T4 r 4~ýT k A C. rIA Canbbuio \tHt ln~or~Davio Ahdtirepower 111owec Advahoces Thete Davi Tharfleer RAN GlnnAKn The research reported here was sponsored by the United States Air Force under Contract F49642-96-C-0001. Further information may be obtained from the Strategic Planning Division, Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data To find, and not to yield : how advances in information and firepower can transform theater warfare / David Ochmanek ... [et al.). p. cm. "Prepared for the United States Air Force by RAND's Project AIR FORCE." "MR-958-AE." ISBN 0-8330-2612-7 (alk. paper) 1. Military planning-United States. 2. United States-Armed Forces-Operational readiness. 3. United States-Armed Forces-Weapons systems. I. Ochmanek, David A. II. United States. Air Force. III. Project AIR FORCE. (U.S.). U153 [.W56 1998] 355.4 ' 0973-dc2l 98-16852 CIP RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy and decisionmak- ing through research and analysis. RAND's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions or policies of its research sponsors. © Copyright 1998 RAND All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from RAND. The cover illustrations hows (clockwise from the top left) an AH-64 Apache helicopter;, the F-15E Strike Eagle aircraft,a nd a missile launched from the Army TacticalM issile System (ATACMS). The background image is drawnf rom an E-8JointS urveillancea nd TargetAttackRadarSystem( ISTARS) screen dis- play. It depicts moving vehicles within a portiono f the Kuwaiti theatero f oper- ations during the Iraqi retreatfromK uwait City in February1 991. Published 1998 by RAND 1700 Main Street, P.O. Box 2138, Santa Monica, CA 90407-2138 1333 H St., N.W, Washington, D.C. 20005-4707 RAND URL: http://www.rand.org/ To order RAND documents or to obtain additional information, contact Distribution Services: Telephone: (310) 451-7002; Fax: (310) 451-6915; Internet: [email protected] TO FIND, AND NOT TO YIELD How Advances in Information and Firepower %4c> Can Transform Theater Warfare David A. Ochmanek Edward R. Harshberger David E. Thaler Glenn A. Kent M P'- qi r PREPARED FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE Project Air Force RAND Approved for public release; distribution unlimited Though much is taken, much abides; and though We are not now that strength which in old days Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are; One equal temper of heroic hearts, Made weak by time andf ate, but strong in will To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield. -Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ulysses The Art of war is simple enough. Find out where your enemy is. Get at him as soon as you can. Strike at him as harda s you can and as often as you can, and keep moving on. -Ulysses S. Grant iii PREFACE "We are surrounded by insurmountable opportunities." -Pogo Ironically perhaps, these are trying times for American defense planners. On the one hand, U.S. armed forces today are perhaps better prepared than ever before to protect the nation and to defend its interests around the globe. With the Cold War behind us, U.S. forces continue to enjoy a legacy of decades of investment in research and development, in modern weapons, and in extensive, realistic training. And by any measure, either in absolute terms or relative to the rest of the world, the United States is devoting a substantial level of resources to defense. Yet it is difficult to avoid the sense that the nation is not focusing its defense resources as well as it could on meeting emerging threats and challenges. Over the past four years, modernization spending (as measured by the combination of Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and procurement funding) has been at its lowest level since 1977. Moreover, the share of spending on pro- curement-the expenditures that actually place new equipment into the hands of soldiers, sailors, and airmen-has fallen at a dispropor- tionate rate. Procurement spending by the Department of Defense is now at its lowest level since the beginning of the Korean War. More to the point, our potential adversaries may have profited more from the lessons of the Gulf War than our own defense establish- ment. There is ample evidence that the military forces of key re- gional powers are emphasizing improvements in such areas as bal- listic and cruise missiles, weapons of mass destruction, modern air defenses, low-cost antiship weapons, and other capabilities that V vi How Advances in Information and Firepower Can Transform Theater Warfare could be used to deter or impede U.S. forces' access to overseas the- aters and to suppress their tempo of operations once deployed. It is not evident that U.S. operational concepts for deploying or employ- ing forces are adjusting to these emerging challenges. Nor is there a consensus within the U.S. defense community to capitalize on unique and enduring U.S. advantages in rapidly deployable fire- power and information systems, the early potential of which was demonstrated in Operation Desert Storm. Left unchecked, these trends could lead to a situation a decade hence in which U.S. forces, though sizable and well-trained, lack the capabilities they need to defeat aggression by a capable opponent without risking unaccept- ably high casualties and costs. As is often the case, the problems stem not so much from technical barriers as from the difficulty in discerning that the risks of adopting new approaches to warfare are increasingly outweighed by the risks of holding onto more traditional approaches. New systems are emerging that can enable operational concepts well suited to meet- ing the demands of the future, but many of these programs are vul- nerable to unnecessarily prolonged development schedules or even cancellation because of misguided funding priorities. This report does not argue that the nation should be spending more on defense. It does argue that the Department of Defense should reexamine its force mix and investment priorities in order to exploit more fully and more rapidly important opportunities that exist to enhance U.S. capabilities for rapid power projection. The analysis set forth here should be useful to anyone with a serious interest in U.S. national security and defense planning, particularly those interested in capabilities needed to deter-and to prevail in-major theater conflicts. PROJECT AIR FORCE Project AIR FORCE, a division of RAND, is the Air Force's federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) for studies and analyses. It provides the Air Force with independent analyses of policy alternatives affecting the development, employment, combat readiness, and support of current and future air and space forces. Preface vii Research is performed in three programs: Strategy and Doctrine, Force Modernization and Employment, and Resource Management and System Acquisition. CONTENTS Preface ......................................... v Figures ......................................... xi Tables .......................................... xv Sum m ary ....................................... xvii Acknowledgments ................................. xxi Chapter One INTRODUCTION: DEFENSE PLANNING FOR THE 21st CENTURY ................................ 1 Approach and Overview ......................... 3 Chapter Two SCENARIOS FOR EVALUATING FUTURE NEEDS AND CAPABILITIES ............................. 5 A Generic Scenario for Force Planning ............... 9 Chapter Three COMPETING APPROACHES TO THEATER WARFARE ... 13 Chapter Four ASSESSING FUTURE U.S. CAPABILITIES FOR THE HALT PHASE ................................... 23 Employing the Force: First Enable, Then Destroy ....... 26 Assessing a Single Operational Objective Rather Than a Theater Campaign .......................... 29 A Simpler Approach to Assessing Modern Firepower... 31 Weapons and Sortie Effectiveness ................. 36 Results of the Base Case .......................... 42 ix x How Advances in Information and Firepower Can Transform Theater Warfare Variations of the Base Case: Multiple Axes of Advance and Increased Spacing ....................... 48 Confronting the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction ............................... 52 Exploring the Contributions of Carrier Aviation ...... 55 Preliminary Judgments .......................... 59 A More Likely Opponent ......................... 60 Conclusion: Long-Range Firepower Can Rapidly Attrit Mechanized Forces ......................... 64 Chapter Five PRIORITIES FOR MODERNIZATION: ENSURINGA ROBUST CAPABILITY TO HALT INVASIONS ...... 67 Defeating Enemy Aircraft ........................ 71 Suppressing Surface-to-Air Defenses ................ 72 Gaining and Exploiting Information ................ 73 Rapidly Destroying Armor ........................ 74 Chapter Six BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR THE DEFENSE PROGRAM ............................... 77 Paying for Needed Enhancements .................. 78 Concluding Observations ........................ 85 Appendix: ASSESSMENT APPROACH AND METHODS ..... 87 FIGURES 2.1. Canonical Scenarios Do Not Pose a Stressing Challenge ................................. 6 2.2. Adversaries Will Seek to Achieve and Exploit Surprise .................................. 9 2.3. A Representative Scenario for Force Planning ...... 11 3.1. Past Warfighting Concepts Focused on the Close Battle .................................... 14 3.2. Traditional Concepts Fail in Stressing Cases: Persian Gulf Scenario, C-day = D-day ................... 16 3.3. Emerging Concept for Halting Invasions .......... 18 3.4. Emerging Firepower and Information Capabilities Enable a New Approach to Theater Warfare ........ 19 4.1. Base Case Assumptions ....................... 24 4.2. Sortie/Missile Apportionments Vary Between Early and Late Halt Phase .......................... 29 4.3. Estimating FEBA Movement: A Simple Model ...... 32 4.4. A Transparent Approach to Assessing the Halt Force ................................. 34 4.5. The CBU-97 Antiarmor Weapon ................ 37 4.6. Estimating Skeet's Effectiveness: Optimal Versus Random Deliveries .......................... 39 4.7. Assumptions Regarding Sortie Effectiveness: Skeet Antiarmor Munitions ......................... 40 4.8. Halt Phase Allocations ........................ 43 4.9. Net Advance of Unattacked Enemy Forces Along Two Main Axes ................................. 43 4.10. Enemy Advance and Armor Kills: Base Case, Unlimited Weapons ......................... 45 xi