Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses No.1, Development Enclave, Rao Tula Ram Marg Delhi Cantonment, New Delhi-110010 Journal of Defence Studies Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.idsa.in/journalofdefencestudies Operation Golden Bird: Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the India-Myanmar Border Rumel Dahiya To cite this article: Rumel Dahiya (2016): Operation Golden Bird: Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the India-Myanmar Border, Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3 July-September 2016, pp. 5-20. URL http://idsa.in/jds/jds_10_3_2016_operation-golden-bird Please Scroll down for Article Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.idsa.in/termsofuse This article may be used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, re- distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Operation Golden Bird Revisiting Counter-Insurgency on the India-Myanmar Border Rumel Dahiya* Operation Golden Bird, conducted along the Indo-Myanmar border in the North-Eastern state of Mizoram under the aegis of 57 Mountain Division (57 Mtn Div) in April–May 1995, has often been portrayed as a joint operation between the armed forces of India and Myanmar. In reality, however, this operation was planned and executed by the Indian Army alone, with troops ex 57 Mtn Div and those under operational control of Headquarters Inspector General, Assam Rifles (North) or HQ IGAR(N). The Mizoram police was excluded from the operation, at least in the initial stages. That the Myanmar Army also got involved in the operation was not by design on any side. The operation was characterised by availability of local intelligence; adhoc mobilisation of troops who had no knowledge of the ground; ambitious planning without adequate logistics support; and great perseverance displayed by troops deployed to counter a strong contingent of about 185–200 strong insurgent group. In another context, the operation is cited as the first robust cross-border operation undertaken in Myanmar territory against Indian insurgents. The operation was hardly covered by the national media at the time and only received a limited coverage by the press in the North- East. Besides, no authoritative account has ever been placed in the public domain and hence comments on it are often based on hearsay and conjecture. The author, having taken part in the operation as one of * Brigadier Rumel Dahiya (Retd.) is Deputy Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, New Delhi. ISSN 0976-1004 print © 2016 Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses Journal of Defence Studies, Vol. 10, No. 3, July–September 2016, pp. 5–20 6 Journal of Defence Studies the two task forces commanders and having interrogated more than half of the insurgents apprehended, had a ringside view of the operation and is in a position to comment authoritatively on these and other aspects related to the operation based on practical knowledge and the benefit of hindsight that, hopefully, makes the analysis objective. Since no notes were made and there is no access to official records, this perspective, based on recollection of events that took place more than two decades back, may not be exact to the last decimal as some details may have faded from memory. However, it is felt that the researchers and the readers deserve to know the truth about a major operation that brought out some positive aspects and exposed some weaknesses in conduct of counter- insurgency (CI) operations by India. Background The operation was launched following reports from the intelligence agencies that a group of about 200 Indian insurgents—initially reported belonging to National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak–Muivah) or NSCN (IM), but later found to be comprising of cadres from the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA), the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) from Manipur, and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) from Tripura—was planning to move with a huge consignment of arms and ammunition from Bangladesh to the state of Manipur in India. The aim of the operation was to apprehend and/or neutralise the insurgent group before they could enter into Indian territory. The information about delivery of an arms consignment near Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh was received in January 1995. The initial information received was that the consignment was meant for the Nagaland and Manipur-based insurgent group, the NSCN (IM). Subsequently, reports were also received that one of two factions of the Chin National Front, namely, CNF(R), was carrying out stocking of rations at some places within Myanmar all along the Indo-Myanmar border for use by the Indian insurgent group. It was known that two Myanmarese insurgent groups—the National Unity Party of Arakan (NUPA) and Chin Army (CA)—and a Bangladeshi group—the Shanti Bahini—had established camps near Parva in North Mizoram (see Figure 1). These groups were requested for information about the plans of movement of the Indian insurgent group but only the CA agreed to provide information. Information was received by one of the Assam Rifles (AR) posts at Bungtlang on 1 April 1995 that the insurgent group had moved to the tri- Operation Golden Bird 7 junction, that is, the Bangladesh–India–Myanmar border, the previous day (see Figure1). The same day, Indian civil intelligence agencies also reported that a large group of insurgents had entered Mizoram from the tri-junction on 31 March 1995. Border Security Force (BSF) personnel at Parva apprehended three CNF(R) cadres who confirmed the information provided by other sources. The next day, AR sources reported that the insurgent groups had crossed village LtulphungTlang in Myanmar and had moved north, and that the group was likely to cross the Kolodyne River. The approximate route that the insurgent group took is indicated in Figure 1. The availability of troops at that time in Mizoram was rather meagre. There were no regular army units deployed in the state. The HQ Mizoram Range Assam Rifles (MRAR) comprised only of the 19 AR Battalion, and two companies each of 1 AR, 6 AR and 18 AR were available in the whole state. Operationally, only 19 AR was available, whereas the troops of other battalions were basically rear elements guarding various posts in small numbers. Also, no contingency plan appeared to exist for intercepting insurgent groups moving along Indo- Myanmar border from Bangladesh, despite the knowledge that this route had been used previously by NSCN (IM) on one or two occasions to ferry arms and ammunition to Manipur and Nagaland. The absence of contingency planning is explained by the fact that the 8 Mtn Div had been moved to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) following a strong uptick in Pakistan-sponsored terrorist activities in the state and prevalence of peace in Mizoram after the Mizo Accord. However, in the meantime, NSCN (IM), PLA, and other Manipur-based insurgent groups as well as ULFA had increased their terrorist activities. As Mizoram was a peaceful state, the AR troops had been moved out to Manipur and Nagaland for counter insurgency operations (CI Ops). Phase 1 of the oPeration The initial plan basically involved establishing first interception line along the Kolodyne River and a second interception line joining important villages such as Zawngling, Khengkhong, Tuipang and Tuithminhar (see Figure 1). Units in Nagaland and Manipur were occupying the insurgency grid with specific areas of responsibility, which precluded the lifting of a complete unit in one go at a short notice. Therefore, company size sub-units from various units, starting with 3/4 Gurkha Rifles (GR) and 1st Battalion Special Forces (1 SF), were heli-lifted from Imphal. 8 Journal of Defence Studies Figure 1 Op Golden Bird – Initial Action Operation Golden Bird 9 The sub-units were ordered to move with three-days packed rations, on-weapon scale of ammunition and authorised scale of radio sets. A limited number of maps of the area of operation were issued on reaching Mizoram. These troops, as also additional troops brought in subsequently from Manipur and Nagaland, were unfamiliar with the area of operation and had to depend on guides for terrain information. Unfamiliarity with the ground and lack of adequate maps and radio sets made it difficult to send out sub-teams away from the sub-units restricting their operational reach and effectiveness. Besides, the companies often went out of radio communication range due to terrain configuration and distances involved. The operation was under the direct command of General Officer Commanding (GOC), 57 Mtn Div, who was initially operating from an AR post at Twangklawng. The overall impact was that there was no coordination amongst the columns drawn from various units. The Div HQ was located at Liemakhong near Imphal. The Div was deeply committed in CI operations in Manipur and could, therefore, only move two staff officers to HQ MRAR at Aizawl. From time to time, information was received about the move of the insurgent group from one place to another, from various sources. Although sometimes the troops came tantalisingly close to the moving column of the insurgent group, it could not be intercepted because of unfamiliarity of Indian troops with the ground and the guidance provided to the insurgent groups by CNF(R) cadres. The insurgent column moved East in the Myanmarese territory on 5 April 1995. The information, however, was received only after about 12 hours of their crossing. Some readjustment was made in the deployment of troops and additional troops were brought in for the operation. On 8 April 1995, a few porters were intercepted by our own troops who confirmed that the insurgent group was making use of prearranged logistics bases and were using porters to carry heavy loads. An additional team of 1 SF and four columns of 15 KUMAON were deployed on the second interception line, which also extended to the Myanmarese territory. Own troops had crossed into the Myanmar territory on a number of occasions, as marked in Figures 1 and 2. One of the columns came across the column led by a non-commissioned officer (NCO) from the Myanmar Army in village Fartlang in Myanmar. The Myanmarese troops also came to know about the night stay of the insurgent group in the village and punished the villagers by shooting two pigs as penalty. They were upset with the villagers for not informing 10 Journal of Defence Studies them about the arrival of the terrorists in the village. Columns of 15 KUMAON and 13 Sikh Light Infantry (SIKH LI) were moved East from area Sapi and Mahwre and to general area Ngaiphaipi in Myanmar where they were confronted by an officer-led column of Myanmar Army who asked own troops to return to Indian territory (see Figure 2). They deployed tactically to stop the movement forcibly. When this was reported to the higher HQs, a contradictory order to move deeper to a new line of interception, with the proviso that no casualties on own side were acceptable, was issued. When this anomaly was pointed out, there was no answer forthcoming. The insurgent group had evaded contact on the first interception line along the Kolodyne River due to paucity of troops, lack of briefing and coordination, and inadequate radio communications. It clearly emerged that there was no understanding with the Myanmarese Army till that time. Despite Indian troops in hot pursuit of the insurgent group, no success was achieved in intercepting them. The nearest Indian troops came to confronting the insurgents was on 13 April 1995 at Fartlang. It came to light that the insurgent group had moved deeper into Myanmar territory on 16 April and had two clashes with the Myanmar Army on 17 April 1995 in general area Hlamphie (see Figure 1). This was also confirmed by the Myanmarese side during the Indo-Myanmar Liaison Conference held at Imphal on 28 April 1995, when the Myanmar Army delegates confirmed killing 23 insurgents and recovering a large number of weapons from them in two encounters on 17 April 1995. On 18 April 1995, the contingent of about 300 Myanmarese troops, under their commanding officer (CO), reached village Zephai (see Figure 2). An attempt was made to negotiate conducting a joint operation against the insurgents but the Myanmarese commander firmly asked own troops to withdraw immediately from their territory. He expressed readiness to use force if necessary. Accordingly, it was decided to withdraw Indian troops to this side of the border. In the meantime, additional columns from 13 SIKH LI and 6 Rajputana Rifles (RAJ RIF) were also inducted into the operation. However, the induction of additional sub-units from Nagaland and Manipur did not produce much success. Limitations of radio communication due to short range of very high frequency (VHF) sets carried by the columns, and inadequate numbers of both high frequency (HF) and VHF sets as well as that of medical cover had become serious handicaps. In many cases, the troops were left with limited or no rations and many troops had Operation Golden Bird 11 suffered cerebral malaria attacks due to lack of appropriate medicines. This was the result of the initial assessment that the operation would be of a short duration and, in most cases, the troops were asked to move self-contained for a period of three to five days. The difficult terrain, hot weather, and the one change of clothing they had taken with them affected their ability to operate for a longer period. Moreover, neither staff officers from 57 Mtn Div and MRAR were available in adequate numbers, nor were communications efficient. During the first phase of the operation, columns were often out of contact with one another and with GOC 57 Mtn Div/Commander MRAR located at Twangklawng. Whereas the urgency in carrying out the operations was fully understood, the lack of adequate planning, communication and logistics support in conducting the operations are difficult to explain. These shortcomings were clearly a result of the lack of foresight and overambitious planning on the part of the higher HQs. However, the presence of Indian troops in large number fairly deep inside the Myanmar territory possibly forced the Myanmar Army to carry out offensive operation. A small group of insurgents, including self-styled Foreign Secretary of ULFA, Sasha Chowdhury, broke away from the main group at Hlamphie after clash with Myanmar Army and were arrested near Tuipang on 22 April. It was also learnt that CNF(R) disengaged itself from the group after 17 April due to the Myanmar Army becoming active. Phase 2 of the oPeration When it became clear that the insurgent group, despite pressure from the Myanmarese Army, had actually moved deeper into the Myanmarese territory rather than crossing to the Indian side, and that Indian troops could no longer move freely across the border, it was decided to move the latter in and around Farkawn Bulge (see Figure 3) on 18 April 1995. It was for the first time that all the column commanders were collected together at Serchhip (see Figure 1), HQ of 19 AR, for a sand model briefing on 19 April which was conducted by the Commander, MRAR. An operational instruction and maps of the new area of deployment were issued and Indian troops were grouped under two task forces: one under CO 19 AR; and second under officiating CO 15 KUMAON. The first task force was allotted columns from 13 SIKHLI, 6 RAJ RIF, a team from 1 SF and a column each from 1 AR and 19 AR. The second task force comprised of columns of 15 KUMAON, a team of 1 SF and a column of 3/4 GR. Tactical HQ of MRAR was established at Khwabung, at an existing 19 12 Journal of Defence Studies 1 e s a h P – d r Bi n e d ol G p O 2 e r u g Fi Operation Golden Bird 13 AR post. Most of the troops had bath and two hot meals after a number of days at Serchhip. The troops were then redeployed along the Farkawn Bulge. After an intelligence void of some days, on 25 April, definite information was received about the movement of the insurgent group and a concurrent readjustment of deployment was carried out. The surveillance detachment of 13 SIKH LI picked up the footprints of the insurgents just across the border on a foot path leading to Klangpi, inside Myanmar (see Figure 3). In a firefight lasting for about 15 minutes, six insurgents were killed; five weapons, 52 rucksacks, approximately 500 rounds of ammunition, and about 5 quintals of rice were also recovered. Getting wind of this encounter, about 80 Myanmarese troops arrived in village Klangpi on 28 April 1995. They were requested again to carry out joint operations with the Indian forces, but it was turned down. After discussions at the Indo-Myanmar Liaison Conference held on 28 April 1995, HQ 3 Corps issued explicit orders not to cross the international border. On the same day, some adjustments were made to intercept this group. However, one such adjustment subsequently proved wrong wherein a column ex 15 KUMAON deployed at a strategic place on the edge of Farkawn Bulge at Ford 1 (see Figure 3) had moved South to put a block; and in the meantime, the main column of about 80–90 insurgents reached the same spot where 15 KUMAON column was originally deployed (Ford 1). Finding the place vacant, they approached a hut where a Mizo couple was working in the nearby field. An officer of Special Intelligence Bureau and a Mizo translator also reached the same spot at the same time. These two were murdered on the spot and the Mizo couple were ordered at gunpoint to show them the safe route towards Myanmar territory. This action was observed by another farmer working in a field nearby who hid himself on seeing large number of unfamiliar armed men. Subsequently, they were also murdered by the insurgents and their bodies were recovered by Indian columns after two days. In the meantime, the columns of insurgents, including the one with Sasha Chowdhury, which had separated from the main column after an encounter with the Myanmarese Army at Hlamphie on 17 April, were fired upon by CNF volunteers near Sapi (vacated by Indian troops on 18 April). In this encounter, SS Lt Angam John Singh, deputy leader of PLA in the group, was injured; he died at civil hospital in Tuipang where he was evacuated by the civilians for treatment. By the end of April 1995, the insurgent group was tired, demoralised