AD-A264 472 THE BATTLE OF CRETE iTS IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS I J " DTICl A Monograph ELECTE byMA1919 Major Blair A. Ross Jr. C InfantryC School of Advanced military Studies United States 1Ar8my Co0mm1an d andK G3nensaesral Staff College Aproe roP uRbeliDlce iasst"IerUui;nb itiitel 'o,, '"' "'93--l1050 S' 9 5 18 01:1 THE BATrLE OF CRETE ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS A Monograph by Major Blair A. Ross Jr. Infantry School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas S~First Term AY 92-93, 1992 Monograph The Battle of Crete and its Implications for Modern Contingency Operations MAJ Blair A. Ross, Jr. United States Army Command and General Staff College ATTN: ATZL-SMV Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 "Approved for Public Release; Distribution is Unlimited" See attached Crete, Contingency Operations, Airborne Operations, 49 Forcible Entry, WW II German Airborne Forces Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified Unlimited SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES MONOGRAPH APPROVAL Major Blair A. Ross, Jr. Title of Monograph: The Battle of Crete and Its Implications for Modern Contingency Operations Approved by: SMonograph Director Robert M. Epstein, Ph.D./ tO1 7naX C Director, School of COY James R. McDonough, M Advanced Military Studies _ _ _ _ _ _ _Director, Graduate Philip kes, Ph.D. Degree Programs Accesion For NTIS CRA&I Accepted this /_ day of 6.4I 1992 OUTnIaCn nouTiAnBce d CQ3 ray Distr ibutlion I Availability Codes Avail and I or i O~st Soecial ABSTRACT THE BATTLE OF CRETE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR MODERN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS by Major Blair A. Ross, Jr., USA, 47 pages. This monograph examines the implications for modern contingency operations of the World War II German assault on the island of Crete. Emerging United States security strategy places increasing reliance on crisis response capabilities. Evolving military doctrine, based substantially on American experiences in the last decade, stresses the achievement of quick, decisive victory with minimum casualties. The German experience on Crete suggests that contingency operations requiring forced entry may be prolonged and costly undertakings. The focus of research is on deriving applicable parallels between the seizure of Crete, recent United States experiences, and potential future contingency requirements. The monograph first highlights emerging contingency requirements and corresponding doctrinal developments. it next describes the background to the seizure of Crete in 1941, Operation MERCURY. It then analyzes the assault through the use of tactical themes which relate this specific case to recent American experiences and to contingency operations in general. These themes are acquisition of intelligence, tactical and strategic surprise, operational planning, logistic preparations, the impact of tactical reverses, requirements for specialized units, and joint force integration at tactical levels. From this analysis, the monograph concludes that a contingency response doctrine based only on recent American experiences is inadequate, potentially leading to failure in situations where determined and well prepared opposition is encountered. It recommends several factors for consideration in future contingencies, based on the tactical themes traced through the analysis of Operation MERCURY. ii Table of Contents Page I. Introduction ............................................. 1 II. Operational Context: Crete and the ..................... 5 Balkans Campaign III. Acquisition of Intelligence ............................. 6 IV. Tactical and Strategic Surprise ....................... 9 V. Operational Planning .................................... 10 VI. Logistical Preparation .................................. 17 VII. Impact of Tactical Reverses ............................. 19 VIII. Maintaining Cohesive, Resilient Units ................. 30 IX. Joint Tactical Integration .............................. 31 X. Implications for Future Contingency Operations ........ 33 XI. Conclusion .............................................. 38 Endnotes ....................................................... 41 Bibliography ................................................... 45 iii Table of Maps Page Map 1 Airborne Assault Plan ...................... 15 Map 2 Maleme Area .................................. 20 Map 3 Prison Valley Area ......................... 21 iv INTRODUCTION As the United States adjusts its foreign policy to the post cold war era, it has adopted a new framework for its national security strategy. It has shifted from a reliance on forward deployed forces of considerable strength to the maintenance of a smaller forward presence, with elements based in the continental United States responding in the event of an overseas crisis. The armed forces have reflected this shift with an increased focus on contingency operations, versus the former orientation on the execution of established war plans. The previous cold war concepts normally assumed the existence of regional alliances, along with an established infrastructure upon which to base a large-scale military response. The plans did not require the establishment of a lodgment in their initial phases. Planning for the contingency operations inherent in the new security strategy can rarely make such assumptions. The United States is faced with a variety of potential threats and uncertain regional political conditions. Military responses to crisis may be required in areas of the globe offering little in the way cf supportive regional powers, ready access to facilities, or established operational infrastructure. The critical precursor in such endeavors may well be a forced entry operation to secure and establish a base for subsequent operations. Recent cases of American military action in responsie to crisis have formed a key segment of the foundation for emerging Army doctrine. Operations URGENT FURY in Grenada, JUST CAUSE in Panama, and DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM in the Persian Gulf have generated doctrinal concepts focused on obtaining a quick, decisive victory with minimal casualties. They are characterized by violent offensive action with overwhelming force, targeted 1 simultaneously against all potential centers of resistance to rapidly azhieve success. Such concepts aLe frequently reflected in the draft revision to the US Army's keystone doctrinal manual, FM 100-5, Operations.' Of significance, however, is the character of the opposition the Army faced in the operations of the last decade. The Grenadian Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA) and the Panamanian Defense Force (PDF) were much less capable than the American forces deployed at short notice against them. Iraq's large and well equipped armed forces were restrained from preemptive action by their political leadership. They permitted an unmolested expansion of coalition forces which subsequently outmatched them in every respect. We may not have the luxury of a marginally effective foe or an unimpeded buildup in the future. The experiences of the first few plaiteloads of Rangers at Point Salines Airport notwithstanding, the Army has not faced a truly demanding forced entry operation since the Second World War.- The increased likelihood of such operations within the context of the new National Military Strategy, along with their critical importance to the attainment of operational success, bolster the relevance of continued study of the tactical requirements of forced entry operations. The lack of recent experience against a determined and capable opponent argues for the examination of other historical examples, wherein mission requirements were essentially si.,"L2.ar, th- opposition more serious, and the outcome less assured. The German assault on Crete in May, 1941, Operation MERCURY, provides a suitable case for study. It was a joint operation involving a corps-sized ground force supported by a substantial air component, enabling the attackers to attain air supremacy prior to the assault. It was staged at relatively short notice, 2 from an area with inadequate existing facilities and a transportation infrastructure degraded by damage from recent military operat.jons. The allied forces defending the island were well train ., reasonably well equipped, in most cases well led, and fully prepared to meet the attack. The tactical conditions generally replicate any number of situations potentially facing the United States in the future. The German experience in MERCURY highlights a number of tactical issues which form the basis for this study. These issues are evident to varying degrees in the American operations of the last decade. In the German case, their impact was compounded to the point of seriously jeopardizing mission accomplishment. They represent factors the Army must remain cognizant of as it adiusts its tactical doctrine to correspond with the emerging precepts contained in the revised FM 100-5. The first issue is the acquisition of adequate intelligence. The expectations for our highly technical collection and analysis system are great. They shape our perspective towards assuming a detailed knowledge of enemy disposition and capabilities prior 7o commitment of forces. The intelligence system has not always been able to meet these expectations, however. Related to this factor is a second concern, assumptions of strategic and tactical surprise. In an era of intense media focus on any military contingencies, the achievement of strategic surprise in a theater of operations is all but impossible. With operations necessarily oriented on the key airfield or port facilities needed to sustain an intervention, tactical surprise is equally difficult to achieve. A third concern encompasses the area of operational planning. Planning must provide for the full integration of all participants and allow considerable flexibility. All feasible 3