Faculty of Social Sciences University of Helsinki Finland CONSIDERING CHARACTER AND EXCUSES AS BLAME MITIGATION A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRAWSONIAN AND ARISTOTELIAN ACCOUNTS OF MORAL RESPONSIBILITY Eero Kaila ACADEMIC DISSERTATION To be presented, with the permission of the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki, for public examination in Auditorium XIII, University main building, on the 28 of January 2017, at 10 am. Helsinki 2017 ISSN 2343-273X (pbk.) ISSN 2343-2748 (PDF) ISBN 978-951-51-2583-5 (pbk.) ISBN 978-951-51-2584-2 (PDF) Unigrafia Helsinki 2017 ABSTRACT This dissertation is aimed at clarifying the concept of moral responsibility within Anglophone, analytic ethics broadly defined, as well as looking at the concept of character to inquire about its role embedded within these theories. In this work, it is claimed that considerations of character matter when moral responsibility is assessed. Two families of theories of moral responsibility are compared with each other starting with Peter F. Strawson’s sentimentalist theory, originated in his influential article “Freedom and Resentment” (Strawson, 1962) and followed by work of others including R. Jay Wallace (1994). Scholarship on Aristotle's theory provides the basis for a similar framework of responsibility for action (NE III.1). Other aspects of Aristotle’s work provide additional depth to his concept of moral responsibility however. Character differs greatly in emphasis in Aristotle's theory from that of Strawson. It is claimed here that character is an essential part of human agency, and is thus a defining factor for actions taken. It is also claimed since that character is not a precise concept, taking it fully into account presents a formidable challenge to all theories attempting to explain responsibility exhaustively. In Strawson’s case, the further claim is made that what is traditionally discussed in terms of character is rephrased in terms of pleas and special conditions, which amount together into excuses instead. One common concept that both of these doctrines utilize is blame. Blame (usually accompanied with praise) is identified as a crucial component of responsibility by a majority of thinkers writing on the subject, and this reasoning is followed here as well. An aporetic conclusion supporting critical sources is reached in terms of a common understanding of moral responsibility in Part I. The Aristotelian notion of character and the Strawsonian notion of excuse will be re-visited as examples of blame mitigation within the context of these theories in the systematic section of Part II. Analysis is conducted based on Bernard Williams’s (1993 & 1997) explication of elements of responsibility, where a comparison is done between character and excuses appearing in the two families of theories of responsibility. Based on the findings it is concluded that the two theoretical families share similarity of structure regardless of the difference in their age, in a way that no matter whether character or excuses are used to describe the alteration of initial judgment, in terms of the end results blame mitigation appears to happen identically in all cases. Examination of character in the context of philosophy of responsibility shows that there is room for expansion in the narrower attempts to define the concept. Comparisons of both of these theoretical alternatives are illustrated with examples and further discussion is called for. 3 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The conception of this thesis owes a great deal to the “Responsibility: A Philosophical Enquiry into Ethics and Politics of the Concept” research project, from which gave this effort a great start, the project leader and supervisor Dr. (docent) Olli Loukola having been a constant source of assistance. I've worked most in a team with Markus Neuvonen. Our discussions as well as the conference presentations we’ve done together have been hugely important for this work. Liuda Kočnovaitė's philosophical insights, not to mention her organizational skills, have also been remarkable. Additionally, even though with us only for a short time, Frank Martela was present at a key moment in terms of seeking initial funding for our three-year project. He has since been a great influence as a prolific public writer as well. Thanks to Joonas Leppänen and Sanna Tirkkonen for being good friends and co-workers as room-mates at the “oppiaine”. My senior colleagues Teemu Toppinen, Annamari Vitikainen and Simo Kyllönen, with whom I have shared work-space as well, have all done extremely well in academia, and thus have set the bar high. Additionally, Henrik Rydenfelt, Johanna Ahola-Launonen, Dina Babushkina, Malin Grahn-Wilder, Säde Hormio, Juhana Lemetti and Ville Paukkonen, to all of whom I am equally indebted, are people who have been especially efficient in organizing, presenting and giving feed-back at the various conferences, seminars and other occasions that we have met at. These thanks really extend to each and every person working on floors 5 and 6 in the A-wing of Metsätalo now and in the past. The number of helpful, brilliant people there has been too large to be possible for me to thank individually. Please accept my apologies for the inevitable omissions. Professors Timo Airaksinen, Uskali Mäki as well as the university lecturers Olli Loukola, Heta Gylling and Arto Siitonen were in charge, while I was at the department. Professors Jaakko Kuorikoski and Aki Lehtinen have done good work recently. Long-time head of department Kristian Klockars has also been very gracious in his trust in my abilities leading to my occasional stints as an assisting teacher at the department. The invaluable commentary provided by the pre-examiners Mikael Karlsson and Jussi Suikkanen helped to clarify key features of this final version. Thanks to Ilpo Halonen and Karolina Kokko-Uusitalo for running the office without a hitch. Of professors from other institutions whom I’ve met, Jane L. McIntyre, Christia Mercer, Jonas Olson and Henry Rosemont Jr. have made a positive impression as being exemplary academicians. Extra special thanks go to aforementioned colleagues, who took great pains in reading and commenting on my (awful, awful) drafts. To these people, I am eternally grateful. Thanks to Inkeri Koskinen for informing me about a work space (suoja). Salutations to Severi Hämäri, Tero Ijäs and Pii 4 Telakivi too for sharing your struggles at a writing club a while back. Grateful thanks to Markku Oksanen for advice on structure, and to Matias Slavov and Aino Lahdenranta as well for recommending me as a session chair at the Hume Society conference, where at I met countless smart and delightful people, including the author of one of the articles referred here, professor emerita McIntyre. Grateful thanks to all my friends who have given me positive encouragement throughout the years. The research completed for this dissertation has been funded for the most part by the University of Helsinki and its various offices, including three-year funding for the above-mentioned project, personal grants from The Research Foundation of the University of Helsinki, The Fund for Humanities and Social Sciences, as well as the Faculty of Social Sciences. All of these grants have helped the work progress. Additionally, the Department of Political and Economic Studies has employed me sporadically as a teacher and as a supervisor of exams, for which I am also grateful. The Emil Aaltonen Foundation provided me with a much needed boost for the finalization period with their encouragement grant in the summer of 2016. Finally, I have enjoyed travel grants provided by the Chancellor’s office in Helsinki, the former national Doctoral School of Philosophy and a very generous one from the University of Oslo. Last, but not least, my unending gratitude goes to my wife Katja and my son Helmer. Throughout my graduate studies, Katja has been working all the while, supporting our family. My son, Helmer, naturally the most important person in my life, is doing well in school. The years shared with Katja, Helmer and Alisa the Basset Hound have been the best, and I hope for many more. My heart-felt thanks go to my family including parents Erkki and Pirjo, sisters, Ella, Marja and Anna, grandparents Helmi✝, Leena and Mauno, as well as the families of aunt Raija, in-laws Paavo and Marja and sisters-in-law Kirsi and Karita. 5 Chapter 5 is based on scholarly work done in preparation for the previously published, peer-reviewed Finnish-language article on the topic of Aristotle's conception of responsibility in Historiallinen aikakauskirja 02/11 (Kaila 2011). Since its publication, the work on the article has been expanded from these efforts and presented at the World Congress of Philosophy XIII in Athens, Greece in August 2013. Parts of the thesis have been additionally presented at the following venues: Two graduate student conferences of the former Finnish Doctoral School of Philosophy were participated in Tampere in 2011 and 2012. The topics of these were focused on moral sense theory. A general presentation of the concept of character in theories of responsibility was held at the same venue in 2013. The analysis section (chapter 7) was later presented and discussed at the University of Helsinki’s Moral and Political Philosophy Research seminar in December of the same year. A paper was read at a graduate seminar in 2014 held by (the new) doctoral programme of University of Helsinki. This occasion was dedicated to the methodology section of this work, which is found in chapter 2. Finally, a presentation on Wallace's exemptions (ch. 4.1.2) was presented at the University of Turku in spring of 2016. 6 For Katja & Helmer 7 CONTENTS Abstract ................................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements ................................................................................................. 3 Contents ................................................................................................................. 8 1 Introduction ................................................................................................. 11 2 Methodology and Scope ............................................................................... 17 2.1 Methodology ....................................................................................... 19 2.2 Literature review .................................................................................24 Part I: Two Theories of Responsibility ...................................................... 31 3 Strawsonian Responsibility ......................................................................... 32 3.1 Responsibility in “Freedom and Resentment” .................................. 40 3.1.1 The Problem of Determinism ..........................................................42 3.1.2 Reactive Sentiments and Blame ..................................................... 49 3.1.3 Special Considerations or Pleas ....................................................... 56 3.1.4 The Web of Human Attitudes and Feelings .................................... 59 3.2 Summary .............................................................................................62 4 Responses to Strawson ............................................................................... 64 4.1 R. Jay Wallace’s Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. ............. 65 4.1.1 Wallace’s Strawsonian Responsibility ............................................ 66 4.1.2 Excuses and Exemptions .................................................................70 4.1.3 Reflective Self-control and the Morality System ............................. 74 4.2 Discussion: The Current Debate on Blame ....................................... 83 4.3 Criticism ............................................................................................. 94 4.3.1 Herbert Fingarette: “Responsibility” .............................................. 98 4.3.2 Marion Smiley: Moral Responsibility and the Boundaries of Community ................................................................................................100 8 4.3.3 Bernard Williams: Shame and Necessity & “Moral Responsibility and Political Freedom” ...................................................... 103 4.3.4 Gary Watson “Responsibility and the Limits of Evil: Variations on a Strawsonian Theme” ........................................................ 110 4.4 Summary ............................................................................................116 5 Aristotelian Responsibility ........................................................................ 118 5.1 Aristotle’s Theory of Responsibility ................................................. 120 5.1.1 Responsibility for Action ............................................................... 123 5.1.2 Character, Virtues, and Moral Responsibility ............................... 133 5.1.3 The Political Responsibility of the Citizen ..................................... 140 5.2 Discussion: Responsibility for Character in NE III.5 – Moral Responsibility or Moral Education? .............................................................. 144 5.3 Summary ........................................................................................... 155 End of Part I “What does responsibility mean here?” .............................. 156 Part II: Character and Excuses in Theories of Responsibility ........... 160 6 Concepts of Character and Excuse ............................................................ 163 6.1 Moral Character ................................................................................ 166 6.2 Moral Excuses: From Strawson’s Special Considerations to Watson’s Exemptions .................................................................................... 175 6.3 Examples ........................................................................................... 190 6.4 Summary ........................................................................................... 196 7 Analysis ..................................................................................................... 200 7.1 Aristotle’s Character-based Blame Mitigation ................................ 203 7.2 Strawson’s and Wallace’s Excuse-based Blame Mitigation .............205 7.3 Findings ............................................................................................ 210 8 Concluding Statements.............................................................................. 213 8.1 The Argument of this Work .............................................................. 213 8.2 Discussion ......................................................................................... 216 9 9 Conclusion ................................................................................................. 227 Bibliography ...................................................................................................... 232 10