Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison CONSPIRACY THEORIES AND THE FAILURE OF INTELLECTUAL CRITIQUE Kurtis Hagen University of Michigan Press Ann Arbor Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Copyright © 2022 by Kurtis Hagen All rights reserved For questions or permissions, please contact [email protected] Published in the United States of America by the University of Michigan Press Manufactured in the United States of America Printed on acid- free paper First published July 2022 A CIP catalog record for this book is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication data has been applied for. ISBN 978- 0- 472- 13310- 9 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978- 0- 472- 22034- 2 (e- book) Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Contents Preface vii Introduction 1 PART I: THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONSPIRACY THEORIES ONE What Is a Conspiracy Theory? 11 TWO The Philosophers of Conspiracy Theory: Are Conspiracy Theories Epistemically Suspect? 37 THREE Conspiracist Ideation and the Revelation of Real Conspiracies 80 PART II: THE PRE- EMINENT LEGAL SCHOLAR OF OUR TIME FOUR Is Infiltration of “Extremist Groups” Justified? 109 FIVE Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts 122 SIX Were Sunstein and Vermeule Misunderstood? An Examination of Sunstein’s Revision 141 Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison vi Contents PART III: THE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS SEVEN Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Systems 157 EIGHT Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Conspiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies? 180 NINE For the Greater Good: Conspiracy and Moral Justification (an interlude) 206 TEN Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists 228 Conclusion 244 Appendix: 9/11 and Epistemic Authorities 249 Notes 273 Works Cited 317 Index 335 Digital materials related to this title can be found on the Fulcrum platform via the following citable URL: https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461 Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Preface The aim of this book is to make serious consideration of conspiracy theo- ries respectable among the sophisticated. To some this aim may seem auda- cious, even ludicrous. But to most of the philosophers who have contrib- uted substantially to the philosophical literature on conspiracy theories over the past two decades— who are at least arguably the most relevant authorities on the matter— it would be a welcome development, and long overdue. The philosophers I’m particularly thinking of include Charles Pigden, David Coady, M Dentith, Lee Basham, Juha Räikkä, and even Brian Keeley, whose seminal 1999 article, “Of Conspiracy Theories,” is often misinterpreted as arguing that conspiracy theories are generally unwarranted. To suggest that serious consideration of conspiracy theories ought to be respectable, of course, does not mean that all individual conspiracy theo- ries ought, upon consideration, to be regarded as respectable. Rather, it is to say that conspiracy theories ought not be dismissed on account of their being conspiracy theories, and that each ought to be given a fair hearing, given the recognition that sometimes conspiracy theories have turned out to be true, and also that, of the many serious attempts to provide reasons to adopt a dismissive stance toward conspiracy theories generally (includ- ing Keeley’s), none have survived scrutiny (as Keeley readily concedes of his own attempt). Further, it turns out that much of the social science scholarship on the subject, especially the psychological study of conspiracy theorists, has turned out to be flawed and misleading. Those flaws are not randomly Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison viii Preface directed; rather, they consistently serve to disparage conspiracy theorists unfairly. This suggests that there may be a bias against conspiracy theo- rists in the academy, as, indeed, there seems to be among “sophisticated” people more generally. If sophisticated people become aware of such a bias, they should become cautious about their own attitude; otherwise they fail a test of sophistication. This then— apparently biased research on conspiracy theorists— is another reason to adopt a more respectful attitude toward conspiracy theories and the people who believe them, which, after all, is most of us in varying degrees. Previously Published Material Earlier versions of following chapters were first published as indicated below: Chapter 4: “Is Infiltration of ‘Extremist Groups’ Justified?” International Journal of Applied Philosophy 24.2 (Fall 2010): 153– 168. Chapter 5: “Conspiracy Theories and Stylized Facts.” Journal for Peace and Justice Studies 21.2 (Fall 2011): 3– 22. Chapter 7: “Conspiracy Theorists and Monological Belief Sys- tems.” Argumenta 3.2 (issue 6, May 2018): 303– 326. Chapter 8: “Conspiracy Theories and the Paranoid Style: Do Con- spiracy Theories Posit Implausibly Vast and Evil Conspiracies?” Social Epistemology 32.1 (2018): 24– 40. Available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/02691728.2017.1352625 Chapter 10: “Conspiracy Theorists and Social Scientists.” In Taking Conspiracy Theories Seriously, edited by M R. X. Dentith (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2018): 125– 140. The chapter published in Taking Conspiracy Theories Seri- ously is, in turn, a revised and substantially extended version of a short paper first published under the title “What Are They Really Up To? Activist Social Scientists Backpedal on Conspir- acy Theory Agenda,” in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 6.3 (2017): 89– 95. In addition, the booklet Conspiracy Theory: A Philosophical Defense (Burlington, VT: Fomite, 2018), contains some material from, or incorporated into, Chapters 8 and 9. Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. E-book, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2022, https://doi.org/10.3998/mpub.12089461. Downloaded on behalf of University of Wisconsin, Madison Preface ix Acknowledgments and Backstories Defending the view that conspiracy theories ought to be taken seriously, which flies in the face of the “common sense” of many academics, pre- sented challenges. For example, I encountered barriers to publication (such as frequent desk rejections) unlike what I encounter when publish- ing on “harmless” topics in Chinese philosophy, even when I challenged dominant paradigms in that sphere. But the most significant barrier was always psychological. I seriously worried that I might be wasting my time on articles that would never be published, no matter how cogent. Giving up always seemed a rational option. In such a situation, the encouragement of respected friends and colleagues— so important in all cases— takes on a heightened significance. And so, I have some thanking to do, both for substantial help and for significant moral support. In the early days, I received encouraging feedback from my colleagues at SUNY Plattsburgh, E. Thomas Moran and the late Martin Lubin in particular. I also received both encouragement and helpful proofreading and editing services from friend and retired philosophy professor Kent Simmons, who continues to provide aid and encouragement. I sent a draft of my first paper, which addressed Cass Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule’s proposal involving “cognitive infiltration,” to the writer and political activist Marc Estrin. He was outraged at the proposed cognitive infiltration, of which he had not been aware. Apparently, few people were aware of it, though the offending article was published eight months earlier, in April 2009, and an early draft had been available online since January 2008. So the proposal had been publicly available for just about two years. (The situation reminds me a little of the Tuskegee Study in the sense that the results were being published in academic journals and yet “nobody” knew about it.) Estrin asked if I would mind if he wrote a blog about it, and I approved of the idea. He published a blog on his own site January 10, 2010, and on The Rag Blog the next day. Then suddenly, over the next several days, a number of sites reported on the proposal, including Raw Story (which was later credited in Project Censored’s Censored 2011). On January 15, Glenn Greenwald got into the mix with an article on Salon.com called “Obama Confidant’s Spine- Chilling Proposal” (2010). It seems that this little internet buzz alerted David Ray Griffin to the issue, and he quickly wrote a book on the subject, Cognitive Infiltration: An Obama Appointee’s Plan to Under- mine the 9/11 Conspiracy Theory, which I reviewed (Hagen 2011b). A casual glance at the respective copyright dates may seem to indicate that my first article (Hagen 2010) was published before Griffin’s book (2011). But, for the record, I know that not to be true. Griffin’s book was published first. Hagen, Kurtis. Conspiracy Theories and the Failure of Intellectual Critique. 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