O-l-'i"vvty.t i;c public release; STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE ORGANIZATION CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES A STRATEGIC RED TEAM ITEM OF INTEREST January 1991 flOSE RETURN 1ft IUU Tö: '•';:;*■, l s v £■■> ;.-!,,„ s-- ? -..f'V /Z/30^7 STRATEGIC RED TEAM MISSION The SDIO Countermeasures Program Strategic Red Team (SRT) consists of Soviet specialists, defense analysts, and intelligence analysts from private industry, federally funded research centers, and national laboratories. The SRT assists SDIO by (1) examining candidate technical countermeasures and plans for their operational use in terms of likelihood of actual Soviet development and deployment, resource tradeoffs, and consistency with Soviet style, and (2) assessing potential Soviet policies, arms control proposals, and propaganda approaches that could affect Soviet responses to the SDI program. The SRT works with the intelligence community to keep apprised of government assessments of Soviet capabilities and to share with the government insights on Soviet policies and behavior. SRT analyses and findings are provided to the technical Red/Blue process of the Countermeasures Program, SDIO officials, and others within the defense establishment. STRATEGIC RED TEAM Sayre Stevens Robert Kranc, SDIO/SIM Chairman Program Manager Fred Wood Gary Dawson Executive Director Executive Secretary SRT Members Michael Deane Carolyn Mangeng Cosmo DiMaggio James McNally John Farrell Stephen Meyer Daniel Goure Keith Payne Francis Hoeber John Shannon Andrew Hull Richard Soil Joseph LaQuanti Michael Summers Intelligence Community Liaison Robert Feldhuhn, DIA Jerry Pohl, CIA Accession Number: 3024 Publication Date: Jan 01,1991 Title: Current Soviet Views of Ballistic Missile Defenses: A Strategic Red Team Item of Interest Personal Author: Deane, M.J.; Payne, K.B.; et al. Corporate Author Or Publisher: Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, Washington, DC 20301-7100 Descriptors, Keywords: SDIBMD Defense Strategy Soviet Military Opinion Thought Viewpoint Reaction Debate Pages: 00032 Cataloged Date: Jul 18, 1991 Document Type: HC Number of Copies In Library: 000001 Record ID: 22267 Source of Document: SDIO TABLE OF CONTENTS EXECUTIVE SUMMARY II CURRENT SOVIET VIEWS OF BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES 1 PURPOSE AND BACKGROUND 1 General Purpose 1 Background 1 STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN TRADITIONAL SOVIET MILITARY THOUGHT 2 Traditional Requirements for Defense, and The ABM Treaty 2 SOVIET VIEWS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN THE 1980s 4 The SDI and Soviet Reactions 5 STRATEGIC DEFENSES: THE CURRENT DEBATE 7 The Political Context of the Debate 7 The Content of the Debate 8 I. Arbatov: Advocate of Offense Dominance and Critic of Strategic Defense 8 II. Advocates of the Status Quo on BMD 10 III. The Advocates of Mutual Deployment of Limited Defenses, Including Ground- Based (Only) Interceptors 11 IV. Gor"kov and Asriyev: Advocates of Soviet Strategic Defense Modernization 15 V. Advocates of Defense Dominance 16 Apparent Soviet Architectural Preferences 17 APPENDIX A--Soviet Discussion of Mutual BMD This paper was prepared by the Strategic Red Team in response to Strategic Defense Initiative Organization Countermeasures Office tasking. The primary authors are SRT members Michael J. Deane, of Booz-Allen and Hamilton, and Keith B. Payne, of National Security Research. Their observations were supplemented by contributions from other members of the SRT. 1 I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY Purpose Recently, a series of articles appeared in the Soviet press discussing new and, in some cases, "radical" proposals for changing the structure, mission, and forces of Soviet strategic defenses, including ballistic missile defense (BMD). Because of the potential impact of the Soviet position on BMD on the Strategic Defense Initiative program, the Strategic Red Team analyzed this discussion in light of traditional Soviet military thought and the on-going debate over defense sufficiency. Conclusion None of the proposed alternatives to official policy regarding BMD that are being debated in the USSR has garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. Based on the majority of recent articles and some statements by officials, it appears that if the Soviets decide to move toward expanded BMD capabilities, their preference will be for revision of the ABM Treaty to permit additional BMD sites and ground-based interceptors. The extent to which additional defensive capabilities and characteristics-such as space basing-might ultimately be negotiable cannot be determined from available evidence. BMD and the ABM Treaty in Traditional Soviet Military Thought Assuming a constant danger of war, traditional Soviet military thought mandated a complementary strategic offense-strategic defense posture as a means to attain victory in war. Such victory assumed the destruction of the opponent and the survival of the Soviet Union, its political system, economic infrastructure, and war-making capability. Early in the postwar decades, the Soviet leadership pressed hard to achieve the capability for these dual requirements in its military strategy, force structure, and weapons procurement programs. In contrast to Western tendencies, the Soviets viewed strategic offense and defense as complementary, mutually reinforcing, and required for success in war. II By the mid-1960s, however, the apparent limitations of Soviet BMD technology were apparent and Soviet strategic thought proceeded from three premises: • Extremely effective BMD was impossible in the near term. • Preemptive counterforce strikes had to be the primary instrument for destroying the opponent and reducing damage to the Soviet Union. • Strategic defenses, including BMD, remained integral to limiting the potential damage that U.S. retaliatory strikes could inflict. The 1969 U.S. announcement of intentions to deploy a Safeguard BMD for the protection of U.S. strategic offensive forces jeopardized Soviet preemptive counterforce planning. There was, therefore, significant incentive and logic in the Soviet drive for BMD limitations in SALT I. From the Soviet perspective, the resultant 1972 ABM Treaty provided at least three major benefits: (1) a continuing free ride for Soviet ballistic missiles, (2) constraint in a BMD competition, likely to end at Soviet disadvantage, and (3) limited impediments to BMD R&D and no restrictions on the deployment of other defense elements (ASATs, ATBMs, SAMs, civil defense, etc.). The Soviets had not lost interest in strategic defense. In the context of the U.S. Safeguard program, however, they determined that strict limitation on BMD deployment was preferable to a major U.S. capability to defend its strategic offensive forces. The Soviet decision to pursue BMD limitation does not appear to have been derived from an endorsement of Western notions of mutual vulnerability and deterrence "stability". It was a logical extension of the Soviet strategy to emphasize counterforce offensive capabilities in support of the wartime objectives of destroying the opponent and limiting damage to the Soviet Union. Expressed Soviet Views on BMD and the ABM Treaty From the Introduction of SDI to 1989 In view of the fact that the Soviets signed the ABM Treaty, at least in part, to protect their offensive counterforce approach to defeating the enemy and limiting damage to the Soviet Union, President Reagan's introduction of SDI caused great concern in the Soviet Union. Within three days of SDI's debut on 23 March 1983, Soviet Communist Party chief Yuriy Andropov denounced the concept of strategic defense. Soviet military spokesmen subsequently charged that the SDI was intended to enable the United States to fight and win a nuclear war at an acceptable price. Under General Secretary Gorbachev, Soviet officials continued to oppose SDI and called for a stricter interpretation of the ABM Treaty than previously understood by the United States. According to some published and personal reports, this response was driven by not only Soviet strategic requirements, but also concern that greater U.S. exploitation of space for military purposes would provide the U.S.with an extremely important force multiplier for terrestrial forces. The four basic Soviet III counterarguments to SDI to be aired publicly are that it is: inherently destabilizing; integral to U.S. first-strike plans; easily defeated by asymmetric offensive countermeasures; and a threat to offensive force reductions. These same arguments, which repeat much of the commentary by Western critics, were also used to criticize the earlier Safeguard BMD program. Although these types of arguments against SDI have been repeated frequently by Soviet officials, the tone of the Soviet reaction can be divided into two general periods: from 1983 to 1986, and from 1986 to 1989. The distinguishing feature, beginning in 1986, has been an overall reduction in the Soviets' public effort to discredit SDI, and an apparent reduction in the urgency with which the Soviet Union views the program. Time and an obvious downturn in Congressional support for SDI and near-term BMD deployment may have ameliorated Soviet concerns. Nevertheless, despite this apparent reduction in the intensity of Soviet opposition and some concessions at the 1987 Washington Summit, through 1988 the Soviets appeared to be unanimous in their public opposition to expanded BMD. Soviet officials continued to express a linkage between START and U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty as defined by the Soviet Union. In early 1989, however, Soviet statements and articles began to appear that suggested an internal debate regarding BMD and greater interest by some Soviet writers and officials in mutual BMD deployment. The Context for the Current Debate By 1985, Soviet leaders generally accepted the need to make systematic changes. For all, including those who viewed military competition as the critical long-term problem, economic revitalization was the near-term priority. As the consumer of resources from a shrinking economic base, even the military leadership recognized that short-term benefits might produce long-term disadvantage. Moreover, given the projected trend, it was commonly accepted that economic reform had to be fundamental, not superficial, with enough sociopolitical incentive to reinvigorate the populace. For the first four years of the Gorbachev regime, therefore, there was a fairly stable-though not unanimous-consensus within the leadership that to refurbish the general economic and technological base, the Armed Forces would have to accept constraints in growth and modernization, convert some of its facilities to assist in the general economic shift from a quantitative to a qualitative thrust, and cut existing forces. By early 1989, initial reductions were decided. However, it was becoming increasingly obvious in the assessment of some Soviet officials that even these major steps were insufficient to produce the resource savings necessary to invigorate the general economy. Larger cuts would have to be made, cuts which some believed had to impact not simply the fat but the muscle of the Soviet Armed Forces. Without refuting the economic imperatives of the reformists, other Soviet officials contended that the argument was offset by what IV they perceived as an unchanging threat from the West, the countering of which had to be a high priority of the regime. A debate on the future of the Air Defense Forces generally, and BMD specifically became apparent as a sub-set of this broad internal debate on "defense sufficiency." Since early 1989, some statements by Soviet officials have appeared publicly that indicate an increased flexibility regarding the possibility of mutual BMD deployment. Increased support for BMD by some Soviet writers and officials appears to be the result of: 1) recognition of the threat posed to the Soviet Union by the proliferation of ballistic missiles in the Third World-including the threat of purposeful and unauthorized/accidental strikes; and, 2) the perceived viability of the U.S. SDI program. BMD and the ABM Treaty: The Current Debate Within the context of broader debates on the general requirements for reasonable sufficiency, beginning in early 1989, Soviet officials and other writers began to air publicly five competing views on BMD and the ABM Treaty: • advocates of mutual strategic offense dominance at lower levels with minimal strategic anti-aircraft defense and no BMD • advocates of mutual offense dominance at lower levels with continued observance of the current ABM Treaty "as signed," which is official policy • advocates of mutual offense dominance with mutual deployment of an agreed number of BMD sites and ground-based BMD interceptors • advocates of Soviet strategic defense modernization and expansion, including BMD, to offset a growing Western threat • advocates of mutual strategic anti-missile defense dominance with mutual strategic offensive reductions The principal points of each position are summarized below. Offense Only. This viewpoint argues for restructuring the Soviet Armed Forces to meet war prevention, not war-making, criteria at lower force levels. While positing that major conflict on any level is highly improbable, it is maintained that the optimum Soviet operation, if central strategic war should occur, would be retaliatory countervalue strikes. To this end, qualitative improvements should be aimed at developing a survivable, minimal Soviet countervalue retaliatory capability. A key assumption is that the traditional goals of Soviet damage limitation by either offensive strikes or strategic defenses are impossible to attain. Thus, this view generally opposes BMD for any purpose, at even the lowest numerical levels. Offense Dominance Within ABM Treaty Observance. Closely akin to, but less extreme than, the offense-only position are the supporters of the official Soviet declaratory position that START is linked to the observance of the ABM Treaty "in the form in which it was signed in 1972." A modification in this official position acknowledged publicly by the Soviets has been a Soviet willingness to establish the linkage by unilateral declaration, rather than as an explicit requirement in a future START agreement. Offense Dominance With Expanded Ground-Based BMP Interceptors. In the main, this group tends to agree that the East-West military relationship is fairly stable and that a major conflict is improbable. They endorse a relaxation of the ABM Treaty and expansion of ground-based BMD interceptors. They appear to be motivated by the dangers of Nth country attacks, as well as accidental and unsanctioned launches. To some extent, therefore, the type of defense proposed is a defense against peripheral states. However, that it is not only anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) defense that is being discussed is evident. The advocates generally acknowledge that the deployment of the defense will require a revision of the ABM Treaty and should be implemented cooperatively with the United States. Since ATBM defenses do not fall within the scope of the ABM Treaty, suggestions of such requirements clearly include a strategic anti-missile defense capability. Soviet Strategic Defense Modernization and Expansion. Like all other versions of opposition to the offense-only view, against whom their writings are explicitly addressed, proponents of this alternative perceive a greater possibility for major war. While some argue for a relatively higher probability of nuclear exchanges at the very outset of a conflict than others, they agree that an initial conventional conflict contains considerable prospects for escalation because they presume that conventional strikes will include attacks on Soviet Union- based nuclear assets. Thus, they plead the case for a robust Soviet BMD system capable of countering U.S. "offensive air-space operations" and "air- space attack means". Following the unanimous opinion of all other discussants, the group agrees that no Soviet defense at any level will be 100 percent effective. Rather, the proponents justify defenses on the traditional standard of "relative defensibility" of key Soviet societal and war-making resources. Though vague on the size of strategic defenses required, the bottom line, as expressed by one writer, is the notion that "it is impossible to economize on air defense," which in this particular discussion included BMD. Defense Dominance. At the opposite extreme of the offense-only view is the position that questions the wisdom of deterrence and stability based principally on strategic offensive forces. While noting that the ABM Treaty may have been appropriate in its time, proponents of this view maintain that circumstances have changed and the Treaty needs to be reevaluated in the context of (1) a truly defensive Soviet military doctrine and (2) the continuing VI U.S. commitment to SDI-related work. With mutual reductions in strategic offenses, as well as "stringent" limitations on active technical countermeasures and defense suppression, it is argued, mutual transition to defense dominance would ensure stability insofar as neither side could effectively attack the other even in a crisis situation. To those who counter that the transition would entail considerable risk, this article responds that the process should be gradual, coordinated, and phased. The proposed alternatives outlined above are based on approximately 18 Soviet articles or statements explicitly discussing BMD and appearing since 1989. It should be noted that two of the positions outlined above, the first and the fifth, are represented in a single article or by a single author. To date, none of the proposed alternatives-judging from available data- appears to have garnered sufficient authoritative support to have caused an identifiable shift in Soviet policy. It is not possible to identify the relative political weight behind the alternatives to declared policy. Conversely, none of the positions, including official policy, seems to have sufficient strength and authority to close the discussion. Thus, the debate continues. Apparent Soviet Architectural Preferences The available evidence is insufficient to permit a determination of whether or how the Soviets will shift their policy position with regard to BMD deployment and the ABM Treaty. Nevertheless, there is evidence, from open Soviet publications and some statements by Soviet officials, that provides a general outline of Soviet preferences for any expansion of permitted BMD capabilities. These statements typically indicate a general opposition to the deployment of space-based BMD interceptors. For example, General Major V. Belous and General Lieutenant M. Vinogradov wrote in the 23 August issue of Sovetskaya Rossiya that the Soviet Union and the United States may need to deploy BMD against Third Party threats, "However, one provision that remains fundamental is the non-siting in space of strike weapons...." Some statements, however, do endorse space basing. In an article appearing in Pravda on 20 July 1989, Professor V. Etkin, Chief of Applied Space Physics at the Institute of Space Research, suggested the extension of cooperative BMD systems into space. Another article by M. Aleksandrov of the Foreign Affairs Ministry distinguished between space basing for sensors and interceptors, endorsing the former. And, in the fall of 1989, Soviet Ambassador Kuznetsov stated, as reported in TASS (September 26), that "all devices that are not weapons can be permitted in space." Most recent statements indicate that Soviet interest would be in the deployment of a "thin" ground-based ABM shield. These have cited ballistic missile proliferation in the Third World as justification for possible deployment of additional BMD. Concern about the threat from ballistic missile proliferation can VII