RAID D E C AT U R ’ S B O L D A N D DA R I N G AC T Philadelphia The in Tr ipoli 1804 M A R K L A R D A S © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com DEC ATUR’S BOLD AND DARING AC T Philadelphia The in Tripoli 1804 M A R K L A R D A S © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com CONTENTS INTRODUCTION 4 ORIGINS 7 INITIAL STRATEGY 15 THE PLAN 23 Preble’sBoys 31 THE RAID 33 TheStorm 34 ReturnandApproach 35 BoardingandtheFightfortheDeck 39 TheIncendiaryParties 46 TripolitanReaction 52 Withdrawal 52 AFTERMATH 60 ANALYSIS 64 CONCLUSION 71 FURTHER READING 74 GLOSSARY 77 INDEX 80 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com INTRODUCTION FortheUSNavyfrigate Philadelphia,October31,1803,beganasanother routinedayoffTripoliharbor,ontheNorthAfricancoastinwhattodayis Libya.TheUnitedStates,atwarwithTripolisince1801,hadsentsquadrons annuallytoprotectitsMediterraneanshippingandblockadethecity-state. Philadelphia, commanded by Captain William Bainbridge, was part of the 1803–04squadronledbyCommodoreEdwinPreble. Theshipwasoneoffive“subscription”frigatesbuiltfortheQuasi-War withFrance,whichwasfoughtbetween1789and1800.Thesevesselshad beenpaidforbycitizensofthecitiesinwhichtheywereconstructed. Philadelphia,builtinitsnamesakecity,wasthelargestofthefive,157ft longand39ftwide,anddisplacing1,240tons.Ratedat44guns,in1804it carriedabatteryof2818-pdrlonggunsand1632-pdrcarronades.Inpoint of fact, Philadelphia was smaller than the US Navy’s first 44-gun frigates, includingtheother44-gunfrigateinthatyear’ssquadron,Constitution.This vessel was 175ft long, displaced 1,576 tons, and carried a main battery of 24-pdrlongguns.Regardless,PhiladelphiawaslargerthanmostEuropean frigates,andonaparinbothsizeandbroadsidewithEuropeanfrigatesrated at44guns.Itwasaformidablewarship. AswithConstitution,Philadelphia’ssizeandpowerallowedittocommand theseasonceawayfromthecoast,butitwasoutofplaceinshallowwaters. (Philadelphia’s draft was 20ft 6in aft, 18ft at the bow.) For blockade duties, CommodorePrebleusuallypairedhisfrigateswithalighterwarshipfromhis squadron.Theshallow-draftcraftworkedinshore,whilethelargefrigatestood offshore, serving as big brother, protecting the smaller ship from Tripolitan warships if necessary. When Preble dispatched Philadelphia to Tripoli, the MAY10 frigatewasaccompaniedbythe14-gunschoonerVixen. 1801 ThetwowarshipsarrivedatTripolionOctober7,1803,withordersto Tripoli declares remainuntilNovember.Nearlytwoweekslater,onOctober19,Bainbridge war on the US learned that two Tripolitan warships were already at sea, so he had dispatched Vixen to search for them. On October 31, Philadelphia was quitealone. 4 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Introduction At9:00amPhiladelphia’slookoutsspotted two vessels approaching harbor. Bainbridge gave chase. Unable to draw within gunshot beforetheshipsreachedtheapproachestothe harbor, Bainbridge sailed in after them. American charts indicated that portion of Tripoliharborhadadepthof40–60ft.Aware oftheship’sdraftandmistrustingthecharts, Bainbridge’sfirstlieutenant,DavidPorter,had threemenatthebow,takingsoundingsusing a lead line – a weighted line, marked with pieces of cloth tied at set intervals along the line–tomeasuredepth. Porter’s concern was well founded. An unmarked shoal cut across Philadelphia’s path. The shoal lay deep – 15ft below the water’s surface – but while that allowed shallow-draft craft to pass unmolested, it was much shallower than Philadelphia’s draft. It also rose abruptly. At 11:00am Philadelphia,cruisingat8knots,sailedinto these shoal waters. Before the leadsmen could give warning, Philadelphia moved across a submerged sand spit. Momentum carried the ship onto the shoal.Bainbridgeattemptedtoplowtheship forward, but this did not work. Instead, Philadelphia ran hard aground. Yet the stern of the ship was still afloat. DavidPorter,shownhere IfBainbridgecouldlightentheshipforward,hecouldbacktheshipoffthe asacaptain,wasthefirst reef.Thiscouldbedonebyusingaship’sboattotakeoneofPhiladelphia’s lieutenantofPhiladelphia anchorsaft,andusetheship’scapstantowinchthevesselbacktotheanchor. in1804.(USNH&HC) Undernormalconditions,thisproceduretookroutineseamanship,andboth officersandcrewwereuptothatchallenge. Conditionswereanythingbutroutine,however.Philadelphiawasinthe middle of a hostile harbor in broad daylight. It was within range of shore guns. The frigate was heeled over, obviously stuck. A Tripolitan response wouldsoonbegin,soBainbridgeandhismensettowithawill,attempting to free the frigate. First to go overboard was the ship’s fresh water. Consumable stores, such as food and spirits, soon joined other stores over the side. The anchors were cut away, except for one, to be used to pull the OCTOBER31 ship off the shoal. It was shifted aft, as were the ship’s guns. Yet the bow 1803 stubbornlyremainedfixedinthesandbar.Thegunssoonfollowedmostof theanchors.AfewwerekepttodefendtheshipfromTripolitangunboats, Sunset – Bainbridge butmostwentovertheside. surrenders By now it was afternoon. Initial Arab response had been desultory, Philadelphia but soon gunboats began approaching Philadelphia, like sharks circling a beached whale. While they kept their distance, they prevented 5 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Decatur’s Bold and Daring Act – The Philadelphiain Tripoli 1804 Bainbridge from employing boats to kedge Philadelphia off the sandbar. In desperation, Bainbridge ordered the foremast cut away. This failed to free the ship. ThegunboatshadnotyetattemptedtoboardPhiladelphia.Instead,they rowed so that they were off Philadelphia’s high starboard side, making it impossiblefortheAmericancannontofireatthem–theheelofthefrigate’s deck prevented their use. Bainbridge faced the destruction of his ship and crew and could not strike back. It was 4:00pm. The crew was exhausted by five hours of unremitting labor. Bainbridge ordered the ship scuttled. Atsunset,hesurrenderedhisfrigate. Bainbridgeandthe300-plusofficersandmenofitscrewpassedintothe handsoftheBashawofTripoli.Theywouldserveashostagesfortherestof the war. Worse, from the perspective of the American squadron fighting Tripoli, was that the sandbar that trapped Philadelphia also prevented the shipfrombeingsuccessfullyscuttled.TheArabswereabletoplugtheholes madebyPhiladelphia’scarpenter,andrefloatthefrigate.Itsjettisonedguns, ontheshallowseabottomneartheship,werealsosoonrecovered. America’s enemies were now in possession of one of the most powerful frigates in the world. If Tripoli took their prize to sea, Philadelphia could easilydefeatsixofthesevenremainingwarshipsinPreble’ssquadron.Only Constitution could match it. Preble had to retake or destroy Philadelphia WhenPhiladelphiaran before it could be refitted. The ship’s capture that late October day put in agroundinTripoliharbor trainaseriesofeventsthatwouldreachaclimaxinFebruary1804.Theraid onOctober31,1803,its to destroy Philadelphia was a feat that Horatio Nelson, one of Britain’s capturecreatedacrisisthat boldest naval commanders, would characterize as “most bold and daring precipitatedaraidtodestroy actoftheage.” thefrigate.(LOC) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com ORIGINS TheconflictbetweenTripoliandtheUnitedStatesbeganonMay10,1801, whenYusufKaramanli,rulerofTripoli,orderedtheflagpoleinfrontofthe US embassy in Tripoli to be chopped down. Such an act was Tripoli’s traditionalmeansofdeclaringwar. TripoliwasoneofwhatwereknownastheBarbarynations–aseriesof coastal city-states that dotted the Arab coast of North Africa. Each state – Tripoli,Algiers,Tunis,andMoroccoweretheprincipalones–consistedofa fortifiedportandthecoastalplainssurroundingtheport.Nominallyallowed allegiancetotheOttomanEmpireanditssultaninConstantinople.Inpractice, exceptfortributepaidannually,eachbehavedlikeasovereignnation. While each Barbary state received some income through agricultural products,theirmainindustrieswerepiracyandslavery.Theirshipssoughtout merchant vessels of enemy nations, and seized them. Ships, cargoes, and all non-Muslimsaboardtheprizeshipbecamethepropertyofthecrewthattook them.(Thecity’sruler,ofcourse,gotapercentageofthesaleoftheresulting goodsandchattels.)Capturedindividualscouldobtainfreedombyconverting toIslamorbeingransomed.Otherwisetheyweresoldintoslavery. Tokeepprizesflowing,therulersofthesecity-stateswerealwaysatwar withbetweenoneandthreeothernations.Europehadmanysmallcountries withmercantilefleetsthatpliedMediterraneanwaters,sotheBarbaryStates had no shortage of victims. Nations could conclude peace treaties with the states,butthesealmostalwaysincludedpaymentsincashorkind.(Thetreaty of amenity which the United States signed with Algiers included annual deliveryofnavalstores,includingshiptimber.) ThemajorEuropeannavalpowers–GreatBritain,France,andSpain– toleratedtheseantics.Barbarycorsairstendednottomolestmerchantships of nations with powerful navies, unless they found these ships alone, damaged, and in a position where the capture could be plausibly denied. Britain, France, and Spain also had been fighting one another off and on overthelastcentury.Theirenergieswereabsorbedbythesewarsratherthan by ending Barbary banditry. Besides, the only decisive way to end Barbary 7 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Decatur’s Bold and Daring Act – The Philadelphia in Tripoli 1804 8 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Origins piracy was to occupy the ports from which the corsairs sailed. Britain, France, and Spain preferred that North Africa remain independent of Europe,ratherthanbeoccupiedbyrivalEuropeanpowers. While the United States was a British colony, US shipping had been protected by the British flag. With American independence that protection waswithdrawn,andtheBarbaryStatescheerfullyaddedAmericanshipsto their list of targets. At first the United States was little molested. Its trade was focused in the Atlantic, not the Mediterranean. During the period of general peace in Europe between the end of the American War of Independence (1775–83) and the start of the French Revolution (1789), PortugalkepttheBarbarycorsairsblockadedintheMediterranean.Initially theUnitedStatesfounditcheapertobuyofftheonlyBarbaryStatewithan Atlanticport,Morocco. RansomingofChristian The situation changed in 1793 when the French Wars of Revolution captiveswasamajor began,igniting25yearsofgeneralEuropeanwarfare.Thewarincreasedthe industryfortheBarbary demand for American merchant shipping to Europe, at both Atlantic and Statesin1804,asithad Mediterranean ports. Portugal abandoned its blockade of the Straits of beenforcenturies.(AC) 9 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Decatur’s Bold and Daring Act – The Philadelphia in Tripoli 1804 Gibraltar, allowing Mediterranean states access to the Atlantic. Eleven AmericanmerchantshipsweresoontakenbyAlgeriancorsairs,withmore than100Americansailorsmadeprisoner.In1794,theAmericanCongress respondedbyauthorizingtheconstructionofanavy. In1795,beforethefirstshipofthenewUSNavywascompleted,apeace withAlgierswassigned.Navalconstructionstopped,withAmericaobtaining peace through payment of tribute. Yet the price of peace kept increasing. The Barbary princes, sensing weakness, kept declaring war as a way to renegotiatepeaceterms.Yusuf,whohadconcludedtreatieswiththeUnited States in 1796 and 1799, wanted more in line with those of Algiers and Tunis, when he chopped down the American flagpole in 1801. He did not realizethegamehadchangedsince1799. Between1798and1800,theUnitedStatesfoughtabriefandsuccessful naval war with France in West Indian waters. The six frigates laid down underthe1794actwerebythencompleted,andsoweresevenotherfrigates and seven sloops-of-war. Several dozen merchant vessels were also purchased,armed,andconvertedintolightwarships.Theseshipswereideal forhuntingdownthetypeofcraftusedbyBarbarycorsairs. By 1801, the United States had a navy – and was tired of constantly paying more tribute without getting real peace. When the French war WhenEnterprisewas concludedthatyear,anAmericannavalresponsewaspossible.TheAmerican attackedbyaTripolitan navy was downsized, but the ships sold off had been the weakest, oldest, brig,theAmericanschooner and most useless. The remaining warships were of high quality and its defeateditslarger,ifless officers were eager for the glory combat offered. Instead of a new treaty disciplinedfoe,butcould offer, the American response was to send a squadron of warships. Tripoli nottaketheshipasaprize. wasatwarwiththeUnitedStates–arealwar. (AC) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com