Project AIR FORCE NATO'S FUTURE DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A Approved for Public Release Distribution Unlimited 20000417 076 DAVID A. OCHMANEK RAND The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Ochmanek, David A. NATO's future : implications for U.S. military capabilities and posture / David A. Ochmanek. p. cm. "MR-1162-AF." Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8330-2809-X 1. North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 2. United States—Military policy. 3. Europe—Defenses. I. Title. UA646.3 .03 2000 355'.031091821—dc21 99-086504 RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmaking through research and analysis. RAND® is a registered trademark. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 2000 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. Published 2000 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1333 H St., N.W., Washington, DC. 20005-4707 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310)451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] Project AIR FORCE NATO'S FUTURE IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POSTURE DAVID A. OCHMANEK Prepared for the UNITED STATES AIR FORCE RAND Approved for public release; distribution unlimited DTTC QUALITY INSPECTED 3 Preface The 1990s have been a decade of rapid change and adaptation for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). As the Cold War came to a close and the Soviet Union collapsed, some called for an end to the alliance that had played a central role in countering Soviet mil- itary power for the previous 40 years. Others, impressed with the continuing need for transatlantic security cooperation, called upon NATO to adopt new missions, beyond its traditional role of territorial defense, aimed at meeting fresh security challenges. Events have shown the need for a transformed NATO capable of undertaking a wide range of missions, including: • Projecting stability into areas around the periphery of the NATO treaty area • Intervening effectively in civil conflicts, such as those that have arisen in the former Republic of Yugoslavia • Coordinating power-projection operations into areas such as the Persian Gulf region • Countering weapons of mass destruction, both by impeding their proliferation and by preventing the use of such weapons. An evolving consensus among the allies has led to a significant, if fitful, extension of NATO's mandate to encompass at least the first two of these missions. Over time, this expansion of NATO's area of regard and the scope of its missions is likely to continue, provided the Al- liance's leading members have the political will to act when called upon to extend their influence outward. The questions that remain re- late to the types of military capabilities most needed to make these mis- sions a reality, and the rate and extent to which the United States and its allies are likely to field such capabilities. This report addresses these questions in the context of the Alliance's emerging strategy for ad- vancing the interests of its members in peacetime, crisis, and war. It Preceding PageFßlank iv NATO'S FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POSTURE points to the need for a heavy emphasis on enhancing the deployabil- ity of NATO's military forces, and it forecasts a growing need for ef- fective defenses against weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. The research summarized here is part of a larger project on the im- plications of the changing strategic environment in and around Europe and its implications for the United States and NATO. The project, sponsored by the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Air Forces in Europe, and by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Headquarters, United States Air Force, was conducted in the Strategy and Doctrine Program of RAND's Project AIR FORCE. This report should be of interest to those engaged in policy toward, or the study of, European security in the post-Cold War setting. Although its focus is on air forces and mil- itary units that can support air operations, its broad conclusions are rel- evant to all future U.S. and European forces. PROJECT AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analyses. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readi- ness, and support of current and future air and space forces. Research is carried out in four programs: Aerospace Force Development; Man- power, Personnel, and Training; Resource Management; and Strategy and Doctrine. Contents Preface iii Summary vii Acknowledgments xi CHAPTER 1 THE EMERGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 1 CHAPTER 2 CHANGING MISSIONS 7 CHAPTER 3 OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGY 11 Shaping 12 Coping 15 Hedging 18 CHAPTER 4 IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO'S FORCE PLANNING 21 CHAPTER 5 IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. FORCE PLANNERS 25 Shaping 25 Coping 28 Hedging 29 CHAPTER 6 SOME THOUGHTS ON U.S. FORCES IN EUROPE 31 CHAPTER 7 THE WAY AHEAD 37 Summary The United States and its allies face a host of challenges in the in- ternational sphere, including the looming threats of proliferation, re- gional conflict, terrorism, and the manifold problems associated with the failure of regimes to meet the needs of their populations. As daunt- ing as these challenges are, veterans of the Cold War will be quick to point out that things could be worse. After all, NATO's member na- tions no longer face a plausible threat to their survival, as they did throughout the Cold War when Soviet military forces were deployed in the heart of Europe. Although some observers in recent years have be- moaned the loss of "certainty" and "predictability" that they (erro- neously) think characterized the Cold War geopolitical situation, there should be no nostalgia for a period in which two nations with the power to destroy much of civilization pursued antagonistic security agendas. The chief goal of the United States and its allies today, therefore, should be to preserve and consolidate an international situation in which no major power opposes or threatens their most important in- terests. They should pursue a security strategy whose core elements are intended to shape the behavior and expectations of key actors in ways favorable to the West's long-term interests. Of course, from time to time, NATO nations will have to employ their military and other assets to cope with challenges to their interests, and they will want to take steps to hedge against the possible emergence of serious new threats over the longer term. Across all three of these dimensions—shaping, coping, and hedging—the vast majority of challenges to the interests of NATO member states will arise from the periphery of the Alliance's en- larged treaty area and beyond. There is no longer much debate about whether NATO should embrace new missions in addition to its traditional focus on territorial defense. Chief among the new missions are power projection (at least viii NATO'S FUTURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES AND POSTURE to the periphery of the treaty area, if not beyond), crisis management (or the ability to intervene effectively in smaller-scale conflicts), and countering weapons of mass destruction. For military planners, the key questions are: To what degree should their efforts focus on these new missions? What sorts of military capabilities are required to accomplish such missions? And what are the implications for U.S. and allied force planners? The following general findings emerge from our analysis: • The military forces of NATO's member states should be struc- tured and postured for expeditionary operations. Achieving a more expeditionary posture entails expanding and modernizing transportation fleets (principally military airlift, but also sealift), acquiring more mobile logistics assets, upgrading infrastruc- ture in selected countries, and modernizing the forces them- selves so that lighter, more mobile units can be more effective in a wide range of missions. This will entail, among other things, exploiting recent advances in surveillance, information pro- cessing, communications, and precision weapons so that the mil- itary assets of adversaries can be rapidly located, identified, and destroyed with minimal collateral damage. • The ability to deter and defeat chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons will become a growing preoccupation of the Alliance. In addition to improving defenses against ballistic and cruise missiles, this implies that NATO should preserve the basic ele- ments of the U.S. nuclear posture in Europe. " • U.S. forces stationed in Europe are invaluable assets for shaping behaviors and expectations in the region and for responding to challenges in and around Europe. The nature and locus of likely future challenges suggest that air bases in Italy and Turkey are particularly important strategic assets. Given the mix of peace- time and crisis response missions we foresee, the Department of Defense (DoD) should explore the idea of replacing at least one of the four U.S. heavy Army brigades in central Europe with a light infantry brigade, an air assault brigade, or some hybrid formation with greater strategic mobility and tactical flexibility. SUMMARY ix The challenges of the future demand effective and coordinated action by nations with common interests. For the United States and its allies, NATO is by far the best vehicle available for organizing such ac- tion. NATO has made impressive strides toward adapting itself to the demands of a changed and changing world, but its members should recognize that neither the Alliance nor their own military establish- ments are yet perfectly suited to these demands. Fielding the requisite military capabilities will not come cheaply, nor will further institutional changes within NATO be cost-free. But it is well worth the effort. Acknowledgments This report represents, in part, a synthesis of research and analysis conducted by a team of RAND staff members who examined a wide range of challenges likely to face NATO members over the coming decade and beyond. As such, the author is indebted to his fellow team members, including Ian Lesser, who co-led the project, Tanya Charlick- Paley, F. Stephen Larrabee, Peter Ryan, Richard Sokolsky, Thomas Szayna, and Michele Zanini. The work was sponsored by General John Jumper, Commander of United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE). His expansive and ambitious vision of NATO's future, and the American role in it, went far to animate and encourage all members of the research staff who worked on the project. An early draft was reviewed by Ambassador Robert Hunter and by Marten van Heuven of RAND—both veteran diplomats with vast ex- perience in U.S.-European security policy. Their ministrations im- proved the report greatly. RAND colleagues Zalmay Khalilzad and Robert Levine were also generous with their time and expertise, offer- ing constructive suggestions at several points in the development of the report. The author also wishes to thank Major General Roger Brady, Major Kathleen Echiverri, and Major Jerry Gandy of USAFE Head- quarters for their reviews of the report; and Colonel Joseph Wood, Commander of the 23rd Fighter Group, Colonel John Plant of Head- quarters, United States European Command, and Major Phil Smith of Headquarters, United States Air Force, for their comments and sug- gestions. Jeanne Heller did her usual fine job of editing the text.