ContinentalPhilosophyReview(2004)37:175–201 (cid:1)c Springer2005 Deconstructionisnotvegetarianism:Humanism,subjectivity, andanimalethics MATTHEWCALARCO DepartmentofPhilosophy,SweetBriarCollege,SweetBriar,VA24595,USA (e-mail:[email protected]) Abstract. This essay examines Jacques Derrida’s contribution to recent debates in animal philosophyinordertoexplorethecriticalpromiseofhisworkforcontemporarydiscourses on animal ethics and vegetarianism. The essay is divided into two sections, both of which haveastheirfocusDerrida’sinterviewwithJean-LucNancyentitled“‘EatingWell,’orthe CalculationoftheSubject.”MytaskintheinitialsectionistoassesstheclaimmadebyDerrida inthisinterviewthatLevinas’sworkisdogmaticallyanthropocentric,andtodeterminewhether Levinas’sconceptionofethicsleavesaplaceforanimals.InthesecondhalfoftheessayIturn toananalysisofDerrida’sdiscussionofvegetarianismanditscriticalrelationtothehumanism andanthropocentrismthatheiscallingintoquestion.ThemainargumentthatIseektoadvance hereisthatdeconstructionshouldnotbestrictlyidentifiedwithvegetarianism(ascertainof Derrida’sreadershavesuggested),butratherthatwhatisneededisathoroughdeconstruction ofexistingdiscoursesonvegetarianism,aprojectthatremainslargelytobedeveloped. ForthosereaderswhohavebeenfollowingtheAnglo-Americananalyticde- bates on animal ethics over the past several years, it is difficult to allay the suspicionthattheseoncethought-provokingandinstitution-changingdiscus- sionshaveforthemostpartbecomelittlemorethanpedanticdisputesamong scholars. Rather than deepening the discussion of what is at stake in animal ethics–which is nothing less than a contestation of the primacy of human beings with respect to the ethical–most writers have become content with fine-tuning one or another set of established arguments or theories. Discus- sionsinanimalethicsnowtypicallyfocusonthesoundnessoftheargument from marginal cases,1 or the viability of certain esoteric elements of utili- tarian, radical egalitarian, or contractarian ethical theory. It can only come as a welcome sign of relief, then, that the debates are being rehashed along new lines by feminist and Continental thinkers. Feminist philosophers such as Carol Adams, Josephine Donovan, and others2 have begun to explore al- ternativefoundationsforanimalethicsandpoliticsthatseektomovebeyond the traditional rights-based theories that have dominated discussion up to this point. And in the Continental tradition, philosophers including Jacques Derrida,Jean-LucNancy,andGillesDeleuzeandFe´lixGuatarri,havebegun the process of re-examining various philosophical conceptions of animality 176 MATTHEWCALARCO and the ethico-political consequences of the dogmatically anthropocentric milieuofHeideggerianandpost-Heideggerianthought.3 Incomparisonwith thesewide-rangingdevelopmentsinanimalethics,mytaskinthispaperwill appear rather focused and modest. My goal here is simply to bring a small portion of Derrida’s contribution to this recent trend in Continental philoso- phytotheforegroundinordertoexploreitscriticalpromiseforcontemporary discoursesonanimalethicsandvegetarianism. Despite the modesty of this project, the arguments that I wish to make in this paper are somewhat intricate and will at times be difficult for certain readerstofollowsincetheyrequireaminimalfamiliaritybothwithDerrida’s thought and recent discussions in animal ethics. I suspect, however, that the reader’seffortswillbemadeconsiderablyeasierifIlayoutabriefsketchof mymainargumentsandconclusionshereattheoutset.Thepaperisdivided intotwosections,bothofwhichhaveastheirfocusDerrida’sinterviewwith Jean-Luc Nancy entitled “‘Eating Well,’ or the Calculation of the Subject.”4 Inthefirstsection,IapproachthequestionofanimalethicsthroughDerrida’s brief discussion of animality in the work of Emmanuel Levinas, who is per- hapsthecentralfigureinContinentalethicalphilosophy.Inhisinterviewwith Nancy, Derrida suggests that Levinas’s ethical thought, despite its potential for challenging certain aspects of classical humanism, nonetheless remains a “profound humanism” insofar as it is grounded in a problematic and dog- maticanthropocentrism.Mytaskintheinitialsectionistoassessthisclaimby DerridaandtoexaminewhetherLevinas’sconceptionofethicsleavesaplace for animals. Although I differ with Derrida concerning what role animals have in Levinas’s writings, I ultimately agree with him that the latter’s phi- losophy remains a profoundly metaphysical and dogmatic humanism. With thisfundamentalagreementaboutthedogmaticcharacterofLevinas’sethical humanismestablished,inthesecondhalfofthepaperIturntoananalysisof Derrida’s discussion of vegetarianism and its critical relation to the human- ismandanthropocentrismthatheiscallingintoquestion.Inordertoelaborate whatisatissuehere,IexamineDavidWood’sprovocativearticle,“Comment nepasmanger–DeconstructionandHumanism,”whichoffersaratherharsh and incisive critique of Derrida’s statements on vegetarianism. Wood brings forth a number of arguments which suggest that Derrida radically underes- timates the deconstructive and ethico-political potential of vegetarianism as a means of resisting anthropocentric discourses and institutions. I identify threechiefargumentsmadebyWoodagainstDerridaandattempttocounter these arguments with careful readings of certain portions of “Eating Well.” Myultimategoalinthisrejoinderistoarguethat,countertoWood’sassertion, there is no essential co-belonging of deconstruction and vegetarianism and, consequently,thathischiefcriticismsofDerridamisfire.However,inarguing DECONSTRUCTIONISNOTVEGETARIANISM 177 thatdeconstructionshouldnotbestrictlyidentifiedwithvegetarianism,Iam notadvocatingthepositionthatdeconstructionisconsistentwithmeat-eating, butratherpointingtowardthenecessityforathoroughdeconstructionofex- isting discourses on vegetarianism, something that both Wood and Derrida failtopursue. 1. LevinasandtheQuestionoftheAnimal Since at least 1985 Derrida has been involved in a sustained analysis of the placeofanimalityinWesternmetaphysics,andmoreoftenthannot,thishas entailedacarefulreadingofoneormoreofHeidegger’stexts.Beginningwith theGeschlechtarticlesinthemid-1980’s,andcontinuingupthroughOfSpirit, Aporias, and most recently, “L’animal que donc je suis,” he has repeatedly contested the anthropocentric axioms that underlie Heidegger’s determina- tionofthe“abyssofessence”separatinganimallifefromhumanek-sistence. The interview with Nancy, “Eating Well,” constitutes another installment in this series of texts that poses “the question of the animal” in Heidegger’s discourse. What is particularly interesting about this interview, though, is that Derrida here extends the question of the animal beyond the context of Heidegger’swritingstootherthinkersonthecontemporaryscene–mostno- tably, Levinas. Despite acknowledging the many significant differences that separateLevinasandHeidegger,inthisinterviewDerridaassimilatesthetwo thinkersaroundtheircommonreinforcementandsedimentationofparticular aspectsoftraditionalhumanism.Heexplainsthisassimilationinthefollow- ingterms:“DiscoursesasoriginalasthoseofHeideggerandLevinasdisrupt, ofcourse,acertaintraditionalhumanism.Inspiteofthedifferencesseparat- ingthem,theynonethelessremainprofoundhumanisms[Desdiscoursaussi originauxqueceuxdeHeideggeretdeLevinasbouleversent,certes,uncer- tainhumanismetraditionnel.Cesontne´anmoinsdeshumanismesprofonds... malgre´lelesdiffe´rencesquilesse´parent]...”(EW113/BM108).Derridahas devotedseveralpiecestodemonstratingthisclaimwithrespecttoHeidegger, buthaswrittenverylittleonLevinasalongtheselines.Whatisthestatusof thisclaimwithrespecttoLevinas?InwhatfashiondoesLevinas’shumanism bothdisruptandreinforcetraditionalhumanism? First,tounderstandhowLevinas’sthoughtdisruptsclassicalhumanism,it willbehelpfultorecallHeidegger’sdeterminationoftheessenceofhuman- ism. Heidegger elaborates his understanding of humanism most famously in his “Letter on ‘Humanism,”’5 but more complete developments of this thoughtcanbefoundinessayssuchas“Plato’sDoctrineofTruth,”6 andthe Nietzschelecturesfrom1940.7Thelattertwoworksareespeciallyimportant 178 MATTHEWCALARCO forgraspingHeidegger’sunderstandingofhumanism,since,onHeidegger’s account,metaphysicalhumanismproperfindsitsoriginsinPlatoanditsfulfill- ment(Vollendung)inNietzsche.ForHeidegger,thebeginningofthehistory ofmetaphysicsoriginatesinPlato’sthoughtandcoincideswiththefounding of a humanism in which human beings are given a central and privileged place among beings (“PDT” 181; “PLW” 142). What is at stake in Plato’s andallsubsequenthumanisms,Heideggerargues,istotake“humanbeings,” definedmetaphysically(i.e.,definedwithoutposingthequestionofthetruth of being) as “rational animals,” and to direct them “to the liberation of their possibilities,tothecertitudeoftheirdestiny,andtothesecuringoftheir‘life’” (“PDT” 181; “PLW” 142). This determination of the centrality, dignity, and destiny of the human reflects a shift in the essence of truth. Whereas previ- ously truth was understood in terms of the un-concealment or unhiddenness ofbeingsthemselves,withPlatothemeaningoftruthisgraduallyshiftedonto anotherregister,oneinwhichtruthislocatedinthecorrectrepresentationof “objects”byhuman“subjects.”Theunfoldingofthislatterunderstandingof truthisonlyjustbeguninPlato;wemustwaituntilDescartestoseeitreach its apex. With Descartes, concerns about correct representation lead to the searchforafundamentumabsolutuminconcussumveritatis,anabsolute,un- shakablegroundoftruth.8 Thisabsolutegroundisfoundintheself-presence and self-consciousness of the human subiectum which underlies representa- tions and assures their correctness. With Nietzsche’s reversal of Platonism andcritiqueoftheCartesiancogito,metaphysicalhumanismreachesitsend; but,accordingtoHeideggeratleast,theNietzscheanreversalofPlatonicand Cartesianmetaphysicsitselfremainslockedwithintheclosureofthehistory of metaphysics insofar as Nietzsche’s thought is grounded in a subjectivist understandingofvaluesandaperspectivistaccountoftruth. Heideggerattemptstocounterthisclassicalformofhumanismbydisplac- ingthehumansubjectfromthecenterofbeings.ForHeidegger,man’sessence isnotfoundinasubjectivelordingoverordominatingofworldlyobjects,but in being originarily exposed to other beings, ek-sisting in and guarding the truth of being “in order that beings might appear in the light of being as the beingstheyare[damitimLichtedesSeinsdasSeiendealsdasSeiende,dases ist,erscheine].”9 Contemporarypost-oranti-humanism,undertheinfluence ofHeideggerandothers,10 hascontinuedthisdisplacementofmanfromthe centerofbeingsbutunderdifferentrubricsandwithdifferentaims.Levinas offershisownversionofthedecenteringofthe“subject”or“Man”ofclassical humanism, however his disruption of humanism is not presented as an anti- humanism,butinsteadasanotherhumanism,ahumanismoftheotherman. In his explication of this other humanism, Levinas begins within the hori- zon of contemporary anti-humanism, accepting much of the anti-humanist DECONSTRUCTIONISNOTVEGETARIANISM 179 critiqueofclassicalhumanism.Hereadilyadmitsthatdevelopmentsinsocial sciencessuchasanthropologyandpsychology,andthehorrifyingrealitiesof countlesswars,haverenderedtragicomicthenotionthattheManofWestern metaphysics is the privileged point of reference, or telos, of the universe.11 Modern anti-humanism attests to the displacement and ex-centering of man from the comfort, safety, and integrity of his self-presence by demonstrat- ing the priority of language and structures in the constitution of subjectivity (anthropology),theprimacyoftheunconsciousintheego(psychoanalysis), andtheprimordialityofDasein’sfiniteek-sistenceortranscendenceoverand against man’s self-presence (Heidegger and post-Heideggerian thought). As Levinasacknowledgestheimportoftheseadvancesintheory,thereisnoques- tionofgoingbacktoametaphysicalhumanismbeforeanti-humanisminorder tofindagroundforhisownhumanism.Rather,Levinaspositshisrethinking ofhumanismintheformofaquestiontocontemporaryanti-humanism.Thus, Levinasisnotofferingabackwardslookingrefusalofmodernanti-humanism, but rather presents us with a “skeptical critique” of anti-humanism, to make referencetoaremarkablearticlebyPeterAttertononthistopic.12 What anti-humanism in its various forms shares in common according to Levinas is a contestation of the primacy of the inward world of the subject ofclassicalhumanism.13 Priortoandmorebasicthanmanperseveringinhis own being and self-presence, anti-humanism discerns an openness to other- nessattheveryheartofthesubjectthatrendersself-presencederivativeand compromised. This openness can be understood, Levinas suggests, in three ways: (1) as the “openness of every object to all others, in the unity of the universe” (“SI” 103; “NI” 145), that is, as the interaction or community of substances in the Third Analogy of experience in Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason(A211-15/B256-62,seeespeciallyA211/B257-8);(2)astheopen- ness of Dasein’s ek-static mode of being and its ek-sistence in the openness ofBeing,orwhatHeideggeroftenreferstoasanopennesstothecallofBe- ing(AnspruchdesSeins);andfinally,(3)asanopennessinthemoreradical sense that Levinas seeks to locate at the core of the subject, a “denuding of theskinexposedtowoundsandoutrage[de´nudationdelapeauexpose´ea` la blessureeta` l’outrage]”(“SI”104;“NI”146).Thislattercharacterizationof the openness or radical passivity of the subject, the one that Levinas wishes to privilege, is something that can be thought only after or following anti- humanism.Inotherwords,beforethesubjectcanbedeterminedasradically passive,theremustfirstbeadisplacementoftheautarchicalego,secureinits ownself-presence.Thisdecenteringiswhatmodernanti-humanismhelpsto accomplish.Buttheanti-humanistcritiqueonlyclearsthespaceforathought ofthesubjectasradicalpassivity;itdoesnotitselfpursuethisunderstanding ofwhatbeing-subjecttoalteritysignifies. 180 MATTHEWCALARCO Levinasposesthisunderstandingofamoreprimordial“denuded”or“open” subject to anti-humanism as a skeptical question.14 In a memorable pas- sagefromthelastlinesof“HumanismandAnarchy,”Levinassuggeststhat, “Modern anti-humanism is perhaps not right in not finding in man, lost in historyandinorder,thetraceofthispre-historicalandan-archicalsaying.”15 What Levinas’s guarded critique implies is that anti-humanism has perhaps overlooked the diachronic time of the saying of responsibility in which the sensible subject is open and radically passive to alterity beyond conscious- ness–inshort,anti-humanismhasperhaps(“perhaps,”forthereisnocertainty, knowledge,orproofpossiblehere)missedthetimeofethics.Toargue,asanti- humanismdoes,thatstructures(psychological,cultural,symbolic,linguistic, etc.)irreducibletothesubjectconstituteitsbeingdoesnotanswerthequestion ofwhata“subject”mustbeinordertobeopentostructuresassuch.Levinas’s “answer”tothisquestion,ananswerthatisitselfanother(skeptical)question, isthattheverysubjectivityofthehumansubject,itsopenness,isperhapslo- catedinthediachronictimeofethics,responsibility,andradicalpassivity–all oftheseservingasdifferentnamesforatimeandentitythathasitsmodeof beingasbeing-responsiblefortheotherhuman. To return to our reading of Derrida’s statement, then, we can say that not only does Levinas’s thought disrupt classical humanism (as Derrida notes), but it also works to contest the limits of contemporary anti-humanism. Yet, asDerridaalsosuggests,despitethisradicalrethinkingoftheessenceofhu- manism,Levinas’sdiscourseremainsa“profound”humanism.Wecanbegin to make some sense of this second claim if we understand by “profound” something like “dogmatic” or “metaphysical,” since to insinuate that Lev- inas’sthoughtremainsdeeplycommittedtohumanismistostatetheobvious! Clearly,Derridaisgettingatsomethingmoreobliquehere–anunquestioned, metaphysically humanist assumption that lies buried in Levinas’s avowedly non-metaphysical humanism and which needs to be disclosed. Allow me to returntotheearliercitationfromDerridathatIinterruptedwithanellipsis: DiscoursesasoriginalasthoseofHeideggerandLevinasdisrupt,ofcourse, acertaintraditionalhumanism.Inspiteofthedifferencesseparatingthem, theynonethelessremainprofoundhumanismstotheextentthattheydonot sacrificesacrifice[entantqu’ilsnesacrifientpaslesacrifice]. The closing words of this sentence, italicized by Derrida, point us in the directionofthemetaphysicallyanthropocentricgroundofLevinas’shuman- ismoftheotherman.ForDerrida,thehiddencontoursthatguideLevinasin hislimitingoftheethicaltothehumanbetrayanunwillingnessto“sacrifice sacrifice,” by which he means, an unwillingness to question the dominant DECONSTRUCTIONISNOTVEGETARIANISM 181 discourse of Western metaphysics that considers the putting to death of all non-human life as noncriminal. Derrida argues that when Levinas refers to the“Thoushaltnotkill”which“speaks”inthefrailtyofthefaceoftheother, he has determined in advance that this imperative can only be directed to- ward and arise from the other human being, never from a non-human living being such as an animal since it lacks a “face” (EW 105, 112-3/BM 100, 108).DerridaexplainsthisanthropocentriclimitinLevinasinthefollowing terms: ...the“Thoushaltnotkill”isaddressedtotheotherandpresupposeshim [s’adressea`luietlesuppose].Itisdestinedtotheverythingthatitinstitutes, theotherasman...The“thoushaltnotkill”–withallofitsconsequences, whicharelimitless–hasneverbeenunderstoodwithintheJudeo-Christian tradition,norapparentlybyLevinas,asa“Thoushaltnotputtodeaththe livingingeneral.”...Theother,suchasthiscanbethoughtaccordingtothe imperativeofethicaltranscendence,isindeedtheotherman:manasother, theotherasman[l’hommecommel’autre,l’autrecommel’homme].(EW 112-3/BM107-8) ReflectingontheseremarksconcerningLevinasandtherestoftheJudeo- Christiantradition,onemightberemindedofAugustine’sCityofGodinwhich thecommandment“Thoushaltnotkill”isspecificallylimitedtohumanbeings alone,16orofAquinas’sremarksonhumandominionoveranimalsandtherest ofnature.17 Andwhileonecouldcertainlyfindexamplesthatruncounterto Derrida’sgeneralization,18hehaswithoutadoubtaccuratelycharacterizedthe placeofanimalswithinthedominantschemaoftheJudeo-Christiantradition. ThesamecouldbesaidofDerrida’scharacterizationoftheplaceofanimals inLevinas’sthought.Onthewhole,itistruethatLevinasmakesnoattempt tosacrificesacrificeandratheruncriticallylimitshisconceptionsof“ethics” andthe“face”totheotherman.BesidestheshortessayinDifficultFreedom entitled “The Name of a Dog, or Natural Rights,”19 Levinas appears to be whollyuninterestedconcerningtherelationofanimalstotheethicalorjustice- as-politics.However,inthesameyearthataportionofDerrida’sinterviewwith NancywaspublishedinFrenchinTopoi,aninterviewwithLevinasconducted by graduate students at the University of Warwick appeared in English, and inthispieceLevinassomewhatcomplicatesthisstandardpictureofthestatus ofanimalityinhisthought.20 From the outset, the interviewers are concerned to question Levinas on theplaceofanimalsinhiswork.(And,althoughIwillnotdosohere,much couldbemadeofthesceneofthisinterview.Itismorethanabitinteresting that Levinas does not take up the question of the animal at any length for himself until he is provoked to do so by other human beings. Why doesn’t 182 MATTHEWCALARCO the massive suffering of the animals themselves suffice to provoke Levinas to take up this question more often?) Indeed, the second question that the interviewers pose concerns the possibility of the animal taking on a “face.” Aswehaveseen,Derridaratherfacilelyassumesthat,forLevinas,theanimal doesnothaveaface(andnearlyeverythinginLevinas’sworkwouldsuggest that this is the case). But when directly asked about the possibility of the command “Thou shalt not kill” arising from the animal, Levinas not only acknowledges that the animal has a face, but also that “the ethical extends toalllivingbeings”(PM172).Thisisaremarkableandunexpectedclaim– any serious reader of Levinas’s work should be utterly astonished that he understands our responsibilities to extend to include all living beings.21 For if it is indeed the case that the ethical extends beyond man to animals and other living beings, why then is there no trace of the consequences of this increasedresponsibilityinLevinas’sdiscussionofpoliticsandthethirdparty? Does Levinas ever seriously consider the complications that would arise for adiscourseonhumanrightsifresponsibilitiestoanimalsandallotherliving beingswereincludedinourpoliticalcalculus?Alongtheselineswecouldask, does it matter what I feed to the other human being facing me in destitution and hunger? Is killing an animal to feed a hungry human being problematic for Levinas? Or, for that matter, is what I feed to the other, hungry animal anissue?Afterall,donotmostofusfeed“our”hungrycompanionanimals thefleshofotheranimals?DoesLevinaseverseriouslyposethequestionof theethicalandpoliticalimplicationsofsacrificingandeatingthenon-human other?22 Inconsideringsuchquestions,itisevidentthatLevinasisonlyhalf-serious inhisextensionoftheethicaltolivingbeings.ForLevinas,thisextensionof theethical(bywhichhemeansthehuman“capacity”forresponsivitytonon- humanalterity)mustbeunderstoodassecondarytoandderivativeofamore primary responsibility to and for other human beings. If responsivity were infactfiguredasoriginarilyinfinite,incapableofbeingdelimitedapriorito any particular group of beings, then we would be obliged to understand the distinction between responsibilities to human beings and responsibilities to animals as an a posteriori de-termination, one in need of an explanation or justification. That Levinas feels no need to offer such an account betrays an unwittingrelianceoncertaindubiousapriorimetaphysicalassumptions.To illustrate this last claim, note that as soon as Levinas admits that the animal hasaface,hefeelstheneedtoaddquicklythatthe“priorityhereisnotfound in the animal but in the human face. We understand the animal, the face of an animal, in accordance with Dasein” (PM 169). Further on in the same interview, Levinas insists that the “human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of an animal” (PM 172). And after DECONSTRUCTIONISNOTVEGETARIANISM 183 claiming that the ethical extends to all living beings, and that we “do not want to make the animal suffer needlessly and so on,” Levinas asserts that the“prototype”ofthissenseofobligationtootheranimalsis“humanethics” (ibid.).Whencearisesthispriorityofthehuman?Aretheseassertionsbased on careful phenomenological analyses? Or do they betray an unquestioning anthropocentrismandaveiledunwillingnesstosacrificesacrificeasDerrida suggests?Inotherwords,mightthispriorityofthehumaninthelastanalysis holdopenthehopeofjustifyingthesacrificeofthenon-humanotherforour ownandtheotherhuman’sneeds?Wemightalsowonderaboutthefollowing: If, as Levinas suggests, one can only respond to the other animal by way of transferring “the idea of suffering” gained from human ethics to the animal, are we still able in all rigor to call this an ethical response, as he would haveusunderstandthisterm?Isn’tethicalresponsivitylocatedatthelevelof sensibility, prior to “ideas” about suffering? It is as if Levinas believes one isunabletorespondethicallyanddirectly,withoutmediationorconcepts,to “animal”suffering. Ihaveplacedtheterm“animal”inquotationmarkshereinordertobring me to my next point. There is something deeply problematic about the way thedistinctionbetween“thehuman”and“theanimal”isdrawninLevinas’s discourse. The distinction is too clean, too pure to be trusted. For instance, when Levinas acknowledges the possibility of the animal face in general, it is clear that he has only certain animals in mind. This would seem to complicateLevinas’sbroadassertionthatone“cannotentirelyrefusetheface of an animal,” for with regard to certain animals, it seems that he can. For example, Levinas does not hesitate for a moment to attribute a face to dogs, but when it comes to snakes, he says that he “can’t answer that question. A more specific analysis is needed” (PM 172). One perhaps wonders what kindof“analysis”wouldhelponeto“know”whetherornotagivensingular beinghasaface–asifthefacewerenotpreciselythatwhichisirreducibleto analysisandknowledge!Criticalremarksaside,mypointhereisnottoinsist that Levinas ought to be logically and conceptually consistent in his use of theword“animal,”thatifheextendsconsiderationto“animals”heoughtto include all animals, whether it be snakes, dogs, or mice. This requirement presupposes that one already knows which beings are included under the categoryof“animal.”Withintheconfinesofcertainbiologicalorzoological taxonomicschemata,onecangainalevelofcertaintyaboutwhatconstitutes inclusionandexclusionunderagivencategory;butwithinthetimeofethical responsibility,atleastasLevinashasgivenustounderstandit,suchknowledge isimpossible.Howwouldoneevergaintherequisitetime,inthefaceofthe other’sdemand,todoan“analysis”ortomakedistinctionsbetween“snakes” and “dogs” or “animals” and “human beings”? In short, we should be just 184 MATTHEWCALARCO as wary of Levinas’s definitive attribution of a face to “the animal” in the instance of “the dog” as we should be about his call for a more specific analysis concerning “the snake.” We do not and cannot know in advance wherethefacebeginsandends,andthisnon-knowledgeshouldrenderanyand every determination of the limits of responsibility problematic, contestable, andquestionable–especiallydeterminationsasbroadas“animal”or,forthat matter,“human.” Thetendencytodistinguishsharplybetweenhumanandanimalcontinues in a different but related fashion when in the same interview Levinas takes up the motif of saintliness. Here Levinas worries about the implications of Darwinismforethics,sinceifitcouldbeshownthatradicalaltruism(aclose substituteforwhatLevinasmeansbysaintliness)isultimatelyreducibletobi- ology,thenthehumanwouldsimplybeanotherinstanceofanimality,the“last stage of the evolution of the animal” (PM 172). Contesting the “widespread thesisthattheethicalisbiological,”aswellasthenotionthathumanethicsis ultimatelyreducibletoanimalityandbiology,Levinasarguesthat,“inrelation totheanimal,thehumanisanewphenomenon”(PM172).ForLevinas,the humandefinitivelydepartsfromanimalityandmovestowardethicsinbreak- ing with its persistence in being. The animal, in contrast, knows nothing of ethics since it is wholly attached to its own existence in a “struggle for life withoutethics”(PM172).Ofcourse,mostofthetimehumanbeingsarefar from“human”andmuchclosertoanimalsinLevinas’ssense,moreconcerned (and reasonably so, he would add) about their own being and lives than the lives of others. Like Heidegger, though, Levinas contests the metaphysical thesisthatbeingananimalrationaleconstitutestheessenceofbeing-human. TheessenceofthehumanemergesforLevinasinsaintliness,inasitebeyond ratioandanimality,whereanimalityisfiguredaspurepersistenceinbeing:“ ...withtheappearanceofthehuman–andthisismyentirephilosophy–there issomethingmoreimportantthanmylife,andthatisthelifeoftheother.That isunreasonable.Manisanunreasonableanimal”(PM172). HereagainitisevidentthatLevinas’shumanismtakesHeidegger’sdelim- itationofmetaphysicalhumanismintoaccountbynotequatingtheessenceof thehumanwiththemetaphysicaldeterminationofmanasanimalrationale. But Levinas’s displacement of the humanist subject of metaphysics is only partiallysuccessful;itstillretainsandreinforcestheanthropocentrismofclas- sical humanism insofar as the question of the animal’s being is never posed but is instead determined homogeneously and in relation to the measure of man(atendencywhichislargelytrueofHeideggeraswell).ForLevinas,the animaliswithouthumanethics;theethicalrelationwiththeanimalisbasedon the“prototype”ofhumanethics–thehumanremainsalwaysandeverywhere themeasureoftheanimal.NordoesLevinaseverquestionthiscategory(“the