Inside the Battlespace of Stability Operations A Monograph By Major James D. Nickolas Armor School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas First Term AY 99-00 Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited 20000321 034 DTIC QUALITY INPEOM 1 ABSTRACT INSIDE THE BATTLESPACE OF STABILITY OPERATIONS by MAJ James D. Nickolas, Armor, 51 pages. Since the end of the Cold War stability and support operations represent the majority of U. S. Army deployments. The writers of the Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5, Operations, grapple with replacing the 1993 version with a comprehensive doctrine which adequately addresses the needs of staff planners to orchestrate military operations. Expounding on the battlespace framework introduced in the 1993 FM 100-5, the writers developed four types of military action: offense, defense, stability, and support (ODSS). To orchestrate military operations, staff planners must understand the relationship among time, space, and mass in order to visualize, describe, and direct those operations towards a common purpose. By tracing the development of the operational level of war, establishing the systemic nature of operational warfare, and examining the functions of the elements of operational design for the military application of force, the monograph identifies the Newtonian nature of conventional offensive and defensive (OD) operations. A theoretical model based on concepts introduced during the conduct of the first student planning exercise assists in illustrating the functions of the elements of operational design in the OD environment. Having outlined the Newtonian OD environment, the monograph examines the battlespace of stability operations to determine if the elements of operational design assist staff planners with the development and execution of military operations. Because the nature of operations shifts from the application of force to the application of effort, stability operations exhibit quantum theory characteristics. Applying the quantum nature of effort application to the theoretical model demonstrates how staff planners must alter their employment of the elements of operational design in the stability environment. The monograph concludes in both the Newtonian OD and quantum stability environments, the elements of operational design assist planners in determining the battlespace and defining the military problem. The objectivity of the OD environment also enables staff planners to employ the elements of operational design to orchestrate the application of force inside the battlespace. Without this objectivity the quantum stability environment requires staff planners to be inside the battlespace to conduct just in time planning. The monograph further concludes non-local causation re-enforces the political nature of the stability environment while further complicating the planning effort. Non-local causation and just in time planning place a premium on information. Information assists the staff planner in both orchestrating operations and organizing force structures to effectively apply military effort within the battlespace. 2 TABLE OF CONTENTS Page 1. Intro ...d.. .u. ..c.t.io. ......n. ...................... I 11. Doctrinal Foundation..................................................... 4 Ill. Stab ilIity~perations...................................................... 14 IV. The Battlespace ........................................................ 20 V. Conclusions............................................................ 36 Appendix 1 U. S. Joint and Army Peacekeeping Terminology............... 41 Appendix 2 Principles of Stability and Support Operations.................. 43 Endnotes .................................................................. 45 Bibliography................................................................ 48 Section I Introduction To orchestrate military operations, staff planners must understand the relationship among time, space, and mass (combat power), in order to visualize, describe, and direct those operations towards a common purpose'. In the 1986 version of FMV 100-5, Operations, the U. S.A rmy introduced the concept of the operational level of war to facilitate this process. Since the Gulf War, stability and support operations represent the majority of U. S. Army deployments. Do the elements of operational design that evolved from the 1986 version of FMV 100-5 provide planners a useful conceptual framework for operating inside the battlespace of stability operations in a humanitarian intervention environment? This monograph examines the nature of time, space, mass and purpose as they relate to offense, defense, and stability operations during humanitarian interventions. As the Army grapples with a new, diverse, and complex post Cold War environment, the writers of the Army's capstone manual, FMV 100-5, struggle with replacing the 1993 version with a doctrinal framework that encompasses U. S. Title 10 & 32, as well as, United Nations mission requirements. To produce this Army-specific doctrine, these writers derived four types of military actions: offense, defense, stability, and support (ODSS). The FM 100-5 writers concluded the Army must be optimized and doctrine must support the comprehensive range of operations (ODSS) required for this new strategic 4 environment. While concluding that Army doctrine must be comprehensive, the writers also concluded that Army operations routinely require a combination of ODSS missions. For example, at the operational level of war the Army could be pursuing offensive operations, while at the tactical level of war the Army could be pursuing a combination of offensive, defensive, and stability operations2. For the purposes of this monograph, the author focuses the examination on the most prominent nature of the battlespace, iLe ., offense, defense, or stability, while tailoring the discussion of the battlespace towards the operational level of war. The monograph will not challenge the conclusions of the FM 100-5 writers, nor will the analysis of the battlespace include the interaction of mission types executed by subordinate units. By focusing the analysis, the author intends to highlight the similarities and differences between the mission types, thereby arriving at conclusions that would ultimately have implications for the interaction of the four mission types. To establish the framework for the battlespace analysis, the monograph must both describe the evolution of the operational art and determine the nature of the stability environment. Section 11D, octrinal Foundation, examines the theoretical underpinnings of the operational level of war and discusses the current U. S. Army definitions of the elements of operational design. Drawing heavily on the writings of Dr. James Schneider, Professor of Military Theory at the School of Advanced Military Studies, this section will examine the distinction between the operational level of war and the operational art. Understanding that military operations today are themselves complex, while being conducted in ever 5 more complex environments, the section also introduces the box construct as a methodology for examining military problems. Introduced during a division planning exercise, Col. Swan, Director of the School for Advanced Military Studies, presented the students a cardboard box as a means to think about the battlespace dimensions of time, space, mass, and purpose. After introducing the doctrinal foundation, the monograph examines the nature of stability operations. Section Ill, Stability Operations, discusses the Principles of Stability and Support Operations as addressed in FM 100-20, Stability and Support Operations. Tracing the recent shift in the nature of U. S. Army operations, the monograph examines how military operations differ in the OD and stability environments. Finally, this section re-examines the box construct in light of the nature of stability operations to discern how this environment alters the military problem. With the doctrinal and environmental foundation laid, the monograph focuses on the essence of the problem. Section IV, The Battlespace, discusses the concept of battlespace in the OD and the stability environments by examining how time, space, mass, and purpose shape the box and influence operations. Building on the frameworks developed in Sections II and III, the monograph links Newtonian physics and quantum theory analysis to the battlespace dimensions. Within this analysis, the monograph discusses the quantum physics concept of duality and the principle of complementarity. Throughout this section, the monograph integrates the results from Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR into the analysis of the stability operation's battlespace. The concept of duality suggests 6 the elements of operational design be extended to function in both the OD and stability environments. After completing the battlespace analysis, Section V, Conclusions, summarizes the findings of the analysis and points out the relevant conclusions. Expounding on the quantum nature of the stability battlespace, the monograph describes the impact of dualities, non-local causation, just in time planning, and information on how staff planners employ the elements of operational design during stability operations. Section 11 Doctrinal Foundation The evolution of the operational level of war directly influences the current U. S. Army definitions of the elements of operational design.3 The intellectual ruminations inside the U. S. Army during the late 1970s through the mid 1980s represented the Army's struggle to cognitively grasp the changing nature of warfare. Although instigated as a result of the failure in Vietnam, the impact of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, and the Army's reorientation on the Soviet threat to Europe, the intellectual fathers of this renaissance stimulated a more systemic examination of the evolution of warfare.4 Their recognition of the death of the Napoleonic paradigm of the decisive battle gave way to the Tukhachevskiy concept of the battle in depth which ultimately led to the U. S.A rmy Air-Land Battle concept. A brief synopsis of the evolution illustrates this influence. 7 At the conclusion of the First World War, the German and Soviet militaries expended tremendous intellectual capital examining the results of the Great War. Both militaries sought to solve the dilemmas created on the Western Front by the massed armies, increased lethality, decreased mobility, and the apparent disappearance of the decisive battle. Although each army took different approaches to the problem, their combined conclusions eventually influenced the development of American operational thought. The German thinkers grappled with the results of their two front war. Encouraged by their successes on the Eastern Front and their limited successes of the Hutier/infiltration tactics on the Western Front, they attempted to exploit the combined lessons of these diverse Fronts to restore mobility on the battlefield. In keeping with the tradition of the battle of annihilation, or Vemichtungsgedanke, the works of Von Seeckt represented one school of German thought that maintained the emphasis on decisive maneuver as advocated by Von Schleiffen and Von Moltke. This school of thought "provided no basis for any radical change in direction.'5 The German army would apply the developing technologies in mechanization, armor, and air power toward decisive maneuver aimed at a battle of annihilation.6 In conjunction with this reaffirmation of German tactical thinking, the Von Seeckt school of thought also rejected the Von Schleiffen style of command and control in favor of the Von Moltke style. With the return of auftragstaktik,t he illusion of an effective centralized command and control methodology based on the telegraph, telephone, and radio, gave way to a directive command and 8 control system. Based on the same technologies, auftragstaktike nabled the commander to detach himself from the chaos of the battlefield while maintaining situational awareness.7 This directive control sought to balance the tension between the higher commander's desire for control with the subordinate commander's desire to demonstrate initiative.8 Paralleling this development in the German army, a rival concept emerged. Advocated by Guderian, the armor idea challenged some of the more traditional German concepts of warfare. Instead of applying new technologies to old tactics, the armor idea sought to develop new tactics by capitalizing on the potential offered by the new technologies of mechanization, armor and air power.9 Although this "revolutionary theory [was] seldom put into words and often inadequately presented," it relied on surprise, speed, and the flexibility of panzer divisions to strike deep thrusts into the enemy.10 However different these two German ideas appeared, several common principles bridged the two concepts. "Both rejected any policy of attrition, both relied on rapid, decisive movement, and both laid emphasis on the concentration of force at the crucial point."1" Additionally, the von Seeckt and Guderian schools of thought remained focused on the tactical destruction of the enemy's army.12 While the German's sought how to return to the days of von Moltke and the decisive battle, the Soviets pursued a different approach. In the writings of Tukhachevskiy, Svechin, and Isserson, the Soviets took a more systemic point of view. The larger massed armies and continuous battlelines of the Western Front required new solutions. The Soviet theorists recognized the success of the 9 Hutier/infiltration tactics; however, they also recognized the inability of the German army to exploit those successes due to the increased depth of the defense and the requirement for the attacker to move faster than the defender. While the German theorists concentrated on developing the necessary tactical mobility to allow the attacker to move faster than the defender at the point of penetration, the Soviets broadened their view. In order to defeat an opposing army, battle must be joined in depth.1 According to historian Bruce Menning, the Soviets recognized that "decision now came as the result of a whole complex of successive, simultaneous, and related operations."1 This new means of warfare developed by the Soviets formally introduced the operational level of war. For the Soviets, operational art "was a term ... used to bridge the gap between strategy and tactics and to describe more precisely the discipline that governed the preparation for and conduct of operations."1 The Soviet theorists recognized the changes on the battlefield that prevented a decisive tactical engagement from producing decisive results. Classical Clausewitzian strategy precluded the use of a strategic reserve. Since the purpose of strategy was to ensure the mass of combat power was presented at the decisive point, withholding combat power from the tactical engagement was pointless. The Napoleonic condition that validated this dictum no longer existed. According to Tukhachevskiy, that which was expedient in Napoleonic ". .. battles, which rarely involved armies numbering over 100,000 men with weapons of limited range, was completely wrong and out of date during the imperialist 10