ROK Turning Point ☯ CHAPTER 4 Major Issues in the 2002 ROK Presidential Election Daniel A. Pinkston S ince its founding in 1948, the Republic of Korea65 has had a strong presidential system of government except for a brief period of parliamentary rule from 1960 to 1961.66 There have been 16 presidential elections in South Korea since the republic was founded in 1948, including four since democratization in 1987.67 There were several important issues during the 2002 campaign, but a series of corruption scandals surrounding President Kim Dae-jung raised the electorate’s demand for political reforms. Economic policy and regionalism were also important during the 2002 campaign, but North Korea’s nuclear weapons program and a naval clash with North Korea in June 2002 raised concerns over security and government policy towards Pyongyang. In general, the major issues in the 2002 presidential election can be placed into three broad categories: 65 The views in this chapter do not represent the views of the Center for Nonproliferation Studies or the Monterey Institute of International Studies. 66 For a review of the ROK’s constitutional revisions, see Gregory Henderson, “Constitutional Changes from the First to the Sixth Republics: 1948-1987,” in Kihl Young Whan and Kim Ilpyoung, eds., Political Change in South Korea (New York: Paragon House, 1988). For an English version of the 1987 ROK Constitution , see http://eng.assembly.go.kr/laws/constitution. 67 Yonhap News Agency, 26 November 2002, in “ROK’s Yonhap: S. Korea to Hold 16th Presidential Poll Since Liberation,” Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document ID: KPP20021126000051. Daniel A. Pinkston corruption and political reform; inter-Korean relations; and bilateral relations with the United States. Corruption and Political Reform Historically, South Korean electoral politics have been characterized by a number of party realignments and political parties based upon charismatic individuals with strong support from particular regions. These “personality- and regionally- based” parties have developed from Confucian traditions and institutional rules that have enabled party leaders to enforce party discipline by controlling party finances and access to the proportional list for National Assembly elections. There were pressures to reform the nomination process before the 2002 campaign began, and the subsequent changes in party rules affected the nomination processes, which also affected the results of the December 2002 election. The Millennium Democratic Party (MDP), the party of former president Kim Dae-jung, decided in January 2002 to hold primaries to select its presidential candidate. The party adopted an electoral college with 70,760 members, half of whom were not members of the MDP.68 While the MDP was eager to institute primaries and other innovations such as Internet voting, Lee Hoi-chang and his supporters in the Grand National Party (GNP) were reluctant to adopt such reforms since a decentralization of the nomination process increased uncertainty over Lee’s nomination and party control. The MDP’s first primary was held in March, and Mr. Lee In-je (Rhee In-je) was considered the front-runner as the race began 68 Kim Hyung-jin, “Primaries Hottest Topic as Political Reform Panel Resumes,” Korea Herald, 24 January 2002; Kim Hyung-jin, “MDP Contenders Gather on Cheju Island Ahead of First Primary,” Korea Herald, 15 February 2002. ROK Turning Point with seven candidates.69 However, Lee In-je lost the first three primaries in Cheju, Ŭlsan and Kwangju before he was able capture the fourth primary in Taejŏn.70 Meanwhile, Mr. Roh Moo-hyun (No Mu-hyŏn) and his supporters were building a grass-roots network through the Internet. “Nosamo,” a three- syllable abbreviation for the “group that loves No Mu-hyŏn,” began as an Internet discussion group among people mostly in the 20s and 30s. Nosamo membership took off during the primary season and played an important role in the mobilization of voters on the election day.71 In contrast, the GNP was divided over the introduction of a primary system in January 2002. Lee Hoi-chang and his supporters claimed primaries would cause “overheated elections and greater problems with factionalism and regionalism.” A minority reformist faction in the party that included Park Kŭn- hye (daughter of former President Park Chung-hee) disagreed and strongly pushed for reforms. The party finally did adopt a primary system, but Park Kŭn-hye left the GNP and subsequently did not support candidate Lee Hoi-chang. Polls indicated that MDP candidate Roh enjoyed strong popular support right after his nomination in April 2002, but his support 69 The other candidates were Yu Chong-kŭn (柳鍾根), Kim Kŭn-t’ae (金槿泰), Roh Moo-hyŏn (盧武鉉), Kim Chung-kwŏn (金重權), Han Hwa- gap (韓和甲), and Chŏng Tong-yŏng (鄭東泳). See김상연, “'제주 유세' 2라운드/ 민주7龍 ‘내가 후보 적임,” 대한매일, 15 February 2002, p. 6. 70 “Rhee Emerges as MDP Front-runner in Race for Presidency,” Asia Pulse, 18 March 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 71 Shindonga, 1 February 2002, in “ROK Ruling Party Convention Race to Select Presidential Candidate Viewed” FBIS Document KPP200203110000118; 김기영, “민주당 대선경선 스타트 '이인제냐, 대역전이냐',” 신동아, February 2002, http://shindonga.donga.com; 김진수, “노풍의 중심축 ‘노사모’,” 주간동아, 327호, 28 March 2002, http://weekly.donga.com; Joongang Ilbo, 10 April 2002, in “ROK MDP Presidential Hopeful Roh Moo-hyun’s Support Group Analyzed,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020410000047. Daniel A. Pinkston steadily dropped in the wake of a series of scandals surrounding Kim Dae-jung. The MDP suffered overwhelming defeats in local elections held on 13 June 2002 and in by-elections for vacant National Assembly seats on 8 August 2002.72 The results nearly split the MDP and triggered calls for Roh’s replacement as the party’s presidential candidate.73 Table 4.1 ROK Political Scandals During the 2002 Presidential Campaign Date Name Position Accusation 31 Kim Ŭn- Deputy Director Indicted for accepting December sŏng of NIS W50M bribe from MCI 2001 Korea 7 January Kim Sŏng- Nominated to Resigns over alleged bribes 2002 nam head from businessman Yun Commission on Tae-shik, indicated for Anti-Corruption murder of his wife in late 2001 . Called “Pass 21” scandal after name of Yun’s firm. 10 January Park Jun- Information Resigns over alleged links yŏng Agency director to Yun Tae-shik scandal Mid- Shin Sŭng- Brother of Alleged links to G&G January hwan Prosecutor Group lobbying scandal General Shin Sŭng-nam 72 Lee Jong-heon, “Opposition Sweeps South Korea’s Elections,” United Press International, 13 June 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Kim Hyung-jin, “Following Another Election Triumph, GNP Set to Flex Parliamentary Muscles,” Korea Herald, 10 August 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com. 73 Shin Yong-bae, “Internal Strife Brewing in MDP Following Defeat in Elections,” Korea Herald, 16 June 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis- nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 9 August 2002, in “ROK MDP Leaders to Resign, Take Responsibility for ‘Crushing Defeat’ in By Elections,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020809000028; Yonhap News Agency, 9 August 2002, in “ROK’s Yonhap: MDP Likely to Follow in Predecessor’s Footsteps to Create New Party,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020809000057. ROK Turning Point Date Name Position Accusation 22 January Kim Ho- Cheju vice- Detained for questioning sŏng governor regarding Yun Tae-shik scandal 29 January Lee Hyŏng- Nephew of first Arrested for accepting t’aek lady bribes in G&G Group lobbying scandal 28 February Lee Su-dong former director Arrested for taking bribes of the Kim Dae- in G&G Group lobbying jung Peace scandal Foundation 17 April Ch’oe Kyu- Former aide to Arrested for accepting sŏn Kim Dae-jung bribes from Tiger Pools International in sports lotto scandal 22 April Im Jŏng-yŏp Former political Arrested for accepting secretary for bribes from construction President Kim firm in December 1999 3 May Kwŏn No- Former close Arrested for accepting gap aide to President bribes from venture Kim capitalist 18 May Kim Hong- President Kim’s Arrested for accepting gŏl third son bribes in sports lotto scandal 26 May Lee Hong- assistant culture Arrested for accepting sŏk and tourism bribes in sports lotto minister scandal 21 June Kim Hong- President Kim’s Arrested for accepting 2002 op second son bribes from Korea National Housing Corp. The endemic scandals led to Kim Dae-jung’s resignation from the MDP, and to impeachment threats from the GNP. Although the GNP did not fulfill its threat to impeach President Kim, the party, which controlled the National Assembly, rejected Kim’s nominations for prime minister following a cabinet shuffle. Negative campaigning ensued, and the GNP strategy was to emphasize the ubiquitous scandals and to link them to Roh Moo- hyun. Daniel A. Pinkston Efforts to Field a Single Candidate to Oppose Lee Hoi-chang Past presidential elections have included efforts by parties to field a single candidate. In 1987, the failure of the opposition to agree on a single candidate resulted in the election of Roh Tae- woo, but Kim Dae-jung was able to win a close election in 1997 after forming an alliance with Kim Jong-pil. In 2002, there was speculation whether Lee In-je, Park Kŭn-hye, Chung Mong-joon (Chŏng Mong-jun) and others would run for president, and if not, their potential support was considered very valuable. As South Korea was co-hosting the World Cup with Japan, speculation began to grow over the possible candidacy of National Assemblyman Chung Mong-joon. Mr. Chung is also president of the South Korean Football Association and a vice- chairman of the Federation Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). On 17 September, Mr. Chung ended the speculation by announcing his candidacy. A new party, “National Alliance 21” was formed the following month.74 Mr. Chung ran to implement political reforms and to eliminate regionalism, and polls initially indicated he was ahead of Lee Hoi-chang in a two- way race. Eventually, Chung Mong-joon and Roh Moo-hyun decided to seek a single candidacy, which was to be decided after a debate and subsequent polling. If both candidates ran, victory was almost certain for Lee Hoi-chang. The two candidates reached an agreement on 16 November 2002, with the loser of the selection process agreeing to support the winner during the campaign. Mr. Chung and Mr. Roh agreed “to seek a political revolution to replace old politics,” and that “political reform, inter-Korean 74 Kyodo News Service, 17 September 2002, in “South Korea Soccer Chief Chung Announces Presidential Candidacy,” FBIS Document ID: JPP20020917000137; 박민, “‘국민통합21’ 16일 발기인대회,” 문화일보, 14 October 2002, p. 2, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr. ROK Turning Point relations, the economy and agricultural reform were urgent tasks.”75 The GNP objected to the agreement between Mr. Roh and Mr. Chung, arguing that the extra TV exposure through their debates would not only be unfair, but also illegal under the election law. The GNP likened it to the alliance between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong-pil in 1997, and another attempt to maintain “old style politics.”76 The National Election Commission ruled that television stations could air only one debate between the candidates.77 Roh emerged as the victor in the poll following the televised debate, but only seven hours before the polls were to open, Chung withdrew his support.78 Chung said he withdrew his support because of Roh’s “inappropriate remarks” on the last day of the campaign regarding U.S-North Korea relations.79 But after 75 Yonhap News Agency, 16 November 2002, in “ROK’s Roh, Chong Agree to Field Single Presidential Candidate,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021116000004; “South Korea Presidential Contenders to Merge Campaigns,” Channel NewsAsia, 16 November 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Yonhap News Agency, 17 November 2002, in “ROK’s Roh, Chong Agree to Field Single Presidential Candidate through Debates, Polls,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021117000010. 76 Yonhap News Agency, 18 November 2002, in “ROK’s Yonhap: GNP Steps Up Offensive on Single Candidacy,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021118000023; Korea Herald, 18 November 2002, in “ROK’s GNP Calls Single Candidacy Ch’ongwadae ‘Plot’ to ‘Discard’ Roh in Favor of Chong,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021117000032. 77 Yonhap News Agency, 18 November 2002, in “ROK's Yonhap: NEC Allows One TV Debate Featuring Particular Candidates,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021118000068. 78 Charles Whelan, “Koreans Vote for President after Last-Minute Drama Rocks Poll,” Agence France Presse, 19 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; 79 Howard W. French, “South Korean Voters Weigh Rival Visions for Peninsula,” New York Times, 18 December 2002, p. A14, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com.; Christopher Torchia, “North Korea Once Again a Player in South Korean Election,” Associated Press, 18 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; 조희천, “정몽준 ‘盧지지 철회’ 어젯밤 전격선언…‘국민의 현명한 판단 바란다’,” 조선일보, 19 December Daniel A. Pinkston Chung’s statement, Nosamo and masses of young voters with mobile phones and Internet connections mobilized people to get to the polls, helping Roh win a close election.80 Economic reforms and improvements in corporate governance were also important issues during the campaign, but all candidates agreed economic reform was necessary. There were only marginal differences over the degree of reforms and the speed of implementation. Given Roh’s background as a human- rights lawyer and experience as a mediator in labor-management disputes, Lee Hoi-chang appeared to have an advantage as a more centrist figure in this area. Roh supporters feared that when Kwŏn Yŏng-gil (Kwon Young Ghil) of the Democratic Labor Party (DLP) was permitted to participate in the televised debates with Mr. Roh and Mr. Lee in December 2002, Mr. Kwŏn would capture some of Roh’s support. However, Mr. Kwon’s appearance made Mr. Roh look comparatively moderate and closer to the center than conservative Mr. Lee.81 Inter-Korean Relations The June 2000 summit between Kim Dae-jung and Kim Jong Il in Pyongyang raised expectations for better inter-Korean relations, and many South Koreans have been disappointed with North Korea’s subsequent behavior towards the South. After returning from Pyongyang in June 2000, Kim Dae-jung said that the threat of war had been removed from the peninsula. However, a second naval clash between the two sides on 29 June 2002, p. 1, in KINDS, http://www.kinds.or.kr. 80 “Roh's Young Army Used Internet to Win,” Korea Times, 23 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; 81 For a brief profile of Kwŏn, see Park Shin-hong, “Korea's Left Has Patient Champion in Kwon,” Joongang Ilbo, 10 October 2002, http://joongangdaily.joins.com; or Joongang Ilbo, 10 October 2002, in “ROK DLP Presidential Candidate Profiled,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20021010000007. ROK Turning Point 2002,82 and the failure of Kim Jong Il to fulfill his promise to visit Seoul raised questions over the effectiveness of Kim Dae- jung’s “sunshine policy.” Speculation about a possible Seoul visit by Kim Jong Il before the election was also lurking in the background of the campaign, and the GNP opposed any such visit because they felt it would favor the MDP candidate. During the naval clash on June 29, 2002, North Korean naval forces sank a South Korean vessel off the west coast. But, the South Korean military called off the pursuit of North Korean boats when South Korean officials learned that North Korea was preparing to respond with missile fire from shore batteries. Afterwards, the GNP harshly criticized the defense minister and the joint chiefs of staff, and demanded that the Kim Dae-jung government reconsider its policy towards North Korea.83 The GNP’s criticisms were even more compelling in the context of rampant corruption scandals. All major candidates embraced some form of détente or cooperation with Pyongyang. However, Lee Hoi-chang and the GNP were critical of the “sunshine policy” because they felt that 82 “The Naval Clash on the Yellow Sea on 29 June 2002 between South and North Korea: The Situation and ROK’s Position,” Ministry of National Defense, Republic of Korea, 1 July 2002, http://www.mnd.go.kr; Ministry of National Defense, 7 July 2002, in “ROK Defense Ministry Announces Investigation Results of West Sea Clash—Graphics,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020707000007; Hwang Jang-jin, “N.K Readied Anti-Ship Missiles During Naval Exchange of Fire,” Korea Herald, 5 July 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr; Yonhap News Agency, 4 July 2002, in “ROK Defense Minister Refutes Criticism, Says DPRK Was Preparing Missile Launch in Sea Clash,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020704000034; Hwang Jang-jin, “South Korea, U.S. Analyze Communications During West Sea Skirmish with North Korea,” Korea Herald, 1 July 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr; Hwang Jang-jin, “South, North Exchange Fire in West Sea,” Korea Herald, 30 June 2002, http://www.koreaherald.co.kr. 83 Kim Hyung-jin, “GNP to Submit No-Confidence Motion on Defense Minister,” Korea Herald, 4 July 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis- nexis.com. Daniel A. Pinkston Seoul should demand “strict reciprocity” from Pyongyang. In his acceptance speech after the nomination, Mr. Lee said he “would help North Korea on one hand and try to bring it out to a road to reform, opening, and peaceful coexistence.” However, Mr. Lee also said he “would demand that North Korea keep promises and that South Korean food [aid] goes to the mouths of the North Korean people [and not the military].” Mr. Lee even said he would “sharply increase humanitarian aid.”84 Roh Moo-hyun was prepared to expand cooperation with North Korea even more than Kim Dae-jung. The South Korean president has almost exclusive authority for dealing with Pyongyang, but the president still faces constraints from the international system and from domestic political forces. Therefore, Mr. Roh and Mr. Lee would probably be closer in their approaches to Pyongyang than most people might have expected; however, Mr. Lee almost certainly would have taken a harder line than Mr. Roh. In fact, many in the Bush administration believed that Mr. Lee would win the election and reverse the “sunshine policy” and support the Bush administration’s policy of “tailored containment” towards North Korea.85 However, most South Koreans are opposed to the strategies designed to bring a sudden and costly collapse of North Korea. In sum, young South Korean voters shared Mr. Roh’s concern that Washington’s hard-line policy towards Pyongyang could result in greater instability or an unwanted and unnecessary war. 84 Digital Hannara, 10 May 2002, in “Acceptance Speech of ROK Opposition Party Presidential Candidate Lee Hoi-chang,” FBIS Document ID: KPP20020510000043. 85 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. Readies Plan to Raise Pressure on North Koreans,” New York Times, 29 December 2002, p. 1, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis-nexis.com; Jonathan D. Salant, “Lacking Many Options, Bush Administration Seeks to Increase Economic Pressure on North Korea,” Associated Press, 28 December 2002, in Lexis-Nexis, http://www.lexis- nexis.com.