COLLECTION Nate Jones, Able Archer 83 ACCESS Open for Research ACQUISITION Nate Jones DONOR Nate Jones DATE RECIEVED August 2014 SIZE 4 Boxes PROCESSED BY Elena Burger SCOPE NOTE Books, article excerpts, archival documents, letters, memos regarding the Able Archer 83 War Scare. The content of the documents include a mix of military analysis, scholarly reflection, presidential diaries, declassified government memos, and interviews. These documents span in time period from 1965 to 2013, and are primarily American sources, but include Soviet, East German, British, and Bulgarian documents. ALADDIN SUBJECTS Able Archer, Able Archer 83, 1983 War Scare, U.S. -Soviet Relations KEYWORDS Able Archer, Able Archer 83, Autumn Forge, Autumn Forge 83, Nuclear War, War Games, Espionage, Pershing 11, Determenets NAMES Ronald Reagan, Yuri Andropov, Oleg Gordyeysky, Benjamin Fischer, Averell Harriman, Robert Gates, William Casey, George Shultz, Marshal Akhromeyev BOX # AND CONTENTS PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS, BOX ONE Soviet General Secretary Yuri Andropov warned US envoy Averell Harriman that the Reagan administration's provocations were moving the two superpowers toward "the dangerous 'red line'" of nuclear war through "miscalculation" in June of 1983. Andropov delivered this warning six months before the 1983 "War Scare" reached its crux during the NATO nuclear release exercise named Able Archer 83, according to Harriman's notes of the conversation posted. The meeting provides important, first-hand evidence of Soviet leadership concerns about a possible US threat. But other documents included in this posting suggest that not all Soviet political and military leaders were fearful of a US preemptive first strike, but may rather have been "rattling their pots and pans" in an attempt to gain geopolitical advantages, including stopping the deployment of Pershing II and Cruise nuclear missiles in Western Europe. "This would not be the first time that Soviet leaders have used international tensions to mobilize their populations," wrote the acting CIA director John McMahon in a declassified memo from early 1984. President Reagan zeroed in on the essence of this debate in March of 1984 when he asked his ambassador to the Soviet Union, Arthur Hartman, "Do you think Soviet leaders really fear us, or is all the huffing and puffing just part of their propaganda?" The evidence presented here, and in two forthcoming electronic briefing books in this series, suggests that the answer to the president's question was "both." This first of three "War Scare" postings also includes KGB reports corroborating the creation of Operation RYaN, the largest peace-time intelligence gathering operation in history, to "prevent the possible sudden outbreak of war by the enemy;" a newly declassified CIA Studies in Intelligence article concluding that Soviet fears of a preemptive U.S. nuclear strike, "while exaggerated, were scarcely insane;" and declassified backchannel discussions between Reagan advisor Jack Matlock and Soviet sources who warned of "growing paranoia among Soviet officials," whom the source described as "literally obsessed by fear of war." The documents in this series provide new information and add nuance to the ongoing debate over the significance — some even argue, the existence — of a genuine war scare in the Soviet Union. The documents come from Freedom of Information Act releases by the CIA and U.S. Defense Department, research findings from American archives, as well as formerly classified Soviet Politburo and KGB files, interviews with ex-Soviet generals, and records from other former communist states. Talking Points for Meeting with Ambassador to the Soviet Union Arthur Hartman, March 28, 1984 American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945 - 1989, Book IV: Cryptologic Rebirth, 1981-1989, Thomas R. Johnson, National Security Agency Center for Cryptologic History, 1999 CIA Studies in Intelligence article by Benjamin B. Fischer, "The 1983 War Scare in US-Soviet Relations," Undated, circa 1996 Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Monograph by Benjamin B. Fischer, "A Cold War Conundrum: The 1983 Soviet War Scare," September 1997 Department of State memo from Frank H. Perez, Office of Strategic and General Research at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, to Leonard Weiss, Deputy Director for Functional Research at the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, "Subject: Thoughts on Launch–on–warning," January 29, 1971 Secretary of Defense to President Carter, " False Alerts ," July 12, 1980 Interview with Viktor M. Surikov, Deputy Director of the Central Scientific Research Institute, by John G. Hines, September 11, 1993 in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985: Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, of BDM Federal, INC. for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment KGB Chairman Yuri Andropov to General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, "Report of the Work of the KGB in 1981," May 10, 1982, and General Secretary Yuri Andropov from Victor Chebrikov, "Report of the Work of the KGB in 1982," March 15, 1983 KGB Headquarters Moscow, to the London KGB Residency, "Permanent operational assignment to uncover NATO preparations for a nuclear missile attack on the USSR," and enclosed documents, February 17, 1983, Top Secret "MVR Information re: Results from the work on the improvement of the System for detection of RYAN indications, 9 March 1984," and related documents National Intelligence Officer for Warning to Director of Soviet Analysis [CIA] from, "Subject: Warsaw Pact Early Warning Indicator Project," 1 February 1985, Notes of a Conversation with Secretary of State George Shultz, Undersecretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, and Averell Harriman, Undated (prior to Harriman's trip to the Soviet Union). (Circa May 1983). Memorandum of Conversation with Institute for USA and Canada Studies Director Georgy Arbatov and Averell Harriman, May 31, 1983. Memorandum of Conversation between General Secretary Yuri Andropov and Averell Harriman, 3:00 PM, June 2 1983, CPSU Central Committee Headquarters, Moscow. "Meeting of the Politburo," Working notes, August 4, 1983 United States Information Agency Memorandum for CIA Director William J. Casey, from Charles Z. Wick, "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 13," May 5, 1983 "Subject: U.S.-Soviet Relations," The White House Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1983, Secret. Memorandum for National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane from Soviet expert Jack Matlock, "Subject: American Academic on Soviet Policy," December 13, 1983, Herbert E. Meyer, National Intelligence Council, "Subject: The View from Moscow, November 1983 Undated." For National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane from acting Central Intelligence Agency Director John McMahon, "Subject: Andropov's Leadership Style and Strategy," February 3, 1984 Series of five interviews with Colonel General Andrian A. Danilevich by John G. Hines, December 18, 1990 to December 9, 1994, in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985: Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, of BDM Federal, INC. for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Office of Net Assessment Interview with Lieutenant General Gelii Viktorovich Batenin by John G. Hines, August 6, 1993 in Soviet Intentions 1965-1985: Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, of BDM Federal, INC. for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment Series of six interviews with Dr. Vitalii Nikolaevich Tsygichko, General Staff Analyst by John G. Hines, December 10, 1990-1991 in Soviet Intentions 1965- 1985: Volume II Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, by John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich, of BDM Federal, INC. for the Office of the Secretary of Defense Net Assessment October 10, 1983, Diary Entry by Ronald Reagan PART TWO The NATO nuclear release exercise at the heart of the 1983 War Scare included at least four new components that differed from previous "routine" exercises, according to detailed, newly declassified chronologies of Able Archer 83. The Able Archer controversy has featured numerous descriptions of the exercise as so "routine" that it could not have alarmed the Soviet military and political leadership. Today's posting reveals multiple non-routine elements, including: a 170-flight, radio-silent air lift of 19,000 US soldiers to Europe, the shifting of commands from "Permanent War Headquarters to the Alternate War Headquarters," the practice of "new nuclear weapons release procedures," including consultations with cells in Washington and London, and the "sensitive, political issue" of numerous "slips of the tongue" in which B-52 sorties were referred to as nuclear "strikes." These variations, seen through "the fog of nuclear exercises," did in fact match official Soviet intelligence-defined indicators for "possible operations by the USA and its allies on British territory in preparation for RYaN" — the KGB code name for a feared Western nuclear missile attack (Raketno-Yadernoye Napadenie). This collection draws from an unpublished official NATO summary of Able Archer 83, declassified Air Force histories and after-action reports, and a previously unpublished interview with Soviet Chief of Staff Marshal Akhromeyev in which he calls European-wide NATO exercises "the most dangerous." The new material suggests that, during the dangerous year of 1983, when Soviet and US relations were at their nadir, Able Archer 83 included new quirks that made it provocative enough to increase the chance of nuclear war "through miscalculation." "Autumn Forge 83 - Comalf [commander airlift forces] Briefing," September 9, 1983 "Notes of WINTEX 83 Senior Level First Impressions Conference, 22 Mar 1983" and related Documents "Autumn Forge 83 - COMALF [Commander Airlift Forces] Briefing," September 9, 1983 "Autumn Forge 83 - Final After Action Report," February 1, 1984 U.S. Air Force 7th Air Division Telegram, “Exercise Able Archer 83 Participation, 23 December, 1982 "Exercise Able Archer 83: Information from SHAPE Historical Files,"March 28, 2013, and Document 6b: "Exercise Scenario," Undated Air Force Seventh Air Division, Ramstein Air Force Base, "Exercise Able Archer 83, SAC ADVON, After Action Report," December 1, 1983 KGB Headquarters Moscow to the London KGB Residency, "Ref no. 1673/PR of 24.10.83," November 5, 1983, US Air Force Military Airlift Command "Reforger 83\Crested Cap 83\Display Determination 83\Autumn Forge 83 After Act Report," December 8, 1983, Confidential Commander in Chief, United States Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR) "Reforger 83 After Action Report," March 6, 1984 US Air Force History of the Headquarters, Seventh Air Division 1 October 1983 - 31 March 1984, Narrative, by Charles E. Arnold, TSgt, USAF Historian, September 20, 1984 U.S Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing before the Defense Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1986, Ninety-Ninth Congress, First Session, March 27, 1985 Unpublished Interview with former Soviet Head of General Staff Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev, January 10, 1990 Unpublished Interview with former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, October 18, 1989 Unpublished Interview with former National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, undated but in 1989 or 1990 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Memorandum From Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, "Subject: Significant Military Exercise NIGHT TRAIN 84," December 8, 1983, Secret PART 3 President Ronald Reagan weighed the "rather stunning array of indicators" reported by the U.S. intelligence community during the 1983 War Scare and concluded — although the intelligence community remained divided — that "maybe they [the Soviets] are scared of us & think we are a threat. I'd like to go face to face & explore this with them.” This collection examines the U.S. intelligence community's analysis and reaction to data showing that Able Archer 83 spurred "a high level of Soviet military activity, with new deployments of weapons and strike forces." This unprecedented Soviet reaction in turn created a series of introspective U.S. intelligence analyses and counter-analyses, spanning from November 15, 1983 to February 15, 1990, debating whether the U.S. intelligence had actually understood Soviet actions, perceptions, and fears — and acknowledging the danger of nuclear "miscalculation" if it had not. Department of Defense and Central Intelligence Agency, "US and Soviet Strategic Forces," Joint Net Assessment, November 14, 1983 National Intelligence Council memo for Deputy Under Secretary for Policy General Richard G. Stilwell from Major General Edward B. Atkeson, "Subject: Soviet Use of Historical Data for Operational Analyses," November 23, 1983 November 16, 1983 and November 18 1983 Diary Entries by Ronald Reagan Central Intelligence Agency memo for the Director and Deputy Director from Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council Herbert E. Meyer, "Subject: Why is the World So Dangerous?" November 30, 1983. Central Intelligence Agency Directorate of Intelligence, "Soviet Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United States," December 30, 1983, Central Intelligence Agency, Special National Intelligence Estimate, "Implications of Recent Soviet Military-Political Activities" May 18, 1984 Department of State memo from Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research Hugh Montgomery to Secretary of State George Shultz, "Subject: SNIE 11-10-1984," May 28, 1984