SPRINGER BRIEFS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE Julia Gerlach Color Revolutions in Eurasia SpringerBriefs in Political Science For furthervolumes: http://www.springer.com/series/8871 Julia Gerlach Color Revolutions in Eurasia 123 JuliaGerlach InstituteforEast-European Studies Freie Universität Berlin Berlin Germany ISSN 2191-5466 ISSN 2191-5474 (electronic) ISBN 978-3-319-07871-7 ISBN 978-3-319-07872-4 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-07872-4 Springer ChamHeidelberg New YorkDordrecht London LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2014941694 (cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2014 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartof the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation,broadcasting,reproductiononmicrofilmsorinanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionor informationstorageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. 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Printedonacid-freepaper SpringerispartofSpringerScience+BusinessMedia(www.springer.com) Contents 1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2 Mapping Color Revolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 2.1 Successful Cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.1 Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2.1.2 Georgia’s Rose Revolution (2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 2.1.3 Ukraine’s Orange Revolution (2004/2005). . . . . . . . . . . 9 2.1.4 Kyrgyzstan’s Tulip Revolution (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 2.1.5 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2.2 Attempted Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2.1 Armenia (2003/2004). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.2.2 Azerbaijan (2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 2.2.3 Belarus (2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.2.4 Russia (2011/2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 2.2.5 Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 3 Explaining Color Revolutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.1 Conceptualizing Color Revolutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.1.1 Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 3.1.2 Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.2 Internal Dimension: Regime versus Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2.1 The Opposition’s Strategies for Change. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2.2 The Regime’s Strategies for Stability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 3.3 External Dimension: The International Context. . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.1 Linkage and Leverage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.3.2 Democratic and Authoritarian Diffusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 4 Interpreting Color Revolutions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 v Chapter 1 Introduction Abstract From the year 2000, a series of mass demonstrations occurred in post-socialist Eurasian countries. Thousands of citizens took to the streets and squares, waving banners and flags, protesting against their leadership and demanding the minimum requirement of democracy: free and fair elections. Surprisingly,theseprotestsremainednon-violentandyetresultedinthefallofsome autocratic leaders—while others managed to stay in power. Why did large-scale protestsinsomepost-socialiststatesleadtothefallofautocraticleaders,whereas similar other regimes prevail? This study addresses the question by providing an overview of eight cases of so-called Color Revolutions, and explains factors of ‘success’ and ‘failure’ by challenging the state-of-the-art in the political science discourseonColorRevolutions.Itconcludesbysummarizingandcontextualizing the results ofthe analysisand highlighting openquestions for political science on thethemeofColorRevolutions. Keywords Democracy (cid:2) Autocracy (cid:2) Autocratic (cid:2) Eurasia (cid:2) Post-socialist (cid:2) Post-Soviet (cid:2) Transition (cid:2) Mass protest (cid:2) Political change (cid:2) Electoral fraud In the decade after 1989/1991, the ambitious project for political change away from the socialist experiment in Eurasia seemed to be conducted in presidential chambers, parliaments, and meeting rooms, where political elites gathered to decideuponprivatization,writeandadaptnewconstitutions,andcreatenewstate identities. The strength of popular empowerment that had overthrown the lead- ership of communist parties and their respective political systems was almost forgotten, and most scholars agreed a common diagnosis of disenchantment with politics and weak civil society in former socialist countries (Howard 2003). However, with the turn of the millennium, thousands of citizens returned to the streets and squares, waving banners and flags, protesting against their leadership, and demanding the minimum requirement of democracy: free and fair elections. Surprisingly,theseprotestsremainedpredominantlynon-violentandyetresulted inthefallofanumberofautocraticleaders:SlobodanMiloševic´ inSerbia(2000), Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia (2003), Leonid Kuchma’s designated successor Viktor Yanukovych in Ukraine (2004/2005), Askar Akaev in Kyrgyzstan (2005), J.Gerlach,ColorRevolutionsinEurasia,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience, 1 DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-07872-4_1,(cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2014 2 1 Introduction andVladimirVoronininMoldova(2009).InBelgrade,Tbilisi,Kiev,andChi(cid:2)sina˘u, younger and explicitly more Western-oriented governments took over. To many observers, these changes suggested that countries ‘lost in transition’ would even- tually overcome the ‘the post-socialist divide’ and catch-up with the anticipated democratic development. Whereas the ‘Color Revolutions’ fascinated Western academia, governments, and media (‘democratic breakthrough’), they alarmed autocraticleadersinEurasia(‘orangethreat’).WhatworkedoutinSerbia,Georgia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, and Moldova, did not lead to similar outcomes in other Eurasian countries. Similar protests around federal elections were successfully suppressed via force in Armenia (2003/2004, 2008, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2005, 2008, and 2013), and Belarus (2006 and 2010), and more skillfully subdued in Russia(2011/2012). Why did large-scale protests in some post-socialist states lead to the fall of autocraticleaders,whereassimilarotherregimesprevail?Thisstudyaddressesthis question through an overview of eight cases of Color Revolutions ([Mapping ColorRevolutions),anddiscussesfactorsof‘success’and‘failure’bychallenging the state-of-the-art in the political science discourse on Color Revolutions ([Explaining Color Revolutions). It concludes by summarizing and contextual- izing the results of the analysis and highlighting open questions for political science research on Color Revolutions ([Interpreting Color Revolutions). The structure of the book reflects the inductive approach (analysis of cases before theoretical approaches; respectively: theory emerging from empirical analysis) elaborated by Popper (1969). The analysis of cases follows John Stuart Mill’s tradition of systematic comparison of the ‘most similar cases with most differentoutcome’(MSDO)(Mill1843/1974).Thescopeofresearchisdefinedby space and time, referring to Eurasian post-socialist countries after the year 2000 (the year of the first Color Revolution). The selection of cases includes all first- order, large-scale protests around federal elections. ‘First-order’ refers to the primarychallengetoincumbentleadershipbymassdemonstrations,ratherthanto subsequent events such as protests in Armenia in 2008 or in Kyrgyzstan in 2010, which are considered second-order mass protests. However, eight cases (four that overthrew leaders: Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; four that did not: Armenia,Azerbaijan,Belarus,Russia)willbeexploredinaqualitativemediumN interregional comparative analysis. ThisstudytargetsallthoseinterestedingaininginsightsintoColorRevolutions from a political science perspective. It is based on the discussions during my seminarsattheInstituteforEastEuropeanStudiesattheFreeUniversityofBerlin and at the Aleksanteri Institute at the University of Helsinki between 2011 and 2013.Iwouldliketothankallofmystudentsforourmanyproductiveandcolorful discussions in class. Chapter 2 Mapping Color Revolutions Abstract This section presents a series of case studies of ‘Color Revolutions’. It outlines the most important features of the events and situates them within the politicalcontext.Asaworkingdefinition,werefertoColorRevolutionsascounter- elite-led,non-violentmassprotestsfollowingfraudulentelectionsinEurasianpost- socialistcountriesintransition.Somehave been successful, inthe sense that they removedtheexistingstateleadership([successfulcases); othersfailedtoachieve that goal ([attempted cases). Thus, the label ‘success’ does not imply any char- acteristicsoftheresultingpost-revolutionarygovernmentorachievementstowards a consolidated political system. Eight cases will be discussed: Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan form the ‘successful’ group; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, and Russia representthe ‘attempted’ cases ofColor Revolutions. Keywords Bulldozer revolution (cid:2) Rose revolution (cid:2) Orange revolution (cid:2) Tulip revolutions (cid:2) Maidan (cid:2) Bolotnaya (cid:2) Lukashenka (cid:2) Putin (cid:2) Elections 2000 2003 2004/2005 2005 SERBIA GEORGIA UKRAINE KYRGYZSTAN 2003/2004 2005 2006 2011/2012 ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN BELARUS RUSSIA Fig.2.1 Timelineoffirst-orderandlarge-scale‘colorrevolutions’.Sourceownillustration J.Gerlach,ColorRevolutionsinEurasia,SpringerBriefsinPoliticalScience, 3 DOI:10.1007/978-3-319-07872-4_2,(cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2014 4 2 MappingColorRevolutions 2.1 Successful Cases 2.1.1 Serbia’s Bulldozer Revolution (2000) According to the mainstream body of literature, the uprising that occurred in Serbia following the presidential elections of autumn 2000 is the first case of a Color Revolution in Eurasia. In this respect, these events form the role model for subsequent Color Revolutions. Due to its unexpected success in ousting a long- term autocratic leader through creative, non-violent mass protests within only a fewdays,theactorsinvolvedmanagedtopromotetheSerbianmodelasaformula for success, which has subsequently served as a tool kit for political activists not only in the post-socialist space, but also during the so-called Arab Spring in the Middle East (Aneja 2011: 548) (Fig. 2.1). On the eve of the events, Serbia suffered severe political and socioeconomic problems. Many can be considered consequences of bloody civil wars and ethnic conflictsthathadaccompaniedthedissolutionoftheSocialistFederalRepublicof Yugoslavia (SFRY). By the year 2000, five independent states existed within the territory of the former SFRY: Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) as a rump state of Montenegro and Serbia (including the autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo). FRY’s situation was extremely tense because of the war in Kosovo— another attempt at secession, which had led to NATO’s military engagement in 1999 and political and economic sanctions. Under the leadership of Slobodan Miloševic´, a former communist and extreme-nationalist who came into office in 1987,thecountryhadnotonlylostterritoryandmanylives,butalsointernational reputation.Aboveall,theinfrastructureandthestatebudgetwereclosetocollapse. An unemployment rate of almost 40 %, hyperinflation, and shortages of certain goods andbasicservices led topovertyandresentment (Nikolayenko 2009: 10). In this context, early presidential elections in the FRY were announced for September 24, 2000. By only giving 8 weeks notice of the elections, the author- ities allegedly aimed to prevent effective participation by the parties opposing Slobodan Miloševic´, the autocratic incumbent. The opposition had been divided formorethanadecade,lackingunityoutofprogrammaticandpersonalreasons— its leaders barely trusted each other. They eventually united to challenge Miloševic´, who had remained in power for more than a decade by changing constitutionsandswitchingofficesintheelections(BunceandWolchik2011:87). As a result, 18 parties formed a coalition called Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).TheircandidateforpresidencywasVojislavKoštunica,alawyer whohad beendismissedfromhispositionatBelgradeUniversitybecauseofhiscriticismof thecommunistleaderTito(JosipBroz)in1974.Inthiscriticalvein,Koštunicawas one of the founders of the Democratic Party in 1989, which he left in 1992 to found the Democratic Party of Serbia. He had served as a member of parliament from 1990 until 1997. His nomination was a clever move because he appeared ‘untouchable’, never having been associated with communism, Miloševic´’s 2.1 SuccessfulCases 5 regime, or the West. Politically, he stood for moderate nationalism and the re- integration of the FRY into the international arena. His campaign manager and mostimportantallywasZoranÐind¯ic´,whoalsohadbeenadissidentinthe1970s. Facing trial, Ðind¯ic´ had emigrated to West Germany, where he completed a PhD in philosophy at the University of Konstanz. Upon his return, he was involved in founding the Democratic Party, became a member of parliament for 7 years and the mayor of Belgrade in 1996 (Krnjevic´-Miškovic´ 2001: 97ff.). Another crucial actor particularly ensuring mass mobilization for protests was theyouthmovementOtpor(Resistance).Emergingfromthestudentmovementin Belgrade inthe mid-1990s and trained in non-violent protest in ‘the West’, it had developed a large non-hierarchical network of activists both in the capital and throughout the regions. During the presidential election campaign, Otpor coop- erated with civil society groups and NGOs, and supported the parliamentary opposition by mobilizing people, especially the young, to vote. Otpor employed creative and simple campaigning with the slogans ‘‘He is done!’’ (referring to Miloševic´) ‘‘It is time!’’ (referring to political change), and a new pop-culture of resistance and street protest (Nikolayenko 2009: 14). DespitebeingvirtuallybannedfromTVandradiocampaigningintherun-upto theelection,outofthefivepresidentialcandidates,Koštunicawasleadingthepolls. PeopleinMontenegroandKosovo bythe majority boycotted theelection. This is whytheupcomingeventshavebeenassociatedwithSerbia,andnotwiththeFRY. The following day, both Miloševic´ and DOS claimed victory. In the political tur- moil, the Federal Election Commission called for a second ballot, arguing that neithercandidatehadwonanoutrightmajority.Inprotest,theoppositioncalledfor ageneralstrikeandaboycottofthesecondballot.FromSeptember27,large-scale protests started in Belgrade and other cities, putting pressure on Miloševic´. In particular, the general strike involved miners at the Kalubara mine that supplied Serbia’s most important electric power plant. On October 3, police attacked the miners. Spreading the news, the labor unions mobilized citizens to support the miners and to successfully break the police lines. Under pressure, the Supreme CourtannulledtheelectionsonOctober4,callingare-runforJuly2001.Bythen, thousandsofpeoplefromalloverthecountryhadattendedanti-Miloševic´ralliesin Belgrade,andtheoppositionhadsetadeadlineofOctober5forMiloševic´ togive uppower.Approximatelyhalfamillionpeople(10 %ofthecountry’spopulation) gathered in front of government buildings and state media Radio Television of Serbia(RTS),eventuallystormingandoccupyingthemontheeveningofOctober 5.VelimirIlic´ (thethenmayorofCˇacˇak)arrivedattheprotestsinabulldozer,and Ljubisav Ðokic´, an unemployed bulldozer operator, used his vehicle to storm the RTSbuilding.Theseevents(whetheraccurateornot)representtheturningpointof the protests, and are eponymous: the events in Serbia are called the ‘Bulldozer Revolution’.Neitherpolicenorsecurityforcesopposedthedemonstrators.Oncein control of the political infrastructure, Koštunica addressed the public from the balcony of Belgrade City Hall. On October 6, Miloševic´ recognized Koštunica’s victory in the elections and resigned the following day. Koštunica served as presidentfrom 2000 until 2003 (Bunce and Wolchik 2011: 105–112).