ConstructingtheU.S.RapprochementwithChina,1961–1974 From“RedMenace”to“TacitAlly” WithNixon’shistoricreconciliationwithChinain1972,Sino-American relations were restored, and China moved from being regarded as America’s most implacable enemy to being a friend and tacit ally. Existing accounts of the rapprochement focus on the shifting balance ofpowerbetweentheUnitedStates,China,andtheSovietUnion,but inthisbookGoharguesthattheycannotadequatelyexplainthetiming andpolicychoicesrelatedtoWashington’sdecisionsforreconciliation withBeijing.Instead,sheappliesamorehistoricallysensitiveapproach that privileges contending official American constructions of China’s identity and character. This book demonstrates that ideas of reconcil- iation with China were already being propagated and debated within official circles in the United States during the 1960s. It traces the re- lated policy discourse and imagery, examining their continuities and evolution into the early 1970s and the ways in which they facilitated Nixon’s new policy. Furthermore, the book analyzes the implementa- tionofthepolicyofrapprochementanddemonstrateshowthetwosides constructedthebasisforthenewrelationshipbasedonfriendlymutual images, shared interests, and common enemies. It reveals how, begin- ning in 1973, Nixon and Kissinger pursued the policy of supporting Chinaasa“tacitally”againsttheSovietUnion. Evelyn Goh is Assistant Professor at the Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. She graduatedwithfirst-classhonorsingeographyfromOxfordUniversity and also obtained an M.Phil. in environment and development from Cambridge University. In 2001, she completed a doctorate in inter- national relations at Nuffield College, Oxford. Dr. Goh has been a Visiting Fellow at the East-West Center in Washington, D.C., where she received the 2004 Southeast Asian Fellowship. Her main research interests lie in the areas of U.S. foreign policy, U.S.–China relations, andAsia-Pacificsecurityandinternationalrelations.Shehaspublished onthediplomatichistoryofU.S.–Chinarelations,U.S.strategyinthe Asia-Pacific region, the implications of 9/11 on U.S. power, and envi- ronmentalsecurity. Constructing the U.S. Rapprochement with China, 1961–1974 From “Red Menace” to “Tacit Ally” EVELYN GOH NanyangTechnologicalUniversity    Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge  , UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521839860 © Evelyn Goh 2005 This book is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published in print format - ---- eBook (NetLibrary) - --- eBook (NetLibrary) - ---- hardback - --- hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate. Contents ForewordbyRosemaryFoot pageix Acknowledgments xi ListofAbbreviations xiii 1 Introduction 1 part i. competing discourses, 1961–1968 2 “RedMenace”to“RevolutionaryRival”:Recastingthe ChineseCommunistThreat 17 The“RedMenace”:CommunistChinaasExpansionistMilitary Aggressor 20 “RevolutionaryRival”:CommunistChinaasIndependent MilitantChallenger 30 3 “TroubledModernizer”to“ResurgentPower”: RevisionistImagesofthePRCandArgumentsforaNew ChinaPolicy 46 “TroubledModernizer”:ChinaasanUnderdevelopedCountry 47 “ResurgentPower”:ChinaasFrustratedReemergingMajorState 61 4 TheRevisionistLegacy:TheDiscourseofReconciliation withChinaby1968 82 CompetingDiscourses 84 TheDiscourseofReconciliationwithChina,1968 92 part ii. discursive transitions, 1969–1971 5 Nixon’sChinaPolicyDiscourseinContext 101 “ToughCoexistence”:Nixon’sChinaPolicyThinkingasVice President,1952–1960 102 v vi Contents Chinaas“KeyPlayer”:TheDevelopmentofNixon’sChina Strategy,1960–1968 106 PresidentNixon’sChinaPolicyDiscourse,1969–1971 112 Nixon’sDiscourseofReconciliationinContext 121 6 DebatingtheRapprochement:“ResurgentRevolutionary Power”versus“ThreatenedMajorPower” 124 NewOpportunitiesandOldDoubtsattheBeginningofthe NixonAdministration 125 “RevolutionaryResurgentPower”:TheStateDepartment RethinksChinaPolicy 128 “ThreatenedMajorPower”:TheWhiteHouse ReconceptualizesChina 136 DebatesandDepartures:TheRenewedWarsawTalks,1970 142 Conclusion 147 part iii. discourses of rapprochement in practice, 1971–1974 7 “Principled”RealistPower:LayingtheDiscursive FoundationsofaNewRelationship,July1971to February1972 153 Kissinger’sNewRepresentationoftheChinese 155 NewIdentity,NewInterests:ArticulatingtheCommonGround foraNewRelationship 164 Conclusion:DiscursiveFoundations 182 8 PrinciplesinPractice:PolicyImplicationsoftheU.S. DecisionforRapprochement 184 TestofFriendship:The1971SouthAsianCrisis 185 NegotiatingPrinciples,PostponingResolution:U.S.Policy towardTaiwan 192 DiscursiveReconstructionsandPolicyOutcomes 204 9 “Selling”theRapprochement:TheNixon Administration’sJustificationoftheNewChinaPolicy 206 “RealistResurgentPower”:ExplainingtheFormerEnemy 207 Chinaas“theEnemyofMyEnemy”:RealpolitikfortheRight 215 Conclusion 220 10 “TacitAlly,”June1972to1974:ConsolidatingorSaving theU.S.–ChinaRapprochement 222 TriangularPolitics,June1972toFebruary1973:FormerEnemy toTacitAlly? 223 MaintainingMomentuminU.S.–PRCRelations, July–November1973 236 Stalemate:U.S.–PRCRelationsin1974 247 Conclusion:TriangularBalanceofPowertoTacitAlliance 252 Contents vii 11 Conclusion 256 Bibliography 269 DramatisPersonae 285 Index 295 Foreword Thisbookisimportantforthreemainreasons.First,itenhancesourun- derstandingofoneofthemostimportantbilateralrelationshipsofourera. Sino-Americanrelationshavemovedinregularcyclesbetweenperiodsof hostility and somewhat grudging coexistence since the establishment of thePeople’sRepublicofChinain1949.Mostoftherestoftheworldhas been affected by the changing state of those relations: they have had a majorimpactonregionalsecurity,ongreatpoweralignments,andonthe centralnormsoftheglobalsystemthatinvolvemattersofwarandpeace. Intheearlytwenty-firstcentury,wehavearrivedatapointwheretherela- tionshipisperceivedtohavestabilized.Forsome,itwarrantsthedescrip- tionthatitisthebestithaseverbeen,oratleastthebestsincePresident Nixon’s landmark visit to China in 1972. Dr. Goh’s study offers an op- portunitytoreflectonthatcomparison,usefullyremindingusofsomeof thefactorsthatcontributetoacontinuingfragilityinthosebilateralties. Aboveall,herworkhelpsustounderstandwhathasmadeitpossiblefor negativeU.S.imagesofChinatobetransformedintodescriptionsofthe country that are positive enough to permit bilateral cooperation in the threemajordomainsofsecurity,economics,andculture. Second, the study is particularly valuable because of its approach. In thepast,therelationshipbetweenthesetwocountrieshasalmostentirely beenexaminedthrougharealistlens,withshiftsinthebalanceofpower regardedasthekeytoexplaininghowperiodsofconflicthavegivenway to eras of cooperation. Dr. Goh’s book, however, shows that there were severaloptionsavailabletoU.S.administrationsastheystruggledtomake sense of the opportunities provided by the Sino-Soviet split. Instead of relying on balance-of-power logic, she takes the ideas that underpinned ix