iii Preface On September 15, 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology directed the establishment of a Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy. He chartered the task force to review trends and opportunities to improve DoD’s capacity “to attract and retain civilian and military personnel with the necessary motivation and intellectual capabilities” to serve and lead within the Department. The task force then asked the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) for analytic support. Specifically, NDRI was asked to undertake two larger tasks: (1) to collect and analyze existing DoD data on presidential appointees with Senate confirmation and on political appointees who do not require Senate confirmation; and (2) to review the literature both on the appointees and on the appointment process, focusing on the deterrents that potential appointees may encounter. This report documents the results of this work, some of which was incorporated into the task force’s final report, which was released in February 2000 by the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics. This research was conducted for the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology within the Forces and Resources Policy Center of RAND’s National Defense Research Institute. NDRI is a federally funded research and development center sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the Unified Commands, and the defense agencies. ix Tables S.1. OSD Political Appointees Requiring Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 .......................................... xiv 2.1. OSD Political Appointees Requiring Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 .......................................... 7 2.2. OSD Position Titles That Have Not Changed Since Their Establishment ....................................... 9 2.3. PAS Functions as Specified in 10 U.S.C. ..................... 11 2.4. Army Political Appointees with Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 .......................................... 11 2.5. Navy Political Appointees with Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 .......................................... 12 2.6. Air Force Political Appointees with Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 .......................................... 13 vii Figures S.1. Percentage of Time PAS Positions Are Filled, by Presidential Administration ...................................... xv 2.1. Percentage of PAS Positions Filled, by Year .................. 14 2.2. Percentage of Time PAS Positions Are Filled, by Presidential Administration ...................................... 15 2.3. Distribution of Tenure for Individuals Serving in Senior PAS Positions ........................................... 16 2.4. Number of DoD Civilians, 1986–1998 ...................... 17 2.5. Number of Individuals Serving in PAS, Schedule C, Noncareer SES, and Career SES Positions, 1986–1998 ................... 18 3.1. Process for Filling Appointed Positions Requiring Senate Confirmation ........................................ 19 xi Summary Political appointees constitute the heart of civilian leadership in the Pentagon. Individuals who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the U.S. Senate occupy a total of 45 positions in the top echelons of the Department of Defense (DoD), including the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military departments—up from 12 a half-century ago.1 The Political Appointment and Confirmation Process: A Help or a Hindrance to Attracting Individuals to Serve in Senior DoD Positions? As the number of political appointee positions has grown over the past 50 years, so too have the processes and procedures that individuals must undergo to gain Senate confirmation. Candidates today must provide extensive background and financial information to the White House before they are nominated. Once nominated, individuals must provide even more information on additional topics to the FBI, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and Senate investigators. Once confirmed, political appointees must then adhere to a complex set of federal ethics and conflict-of-interest laws passed in recent decades—legislation that limits their financial and investment options when they are in office while constraining their business and employment opportunities after they leave government service. At the same time, political appointee positions are taking longer to fill than has been the case in the past; the amount of time such positions go unfilled or are occupied by “acting” officials is rising; and the average time a political appointee spends in a DoD position is shrinking. Today’s political appointee nominees face a confirmation process that lasts an average of 8.5 months—more than triple the wait their counterparts endured just three decades ago. Moreover, political appointee positions are vacant some 20 percent of the time today, up from nearly nil 50 years ago. And turnover is high; the most common tenure for the most senior DoD officials ranges between 11 and 20 months. _________________ 1Public Law 105-261 (October 17, 1998) reduced the number of authorized Assistant Secretary of Defense positions from ten to nine, thereby reducing the number of authorized political appointee positions requiring Senate confirmation in the DoD from 45 to 44. As of May 1999, official OSD title reports reflected 45 such positions in the DoD. xii In recent years, these trends have come under increasing scrutiny from policymakers both in and outside the DoD, who are concerned that the process might be deterring highly qualified individuals from government service. NDRI’s Assistance to the Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy In September 1998, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology directed that a Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy be established. The under secretary charged the task force with review[ing] trends and opportunities to improve DoD’s capacity “to attract and retain civilian and military personnel with the necessary motivation and intellectual capabilities” to serve and lead within the Department. The task force included an assessment of the trends and policies affecting the top civilian leadership in its review. Shortly after it was created, the task force asked RAND’s National Defense Research Institute (NDRI) to provide two areas of technical assistance to its review: (1) collecting and reviewing DoD data on presidential appointees, and (2) reviewing the literature both on appointees and on the appointment process, with a focus on deterrents that potential appointees may encounter. NDRI’s assistance was incorporated into the Defense Science Board’s final report, entitled Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy (Defense Science Board, 2000). NDRI’s Review of DoD Data on Presidential Appointees Using DoD data, NDRI tallied the changes in the number of DoD political appointee positions from 1947 through 1999. As part of this task, NDRI interviewed individuals who were knowledgeable about the DoD’s political appointee process and its political appointee data, including people who had occupied political appointee positions in the department and those who had been involved in managing its political appointee confirmation process. These interviews and data reviews uncovered four findings: 1. The numbers and layers of political appointee positions that require Senate confirmation increased over time. NDRI found that the number of positions in the DoD that require appointment by the President and confirmation by the xiii Senate (all of which are in the OSD and in the military departments) nearly quadrupled between 1947 and 1999. Passage of the National Security Act of 1947 established the Secretary of Defense as the first such position. In 1947, the military departments contained 11 political appointee positions that required Senate confirmation. By 1999, the number of political appointee positions that required Senate confirmation in the OSD and the military departments had grown to 45, down from a high of 47 in 1993. This growth reflects increases both in positions that have existed for much of OSD’s history and in new positions stemming from new layers of administration. Table S.1 outlines how this growth has taken place within the OSD. The most noticeable growth has been in one long-standing type of position, Assistant Secretary of Defense, and in two new administrative layers, Under Secretary and Deputy Under Secretary of Defense. 2. Functional responsibilities of political appointee positions in the OSD have tended to narrow. In general, as the number of Senate-confirmed political appointee positions has grown in the OSD, the functional areas for which each is responsible have narrowed. Functions that at one time were overseen by one position—e.g., Assistant Secretary of Defense (Legislative and Public Affairs) or Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower, Personnel, and Reserve)—are now managed by several political appointee positions. 3. The tenure of senior political appointees generally has been short. From 1949 through 1999, the average tenure for a Secretary of Defense was 30 months. Deputy Secretaries of Defense served an average of 23 months. Those averages, however, include individuals who served much longer stints—such as Robert McNamara, who served 85 months as Defense Secretary, and Caspar Weinberger, who served 72 months as Defense Secretary. Most of the highest- level DoD political appointees—Secretary of Defense, Deputy Secretary, and military department secretaries—served 11 to 20 months. These tenures are similar to those of other senior officials in the federal government. 4. The vacancy rates of political appointee positions have increased. Whereas the Secretary of Defense post has been vacant only three times—for a total of 104 days—vacancies in other political appointee positions in the DoD have increased since 1947. Figure S.1 depicts this drop in occupied political appointee position rates over time. As this figure indicates, political appointee positions were vacant or occupied by an “acting official” 2 percent of the time during the Truman administration. That figure increased steadily over the years, exceeding 20 percent in the first Clinton administration. xiv Table S.1 OSD Political Appointees Requiring Senate Confirmation, 1947–1999 Positiona SD DSD USD DUSD DDRE ASD ATSD COMPbDOTE GC IG Total 1940s 1947 1 1 1949 1 1 3 5 1950s 1953 1 1 9 1 12 1960s 1969 1 1 1 8 1 12 1970s 1972 1 2 1 10 1 15 1977 1 1 2 7 1 12 1980s 1981 1 1 2 1 7 1 13 1982 1 1 2 1 8 1 1 15 1983 1 1 2 1 9 1 1 16 1984 1 1 2 1 10 1 1 17 1985 1 1 2 10 1 1 1 17 1986 1 1 2 1 9 1 1 1 1 18 1988 1 1 2 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 21 1989 1 1 2 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 1 22 1990s 1993 1 1 3 2 1 12 1 1 1 1 1 25 1994 1 1 4 2 1 10 1 1 1 1 23 1996 1 1 4 2 1 10 1 1 1 1 23 1999 1 1 4 2 1 10 1 1 1 1 23c SOURCES: Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947–1995 (1995), memorandum from D. O. Cook (1999), and OSD and military department internal title reports (1998–1999). aSD = Secretary of Defense; DSD = Deputy Secretary of Defense; USD = Under Secretary of Defense; DUSD = Deputy Under Secretary of Defense; DDRE = Director, Defense Research and Engineering; ASD = Assistant Secretary of Defense; ATSD = Assistant to the Secretary of Defense; COMP = Comptroller; DOTE = Director, Operational Test and Evaluation; GC = General Counsel; IG = Inspector General. bThis table illustrates the overall trends of presidential appointee with Senate confirmation (PAS) positions over time, both types and layers, but does not track changes in individual-position titles or layers. Therefore, for example, we have counted the Comptroller in three different columns on the above table. From 1949 until 1986, the Comptroller was an assistant secretary position, and we counted it as such. From 1986 until 1993, the position was titled DoD Comptroller (COMP) and is thus listed separately in the table. Since then, the position has been titled Under Secretary (Comptroller), and we have counted it in the Under Secretary column. cPublic Law 105-261 (October 17, 1998) reduced this number to 22. NDRI’s Literature Review of Political Appointments and of Potential Disincentives to Government Service NDRI’s literature review of the political appointment process revealed numerous disincentives to government service both in the steps leading from appointment through confirmation and in the postappointment environment senior DoD officials encounter. xv TTrruummaann EEiisseennhhoowweerr II EEiisseennhhoowweerr IIII KKeennnneeddyy//JJoohhnnssoonn JJoohhnnssoonn NNiixxoonn NNiixxoonn//FFoorrdd CCaarrtteerr RReeaaggaann II RReeaaggaann IIII BBuusshh CClliinnttoonn II CClliinnttoonn IIII ((TToo 55//9999)) 2200 4400 6600 8800 110000 SOURCES: Department of Defense Key Officials, 1947–1995 (1995), memorandum from D. O. Cook (1999), OSD and military department internal title reports (1998– 1999), and Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy internal document (undated). Figure S.1— Percentage of Time PAS Positions Are Filled, by Presidential Administration Disincentives to government service inherent in the political appointment process. Today’s DoD political appointee candidates go through a selection, investigation, nomination, and confirmation process that lasts an average of 8.5 months, compared with a process that took an average of 2.4 months during the Kennedy administration. Much of this delay results from extensive questioning and background checks, first by the White House and later by the Senate, as well as from delays in confirmation. The literature on political appointments suggests that individuals face deterrents to government service at various stages along this process. During the selection stage, the White House asks candidates to provide a range of sensitive personal, medical, and financial information that some individuals prefer not to reveal. As candidates move into the investigation stage, agencies such as the FBI and the IRS ask for more detailed information—such as candidates’ compensation histories, loan agreements, and financial assets. Some candidates fear that this information, although protected by the Privacy Act, might nonetheless be leaked xvi to the public. Also at this stage, the candidate must resolve sometimes-complex issues concerning conflicts of interests—for example, by having to divest defense industry investments. On occasion, the Senate confirmation process puts candidates at risk of having their reputations tarnished or their personal lives placed under intense press scrutiny. And those who have been in the private sector often face large pay and retirement cuts once they have assumed government positions. Disincentives to government service inherent in postappointment restrictions. The literature suggests that other restrictions imposed on political appointees once they have been appointed and confirmed may deter candidates from serving in DoD positions. Political appointees face a lifetime ban, for example, against attempting to influence any part of the U.S. government or court system on specific matters they dealt with while in government service. In addition, they face a five-year restriction against lobbying the DoD as well as a lifetime prohibition against representing any foreign government. There is no information about the number of candidates who are actually deterred by these considerations. The literature notes that many political appointees express a great deal of satisfaction with their government service. The opportunities to engage in public service, work on intellectually stimulating problems with interesting co-workers, and carry out presidential policies are all attractive aspects of political appointee positions in the DoD. xvii Acknowledgments We wish to express our thanks and appreciation to the people who assisted us during our project. The Defense Science Board Task Force on Human Resources Strategy asked the questions that shaped this report. We are grateful to the following individuals on this task force who provided encouragement: Dr. John Foster, Jr., and General Larry D. Welch, USAF (retired), co-chairs for the task force; Chase Untermeyer, chair for the civilian panel; and Dr. Curt Gilroy, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness). This study relied primarily on hard-copy data—both published and unpublished—and on the literature to describe Department of Defense political appointee positions and the process. As a result, the report would not have been possible without the assistance of those within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and the Defense Manpower Data Center who helped us identify, locate, and interpret data going back 50 years—data that were not originally assembled for our purposes. In particular, Chris Koehle and Cheryl Sneed of the Staffing, Classification, and Executive Resources Division, Personnel and Security Directorate, Washington Headquarters Services, and Joyce N. Fuller, Office of the Under Secretary of the Navy, contributed their vast corporate knowledge and dug into reams of paper files in search of the data we needed. We thank them for their avid support and excellent results. We are also grateful that the Historical Office, Office of the Secretary of Defense, had the foresight to publish a useful collection of data on presidential appointees that require Senate confirmation, going back to the creation of the Department of Defense. Individuals from the Office of Executive Resources, Office of the Secretary of Defense; from the Senate Armed Services Committee; and from the Office of Government Ethics also provided valuable insights on the political appointment process not available through published documents. We thank them for sharing their perspectives. Finally we are grateful to Bob Roll, our RAND colleague, for his thoughtful review of an early draft. The data contained herein are highly detailed, and in some cases their interpretation is complex. Any errors or mistakes are our own.