Judith resnik Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights abstract. Two developments frame this discussion: the demise of negotiated contracts as the predicate to enforcing arbitration obligations under the Federal Arbitration Act and the reori- entation of court-based procedures to assimilate judges’ activities to those of other dispute reso- lution providers. From 1925 until the mid-1980s, obligations to arbitrate rested on consent. Thereafter, the U.S. Supreme Court shifted course and enforced court and class action waivers mandated when consumers purchased goods and employees applied for jobs. To explain the legitimacy of precluding court access for federal and state claims, the Court developed new rationales—that arbitration had procedural advantages over adjudication, and that arbitration was an effective enforcement mechanism to “vindicate” public rights. The result has been the mass production of arbitration clauses without a mass of arbitra- tions. Although hundreds of millions of consumers and employees are obliged to use arbitration as their remedy, almost none do so—rendering arbitration not a vindication but an unconstitu- tional evisceration of statutory and common law rights. The diffusion of disputes to a range of private, unknowable alternative adjudicators also violates the constitutional protections accorded to the public—endowed with the right to observe state-empowered decision makers as they im- pose binding outcomes on disputants. Closed processes preclude the public from assessing the qualities of what gains the force of law and debating what law ought to require. The cumulative effect of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on arbitration has been to produce an unconstitu- tional system that undermines both the legitimacy of arbitration and the functions of courts. author. © Arthur Liman Professor of Law, Yale Law School. Thanks are due to the Yale Law Journal and to Noah Messing for hosting Arbitration, Transparency, and Privatization: A Sem- inar, on October 23, 2014; to Dennis Curtis, William Genego, Linda Greenhouse, David Horton, Vicki Jackson, Amalia Kessler, Daniel Markovits, Uriel Procaccia, Margaret Jane Radin, Roberta Romano, Alan Schwartz, Joanne Scott, Reva Siegel, Nan Aron, Michelle Schwartz, Seana Shiffran, Tom Stipanowich, and Markus Wagner; to workshop participants at the University of Miami and Yale Law Schools; to Ryan Boyle of the American Arbitration Association and Donna Stienstra of the Federal Judicial Center; to Michael VanderHeijden for remarkable library sup- port; to former research assistants Kathleen Claussen, James Dawson, Marissa Doran, Ruth Anne French-Hodson, Jason Glick, Adam Grogg, Andrew Sternlight, and Charles Tyler; to cur- rent research assistants Jason Bertoldi, Michael Clemente, John Giammatteo, Kate Huddleston, Mark Kelley, Diana Li, Adam Margulies, Marianna Mao, Chris Milione, Devon Porter, Benjamin Woodring, and Jonas Wang; and to Bonnie Posick for expert editorial advice. 2804 diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights feature contents introduction: dispute diffusion 2806   i.   the public in courts 2818   ii.  the creation and erasure of rights 2836   iii. locating the private and the public in arbitration 2855   A.  The Paradigm of Merchants, Contracts, and Consent 2860   B.  From Waffles to Cheerios: Employees, Consumers, and Obligations To Arbitrate 2863   iv. metrics of effective vindication, adequacy, and unconscionability 2874   A.  Gateways to Judging Arbitration’s Legitimacy 2874   B.  Effective Vindication’s Genesis in an “International Commercial Transaction” and Under the Supervision of the Securities and Exchange Commission 2883   C.  Judicial Cost-Benefit Analyses and the Question of Collective Actions 2885   D.  “Mass” Arbitration Clauses Without a Mass of Claims 2893   1.  Public Access to, and Confidentiality in, Arbitration 2894   2.  Accounting for Individual Consumer and Employee Arbitrations 2900   a.  Finding the Filings 2901   b.  Locating the Rules and Fee Structures 2910   c.  Concerns about Compliance 2914   E.  Contracting for Judges in a Market for Courts 2915   F.  Regulated Arbitrations: Court-Annexed Arbitration in Federal Courts, Agency Supervision, and European Directives 2920   conclusion: “nightmarish” scenarios and the constitution of courts 2932   2805 the yale law journal 124:2804 2015 introduction: dispute diffusion “To avoid the expense and delay of having a trial, judges encourage the liti- gants to try to reach an agreement resolving their dispute.” —“Understanding the Federal Courts/How Courts Work,” website of the U.S. Courts, 20151 “We may change any terms, conditions, rates, fees, expenses, or charges re- garding your Services at any time.” —Wireless Provider “Customer Agreement,” 20152 Courts are equated with public processes, and arbitration with private con- sensual agreements. Yet that convention misses the degree to which public law has come to regulate the contours of arbitration, and the ways in which courts have incorporated privatizing practices. While public and private—in various senses of those words—have long co-mingled in courts and in arbitration, the balance has shifted, reconfiguring the field of dispute resolution and diminish- ing distinctions between the work of courts and of other dispute resolution providers. One reason to care about the changing mix of the public and the private in both venues is that the political authority and the moral legitimacy of courts and arbitration have depended on distinctions between public and private spheres. In theory, judges are agents of the state, charged with implementing its law through public decision making; arbitrators are creatures of contracts, obliged to effectuate the intent of the parties. The distinction is presumed to be constitutionally respectful and welfare-maximizing, enabling the enforcement of public rights and protecting the autonomy of contractual relationships. Yet the two practices—adjudication and arbitration—are coming to be styled as fungible options on a “dispute resolution” (DR) spectrum. An in- creasingly common parlance (crisscrossing the globe) replaces the phrase “alternative dispute resolution” (ADR) with DR, so as to put courts—now deemed “Judicial Dispute Resolution” (JDR) or “Judicial Conflict Resolution” 1. Civil Cases, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederal Courts/HowCourtsWork/CivilCases.aspx [http://perma.cc/BR9L-4WGC]. 2. The quotation comes from Wireless Customer Agreement, AT&T § 1.3 (2015), http://www .att.com/legal/terms.wirelessCustomerAgreement-list.html [http://perma.cc/9XA6-E956] [hereinafter AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement] (emphasis omitted). Similar provisions are proffered by other wireless service providers. See, e.g., General Terms and Conditions of Service, SPRINT, http://shop2.sprint.com/en/legal/legal_terms_privacy_popup.shtml?id16 =terms_and_conditions (“We may change any part of the Agreement at any time, including, but not limited to, rates, charges, how we calculate charges, discount, coverages, technolo- gies used to provide services, or your terms of Service.”). 2806 diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights (JCR)3—on a continuum of mechanisms responding to conflicts. This formula- tion aligns courts with a range of options that clouds courts’ identity as a unique constitutionally obliged mode of decision making. The reasons for and the goals of this homogenization vary, as the field of DR is capacious. Among its proponents are those seeking to respond to the high demand for adjudicatory services by augmenting “paths to justice” so as to enhance access,4 reformers aspiring to shape more collegial problem-solving processes,5 entrepreneurs looking for business,6 and potential defendants hoping to avoid the publicity and regulation that courts entail.7 The methods include expanding the forms of process, increasing the power of private pro- viders to issue binding judgments, and broadening the repertoire of providers. The shared aim is to produce resolutions enforceable by law. “Dispute Diffusion” is the term I offer to capture these new commitments to the eclipse of court-based adjudication as the primary paradigm for govern- ment-authorized dispute resolution. Implementation in the United States comes through a mix of policymaking through statutes, rules, regulations, and court-made doctrines, which press trial-level judges to become conciliators, to deploy other individuals as “neutrals” to mediate or to arbitrate in courts, and to outsource decision making to the private market. Much of the work seeks to quiet conflict by relying on confidential interactions among disputants and de- cision makers. The claims filed, the methods used by decision makers, and the results are often outside the public’s purview. An array of provisions— forming what I term “Alternative Civil Procedural Rules” (ACPR)—reflect the 3. Such shorthands appear in a variety of materials. See, e.g., THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE: COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION (Tania Sourdin & Archie Zariski eds., 2013) [hereinafter THE MULTI-TASKING JUDGE]. 4. See, e.g., HAZEL GENN, PATHS TO JUSTICE: WHAT PEOPLE DO AND THINK ABOUT GOING TO LAW 148-66 (1999); Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution Processes Within the Framework of the World-Wide Access-to-Justice Movement, 56 MOD. L. REV. 282 (1993). 5. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Democrat- ic Defense of Settlement (in Some Cases), 83 GEO. L. J. 2663 (1995). 6. See Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War with the Profes- sion and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 931, 950-53 (1993). 7. For example, advertising campaigns have characterized litigation as abusive, while defenders of court-based processes argue that critics have exaggerated the harms of lawsuits and un- dervalued the legitimacy of the injuries sought to be redressed. See, e.g., Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717, 731-33 (1998) (discussing how a lawsuit against a fast food restaurant, which had served scalding coffee that caused serious injuries, became a poster case for the misuse of courts); Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Judicial Hellholes, Lawsuit Climates and Bad Social Science: Lessons from West Virginia, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (2008) (detailing anti-litigation organizations targeting jurisdictions for being insufficiently protective of business interests). 2807 the yale law journal 124:2804 2015 developing deregulatory norms. While conferring adjudicatory license on a variety of private processes, the ACPR rarely address the needs of indigent users, the independence of the decision makers, and the rights of the public to participate. Some aspects of Dispute Diffusion can be attributed to private ordering,8 but the focus in my discussion is not on international sovereign debt or trade arbitrations. Rather, my concerns are about mandates applied to hundreds of millions of consumers and employees, obliged to arbitrate not because of choice but because public laws have constructed requirements to use private decision making in lieu of adjudication. The United States Supreme Court opened the floodgates during the last three decades, as it reinterpreted 1925 congressional legislation, now known as the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), to require courts to enforce a myriad of arbitration provisions, promulgated by issuers of consumer credit, manufacturers of products, and employers. The result has been the mass production of arbitration clauses requiring that claimants, alleging violations of federal and state statutory and common law wrongs, proceed single-file to decision makers designated by the clauses’ providers. To assume the result is “mass arbitration” is to misunderstand how the provisions function; few who are cut off from using the courts and required (rather than choosing) to arbitrate do so, thereby erasing as well as diffusing disputes. Procedural change is synonymous with the history of courts, as transna- tional exchanges shape and reshape both adjudication and arbitration. The de- velopment of new modes for responding to disputes and the proliferation of sites for resolution are not problems, per se. An important example is the growth of administrative adjudication, through which many (but not all) pow- ers of courts are delegated to other kinds of judges who work under rules craft- ed through public exchanges and subjected to constitutional limitations.9 In doctrinal terms, as long as the Court determines that the “process due” suffices, delegation to an alternative forum is permissible.10 8. See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD, LEGAL THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (2010); A. Michael Froomkin, ICANN’s “Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy”—Causes and (Partial) Cures, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 605 (2002); Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1 (2015). 9. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), is the iconic statement of the obligations that follow such adjudicators. A recent review of the interactions among federal administrative adjudi- cators comes from Bijal Shah, Uncovering Coordinated Interagency Adjudication, 128 HARV. L. REV. 805 (2015). In the federal system, Article III imposes some constraints on the permissi- ble scope of delegation to non-Article III judges. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2608-09 (2013). 10. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), provides the oft-stated test evaluating the private and public interests at stake and the risks of error of not providing certain forms of process. 2808 diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights But in the context of mandated arbitration, the Court has not exercised its obligation to analyze the alternatives and assess their quality. Rather, the Court has spun off decision making without imposing structured safeguards. The re- sult is a system that ought to be seen as unconstitutional, in which state- enforced dispute resolution is outsourced to hundreds of unregulated providers whose rules are hard to find, processes generally closed, and outcomes difficult to know. The burden of my discussion is to understand why and how new dispute resolution institutions are being constructed, to map their contours and values, and to analyze their constitutional and normative implications. The recent Su- preme Court FAA case law has garnered a good deal of criticism for cutting off the production of law,11 for undermining the role of Article III courts,12 for limiting associational rights,13 and for constricting access to law by enforcing bans on the collective pursuit of claims.14 The reallocation of disputes through the FAA to non-public service providers should also be understood as a shadow conflict over public subsidies for litigants. Justices who object to reading the federal Constitution as imposing positive obligations to support civil litigants and who are leery of court-based class actions can avoid debates about the scope of such rights by obliging disputants to use single-file arbitration.15 The 11. J. Maria Glover, Feature, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052 (2015). 12. See PETER B. RUTLEDGE, ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTITUTION 15-53 (2012); Roger J. Perlstadt, Article III Judicial Power and the Federal Arbitration Act, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 201 (2012). 13. See Burt Neuborne, Ending Lochner Lite, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 183 (2015). 14. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 118-133 (2011); Myriam E. Gilles, The End of Doctrine: Private Arbitration, Public Law and the Anti-Lawsuit Movement (Benjamin N. Cardozo Sch. of Law, Jacob Burns Inst. for Advanced Legal Studies Research Paper No. 436, 2014), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2488575 [http://perma.cc/REK9-6NZQ]. 15. For example, Justice Scalia has authored two opinions requiring single-file arbitrations de- spite evidence that absent the capacity to use collective action, claims will not be brought. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011), discussed infra notes 370-373, 422-437, 441-445 and accompanying text. Justice Scalia has also questioned the extent to which the Constitu- tion requires governments to assist individuals seeking to use the courts. See, e.g., Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349-350 (1996). Justice Thomas concurred in both of the arbitration rulings upholding class bans. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2312-13 (Thomas, J., concurring); AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1753-56 (Thomas, J., concurring). He has also objected to constitutional obligations to subsidize litigants. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S.Ct. 2507, 2521 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting); M.L.B. v. S.L.J. ex rel. M.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 130 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Both Justices Scalia and Thomas also joined in imposing limits on class actions. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011). 2809 the yale law journal 124:2804 2015 consequence, as one researcher of arbitration provisions for employees has con- cluded, is a system that exacerbates inequalities.16 The FAA case law has also troubled contract and arbitration scholars,17 be- cause obligations to arbitrate arise not from negotiation but by signing (or clicking on) documents, some of which stipulate that the drafter of the provi- sions “may change any terms” unilaterally.18 Deeming an obligation to proceed (almost always on an “individual basis”19) through a designated dispute resolu- tion system to be an enforceable “contract” undervalues private law,20 rightly admired for facilitating cooperative agreements, reflecting the will of the par- ticipants able to tailor obligations to their particular needs. My argument is that the cumulative impact of recent Supreme Court deci- sions on arbitration also produces an unconstitutional system, providing insuf- ficient oversight of the processes it has mandated as a substitute for adjudica- tion and shifting control over third-party access away from courts and to the organizations conducting arbitrations and the commercial enterprises drafting arbitration clauses. Legal claims are a species of property, and open courts are the venues designated under constitutions to respond to claimed deprivations of those property rights. Limitations on rights—and new procedures for their 16. Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71 (2014). Colvin argues that mandated arbitration gives control over process to employers, lowers the bargaining capacity of employees, and limits access to counsel. 17. See THOMAS E. CARBONNEAU, TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL LAW OF ARBITRATION (2014); MAR- GARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW (2013); OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT 185, 196-97 (2012); Stephen J. Ware, Vacating Legally-Erroneous Arbitration Awards, 6 Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 56, 71-72 (2014). Some studies also raise the concerns that consumers signing such provisions are generally unaware of the clauses, which often have poor “readability scores”; moreover, if read, most consumers “wrongly believe” that the clauses do not preclude them from using courts through class actions. See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress, Pursuant to Dodd-Frank Wall Street and Consumer Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU § 1, at 11; § 2, at 27-28 (2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study -report-to-congress-2015.pdf [http://perma.cc/P5B9-JPSZ] [hereinafter CFPB 2015 Arbitra- tion Study]; Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements 8-11 (St. John’s Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14- 0009, Feb. 19, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2516432 [http://perma.ccs/LPM3-8KPG]. 18. AT&T Wireless Customer Agreement, supra note 2, at § 1.3. 19. Id. at §§ 2.1-2.2; see also CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 52 n.120. 20. Radin terms the decision to count such obligations as contracts to be a normative “degrada- tion” of contract that erodes the moral foundations of contracts. RADIN, supra note 17, at 19- 28; see also Michelle E. Boardman, Consent and Sensibility, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1967 (2014) (re- viewing RADIN, supra note 17). 2810 diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights vindication—are readily permissible but cannot, constitutionally, be imposed arbitrarily or be insulated from tests of fairness and lawfulness. The Court’s own explanations of its decisions licensing arbitration reflect the concern that procedural innovations should protect the rights at stake. The Court has repeatedly described its rulings as resting on the requirement that arbitration provide opportunities for the “effective vindication” of statutory rights,21 and the Court has regularly drawn the analogy between arbitration mandates and forum selection clauses in which disputants designate one juris- diction’s court system or another.22 Thus, the Court’s reallocation of adjudicatory authority to arbitration could be constitutional, were several conditions met. First, the Court would have to police the alternatives to assess the adequacy and fairness of the procedures ex ante, to understand how they are used in practice, and to impose oversight on both process and outcomes ex post. When doing so, the Court would need to ensure that the alternatives provide egalitarian dispute resolution mechanisms, responsive to the asymmetries among disputants through fee waivers to the indigent, collective actions, or other means to protect opportunities for voice and participation. Second, the Court would have to require public access to the processes and outcomes, making the alternatives transparent and accountable so as to facilitate debates about both procedures and governing norms. But the Court has not done so. Rather, the Court’s expansion of the FAA— diffusing disputes through outsourcing to deregulated and variable processes— strips individuals of access to courts to enforce state and federal rights, strips the public of its rights of audience to observe state-empowered decision makers imposing legally binding decisions, and strips the courts of their obligation to respond to alleged injuries. 21. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 240-42 (1987); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985). The doctrine’s breadth is discussed infra Part IV. 22. “An agreement to arbitrate before a specified tribunal is, in effect, a specialized kind of forum-selection clause that posits not only the situs of suit but also the procedure to be used in resolving the dispute.” Scherck v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 519 (1974); see also Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 628, 630-31. This “forum selection” analogy has been repeat- edly invoked by the Court. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 698 (2010); EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295-96 (2002); Cortez Byrd Chips, Inc. v. Bill Harbert Constr. Co., 529 U.S. 193, 199-201 (2000); Vimar Seguros y Rea- seguros, S.A. v. M/V Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528, 533-34 (1995); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 289 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shear- son/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 482-83 (1989); Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 36-37 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Shearson/Am. Express, 482 U.S. at 255. 2811 the yale law journal 124:2804 2015 Evidence of these failures comes from data about the use of arbitration by consumers. Despite the heralding of arbitration as a speedy and effective alter- native to courts, the mass production of arbitration clauses has not resulted in “mass arbitrations.”23 Instead, the number of documented consumer arbitra- tions is startlingly small. Arbitrations involving wireless service providers pro- vide one example, which I have chosen because the Supreme Court addressed the ban on class arbitrations in that context in its 2011 decision involving AT&T Mobility.24 According to information from the American Arbitration Association (AAA), designated by AT&T to administer its arbitrations and complying with state reporting mandates, 134 individual claims (about 27 a year) were filed against AT&T between 2009 and 2014.25 During that time pe- riod, the estimated number of AT&T wireless customers rose from 85 million a 23. The phrase is becoming part of debates on the FAA case law. See generally David Horton, Mass Arbitrations and Democratic Legitimacy, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2014). 24. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1753 (2011). 25. The American Arbitration Association provides quarterly reports on consumer arbitration pursuant to the laws of various jurisdictions in which it operates. Consumer Arbitration Statistics, AM. ARB. ASS’N (2015), https://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/aoe/gc/consumer /consumerarbstat [https://perma.cc/8ZBZ-FX5T] (select the document “Provider Organiza- tion Report”). With the indefatigable, thoughtful, and innovative research assistance of a group of Yale Law School students whom I thanked at the outset, and with the guidance of Bonnie Posick’s tracking of massive amounts of materials, we reviewed five years of data by downloading the file documenting arbitrations from July of 2009 through June (the second quarter) of 2014 and by filtering claims against AT&T. Because the AAA takes data from the website each quarter, the materials on the web as of the spring of 2015 no longer included some of what had been posted for 2009, and new materials had been added to provide in- formation through the end of 2014. The data we analyzed ran from July 2009 through June of 2014; we downloaded the data to retain them. These data are hereinafter referenced as AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, and are on file with the author. A preliminary word on methodology is in order. After downloading the five-year period detailed above, we then removed all claims filed by one firm after learning that it had filed the 1,149 claims in an effort to create de facto class actions, see infra notes 480-482 and ac- companying text. Thus, we identified 134 individual claims. Thereafter, we sent summaries and drafts of our analyses to AAA’s Vice President for Statistics and In-House Research, Ryan Boyle, who responded generously to our many inquiries and who provided materials and explanations of AAA’s data and policies. That series of e-mails and telephone exchanges, from February through April of 2015 are hereinafter referenced as Boyle AAA 2015 Materials. The record in the AT&T litigation included AAA data from five years between 2003- 2007, and the numbers are parallel to those we identified for 2009-2014 in that fewer than two hundred consumer arbitration filings were recorded. See Brief of Civil Procedure and Complex Litigation Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 12, 20, AT&T v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (No. 09-893), 2010 WL 3934621 (citing Declaration of Bruce L. Simon in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Amended Motion To Compel Arbitration, ¶¶ 8-9, Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 620 F. Supp. 2d 1248 (W.D. Wash. 2009) (No. 06-944), rev’d, 673 F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2012)). See infra note 485 and accompanying discus- sion. 2812 diffusing disputes and the erasure of rights year to 120 million people, and lawsuits filed by the federal government charged the company with a range of legal breaches, including systematic over- charging for extra services and insufficient payments of refunds when custom- ers complained.26 More generally, the AAA, which is the largest non-profit provider of arbi- tration services in the United States, averages under 1,500 consumer arbitra- tions annually;27 its full docket includes 150,000 to 200,000 filings a year.28 Thus, were arbitration providers to be in high demand, their capacity to respond would be limited. An estimated 290 million people have cell phones,29 and “99.9% of subscribers” to the eight major wireless services are subject to arbitration clauses.30 For those with credit card debt, about 50% face arbitra- tion,31 as do more than 30 million employees.32 Virtually all of these arbitration 26. AT&T, Number of AT&T Wireless Subscribers from 2007 to 2014 (in 1,000s), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/220692/number-of-atundt-wireless-subscribers-since -2007 [http://perma.cc/PU6N-FTP4]; 4Q 2014 AT&T By the Numbers, AT&T (2014), http://www.att.com/Common/about_us/pdf/att_btn.pdf [http://perma.cc/3CEP-YPER]. See, e.g., Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable Relief at 3-4, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov /es/system/files/documents/cases/141008attcmpt1.pdf [http://perma.cc/FK95-6AEX]; Stip- ulated Order for Permanent Injunction and Monetary Relief at 16, FTC v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, No. 1:14-cv-3227 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/es/system /files/documents/cases/141008attstip2.pdf [http://perma.cc/Z4D3-JQTB]; infra notes 509- 511 and accompanying text. 27. AAA Data, July 2009-June 2014, Provider Organization Report, supra note 25 (recording 7,303 claims labeled consumer arbitrations, excluding construction, real estate, and employment categories); Analysis of the American Arbitration Association’s Consumer Arbitration Caseload: Based on Consumer Cases Awarded Between January and August 2007, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http:// www.adr.org/aaa/ShowPDF?doc=ADRSTG_004325 [https://perma.cc/LPG6-S6F9] (“Each year, the AAA administers approximately 1,500 consumer cases . . . .”). The AAA data from 2015 listed 1,063 filings in 2010; 1,425 arbitrations in 2011; 2,811 arbitrations in 2012; and 1,741 in 2013. Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 28. Statement of Ethical Principles for the American Arbitration Association, An ADR Provider Organization, AM. ARB. ASS’N, http://www.adr.org/aaa/faces/s/about/mission /ethicalprinciples [http://perma.cc/Z4QY-9TNX] (describing the AAA as administering “approximately 150,000 cases” each year) [hereinafter AAA Ethical Principles]. The AAA provided us more recent data, indicating that annual filings (not limited to arbitration) were “203,084 in 2013 and 223,751 in 2014.” Boyle AAA 2015 Materials, supra note 25. 29. The number of subscribers comes from BAR-GILL, supra note 17, at 187, 196-97. 30. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 26, 28 tbl.1. Most include a small claims court option, id. at § 1, at 15, and discussed infra notes 486-492 and accompanying text. 31. CFPB 2015 Arbitration Study, supra note 17, § 2, at 10; see also Arbitration Study Preliminary Results: Section 1028(a) Study Results to Date, CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU 22 (2013), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201312_cfpb_arbitration-study-preliminary-results.pdf [http://perma.cc/LS7Q-HTFZ] [hereinafter CFPB 2013 Preliminary Results]. The CFPB not- ed that a class action antitrust settlement limited the use of arbitration clauses for certain is- 2813