STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE The Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) is part of the U.S. Army War College and is the strategic level study agent for issues related to national security and military strategy with emphasis on geostrate- gic analysis. The mission of SSI is to use independent analysis to conduct strategic studies that develop policy recommendations on: • Strategy, planning and policy for joint and combined employment of military forces; • Regional strategic appraisals; • The nature of land warfare; • Matters affecting the Army’s future; • The concepts, philosophy, and theory of strategy; and • Other issues of importance to the leadership of the Army. Studies produced by civilian and military analysts concern topics having strategic implications for the Army, the Department of De- fense, and the larger national security community. In addition to its studies, SSI publishes special reports on topics of special or immediate interest. These include edited proceedings of conferences and topically-oriented roundtables, expanded trip re- ports, and quick reaction responses to senior Army leaders. The Institute provides a valuable analytical capability within the Army to address strategic and other issues in support of Army par- ticipation in national security policy formulation. SSI Monograph DAVID GALULA: HIS LIFE AND INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT Ann Marlowe August 2010 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Depart- ment of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Gov- ernment. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose clas- sified information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepre- sent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the in- terest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sec- tions 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copy- righted. ***** Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 122 Forbes Ave, Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. ***** All Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications may be downloaded free of charge from the SSI website. Hard copies of this report may also be obtained free of charge by placing an order on the SSI website. The SSI website address is: www. StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil. ***** The Strategic Studies Institute publishes a monthly e-mail newsletter to update the national security community on the re- search of our analysts, recent and forthcoming publications, and upcoming conferences sponsored by the Institute. Each newslet- ter also provides a strategic commentary by one of our research analysts. If you are interested in receiving this newsletter, please subscribe on the SSI website at www.StrategicStudiesInstitute. army.mil/newsletter/. ISBN 1-58487-458-9 ii FOREWORD The authors of Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterin- surgency, of whom the most famous is General David Petraeus, write, “Of the many books that were influ- ential in the writing of [FM] 3-24, perhaps none was as important as David Galula’s Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice.” (University of Chicago Edition, Foreword) Yet almost nothing has been published about the life and intellectual context of Galula, who died of a sudden illness while at the height of his intellectual achievements, at the age of 48, in 1967. Little in Galula’s career was predictable, and much of his brilliant work reflects his varied and rich life. Though he is best known for writing about his experi- ences as a captain and major in the French Army in Algeria, Galula had almost completely formed his theories before taking command. Like Forrest Gump, Galula seems to have turned up everywhere that a military theorist of his time needed to be. Galula grew up in Tunisia and Morocco, was ed- ucated at St. Cyr, fought with the Free French from North Africa to Toulon, and then was taken under the wing of a noted Sinologist in the French Army. Learn- ing Chinese in Beijing, he immersed himself in the Chinese Civil War—to the extent of being captured by Mao’s troops—and spent nearly a decade in China and Hong Kong. Close observation of the Vietnam War and the Greek Civil War rounded out his experi- ence of insurgency. Galula knew many of the major figures in coun- terinsurgency. Even before fighting in Algeria, Galula was noticed by General Raoul Salan, who was later iii famous for his leadership of the OAS (Organization of the Secret Army). When Galula arrived in Algeria as a junior commander, he was in the thick of the practical implementation of the ideas of French theorist-prac- titioners like Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier. General Edward Lansdale was an early admirer who helped bring Galula to the United States, where he did the war college and think tank circuit during the first flourishing of counterinsurgency (COIN) theory in the early 1960s. General William Westmoreland helped Galula get an appointment at Harvard’s Center for International Affairs, where he wrote one of his two books. These books represent the intersection of two pow- erful streams of thought, neither well known in the Anglosphere. The older was the tradition of French colonial warfare, which reflected France’s experiences colonizing Algeria, Indochina, and Africa in the mid 1800s. The newer body of work flourished in the late 1950s and early 1960s and was aimed at defeating Communist insurgents inspired by Mao’s theories of protracted war. The French branch of this theorizing, guerre revolutionaire or revolutionary war theory, fell into obscurity in the United States after the French re- linquished Algeria and ended the terrorist activities of the OAS. When Galula lived in the United States off and on between 1960 and 1963, he participated in the first American awakening to COIN under the auspices of President John Kennedy. But the voluminous lit- erature produced during this period—not to mention that of guerre revolutionaire—had been forgotten by all but a few military historians by the publication in December 2006 of the U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. So Galula’s eventual fame belongs to the COIN fever of our time, not his own. iv Ms. Marlowe hopes that these notes towards an intellectual biography will foster a more measured and nuanced view of counterinsurgency doctrine in the U.S. military. This in turn should enable the prac- titioner to make decisions on the use of COIN in the battlespace with a fuller awareness of its context, strengths, and weaknesses. DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute v ABOUT THE AUTHOR ANN MARLOWE, a visiting fellow at the Hud- son Institute, is a writer and businesswoman based in New York City. She travels frequently to Afghanistan and publishes often on Afghanistan’s politics, econo- my, culture and the U.S. counterinsurgency there. Ms. Marlowe is a regular guest on the John Batchelor radio show discussing Afghanistan and counterinsurgency. She has also spoken on Afghanistan to the U.S. Army, the U.S. Army War College, the U.S. State Department, and college students. She was a Media Fellow at the Hoover Institution in 2009. Ms. Marlowe’s articles fre- quently appear in the op–ed pages of The Wall Street Journal and in the Weekly Standard. Her blogs on the links between war and art and on the cultural context of counterinsurgency for World Affairs are available from www.worldaffairsjournal.org/new/blogs/marlowe. Ms. Marlowe holds a B.A. in philosophy magna cum laude from Harvard University and an MBA in finance from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Busi- ness, and has studied classical philosophy in the Ph.D. program at Harvard University. vii SUMMARY This monograph attempts to place David Galula’s intellectual achievement in relation to both his life ex- periences and his time. It is not an assessment of the worth of his ideas, though it may be useful for those who wish to make such an evaluation. The beginning of this monograph is comprised of 3 sections that discuss the history of Galula’s two books, Counterinsurgency Warfare and Pacification in Algeria. The first section outlines the less–than–straightfor- ward publication history of the books and their initial reception. The second section looks at the context in which they appeared, the early 1960s flourishing of writing on counterinsurgency. In the third section, Generals Charles Krulak (Marine Combined Action Platoons [CAP]) and Edward Lansdale are presented as the ancestors of today’s population-centric COIN. The remainder of the monograph has 6 sections that outline in chronological order what is known about Galula’s life. This account is based mainly on the author’s interviews, along with some archival re- search and a recently published French master’s the- sis. The first section covers Galula’s birth to his ser- vice in World War II. The second section follows him through his “journey to the East,” his years in revolu- tionary China where he forged his thoughts on COIN. The third section, “Countering Mao,” discusses how Galula and his contemporary counterinsurgency theo- rists consciously aimed at defeating Mao’s doctrine of revolutionary war. In the fourth section, Galula’s time in Greece and Hong Kong is discussed. The fifth sec- tion concerns the rise of guerre revolutionnaire theory among senior officers in the French Army and the re- viii lationship of Galula’s thought to this body of work. The sixth section follows Galula during his 2-year command in Algeria, and the last section discusses his final years, including his work in the United States, his publication of a novel, and his untimely death. ix