the relationship to the input.5 Conversely, nonlinear systems obey neither of these 2 principles, exhibiting output disproportional to input and a fundamental interdependency that defies reductionism (the sum of the parts does not equal the whole). Therefore, in a nonlinear or complex system, a decision predicated upon the expectations of linear behavior can – and will – produce wholly unanticipated effects, often delayed due to the very nature of the system. Linear decisions made in a nonlinear system can produce the effect that Dörner defined as the “logic of failure.” Was the defeat of the 7th U.S. Cavalry in the Battle of the Little Big Horn due to a “logic of failure” brought on by an inability to recognize and predict the behavior of the complex nature of a hostile environment? The Path of War For much of the nineteenth century, the seven tribes of the warlike Teton, or Lakota, Sioux and their ancestral cousins, the Cheyenne, roamed freely across the Great Plains of North America, hunting buffalo and establishing a presence virtually unopposed by other Native American tribes. For the Oglala, Brulé, Hunkpapa, Miniconjou, Blackfoot, Sans Arc, and Two Kettle Sioux, warfare was as fundamental to their culture as their nomadic way of life.6 But the discovery of gold in the Montana Territory in 1862 and the gradual encroachment of the Bozeman Trail upon territory ceded to the Sioux by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1851 threatened the very existence of the Sioux nation. Peace overtures only exacerbated an already sensitive situation, touching off what would come to be known as “Red Cloud’s War.” Nevertheless, opposing this expansion into their hunting grounds proved costly to the Sioux. Unable to meet the basic needs of their 3