Darwin on Moral Intelligence 1 DARWIN ON MORAL INTELLIGENCE VINCENT DI NORCIA PHD Ethics & Sustainability Author, Consultant, Speaker 294 Cundles Rd. West Barrie, Ontario L4N 7C9 705.725.1280 / mobile: 705.790.0437 [email protected] / www.dinorcia.net © VINCENT DI NORCIA PHD 2011 There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers. Whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed laws of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been, and are being evolved. Charles Darwin. The Origin of Species. Washington Square Press, NYC 1970, 470 Moral concepts are embodied in and partially constitutive of forms of social life. Alasdair MacIntyre. A Short History of Ethics. Colllier, NY. 1966, p. 1. Over 130 years ago Darwin published a masterful study of ethics, The Descent of Man.1 Its core insight is reflected in Alasdair MacIntyre's view that ethics is embedded in our social life. In this essay I would like to explain. As a scientist Darwin felt compelled to apply evolutionary theory to ethics: "My sole excuse for touching on …this great question is the impossibility of passing it over; and because, as far as I know, no one has approached it exclusively from the side of natural history" (DM, 70). Philosophers, unfortunately, have only paid "scant attention" to Darwin's view of life; and much of it mediated by the ideological ruminations of Darwinians like Thomas Huxley and Herbert Spencer, and they still seem to overreact to Darwinian naturalism in ethics.2 Perhaps this explains "astonishing circumstance" noted by the great entymologist, Edward O. Wilson, namely,"that the study of ethics has advanced so little since the nineteenth century."3 To help spur that desired advance I will try to unearth Darwin's original, but oft misinterpreted, view of moral theory in The Descent of Man. There he made two key, related claims: that "the moral sense" evolved from a combination of "the social instincts" in humans as in some animals, and that its emergence required a variety of intellectual or "mental powers." The integration of social instincts and intellectual powers imply an interesting concept of moral intelligence. Darwin's evolutionary view of ethics "from the side of natural history" resonated MacIntyre's insight into its connections with social life. In The Descent of Man, this essay will show, Darwin argued that "the moral sense" evolved from a combination of "the social instincts" and well developed "mental powers." Philosophers need pay more attention to Darwin’s views, and in response to "redesign morality" along naturalistic lines (Dennett, 494; Ruse, 1986: 275).4 The result, I will suggest, can be a rich concept of moral intelligence. © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 2 "No tribe" Darwin writes, "could hold together if murder, robbery, treachery, &c., were common; consequently such crimes within the limits of the same tribe are branded 'with everlasting infamy'; but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits." [DM 93] Man "is a social animal," DM84 in whom "the more enduring social instincts conquer other less persistent instincts.", The Social Instincts Darwin clearly stated his central hypothesis: "The moral sense is aboriginally derived from the social instincts, for both relate exclusively to the community" (DM 96-7). "No organism exists alone", as John Dewey said5. Darwin cited hard instinctual behaviour such as some birds' instinct to migrate and build nests, (Origin, 221f; Descent, 79, 83). But one often could not determine from which of several sources the social instincts originated: natural selection, other instincts like sympathy, reason, imitativeness, or "long-continued habit" (82). Indeed Darwin's "sole" intention in the Descent of Man was after all "to show that there is no fundamental difference between man and the higher animals in their mental faculties."6 Both the social instincts and human mental powers were shared, and evolved from, that of other animals, especially vertebrate primates like the chimpanzee and gorilla. Many animals, he observed, demonstrate social behaviours such as sympathy and mutual defence of the community (DM 83). It is only by observing overt behaviour that we know that any individual animal or humans is intelligent or thoughtful. Inferences from reflective behaviour to mental thought processes in animals are based on the same kind of evidence on which be base our inferences about thinking in humans. He cited the fact that many animals are unhappy if long separated from their fellows; and "so it is with ourselves" (DM ?). Migratory birds, for example, are miserable if not allowed to migrate. Their migratory drive conquers even the maternal instinct (DM 79, 83). Animals "manifestly" feel pleasure and pain, show "most of the more complex emotions", mutual affection, foresight, and even "a sense of beauty." (DM 63). "We tend to underrate the mental power of the higher animals", he warned (DM 46?). All of our mental powers, he noted, "may be found" in incipient and significantly developed forms in the lower animals. Powers such as "self-consciousness, abstraction, language." They are seen to "pause, deliberate and resolve." (DM 46) All animals act intelligently, and many conduct themselves with apparent reflection, recall, imagination, deliberation, and foresight.7 Animals, for example, utter sounds that are "curiously the same" as human speech and language. They also share "homologous" vocal and neural structures (DM 56f). These abilities, he concluded, were the product of "highly advanced intellectual faculties" (DM 103). Animals have been seen to perform various "services" for each other: warning others of danger, defending each other by fighting off predators, grooming, scratching itches, searching for parasites (DM 76f). "It is certain that associated animals have a feeling of love for each other"; for a variety of animals, he adds, demonstrate affection for each other: dogs, starlings, monkeys, horses, sheep (DM 76, 74f). Various animals have been seen to sympathize with other animal's distress: pelicans feeding an old blind pelican, giraffes protecting lame giraffes, domestic dogs licking the house cat when he was sick (DM 77f). And animals, like humans, he noted, abandon the aged, injured and feeble to their fates. In defence of his social instincts hypothesis Darwin noted the deep human "dislike of solitude and his wish for society beyond that of his own family", noting that solitary confinement is "one of the severest punishments" possible for humans (DM ?, 84, 81f). © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 3 An interesting hypothetical corollary of this view is that all human actions are either overt or covert forms of social interaction; but there is not space to pursue this insight here. I think it underlies G. H. Mead's social psychology. See his Mind, Self and Society. But an individual may seek solitude as a temporary escape from intense social pressures, in order to 'recharge' their psychological and social batteries. Our social tendency, he wrote, is "probably an extension of the parental or filial affection." (DM ? ). Since for several years after birth humans cannot survive on their own, the tendency to association is not only learned early--this would leave too much to chance. Instead, it is, as Darwin held, likely an innate inherited behaviour pattern, characteristic of vertebrate animal species like humans and chimpanzees, and some insects. In addition the individuality of the genes, is expressed in the individuality of the individual animal bearing those genes; and the individual is the transmitter and reproducer of those genes. The survival of the individual member of the species, advances and reinforces the survival of the whole species.8 In addition, living in small communities is the norm at least for primates like our near relatives, the chimpanzees. Accordingly, primate sociability is innate rather than learned, a view that hearkens back to Aristotle's talk of humans as social animals.9 Humans have however immensely increased their population and the size and range of their social groups; but we still favour a much smaller community of kin, friends, and neighbours. The manifold increases in size and range of human societies can be seen as exemplifying the elaboration and amplification of the social instincts. Darwin was making several claims here. In Origin Darwin stresses inherited instinctual (in contrast to learned) behaviours such as the cuckoo's instinct to migrate and build nests (Origin of Species, 221f). Inasmuch as the moral sense evolves from our prior instinctual social competences, it does not metaphysically transcend them.10 Some contend that Darwin saw the moral sense as innate, like social instincts:11 "We are moral because of our genes, as fashioned by natural selection", Ruse writes, arguing that our moral beliefs are rooted in biology as well as culture.12 The moral sense then is objective, as part of our evolved nature as a primate species, but not in the sense that morality transcends or is independent of human and animal nature. Darwin also compares instincts with unconscious, seemingly involuntary habits (OS 222), He adds that many mental powers are instinctually based, a claim confirmed by their neural underpinnings in the brain. Indeed he says that morality is learned "through habit, instruction, and example …continued over several generations", viz., as part of one's socialization (DM 102, cf. 89f).13 Moral practices of good decisionmaking and behaving become habits by repeated practice and improvement, as Aristotle had maintained.14 In contrast to simplistic grounding of morality in reasoning, calculation, duty, utility, virtue, emotions, or intentions planning, foreseeing the future consequences of actions, acquiring knowledge, or learning, and using the knowledge gained to identify and criticize baneful customs and superstitious beliefs, and care for the wellbeing and happiness of others, expressing it, and learning to care by imitating examples and following instruction. This would seem to imply a factual empirical, natural basis for moral evaluation and decisionmaking (Putnam ; Janis & Mann; Taylor). Some may only develop a partial, inadequate, or atrophied moral sense. Others may develop extremely high moral powers. And both possibilities seem to fit the picture of a bell curve like distribution of the moral sense in a society. On these grounds, Darwin's ethic implies moral intelligence. © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 4 First, Darwin is concerned not only with the original emergence of an instinct, etc., through chance (genetic) variations, but also its continuing evolution, which rested on its fitness to environmental conditions. instincts represent variations preserved and accumulated through such Natural selection, once they emerged, because they were profitable or useful to the organism. They enhance its environmental fitness and therefore its survival / reproduction. This especially applies to the slow, gradual accumulation of slight variations in complex instincts, such as the social instincts (OS, 223).15 Living in a group improves one's chances of survival, wellbeing and reproduction. Organized communities improve their individual members' access to resources like food and shelter, e.g., through division of labour, enhance defences against predators, improves responsiveness to environmental signals.16 Thus Darwin is not saying that a specific social behaviour is innate; nor does he mean that the development of sociability follows an inherited, epigenetically determined path, as does, for instance, embryonic development, or, to a lesser extent, linguistic competence.17 Certainly the anatomy of the voice box, our ability to articulate sounds, on which linguistic competence rests, is innate and genetically transmitted.18 What Darwin does seem to be saying is that humans naturally, and of necessity, tend to live in groups, in essence a generic social behaviour patterns are favoured over solitary existence.19 Also, Darwin sugggested that those mental powers required by the social instincts are instinctually inherited. The social instincts, in combination with our extensive mental powers, are moreover open and plastic, and enable humans to adapt to a wide variety of environments. This complexity may help explain ambiguous comments about competing instincts. The social instincts, Darwin wrote, are "more enduring [than] other less persistent instincts"; and "Unsatisfied instincts [evoke] feelings of dissatisfaction" (DM 87f, 90). The best way to explain this difficulty is to acknowledge Darwin's ambiguous, concept of diverse generic, plastic instinctual behaviour patterns, and their complex interaction with extensive mental powers An instinctual behaviour differentiates it from other species, or individuals (due to a mutation). Linguistic competence, is a stored generic, plastic depth grammar program the governs the surface grammar of any possible language, as an "instinctive tendency." Darwin might have been happy with the vaguer notion of an inherited, instinctual tendency or 'natural capacity' for association, or genetically transmitted behaviour pattern, e.g., one which made further social learning possible; but he was not clear about the specifics of that pattern or tendency. Darwin terms some individuals unable to enjoy social relations, "unnatural monsters" (DM 90). Abusive socialization and hostile environmental conditions can degrade one's social competence, just as it affects linguistic competence. Brutish, harsh social conditions can and do produce sociopaths, individuals who have little emotional affect respecting social interactions, and sadists, people who enjoy torturing others. Also engrained social inadequacies may reflect brain damage, whehter resulting from injuries or disease (including genetic mutations), pre-birth foetal damage, autism, etc.20 The Moral Sense The moral sense was for Darwin "fundamentally identical with the social instincts"; for its aim was "the general good of the community" (DM 98), and it was "first developed, in order that those animals which would profit by living in society, should be induced to live together" (DM 80). The idea ethics is primarily social goes back to Aristotle and Plato.21 But the social instincts are not the sole source of the moral sense, Darwin noted: © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 5 The following proposition seems to me highly probable--namely, that any animal whatever, endowed with well-marked social instincts, would inevitably acquire a moral sense or conscience, as soon as its intellectual powers become …nearly as well developed, as in man." (DM 71-2). I will return to the case for moral intelligence implied in the need for well developed mental powers in the next section. Here it suffices to show that Darwin saw the emergence of the moral sense as a complex affair. Indeed, his comparison of animal and human sociability does not mean that the moral sense in animals and humans is identical. On the contrary, he cautioned, only humans "can with certainty be ranked as a moral being" (DM 89). of all the differences between man and the lower animals, the moral sense or conscience is by far the most important …of all the differences between man and the lower animals (DM 70-71?). My question is not so much whether the moral sense reinforces the social instincts--it does; the real question is how, and to what effect? Its effectiveness in supporting the social instincts, Darwin suggests, explains the survival of humans as a social animals over time. This needs explaining. First, morality is a social binder. By enjoining altruism and the common good the moral sense reinforces sociability,. The moral sense supports the social instincts because it directs our actions to "relate to the welfare of others", as well as our own (DM, 100). More, it regards "not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men." (DM?). The memory of mutually beneficial experiences lasts, due to "strong retentiveness of former states of pain or pleasure". While morality was for Darwin inherited and evolutionarily transmitted. He favorably cited Spencer's view about "the consolidation of ..experiences of utility" over the generations (102). This does not entail hard determinism; for he also said that morality is learned "from habit, following on beneficial expression, instruction, and example" (102; cf. Aristotle: Ethics, II.6). The social understanding of utility enables Darwin to show how morality supports the sustainability of sociability over the centuries and millenia. Darwin's talk of Welfare and Happiness, with its connotations of wellbeing and interests suggests a John Stuart Mill's utilitarianism.22 Morality regulates the social instincts, through social praise and blame. An individual, he wrote, would therefore gratify his desires unless they "interfere with his social instincts, that is, with the good of others" and thereby face social disapproval (DM 93). "Humans are "greatly influenced by the wishes approbation, and blame" of others (85f?). Darwin even posited two kinds of virtue "strictly social", and "self-regarding" virtues."23 The former evolved originally, while the latter virtues were derivative "acquired at a later stage of development" (DM 170?). Some of the "self-regarding" virtues he mentioned reflected Victorian notions of civilized temperance and "prudence" in contrast to "intemperance" licentiousness, [and] unnatural crimes" (DM 96). Darwin acknoweldged the variation and relativity of social norms, citing "senseless" social customs, citing the Hindu taboo on unclean food. This diversity and complexity implies that the moral sense is innate only in a highly generic,sense, open to wide variation. Morality, like other social value systems, operates at both generic, relatively invariant depth and it diverse, changing surface articulations. The relativity of moral norms to diverse situations implicit in this conception, can be seen as a product of the complex interaction of the moral sense with diverse, changing environments. © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 6 But this raises the question, which community? The first answer is: one's own kin and neighbours, people they personally knew and could trust. Altruism & Reciprocity Altruism, a key form of moral behaviour on which evolutionary theory has focused, is defined as "behaviour which benefits another organism."24 But it takes two forms (at least), strong and weak; only the latter is compatible with Darwin's evolutionary hypotheses about sociability and morality.25 First to strong altruism: One should, Darwin maintained, "regard more and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men" (DM 103). Utility is more than one's own pleasure. Rather it implies empathy, the social ability to "participate in the pleasures of others," and the impulse to relieve their suffering (81). Individuals, Darwin claimed, will risk their lives and even endure torture for "the welfare of the tribe" 88); "Barbarians" sacrificed their lives for their comrades (DM 98f, 88); and courage was a direct product of natural selection (DM 83). But such strong self-costing altruism is not sustainable virtue, habit, or moral code; inasmuch as the agent is not benefited by his moral action. (Nor is strong egoism; for the other is not benefited).26 Strong altruism is unsustainable because it penalizes the moral agent for acting ethically, instead of rewarding him. It is a weak, unreliable foundation for ordinary social interaction. It may have a place as an ideal norm, obligatory in rare, extreme situations where people feel they have to risk their health, lives, property, etc., in order to save others from what they perceive to be likely, and at least equal, harm. Only where the balance of benefit to others greatly outweighs the costs to the agent, strong altruism would seem to be an intelligent option. This would seem to be the core truth of the Kantian argument that altruistic duty is rational.27 Darwin however had an even stronger, more reciprocal, argument for the morality of the social instincts. Inasmuch as social codes focus on sex, marriage, families and property and defence against attack, they support the reproduction of the kin group, and limit moral sense application to one's kin.28 Inasmuch as moral recognition requires spatial proximity and is reinforced over time (assuming good, peaceful interactions and relationships), then the moral code is extended to non kin neighbours in relatively small communities.29 In a key passage Darwin argued that the cohesion and survival of kin based societies require the reduction of threatening immoral and criminal behaviour: No tribe could hold together if murder, robbery, treachery, &c., were common; consequently such crimes within the limits of the same tribe are branded 'with everlasting infamy; but excite no such sentiment beyond these limits. (DM 93) Associating with others, Darwin is saying, is not possible unless an effective moral code proscribing threatening behaviour minimizes the risks of such association to acceptable level, and thereby increases the chances of individual survival and group reproduction. This is intelligent, for it reduces risks and harm and enables societies to survive and reproduce over time. Our moral sense should therefore help us detect and punish cheaters, people who selfishly violate or evade the rules of peaceful coexistence, however subtly, contribute to reducing the risks of social interactions.30 This is the basis of much of the legal codes and especially criminal laws, that every society develops.31 This is evidence that the moral sense is for the most part successful in reinforcing the social instincts. © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 7 Immoral, harmful or criminal conduct, is marginalized in most societies. 80% to 90% of the time social conduct is non-threatening and peaceful.32 High risk behaviour is extreme, highly infrequent circumstances, found at the highly negative tail of any social costs/benefit bell curve.33 In regions beset by high criminality or wars, people usually avoid interacting. Social life withers. People huddle together in their homes, fearfully. The streets are emptied--except for gunfire. Social Darwinist talk of a violent struggle for existence exaggerates the extent and of social conflict,34 and misinterprets competition for resources, and ignores cooperation, within and between species.35 A total Hobbesian civil war is not evolutionarily sustainable. Since social interaction would be so nasty, it would be very short. No society could have evolved, due to the risks. Without the minimal morality of the do no harm norm, in effect, societies--human and animal--could not exist for any significant period of time, and would never have evolved. Their survival would always be doubtful, and doubted. Association between people(s) presupposes the reduction of threats to a very low level of likelihood, far lower than peaceful, non-threatening forms of association. In this way morality is necessary to social cohesion, for it reduces the risks of association with others. The moral sense embodies a social version of that most fundamental moral maxim: first, do no harm. The bonds of kinship, Darwin felt, justify deception, he adds, for "to lie to your enemy has rarely been thought a sin," citing the example of diplomacy (DM 95, but 145?). This shows the defence of kin and community often limit the range of application of the moral sense; but the moral sense also enjoins care for others, and proscribes harm to others, including strangers. After all most moral theorists have agreed with Kant that moral recognition should be offered to any sufficiently rational or intelligent being.36 Different groups and species, Darwin noted, also develop different moralities, or moral codes. Different animal species"follow widely different lines of conduct." Bees for example felt a "sacred duty" to kill other bees (DM 73). The moral sense, Darwin added, also requires individuals to "extend their social instincts and sympathies" to diverse strangers, "and thence to all nations and races" (DM 101):37 As man gradually advanced in intellectual power …his sympathies became more tender and widely diffused, so as to extend to men of all races, to the imbecile, the maimed, and other useless members of society---and finally to the lower animals--so will the standard of morality rise higher and higher. Civilization's advance represents, a move beyond the small communities based on kinship, tribal relationships, close immediate face to face contacts, to large cities and societies and increased mobility and communication among diverse populations (DM 71f 79ff, 96f, 103). And in the last century moral norms have been extended beyond the human community to the higher primate/ mammals, a trend already evident in Darwin's time. This is a form of moral progress. But, How did the scaling up of moral recognition to thousands, and now billions of unknown strangers evolve? The less one knows other persons, the greater the uncertainty about their intentions, and the greater the risks of association with them. That is to my mind the truth about Darwin's stress on a tribal code. Since reducing the risks in social interactions increases trust, one can turn this Negative social morality into a rule for relating to strangers: namely trust them to be non-threatening, until and unless they behave in a threatening manner.38 In this way the risk minimizing effects of morality enable the © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 8 generalization of moral recognition beyond people one knows, namely, one's kin and immediate community. The diffusion of morality, one can further hypothesize, even further reduces risks of interaction than trade, for moral recognition implies that people will not harm or threaten each other. Reciprocity in exchange makes peace and prosperity partners. It implies this minimal benefit, of not putting the stranger at risk. In effect the great moral maxim, do no harm, is the ultimate social rule. It is the fundament of sociability. This is the basis, in my view, it better increases trust, because it is based on a track record of not being harmed from associating, or merely coexisting with, with unkown others. The absence of threat is a benefit, however minimal. To the extent it is reciprocated, it is a social benefit. It is also the beginning of trust, the soothing balm that greases the wheels of social life. Trust is a better social glue than fear, for it facilitates every social relations, and minimizes their costs of the countless transaction of social life. Social interactions, between strangers as well as kin, are for the most part low risk, non-violent, non-threatening, and peaceful. This is a measurable hypothesis, too. It implies that social interactions will increase in frequency in inverse function of the risks involved. The greater the risks of interaction, the lower the frequency of social interactions. And this is indeed the case, as some naturalist theorists have noted.39 Morality is socially intelligent, for it increases the size of the group that one can live with in peace, have a long life, etc. Negative morality is socially powerful. It enables continuing association, at minimal risk; and the more low risk contact one has with others over time, the lower the risks. To the extent that others show they have accepted, and continue to accept, a code of peaceful, non threatening coexistence, then mutual association can and will continue; and it will likely increase in number and intensity over time. So the do no harm maxim then is the moral basis of a sustainable society. Reciprocity The Negative morality of avoiding harm has been shown to lay the foundation for extending a moral code and moral recognition to strangers, humans beyond one's kin and community, and indeed to other animals. But More is needed than the negative morality of avoiding harm, despite its power, an even more powerful mechanism for ensuring the social generality of the moral sense. In addition to reducing the risks of loss and threat, I contend, one should benefit from moral choices and behaviour; and so should others.40 Darwin presented a primarily social and utilitarian view of morality in terms of what would now be termed "reciprocal altruism", or, simply put, reciprocity.41 Reciprocal altruism, Trivers claims, emerges from altruistic situations, defined by reciprocity or mutually beneficial to agents. In an argument redolent of Lonergan's conception of emergent probability, Trivers defines their emergence conditions, as a long time, spatial proximity, long parental care/ socialization, mutual dependence, mutual defence, a dominance hierarchy.42 Trivers research on "reciprocal altruism"--even though I would prefer merely to speak of reciprocity, or mutually beneficial social interactions, and avoid altruism's morally slippery, and misleading association of morality with self-sacrifice) © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 9 Reciprocity contrasts with strong altruism, which opposes one's own welfare to that of others.43 By reinforcing and rewarding reciprocity makes morality sustainable. Positive social interactions are repeated because they are mutually rewarding to the interacting parties.44 They are sustained, increased and extended the extent that it is repeated, replicated, inherited and reproduced countless times, with both strangers and kin. Many forms of social behaviour involve reciprocity: economic, communication, cooperation, commerce, sex, friendship, kinship, neighbourliness, and even peacefully coexisting with others, e.g., on urban streets, in buses, trains, and countless other public and private spaces.45 Thousands of years of peaceful contact and exchange among diverse cultures and religions along the great Silk Road trade route from China to the Mediterranean is a good example of both the extension of morality and the sustainability of reciprocity is.46 It is precisely because it was a trade route, I would argue that the Silk Road was socially and morally successful. For trade, as Boulding held, requires reciprocity; both parties must gain from their exchange. Other social relations, from sexual, love, affection, friendship, and even relations based on equity or justice, embody similar forms of reciprocity involves [Much of this argument is indebted to the economic ethics of the great economic theorist, Kenneth Boulding. Working from his understanding of market relations and trade, Boulding cogently argued that relations based on mutually beneficial exchanges are preferable and more lasting than those based on threat. See Boulding,] Ones' care for others should benefit oneself. There should be reciprocity. This is implicit in Darwin's argument for the positive social morality of the Golden Rule. It enjoins us to 'do unto others as you would have them do unto you.' It is explictly reciprocal and behavioural. And it is interactively social and beneficial: act toward others the way you want them to act toward yourself. Namely, in their interest, to their benefit and wellbeing. And one would expect them to do the same in response: to act so as to benefit you in return. It exemplifies reciprocity. Reciprocity is evident in much human behaviour where both parties benefit, such as sharing food, tools, knowledge/communication, sex, games, trading and commerce.47 Reciprocity is evident in other species, too, e.g., between the cleaner fish and its host, bird warning calls,.48 Cooperation benefits the cooperating parties, it exemplifies rationality reciprocal altruism. Cooperation underlies the division of labour that is seen as fundamental to a rational / intelligence social system from hunting/gathering societies, to Plato's republic, and modern economics and social thought.49 The Golden Rule lies at the heart of morality's transcendence of kinship and neighbourly relations and face to face relations with strangers. It enables the extension of social and moral recognition to millions of unknown, and unknowable, strangers. It makes the mathematical utility calculus of social happiness unnecessary. When interpreted as, 'Act on the expectation of mutual benefit until events or conditions dictate otherwise,' the Golden Rule is also the solution to the Prisoner's Dilemna.50 Assume reciprocity. If and when your good intentioned behaviour, of "I mean no harm' isn't reciprocated, react accordingly, e.g., by inquiring as to the others intent, defenciveness, warnings, etc. By Reciprocating their non beneficial behaviour you signal that you got a negative message, and now seek confirmation, or return to the original non-threatening reciprocity of the golden rule. To the extent that social interactions benefits oneself as well as others, then the risks of harm approach zero, and the case that opting for social interaction is morally intelligent approaches certainty. © Vincent di Norcia Darwin on Moral Intelligence 10 The emergence and spread of reciprocal altruism or mutually beneficial cooperative social interactions is a matter of the probability of an altruist's behaviour being reciprocated by another altruist, as versus a non altruist or cheater.51 Reciprocity or mutually beneficial forms of social interaction, exemplifies soft or reciprocal altruism (and therefore soft egoism as well).52 The kernel of truth in talk of soft egoism is that we should, and usually do, act in our own interests; while the truth of soft altruism is that we should also act in the interests of others, too. Connecting the moral sense and the social instincts requires a positively interactive concept of "reciprocal altruism", one that blends soft altruism and soft egoism.53 Being inherently social and behavioural, the likelihood that the moral sense evolved from the social instincts increases. Accordingly I would reject Ruse's claim that evolution works by "filling us with moral thoughts."54 The drive to association, and the related practice of reciprocal altruism, are on this reading hypothesized to be inherent to our nature and part of our genes, albeit generic, flexible, and plastically open to wide variation due to environmental conditions and individual socialization, etc.55 Morality and Intelligence Darwin argued that an animal with social instincts would only acquire a moral sense, once "its intellectual powers become …nearly as well developed, as in man." (DM 71-2). Morality then is a product of the evolutionary combination of both sociability and intelligence, he wrote: As man advanced in intellectual power [he] was enabled to trace the more remote consequences of his actions; as he acquired sufficient knowledge to reject baneful customs and superstitions; [and] he regarded more and more not only the welfare but the happiness of his fellow-men; as from habit, following on beneficial expression, instruction, and example (DM 103). The moral evaluation of a possible action requires comparison of past and future actions: "A moral being is one who is capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives and of approving or disapproving of them." It not only "looks backwards and judges past actions", it requires us to "move forward too" (DM 91, 93, 88). For once we start a course of action we still need to intelligently adapt to changing conditions, unexpected opportunities and threats, if we are to achieve our original goals (DM 88f). Moral intelligence also involves linguistic and calculative competences, for Darwin continues, language use facilitates working through "a long and complex train of thought", just as figures and algebra enable "long calculation" (DM 57). The communicative powers of language also enable communities to state guides for conduct and communicate to / instruct others about how they "should act for the common good." (DM ??). Deliberation is also required, Darwin adds, for we "cannot avoid reflection on our past actions," for "the images of all past actions and motives would be incessantly passing through the brain of each individual."56 Indeed moral agents, he added, need to develop the "inward monitor" of conscience, which he termed an "inner sense" that involved emotions like honour, shame, sympathy, self interest, beauty, and other "natural feelings."57 He connected "the short but imperious word ought" to awareness of an "innate or acquired" instinct (92); and he sees conscience mostly as remorse for doing wrong (91). At one point Darwin strayed into idealism, namely, when he claimed that "the highest stage of …moral culture [comes] when we recognize that we ought to control our thoughts", (DM 101). Here he © Vincent di Norcia