CO:.MPULSORROYY ALTY-LFIRCEEEN SAINSG ANA NTITRRUESMTE DY PFAOTRE NT FRAULDA:W P,O LIACNYD T HE PATENT-AN'ITIRUST INTERFARCEEV ISITED LawreSncchela mt INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 468 I.ePATENTS AND THE LIMITS OF ENFORCEMENT .... 475 A.e PATENT FRAUD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 477 ee B.eel'HE INFRINGERS' DEFENSE OF lNvALIDITY........... 481ee C.eel'HE LICENSEES' DEFENSE OF lNvALIDITY............ 485ee II.etPATENTS AND ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT ........ 487 ill. PATENT FRAUD AS AN ANTITRUST VIOLATION .. 493 IV.oo\LLOWING ''FULL PLAY'' FOR ANTITRUSTee REMEDIES: DIVESTITURE, REASONABLEee ROYALTY, AND ROYALTY-FREE COMPULSORYee PATENT LICENSING AS REMEDIES FOR PATENTee FRAUD VIOLATIONS . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . 499 V.ea>EDICATION AS COMPARED TO ROYALTY-FREEee LICENSING IN ANTITRUST DECREES ADDRESSINGee PATENT FRAUD...................................... 507 VI. e<PUBLIC POLICY, THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN ee WALKERP ROCELSTI1SGA TION, AND THE UNIQUEee UTILITY OF COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREEee LICENSING: CRITERIA AND JUSTIFICATION FORee ITS USE IN PATENT FRAUD ANTITRUST CASES . . . 512ee A.eCONSENT DECREES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 512ee B.etPATENT ANrrmusT OFFENSES AND THE AR.GUMENTee FOR RE-VITALIZING WALKER PROCESS LmGATIONee AND OOOSING ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING . .. . . . . . . . . 516ee CONCLUSION.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 528 t Professor of Law, Northern Illinois College of Law. B.B.A., City College of New York (now C.U.N.Y.); J.D., New York University School of Law. The author wishes to thank Russell D. Slifer and Catherine Klima-Silberg for their invaluable assistance in preparing this article for publication. 467 468 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467 INTRODUCTION The rise of the modem corporation has brought a con­ centration of economic power which can compete on equal terms with the modem state----economic power versus political power, each strong in its own field. The state seeks in some aspects to regulate the corporation, while the corporation, steadily becoming more powerful, makes every effort to avoid such regulation. Where its own interests are concerned, it even attempts to domi­ nate the state.1 [One area] in which the future might see more active enforcement from [the Department of Justice] than in the recent past [is fraudulent] procurement of patents.2 Corporate abuse of economic power has long been difficult to con­ trol.3 However, in recent times, this problem is more apparent. Due to the growing competitive importance of modem technology, there is now great incentive for corporations to obtain patents at any cost, causing patentees to frequently risk engaging in fraudulent or inequitable conduct before the Patent Office.4 Unfortunately, patent fraud is even more diffi­ cult to detect and remedy than most other forms of corporate economic misconduct. The Patent Office does not have adequate resources to pre­ vent fraud.5 Rather than the ordinary pursuit of patent office interfer- I A. A. BERLE, JR. & G. C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORA"I10N AND PRIVATE PROP· ERTY 357 (1932). 2 Donald I. Baker & Richard H. Sayler, U.S. Justice Depanment Patent-Antitrust Pol­ icy: J'he Hazards of Changing Policies on Distant Horizons, 365 PLI/PAT 105, 159 (1993). 3 See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soui to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandal­ ized Inquiry Into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 390 (1981) (arguing that corporate criminality is "uniquely concealable"). 4 For a description of activities that constitute fraud on the PTO and the difficult nature of proof of such conduct, see infra notes 51, 63, and 137. s In the original Patent Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat 323, the granting of patents was made a purely clerical function, involving no examination on the merits, even though fraudulent excess was a ground for refusing to enforce the grant. Today, "[b)ecause of the immense volume of patent applications, the PTO [continues to be) necessarily limited in the time it may spend on ascertaining the facts necessary to judge patentability. Moreover, it has no testing facilities of its own." 7 JULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, AmnRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,§ 59.05(2)(b)(iii), at 59-67 (1992). As a result, the PTO decided to with­ draw from any policing activity. "In a Notice dated September 8, 1988, the PTO Commis­ sioner indicated that it would no longer investigate and reject original or reissue applications under 37 C.F.R.§ 1 .56. The expressed reason for this new 'hands-off' policy was that the PTO is not an appropriate forum for determining intent to mislead. Thus we may expect, if any­ thing, that the frequency and intensity of inequitable conduct litigation in the courts will in­ crease." RoBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL Cmcurr§ 9.5(a), at 356 (3d ed. 1994). Consequently, "[the] requirement [of disclosure to the Patent Office) has grown in importance because of the highly technical nature of the subject matter of many patent applica- 19981 COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING 469 ences or litigation over validity in response to licensing or infringement suits, the prohibitive costs of patent litigation often tempt potential cor­ porate competitors.into collusion through settlements involving cross-li­ censing or other provisions.6 If fraudulently obtained patents go unchallenged there is much to be gained. Even more than fifty years ago, it was clear that in many important segments of our national econ­ omy "the privilege accorded by the patent monopoly [was being} shame­ fully abused [as} a device to control whole industries, to suppress competition, to restrict output, to enhance prices, to suppress inventions and to discourage inventiveness.''7 Criminal or civil actions may be brought by the Department of Jus­ tice to remedy patent antitrust violations, but there are fiscal, political, anpdra ctical limits to that agency's capacity to investigate, prosecute, anodbt ain relief for fraudulent procurement of patents.8 The Federal Trade Commission (FIC) also has investigatory anrdem edial authority in antitrust matters.9 It can order a complete array of essentially equita­ ble remedies, including relief designed to correct non-competitive condi­ tions in an industry or market,10 but it is also apparently without adequate resources to police patent applications.11 tions, the difficulties inherent in searching the worldwide technical literature, and the unique knowledge that the applicant may hold." Northern Telecom,I nc.v .D atapoint Corp., 908 F.2 d 931, 940 (Fed.C ir.), cen. denied, 498 U.& <J2J) (1990). See also Kingsland v. Dorsey, 338 U� 318,319 (1949) (''By reason of the nature of an application for patent, the relationship of attorneys to the patent office requires the highest degree of candor and good faith. In its relation to applicants,t he office ... must rely upon their integrity and deal with them in a spirit of trust and confidence ...." ); Precision Instrument Mfg.C o.v .A utomotive Maintenance Mach.C o.,3 24 U.S.8 06, 818 (1945) ("Those who have applications pending with the Patent Office or who are parties to Patent Office proceedings have an uncompromising duty to report to it all facts concerning possible fraud or inequitableness underlying the applications in is­ sue.'!).E ffective March 16, 1992,n ew Patent Office rules clarify and reinforce the duties of disclosure, good faith, and candor. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (1997). 6 Although "[it] is difficult to estimate the total cost of repeatedly re-litigating patent validity on similar patents [one] study commissioned in 1989 estimates that the median cost of patent litigation in the United States is over $300,000.'o Peter C.K u & William L.La Fuze, Mooting Patent Invalidity: Justiciability and the Case of Cardinal Chemical 20 RUTGERS CoMPUTER & TECH.L J5.39 ,541 n6 (1994) (citations omitted). 7 FrnAL REPoRT OF nm TNEC,S.Doc . No. 77-35, at 36 (1st Sess. 1941). sT hese limits have become even more apparent in recent years. "At the end of fiscal year 1989,fo r example,t he Antitrust division employed a total of 458 staff, or 425 fewer staff (about half) of the 883 staff it had at the end of fiscal year 1980.o' Changes in Antitrust Enforcement Policies and Activities of the Justice Depanment, 59 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1495, at S-27 tbl2.2 (Dec. 13, 1990); see also infra note 26 (on the effects of politics on antitrust enforcement). 9 See generally Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U�C §41-58 (1994). 10 See id. at §5(b). 11 Recently, for only the fii:st time since the FTC was created in 1914, did the informa­ tion obtained in an antitrust investigation initiated by the FTC result in the reexamination of a patent by the Patent Office. See Antitrnst Investigation Leads to Biochemistry Patent Reexam­ ination, FTC: WATCH,D ec.21.1992, No.3 80, at 1. In themid-1980s,t he FTC opened inves- 470 CORNELL JoURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467 Nevertheless, the FTC and the federal courts have authority to re­ quire, among other forms of relief, compulsory licensing of patents to ''pry open to competition a market that has been closed by . . . i llegal restraints.e"12 Compulsory licensing decrees have been common, there­ fore, where corporations have misused patent rights in restraint of trade.13 Where the door to competition is closed as a result of the use of fraudulently obtained patents, application of the corollary remedy of roy­ alty-free licensing would seem compelling. This is especially true given both the lack of _any equitable basis for claiming the rewards of invention and the practical difficulty of proving the level of fraud on the part of patentees and others usually necessary to invalidate patents.14 Compul­ sory royalty-free licensing can be used to eliminate the present value of a fraudulently obtained patent and to encourage the resumption of compet­ itive conditions with a promise of an eventual return to defendants of control over licensing.15 Thus, patentees are not penalized as harshly. with royalty-free licensing as they are with other available antitrust reme­ dies, such as patent cancellation or dedication, where all property rights ligation into the monopolization (through patent fraud) alleged in that matter. The patent in issue was for a method of mass-producing a form of the drug Intelferon through DNA splicing techniques. Rather than attempting to declare the patent invalid, the results of the investiga­ tion, including statements from prominent scientists, were passed along to the PTO. See id. 12 International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 401 (1947) (In addressing the tying of salt products to leases of patented machines, the court stated that the goal of a suit in equity is not to punish past transgression nor end specific illegal practices, but to open markets.). 13 "[Many] courts have ordered compulsory licensing at a reasonable royalty." 3 RAy . MOND C. NoRDHAUS, PATENT-ANrrmusT LAW, §I04C-2 (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1989). Anti­ trust consent decrees which require partial divestiture, for example, will also occasionally require mandatory patent licensing in order to improve the competitive condition of the pre­ acquisition marketplace. See, e.g., United States v. United Techs. Corp., 1980-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) '163,792 (ND.N.Y. 1981); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. General Tel. and Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1973) (litigated judgment), ajfd in part, rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975); In re Continental Oil Co., 72 F.T.C. 850 (1967). Consent decrees in antitrust suits based on attempts to monopolize an industry through the use of patents often call for defendants to issue even royalty-free licenses. See, e.g., United States v. Pitney-Bowes, Inc., 1959 Trade Cas. (CCH) 'l[ 69,235 (D. Conn. 1959). Although the [Antitrust Division of the Justice Department) has been relatively un­ successful in obtaining [dedication] in contested cases, provisions concerning dedi­ cation and royalty-free licensing have frequently been accepted by defendants in consent decrees. With the continued appearance of such provisions in consent de­ crees, the fact of their commonness may tend to overshadow [any constitutional objections] to such an extent that the judiciary will feel less reluctant in the future to decree such drastic relief in contested cases. NDRDHAUS, supra (citation omitted). 14 See Elkhart Brass Mfg. Co. v. Task Force Tips, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ind. 1994); Avco Corp. v. PPG Indus., Inc., 867 F. Supp. 84 (D. Mass. 1994); see also David P. Cullen & Robert V. Vickers, Note, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 Gao.WASH. L. Rav. I IO (1960) (tracing the history of fraudulent procurement and pointing to the continuing lack of standards to measure conduct before the Patent Office). 15 See infm note 230. 1998] COMPULSORY ROYALTY-FREE LICENSING 471 are forever lost.16 These latter remedies are closely circumscribed by constitutional law, and are infrequently deemed appropriate in antitrust decrees.17 Despite its value in supporting a public policy that seeks to remedy patent fraud, 18 courts hearing Walker Process19ty pe antitrust suits do not employ the compulsory royalty-free licensing remedy as often as ex­ pected, given the tone of antitrust jurisprudence in the 1960s.20 As sug­ gested earlier, the reason for this may lie, in general, in the cyclical, political nature of the Justice Department's antitrust efforts,21 or in the inevitable limits of agencies such as the FI'C.22 The dearth of royalty- 16 See infra note 48 (describing the implications of cancellation). 17 See, e.g., infra note 128 and accompanying text. l8 Preventing the enforcement of fraudulently obtained patents serves the public interest by protecting the integrity of the patent issuing process. See Smith Int'), Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 759 F.2d 1572, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1985). 19 Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965) (This established the principle that patent fraud could serve as the basis for an antitrust claim and is discus°sed at infra notes 157-65 and accompanying text.). 2a For cases raising but denying Walker Process claims, see, for example, Glaverbel Societe Anonyme v. Northlake Mktg., 45 F3d 1550 (Fed Cir. 1995); Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Elector Mechanical Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573 (Fed. Cir.1993); Technicon Instruments Corp. v. Alpkem Corp., 866 F.2d 417 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Argus Chem. Corp. v. Fibre Glass-Evercoat Co., 812 F.2d 1381 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Kimberly Clark Corp. v. Johnson & Johnson, 745 F.2d 1437 (Fed. Cir. 1984); E.L duPont de Nemours v. Berkley & Co., Inc., 620 F.2d 1247 (8th Cir. 1979); Norton Co. v. Carborundum Co., 530 F.2d 435 (3d Cir. 1976); Zenith Lab., Inc. v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 530 F.2d 508 (3d Cir. 1976); Becton, Dickinson & Co. v. Sherwood Medical Ind., Inc., 516 F.2d 514 (5th Cir. 1975). See also RoBERT L. HARMON, PA"IENIS AND nm FEDERAL Cmcurr §9.5(a), at 355 (3d ed. 1994) (the [courts are] disinclined to uphold an inequitable conduct defense in the absence of truly egregious conduct''); Wn.LIAM C. HoLMES, lNrELLEC· TIJAL PROPERTY AND AmnRusr LAW §15.02 (1997). There are very few decisions which have succeeded in imposing antitrust liability based upon the enforcement of fraudulently or inequitably procured patents. See Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc., 562 F.2d365, 372 (6th Cir. 1977) (same violation manifested intention ...t o the same degree as if the original patent had been procured by fraud"); Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Giddens &oo Lewis, Inc., 452 F.2d 579, 595 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1066 (1972) (violationo of proscriptions against conflicts of interest involved "the same threat to the public interest asoo actual fraud" upon the Patent Office); Charles Pfizer & Co., Inc. v. FTC, 401 F.2d 574 (6thoo Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 920 (1969); Arcade, Inc. v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., Co., No. CIV-1-88-141, 1991 WL 429344 (E.D. Tenn., Jun. 7, 1991); Conceptual Eng'g Assocs., Inc. v. Aelectronic Bonding, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1262 (D.R.L 1989); SCM Corp. v. Radio Corp.co of Am., 318 F. Supp. 433 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).oo 21 The years 1981 to 1988 have been described as "a period of strong enthusiasm for protecting the interests and rewards of patentees:• while the years 1989 to 1992 are thought of as a period of "virtual silence and inaction on the patent front:• Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 120; see also infra notes 25, 31 and accompanying text. 22 Any administrative enforcement scheme that seeks to remove the benefits of the patent system will naturally meet corporate resistance. Such resistance tends to be unusually effective before administrative agencies for reasons that may be implied from the following quotation, which appears in many critical discussions of regulatory commissions: The [LCC ) is, or can be made, of great use to the railroads. It satisfies the popular clamor for a government supervision of railroads, at the same time that the supervi- CORNELL JOURNAL OF LA w AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467 472 free licensing decrees in WalkPerro clietigsatison may also result from the fact that this remedy has most often been ordered in consent de­ crees.23 Consent decrees rarely articulate any specific justification for remedies invoked, and, because they are essentially settlements, are rarely reviewed or approved by the United States Supreme Court. Thus, they leave the bench and bar with little sense of when the remedy should be pursued in similarly litigated matters.24 Regardless of the reasons, itee is fair to say that the growing incentive (and trend) toward inequitable conduct before the Patent Office will not be impeded in any meaningful way by historically mercurial, national antitrust enforcement policies. Actually, antitrust enforcement in the United States during the twen­ tieth century may be divided into two distinct eras--the 1920-1980 "traditional" period and the post-1980 "modern" period.25 Patents were sion is almost entirely nonnal. Further, the older such a commission gets to be, the more inclined it will be found to take the business and railroad view of things .... MARVEN H. BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY INDEPENDENT COMMISSION 265 (1955) ( quoting a letter written by Richard Olney in 1892 to President Perkins of the Chicago, Bur­ lington and Quincy R.R.). With regard to the FrC, in particular, a trend which began around 1970 and which contin­ ues to develop in the federal courts "appears to undennine the substantial authority of [that agency]." Jeffrey H. Leibling, Judicial Usurpation of the F.T.C. 's Authority: A Return to the Rule of Reason, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 283, 308 (citing Casewell 0. Hobbs ill, The Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Trade Commission Act, in ANnnluST ADv1soR 340, 345 (1985)). Courts have been reversing important FrC findings and have resorted to a more restrictive reading of the FrC's authority under Section 5. See, e.g., E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. FrC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984); Official Airline Guides v. FrC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FrC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980). This curtailment of the FrC's Section 5a uthority is inconsistent with pre-1980s case law and Congress's goals in creating the FrC. See Leibling, supra, at 309 (citing Hobbs, supra, at 346-53). "If courts continue to disregard the broad level of discretion that Congress vested in the F.T.C., they will effectively strip the F.T.C. of most of its administrative powers and reduce the agency to little more than an investigative tool ...." Idat. 2 84. 23 See infra notes 257-58 and accompanying text 24 It would seem that prior consent judgments "should be influential in subsequent litiga­ tion involving the same industry." EARLW . KINTNER, FEDERAL ANnnlusr LAW§ 40.8, at 122 (1984) (citing United States v. Aluminum Co.o f Am. (Rome Cable), 1967 Trade Cas.( CCH) 'Il 71,980, at 83,472 (N.D.N.Y. 1966)). However, ''the circumstances surrounding such negoti­ ated agreements are so different that they cannot be persuasively cited in a litigation context." ld. 25 See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 117-20 (breaking the traditional period into 1920 to 1965 and 1965 to 1980aperiods). In the traditional period nine 'No-Nos' were established as per se unlawful regarding patents and antitrust laws: tying, grantbacks, exclusive dealing, ex­ clusive patent grants, package licenses, end-product royalties, restricting sales of products pro­ duced under a process patent license, and minimum prices for licensed products. See Charles F.cRule, Patent-Antitrust Policy: Looking Back and Ahead, 59ANrrrn. usT L.J. 729 (1991). Alloo nine "no-nosa" had more or less disappeared by the end of the Reagan Administration. See id. This was largely due to the fact that, during the 1970s, courts began to challenge aggressiveoo antitrust enforcement as a result of the influence of "Chicago schoola" antitrust thinking. See, e.g., WARD BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANnnluST LAW 254-55 (1973). In fact, "[by] the timeoo Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence of the 1960soo was widely considered to be intellectually bankrupt." Edwin J. Hughes, The Left Side of Anti- 1998] 473 COMPULSORRYO YALTY-FRELEI CENSING viewed with skepticism during the traditional period. They were consid­ ered potentially dangerous monopolies to be narrowly construed.26 The modem approach, however, is to view patents as property rights which must be preserved because they are essential to an efficient free market economy.27 This approach, which is more protective of patent owners, is even more frequently advanced as a result of the formation of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in the early 1980s.28 Throughout the 1980s, the non-enforcement policies of the Reagan and Bush administra­ tions severely muted the effect of the antitrust laws.29 There is "little doubt [, therefore,] that patent abuse [, including patent fraud,] remains a serious antitrust concern, and [that there continues to be a] need for judi­ cious application of antitrust law in the patent area."30oo truWhsattF: a irnMeesasan nsWhd y MIattt e77r MsAR,Q . L.RE v. 265,&71 (citing Interview wiWtihi lalEm.B axAtsesri.As,tt taornntGey e neArnatliD tirvuis5s2t iA mnllonu,s-r LJ. 23, 42 (1983)). 26 ''The patent monopoly granted by Congress was not to be treated as a carte blanche to impose contractual terms which happened to be privately profitable to the patent holder." Baker & Sayler, supnorate 2, at 124-25. Seael Mseorco id Corp. v. Mid-Continent Co., 320 U.S. 661, 665 (1944) (The limits of a patent grant should be "narrowly and strictly confineda" in order to avoid the "evils of expansion" of the patent monopoly through private contracts.) 27 SeBeak er & Sayler, supnortea 2; seael Msaorti n J. Adelman, PropReirtyg Ththse ­ orayn Pdat eAnntt itTher Ruosltoe:fC ompulilcseonrsy52i Nn.gY,.L U.R.E v. 977, 980 (1977) ("[The features of patent rights as property) and the problems they engender indicate that application of a property rights theory to the patent area does not support a policy of unrestrained exploitation. Rather, such an application suggests that ... restrictions on the patentee's monopoly power, like compulsory licensing, would be consistent with the character of patents as property."). 28 The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ("CAFCa") has maintained a decidedly pro-patent stance. The CAFC was created in 1982 because it was thought that one court with exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals would promote a consistent interpretation of the law. SeEelle n E. Sward & Rodney F. Page, ThFee deCroauIlrm tpsr ovAecAmtP e:rn atc titioner's Perspe33 cAtM.i Uv. Le.R,E v . 385, 387-88 (1984). The variations in the interpretation of patent law prior to 1982 had led to forum shopping, discouraged innovation, and made busi­ ness planning difficult. Seea t 3i87d. .Th e CAFC, however, has proven itself to be pro-patent. From 1982 through 1987 the CAFC upheld 89 percent of the district court decisions finding a patent valid and reversed 45 percent of the decisions rejecting a patent. SeAele xander E. Silverman, Comment, InlteeclPtruoaplLe artywa ntdh Vee ntuCraep ital5 HIPGrH ocess, TECH. LJ. 157, 161-62 (1990). Pre-CAFC courts upheld only 30 to 40 percent of the deci­ sions holding patents valid. See at i16d2. .In addition, the CAFC recognizes as binding precedent the decisions of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, two pro-patent courts. Seide; s eael sHuogh,es, supnortea 25 . Unfortunately, "the uniformityo that the creators of the CAFC originally sought actually transformed the strongest protective aspects of the patent system into weapons for offensive use against legitimate corporate com­ petition." Michael Paul Chu, AnA ntiStorluustttoi oNtneh wWe a voefP redaPtaotIrenyn ­t fring3e3 WmMe. nt& ,M ARYd.. REv. 1341, 1351-52 (1992). 29 "'mIna ny respects, the past twelve years have been the worst of times for American antitrust laws.'" Baker & Sayler, supnortea 2, at 109 (quoting E. Fox & R. PrroFSKY, ANTI­ TRUST POLICY, CHANGING AMERICA: BLUEPRINTS FOR TIIE NEW ADl>ilNtSTRATION (1993)). 30 Kevin J. Arquit, PatAebntu asnetd h Aen tiLtarwu5s9s A,tNn musr L.7J39., 7 39 (1991). 474 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467 There hadb een some signs that the present administration might initiate yet another reversal in the direction of national antitrust policy; early commentators notedt heir anticipation of a more active future en­ forcement policy in the current Justice Department, particularly in the area of fraudulent procurement of patents.31 A recent heado f the Anti­ trust Division seemedt o be inclinedt owardt his kindo f activism.3200 With the hope that renewedfo cus on this critical problem might follow, this article rev�ews the historic interface between patent anda nti­ trust law in Parts I andII , the contexts in which fraudulently procured patents have become an antitrust problem in Part ill, andt he evolution of antitrust remedies seeking to impose limits on the enforcement of patents procuredt hrough fraudo r inequities in the Patent Office in Part IV.I n Part V, royalty-free licensing is contrastedw ith compulsory patent li­ censing for royalties, divestiture, and eddication in terms of the utility ands tandards for imposition of such remedies. Finally, in Part VI, the public policies servedb y royalty-free licensing for patent frauda ndt he circumstances under which this uniquely valuable remedy serves those policies through consent decrees or when imposedi n antitrust litigation are identified. (1) The conclusions that seem to follow are: that a means must be foundt o increase judicial receptivity to patent-antitrust claims, because patents are increasingly more likely to be fraudulently procured, often in violation of the antitrust laws;33 and( 2) that compulsory royalty-free pat- 31 See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 110-11. But see Stephen P. Reynolds, Antitrust and Patent Licensing: Cycles of Enforcement and Current Policy, JuRIMl:TIUCS, Winter 1997, at 129, 146: The scarcity of Supreme Court decisions on the antitrust implications of technology licensing during the past 20 years makes for uncertainty. Nevertheless, the Clinton Administration's words and actions suggest that Department of Justice views on the substantive law are much closer to those of the Bush and Reagan years than to the aggressive positions taken by earlier generations. This may be the result of the fact that major changes in DOJ policy may be unlikely. Antitrust budgets are likely to decline; U.S. intellectual property continues to be an important source of foreign exchange earnings; and technical innovations are important sources of competitive advantage for the types of industries the Clinton administration has supported. See Baker & Sayler, supra note 2, at 110. 32 The Perils of a Pushy A11titrust Policy, CHI. TRm., Sept. 13, 1993, at 14N ("President Clinton's chief trustbuster has served notice that she's ending the laissez faire antitrust policy of the Reagan and Bush years:•,. 33 Fraudulently procuring a patent is not a per se antia:ust violation; specific intent is also needed for an attempt to monopolize charge. See Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1987); American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1363 (Fed. Cir.), cen. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984); HARMON, supra note 5, § 11.3,oo at 460-61 :oo Under Walker Process the maintenance and enforcement of a patent procured by knowing and willful fraud may meet the intent and conduct elements of violation of the Sherman Act, provided that the ability to lessen or destroy competition, in­ cluding market power in the relevant market, can also be shown. 1998] CoJMPULSORY RoY.h.LTY-FREE LICENSING 475 ent licensing is an important, relatively effective, yet under-utilized means of protecting the public and the free market, especially given the decreasing government resources available to counter abuses of the pat­ ent system. Many of the public interests protected by antitrust enforce­ ment would be much better served if a greater number of Walker Process claims were to be sustained and if compulsory royalty-free licensing were more widely accepted and imposed. I.eePATENTS AND TIIB LIMITS OF ENFORCEMENTee Holders of valid letters-patents enjoy . . .t he exclu­ sive· right and liberty of making and using the invention therein secured, and of vending the same to others to be used . . . ; and the rule of law is well settled, that an invention so secured is property in the holder of the pat­ ent, and that as such the right of the holder is as much entitled to protection as any other property, during the term for which the franchise or the exclusive right or privilege is granted.34 Patents allow for the exclusive use of inventions for a time, but they are not granted solely to facilitate the accumulation of private profit. The primary objective of patent grants is that the public can benefit from invention.35 This is difficult to achieve, however, where there are finan­ cial incentives to obtain patents by any means, including.fraud (or what is now characterized as "inequitable conduct")36 before the Patent Office, and patent applications may not actually represent genuine invention or ...A bare allegation that a patentee obtained a patent through inequitable conduct does not establish a violation of the Sherman Act. See also Spectrum Sports v.M cQuillan, 506 U.S.4 47, 455-56 (1993) (reiterating in dicta that, as in Walker Process, antitrust plaintiffs claiming patent abuses must still allege and prove a relevant marl<et, and that one cannot presume that a patent itself defines a relevant marl<et); Atari Games Corp. v.N intendo of Am., Inc., 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed.C ir. 1990). 34 Cammeyer v.N ewton, 94 U.tS. 225,226 (1876) (patent infringement suit involving an improvement patent for a portable and adjustable still-water dam). 35 See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.tS. 502, 510-11 (1917)." While one great object (of our patent laws] was, by holding out a reasonable reward to inventors, and giving them an exclusive right to their inventions for a limited period, to stimulate the effects of genius; the main object was to promote the progress of science and useful arts." Id. (quoting Pemock v.D ialogue, 2 Pet. 1 (1829)).Pa tent rights also serve the public interest by encouraging investment-based risks, new jobs, new industries, new con­ sumer goods, and trade benefits. See liAru,,ioN, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 8 (citing Loctite Corp. v.eVetrascal Ltd 781 F.2d 861 (Fed.C ir. 1985)); see aiso Mercoid Corp. v. Mid-Continentee ., Investment Co 320 U.S. 661,665 (1944) (''It is the public interest which is dominant in the ., patent system.").ee 36 See infra note 63 for a description of that which constitutes inequitable conduct. 476 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAw AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 7:467 advancement of "science and the useful arts."37 Such incentives clearly exist where "[b] usiness-growing bigger and bigger each decade-[ can] fasten its hold more tightly on the economy through the cheap spawning of patents and [use] one monopoly to beget another through the leverage of key patents."3Boo Consequently, because of the potentially enormous destructive eco­ nomic impact of such anticompetitive behavior, courts enforce the princi­ ple that any attempt to enlarge the monopolized domain beyond the narrow patent claim will deprive a patentee of all rights to enforce its franchise until the consequences of any illegal extension are fully dissi­ pated.39 Thus, courts of equity will withhold assistance in infringement suits or suits for royalties until it can be shown that improper anticompe­ titive practices have been abandoned.40 Such practices may also include 31 Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. at 511 (the proper goal of patents is to '"pro­ mote the progess of science and useful arts."') (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8); see also infra note 311. 38 Automatic Radio Mfg. Co. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 339 U.S. 827, 837 (1950) (Douglas and Black, JJ., dissenting) (citing Justices Brandeis and Stone). Justice Douglas highlighted the problem of tying the licensing of patented articles to the condition that other unpatented articles be purchased, a practice which effectively enlarges the protections of the patent system beyond its intended purpose. See id. 39 In Motion Picture Patents Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917), the Supreme Court overruled Henry v. A.B. Dick, 224 U.S. l (1912) and created the "patent misuse" doctrine. Patent "mis­ use" encompasses patentees utilizing valid patents beyond the scope of their claims. See J. Thomas McCarthy, AP atent Licensing Policy for Minimizing Antitrust and Misuse Risks, 46 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 547,574 (1964). The "patent misuse" doctrine was created to deny relief for patent infringement to a patentee "if he has attempted illegally to extend the scope of his patent monopoly." Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176, 180 (1980); see also United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 251-52 (1942) (holding that efforts to control prices of a patented article after the patentee's first vending of the patented article were an inappropriate extension of the patent monopoly). Examples of patent misuse also include ty­ ing arrangements, conditional licensing agreements, patent pooling, and some cross licensing acrangements. See John M. Bloxom IV, Comment, On the Convergence of the Patent and Antitrust Statutes: SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 39 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 245, 256 (1982). The defense of patent misuse renders the patent unenfiorceable regardless of the validity of the patent See Joel R. Bennett, Patent Misuse: Must an Alleged Infringer Prove an Antitrust Violation, 11 AIPLA Q.J. I, 7 (1989) (citing Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger, 314 U.S. 488 (1942)). The infringer need not even prove that it in fact was harmed. See Morton Salt, 314 U.S. at 493-94. 40 The "patent misuse" doctrine remains in effect until the misuse is discontinued and the effects are dissipated. Byron A. Bilicki, Standard Antitrust Analysis and the Doctrine of Pat­ ent Misuse: A Unification Under the Rule of Reason, 46 U. Prrr. L. REv. 200, 214 (1984). In some instances, this unenforceability may provide a windfall for a wrongdoer (the infringer). See Robert J. Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 A.Nrrmusr L.J. 641, 647 (1985) (suggesting that in order to avoid the harshness of the patent misuse doctrine the courts shou Id hold the misusing clause unenforceable rather than the entire patent); see also Mark A. Lemley, The Economic Irrationality of the Patent Misuse Doctrine, 78 CAL L. REv. 1599, 1619 (1990) (arguing that the effect of the "patent misuse doctrine is to unfairly create a scheme of compulsory royalty free licensing where a patentee is guilty of misuse and an unhanned infringer is unnecessarily rewarded). Legislation and cases limited the patent misuse doctrine during the 1980s. See generally Hoerner, supra; J. Diane Brinson, Patent Misuse: Time for a Change, 16 RUTGERS