GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works Faculty Scholarship 2008 CCrriimmiinnaall LLaaww aanndd tthhee PPuurrssuuiitt ooff EEqquuaalliittyy Donald Braman George Washington University Law School, [email protected] Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.gwu.edu/faculty_publications Part of the Law Commons RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Donald Braman, Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality, 84 Tex. L. Rev. 2097 (2006) This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in GW Law Faculty Publications & Other Works by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality Donald Braman* Much of the debate over criminal justice in America derives from the fact that many low-income and minority Americans feel neither equal under nor protected by our criminal laws. The effects of underenforcement are devastating: Many people living in our nation’s inner cities no longer feel safe walking through their own neighborhoods.1 The effects of mass incarceration are more devastating still, draining already impoverished communities of capital, further straining and often breaking fragile families, and stigmatizing not only offenders, their families, and their communities, but also hardening racial divides in the process.2 Repeated attempts to remedy this situation through the courts have, to put it mildly, failed. Expansive readings of the rights of criminal suspects, defendants, convicts, and prisoners have not only failed to stem the massive institutionalization of those in disadvantaged communities, they have made those who litigate to enforce those rights appear to be pro-criminal.3 Worse still, as some commentators have noted, these tactics may well interfere with communities’ self-policing capabilities.4 The result has been a confused movement towards longer sentences out of an indeterminate blend of * Assistant Professor, George Washington University School of Law. I thank Kenworthey Bilz, Richard Brooks, Dennis Curtis, Daniel Freed, Nancy Gertner, Dana Goldblatt, Ryan Goodman, Derek Jinks, Dan Kahan, and Tracey Meares. Special thanks to Tahlia Townsend, whose ideas and insights run throughout. 1. See Michael A. Fletcher, Study Tracks Blacks’ Crime Concerns: African Americans Show Less Confidence in System, Favor Stiff Penalties, WASH. POST, Apr. 21, 1996, at A11 (reporting that 52% of black Americans are “afraid to walk alone at night” near their own homes). 2. See generally DONALD BRAMAN, DOING TIME ON THE OUTSIDE: INCARCERATION AND FAMILY LIFE IN URBAN AMERICA (2004) (recounting the experiences of the families of prisoners); INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002) (presenting a collection of essays arguing against America’s current system of “mass imprisonment,” noting that a disproportionate number of American criminals are people of color and investigating the social and material impact on the families and communities of these criminals). 3. See, e.g., RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 375 (1997) (advising progressives to pay as much attention to the interests of those “who must share space on streets and in buildings with crack traffickers” as they do to the interests of crack traffickers); Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, When Rights Are Wrong, in URGENT TIMES 3, 3–4 (Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 1999) (describing how the building search policy of the Chicago Housing Authority was declared unconstitutional over the objections of the community residents whose constitutional rights were supposedly being “protected”). 4. See, e.g., Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 6–22 (arguing that libertarian conceptions of civil rights pursued by the ACLU and enforced by federal judges have disabled community anti-crime measures advocated by residents in low-income housing projects). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1175803 2 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:[XXXX] political calculations and warring conceptions of what balance of liberties and sanctions will genuinely serve those in disadvantaged communities. Equal protection litigation, too, has failed fairly convincingly. This is partly a result of the Supreme Court’s invidious intent standard, which forces litigators to go beyond claims that state policies inadvertently contribute to the subordination of disadvantaged populations and assert that the state acted with discriminatory intent.5 Labeling government actors as racists has alienated not only legislators and members of the executive branch, but also, increasingly, the general population who view many of the laws as motivated by and justifiable in terms of neutral principles.6 But if the intent-based standard has many failings, the most commonly considered alternative—court-mandated remedies derived from an effects- based standard—has problems that may be equally as serious. Even if courts were willing to undertake broad enforcement in principle, they would remain poorly equipped to administer broad effects-based remedies in practice.7 Perhaps even more importantly, courts are poorly positioned politically to manage such broad normative undertakings. Indeed, where activists have pitted the courts against the legislature and the executive branch on sensitive social issues—particularly in the criminal law—they have often provoked resistance and backlash with harms outweighing the benefit of the initial judicial intervention.8 5. See Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects: The Evolving Forms of Status- Enforcing State Action, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1131–35 (1997) (chronicling the emergence of the discriminatory purpose doctrine). 6. See, e.g., KENNEDY, supra note 3, at 375 (explaining how laws enhancing penalties for dealing crack that apply to “anyone” caught dealing were misinterpreted as imposing a racially discriminatory burden on blacks); Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 4, 16 (explaining how the ACLU effectively defeated Chicago laws that gave police the right to conduct mass building searches and that prohibited gang loitering despite the fact that many residents wanted these laws to protect against gunfire outbursts, fighting, and drug dealing). 7. See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1255 (1978) [hereinafter Sager, Fair Measure] (citing possible institutional boundaries to broad state enforcement of “underenforced federal constitutional norms”); Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Constitutional Law, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 410, 411–12 (1993) [hereinafter Sager, Justice] (discussing the possible political and legislative ramifications of selectively enforcing certain equal protection principles). 8. See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, Race, Politics, and Juvenile Justice: The Warren Court and the Conservative “Backlash,” 87 MINN. L. REV. 1447, 1447–49 (2003) (citing political and legislative reform of juvenile courts from institutions that were “nominally rehabilitative social welfare agenc[ies]” to “formal legal institutions”); William J. Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1016, 1018–19 (1995) [hereinafter Stuntz, Privacy’s Problem] (discussing how criminal procedural rules are used to encroach on the Fourth and Fifth Amendment privacy rights); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (1997) [hereinafter Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship] (asserting that there is an information deficiency among the authors of the criminal procedural rules that prevents these rules from properly defining defendants’ rights). Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1175803 2006] Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 3 In this Article I argue that, to make their vision of justice a reality, egalitarians will need to change both their focus and their tactics with respect to criminal law.9 The tragedy of contemporary criminal justice is not that individual rights are too narrowly construed, but that those living in disadvantaged communities are injured both by crime and counter-productive law enforcement. The remedies that egalitarians have historically looked to—remedies articulated within the framework of individual rights—are poorly suited to address the systematic reproduction of inequality that results. First, as a matter of effective politics, egalitarians will need to shift their focus from the racially motivated harms directed at individual criminal offenders and defendants to the collateral and often unintentional harms borne by non-criminals in their communities.10 To give just two examples of these harms: (1) the fact that the vast majority of those convicted of drug offenses are not required to complete drug treatment programs as part of their sentence has devastating effects on the vulnerable families and communities to which they return;11 and (2) the fact that fathers who are incarcerated are prevented from supporting their children not only harms a broad class of non-criminals, but has far-reaching normative effects on family formation and father absence, which create serious inter-generational harms.12 Second, as a matter of pragmatic reform, egalitarians should shift their focus from the doctrine of individual liberties to more modest policy reforms aimed at increasing the influence that citizens in disadvantaged communities exercise over the form of justice itself.13 For too long, these communities have been asked to choose between expansive readings of criminal rights or oppressively harsh criminal sanctions—either choice making them a party to their own subordination. 9. The principle of antisubordination best captures this deeper conception of justice. See, e.g., Owen Fiss, Another Equality, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, 2004, at 3–4, http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1051&context=ils (discussing antisubordination as it relates to racial antidiscrimination law); Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108–17, 147–70 (1976) (describing the “antidiscrimination” and the “group-disadvantaging” principles). As will become clear, though, I disagree with Fiss’s privileging of the judiciary in pursuing this conception of justice. 10. This would be a return to what Tracey Meares describes as “public-regarding” concerns in criminal procedure. Tracey L. Meares, What’s Wrong with Gideon, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 215, 216 (2003). 11. See BRAMAN, supra note 2, at 54–57 (detailing these consequences and reviewing the literature). 12. See id. at 89–96, 154–63 (discussing the effects of incarceration on family structure and economic well-being). 13. Adriaan Lanni has described why juries are particularly promising places to look with respect to community empowerment. See Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 394–95 (2005) (discussing how juries can be a useful cross-section that adequately displays overall community views on charging, sentencing, and policy-making judicial practices). 4 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:[XXXX] There are, of course, complaints that can be leveled against this strategy. It certainly does not offer the sweeping and certain justice that some imagine the Constitution guarantees and courts will deliver.14 Perhaps some will see it as diminishing the principle of equality under the law to the level of mere politics. But effective reform—reform that is likely to last—requires an attention to popular sentiment and social consequence that has eluded doctrinal remedies and libertarian principles to date. It requires both a partnership with and the empowerment of those the Court seeks to protect. I develop my argument in three parts. In Part I, I review the co- evolution of criminal law and equality concerns through the lens of twentieth century constitutional doctrine. Much of the terrain is familiar, but placing criminal law and equal protection doctrine side by side produces insights into the mismatched objectives and methods of egalitarian reformers of criminal law, the results of which are a source of trenchant iniquity today. In particular, I describe how, in the context of rising crime rates and cultural conflict, the Warren Court and an increasingly conservative state created dysfunctional competition for control over the power of the criminal law to harm and protect disadvantaged communities—particularly black communities suffering from the legacies of American racial inequality. In Part II, I describe the current predicament of the criminal law. By way of example, I show how disparities in crack cocaine sentencing moved egalitarians to undertake two unsuccessful and, in retrospect, counterproductive strategies. In the first, egalitarians attempted to use constitutional constraints on criminal procedure to increase the costs of criminal law enforcement in disadvantaged communities, thereby reducing the harms of overincarceration. In the second, egalitarians made claims of hidden or unconscious racism to meet the increasingly obscure doctrinal standard of invidious intent. Both strategies have earned egalitarian litigators the scorn of not only conservatives, but also many in the disadvantaged communities the litigators are attempting to assist. Moreover, it has left egalitarians with little in the way of a political agenda for addressing the subordinating harms of crime and mass incarceration. Part III lays out an alternative approach. There I argue for an approach coordinated across the political branches, an approach that seeks to make both criminals and the criminal justice system more responsive to the practical concerns of the citizenry. I review empirical data indicating that the public is eager for reforms that do both, and I outline a modest reform to leverage this popular preference: jury polling. Jury polling elicits information about the popular preferences as a regular part of criminal jury trials, forcing greater information about how disadvantaged communities feel 14 Owen Fiss is the most notable advocate of this conception of court-centered justice. See, e.g., The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1979). 2006] Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 5 about alternative regimes of criminal sanctions. Jury polling, I argue, would systematically (and respectfully) elicit greater information about and draw attention to the complex needs of those living in our nation’s most vulnerable neighborhoods. I. The Second Reconstruction and the Criminal Rights Revolution I base my argument on an uncontroversial premise: The same concerns about racial inequality that underwrote the Second Reconstruction15 also underwrote the criminal rights revolution.16 The crucial difference, however, is that unlike the mainstream aspects of the Second Reconstruction—the marches, legislation, executive orders, and litigation, which embodied what many now describe as “popular” or coordinated constitutionalism—the criminal rights revolution was largely court-focused, uncoordinated, and unpopular. In this Part, drawing on existing analyses of the Second Reconstruction and the revolution in criminal rights,17 I lay out this claim and 15. I refer to the “Second Reconstruction” rather than the “Warren Court Era” not only because my timeline extends beyond the Warren Court, but also because the latter phrase places undue weight on the Supreme Court’s role in guiding constitutional politics. 16. See, e.g., David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1060 (1999) (“The entire field is of significance today only because of a particular historic concern about racial discrimination.”); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA L.J. 1, 7 (1995) (describing Miranda as an “equal justice” case); Meares & Kahan, supra note 3, at 8 (arguing that the criminal rights revolution is “best understood contextually, as a program to counteract the distorting influence of institutionalized racism on America’s criminal justice system and, more generally, on American democracy”); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8, at 5 (“The post- 1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendants much worse than white ones. Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980) (characterizing the Fourteenth Amendment “as another harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment”). 17. My account of equal protection history draws principally on the work of Robert Post, Reva Siegel, and Jack Balkin. See generally Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or Antisubordination, ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP: THE ORIGINS AND FATE OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY, 2003, http://www.bepress.com/ils/iss2/art11 (challenging the conventional wisdom that the anticlassification principle triumphed over the antisubordination principle and arguing instead that American civil rights jurisprudence vindicates both principles); Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination Legislation After Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441, 446 (2000) (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions “[r]estricting the participation of the representative branches in enforcing the Equal Protection Clause” represent a “fundamental break with the forms of interaction that the Warren and Burger Courts cultivated with Congress”). My account of criminal procedure draws primarily on the work of Akhil Amar, Dan Kahan, Tracey Meares, and Bill Stuntz. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997) (analyzing the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments in light of the text, history, and structure of the Constitution); Dan M. Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153 (1998) (analyzing the tension between an emerging doctrine of criminal procedure based on discretionary law enforcement and the existing constitutional framework that seeks to limit such discretion); William J. Stuntz, The Substantive Origins of Criminal Procedure, 105 YALE L.J. 6 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:[XXXX] establish the point of departure for the more controversial claims of Part II and the novel proposals of Part III. A. The Second Reconstruction and the Hope of Equality The last century witnessed the rise and fall of the Second Reconstruction.18 The rise—embodied in the freedom marches in Birmingham, Selma, Washington, and across the South;19 in escalating executive orders for desegregation;20 in the passage of the Civil Rights Acts and the Voting Rights Act; in the enforcement of those laws by the Civil Rights Division of the Attorney General’s Office; and in court decisions leading up to and following in the spirit of Brown v. Board of Education21— spoke to the American promise of equality and the “withering injustice”22 of racial subordination despite that promise. It was a broad movement with a 393 (1995) (recounting the historical progression of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments); Stuntz, Uneasy Relationship, supra note 8 (arguing that the constitutionalization of criminal procedure has substantial unappreciated costs and that constitutional regulation of the criminal justice system would be better served by focusing on criminal substance and the funding of defense counsel). My account of the empirical analyses regarding the effects of these reforms draws principally from Gerald Rosenberg and Brad Canon. See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE 304– 35 (1991) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s criminal rights revolution failed to achieve its goals because political support as well as the conditions necessary for change were both lacking); Bradley C. Canon, Testing the Effectiveness of Civil Liberties Policies at the State and Federal Levels, 5 AM. POL. Q. 57 (1977) (noting the differential impact between federal and state exclusionary rules on illegal searches and seizures). 18. See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM AND REBELLION: THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION IN BLACK AMERICA, 1945–1990, at 3–4 (1982) (describing the Second Reconstruction as that period of American history between approximately 1954 and 1968 when mass protests spurred executive, legislative, and judicial actions that dismantled much of the formal legal apparatus of the Jim Crow system). For the purposes of this Article, I adopt the somewhat broader conception extending into the mid-1990s. 19. See generally CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE (1996) (describing the intensive community organizing that supported the civil rights movement); VOICES OF FREEDOM: AN ORAL HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FROM THE 1950S THROUGH THE 1980S (Henry Hampton & Steve Fayer eds., 1991) (discussing citizens’ descriptions of their participation in freedom marches). 20. Growing concern about the subordination of blacks in the United States had moved both the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations to establish commissions and make executive orders to end segregated facilities where possible. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,730, 3 C.F.R. 389 (1954– 1958) (ordering military forces to oversee compliance with desegregation standards in various school systems); Exec. Order No. 9981, 3 C.F.R. 722 (1943–1948) (ordering desegregation in the Armed Forces). 21. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Judiciary had also begun to remove barriers to equality in other areas of life by redefining state action and by striking down racially restrictive covenants, Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948), voting requirements, Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944), and limits on union membership, Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944). 22. Martin Luther King Jr., I Have a Dream, Address to the March on Washington for Jobs and Freedom (Aug. 28, 1963), available at http:// www.stanford.edu/group/King/publications/speeches/address_at_march_on_washington.pdf. 2006] Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 7 deep conception of equality—a justice that extended beyond individual concerns to the problems of group conflict and social subordination.23 The language of Brown certainly speaks to this conception of justice. Where the Plessy Court had dismissed the harms of segregation as the fictive “construction”24 of overly sensitive blacks, the Brown Court found that same harm to be real, deep, and unacceptable. Even where educational facilities were equal in every “tangible” respect,25 the Court reasoned, the harm done by school segregation was still unacceptable where it created “a feeling of inferiority” that frustrated the education of black children.26 Brown is often described as an embrace of Harlan’s dissent in Plessy.27 In some respects, this may misapprehend the way those engaged in the First 23. See Alan F. Westin, The Supreme Court and Group Conflict: Thoughts on Seeing Burke Put Through the Mill, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 665, 674 (1958) (arguing that this broad movement was an appropriate response to a new and “contemporary” understanding of equal protection under the law). This was one of the main concerns that conservatives had with Brown at the time. See, e.g., Albert A. Mavrinac, From Lochner to Brown v. Topeka: The Court and Conflicting Concepts of the Political Process, 52 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 641, 642–43 (1958) (asserting that the Court had abandoned the individualist conception of justice embodied in Lochner for a group-based conception in Brown). 24. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (“We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff’s argument to consist in the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction upon it.”). 25. There were, of course material disadvantages that blacks in the dual school system faced. Black schools, on average, had lower quality facilities, fewer teachers, larger class sizes, older books, and other material disadvantages. See, e.g., Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 632–33 (1950) (“The University of Texas Law School, from which petitioner was excluded, was staffed by a faculty of sixteen full-time and three part-time professors, some of whom are nationally recognized authorities in their field. Its student body numbered 850. The library contained over 65,000 volumes. Among the other facilities available to the students were a law review, moot court facilities, scholarship funds, and Order of the Coif affiliation. The school’s alumni occupy the most distinguished positions in the private practice of the law and in the public life of the State. It may properly be considered one of the nation’s ranking law schools. [In contrast,] [t]he law school for Negroes which was to have opened in February, 1947, would have had no independent faculty or library. The teaching was to be carried on by four members of the University of Texas Law School faculty, who were to maintain their offices at the University of Texas while teaching at both institutions. Few of the 10,000 volumes ordered for the library had arrived; nor was there any full- time librarian. The school lacked accreditation.”). But these arguably could have been remedied without integration. 26. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494. This links Brown with Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1879), in which the Court suggested that the exclusion of blacks from juries was “practically a brand upon them . . . an assertion of their inferiority.” 27. See, e.g., Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 29–30 (1999) (opining that Harlan’s dissent in Plessy became famous because it was vindicated by Brown); Paul Finkleman, Civil Rights in Historical Context: In Defense of Brown, 118 HARV. L. REV. 973, 996 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004)) (noting that Justice Harlan’s dissents “pave[d] the way” for Brown); Matthew J. Perry, Justice Murphy and the Fifth Amendment Equal Protection Doctrine: A Contribution Unrecognized, 27 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 243, 251 (2000) (using Brown as an example of an instance when Chief Justice Warren chose not to cite important dissents in controversial opinions, because “despite the fact that Brown essentially 8 Texas Law Review [Vol. 84:[XXXX] Reconstruction understood their struggle for equality under the law.28 But in at least one respect it does seem right. The Brown Court was doing more than objecting to segregation for segregation’s sake; it was attempting to make good on Harlan’s claim that “there is in this country no superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens,” that, as he put it, “[t]here is no caste here.”29 In Brown, the American racial caste system had reached what many hoped would be the beginning of its end. But the Brown Court was not alone in its fight against racial stratification in civil and private life; in fact the Court was both responding to and encouraging the activism of the public, the Legislature, and, perhaps most directly, the Executive Branch.30 President Truman had spoken forcefully on the issue of racial discrimination,31 and it was under Truman that Attorney General McGranery asked the Court to discard segregation once and for all “as a negation of rights secured by the Constitution.”32 Responding to public demand and the unanimous Brown decision, when the Governor of Arkansas used the National Guard to bar black students from attending Little Rock Central High School in 1957, the NAACP obtained an order barring the use of the Guard for that purpose, and President Eisenhower immediately sent the 101st Airborne to protect the black students as they attended their new school.33 In 1960, when segregationists threatened the six-year-old Ruby Bridges for planning to attend a formerly all-white school in New Orleans, President Eisenhower again responded, this time sending federal marshals as escorts.34 Congress also played an active role in the Second Reconstruction. Under intense pressure from an increasingly active public and a determined President Johnson, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964,35 which prohibited discrimination in employment, established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, and banned discrimination in public vindicated and adopted Harlan’s position,” Warren did not cite Harlan’s dissent in Plessy anywhere in the Brown opinion). 28. See Siegel, supra note 5, at 1121 (noting the distinction between “civil” and “social” rights at the time of the Plessy decision). 29. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559. 30. See infra notes 31–32 and accompanying text. 31. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Appellants, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 8) (quoting from President Truman’s addresses to Congress), available at http://curiae.law.yale.edu/pdf/347-483/022.pdf. 32. Id. at 25. 33. Sadly, they were not fully protected. The “Little Rock Nine,” as they were known, were beaten, spat on, and cursed at throughout their attendance. See JUAN WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE 92–119 (1987). Melba Patillo Beals, a member of the “Nine” was beaten, stabbed, and had acid thrown in her eyes. See MELBA PATILLO BEALS, WARRIORS DON’T CRY 173–74 (1995). 34. See Joel Wm. Friedman, Desegregating the South: John Minor Wisdom’s Role in Enforcing Brown’s Mandate, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2207, 2224–25 (2004) (relating Ruby Bridge’s predicament). 35. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 2006] Criminal Law and the Pursuit of Equality 9 accommodations connected with interstate commerce.36 That act and the Civil Rights Act of 1968,37 which extended these guarantees to housing and real estate, did not aim to remove race from the language of the law; they described practical efforts that could be made in furtherance of a society in which the law no longer contributed to racial injustice. The Voting Rights Act of 196538 was another part of this broad attack on legal and political maintenance of inequality.39 Ordinary citizens, too, were active reconstructors. Across the country, they took to the streets and the voting booths in increasingly large numbers and pushed for the elimination not only of segregation but of the more subtle forms of discrimination that sustained racial inequality. In bus boycotts, freedom rides, lunch counter sit-ins, and perhaps most famously, the marches on Birmingham, Washington, and Selma, Americans demanded a deep and abiding justice that included the unmet promise of true equality of opportunity. When private citizen Martin Luther King Jr. declared, “No, no, we are not satisfied and we will not be satisfied until ‘justice rolls down like waters and righteousness like a mighty stream,’”40 he not only voiced his opposition to segregation but also described the greater aspiration and demand of the movement—true equality in the economic, political, and social life of the nation. Throughout the 1960s—under pressure from the public, the Executive Branch, and Congress—the Court extended its holding in Brown to other areas of segregation.41 And, in Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,42 36. President Kennedy, in proposing the Act, gave voice to the broad principle it embodied, declaring that “[s]imple justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers of all races contribute, not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or results in racial discrimination.” H.R. DOC. NO. 124, at 12 (1963), as reprinted in 1963 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1526, 1534. 37. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73. 38. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437. 39. President Johnson, speaking to Congress in advance of their vote on the Act, made the case in terms of what he described as a “constitutional promise”: Our mission is at once the oldest and the most basic of this country: to right wrong, to do justice, to serve man. . . . Experience has clearly shown that the existing process of law cannot overcome systematic and ingenious discrimination. . . . In such a case our duty must be clear to all of us. The Constitution says that no person shall be kept from voting because of his race or his color. We have all sworn an oath before God to support and to defend that Constitution. We must now act in obedience to that oath. Special Message to the Congress: The American Promise, 65 PUB. PAPERS 281, 281–83 (Mar. 15, 1965). President Johnson was reminding Congress that the Constitution was not the purview of the courts alone. While seeing the promise of equality as a constitutional promise, Johnson recognized that the obligation to defend and uphold the Constitution extended to all Americans. 40. King, supra note 22 (quoting Amos 5:24). 41. See, e.g., Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 171 (1970) (holding that police enforcement of a local custom requiring the separation of races in eating establishments violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee to equal protection). 42. 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964) (upholding Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964).