CChhiiccaaggoo JJoouurrnnaall ooff IInntteerrnnaattiioonnaall LLaaww Volume 6 Number 2 Article 6 1-1-2006 CClliimmaattee CChhaannggee:: AA CCaattaassttrroopphhee iinn SSllooww MMoottiioonn R. T. Pierrehumbert Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil RReeccoommmmeennddeedd CCiittaattiioonn Pierrehumbert, R. T. (2006) "Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion," Chicago Journal of International Law: Vol. 6: No. 2, Article 6. Available at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cjil/vol6/iss2/6 This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago Journal of International Law by an authorized editor of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact [email protected]. Climate Change: A Catastrophe in Slow Motion R.T. Pierrehumbert* I. INTRODUCTION The word catastrophe usually brings to mind phenomena like tsunamis, earthquakes, mudslides, or asteroid impacts--disasters that are over in an instant and have immediately evident dire consequences. The changes in Earth's climate wrought by industrial carbon dioxide emissions do not at first glance seem to fit this mold since they take a century or more for their consequences to fully manifest. However, viewed from the perspective of geological time, human- induced climate change, known more familiarly as "global warming," is a catastrophe equal to nearly any other in our planet's history. Seen by a geologist a million years from now, the era of global warming will probably not seem as consequential as the asteroid impact that killed the dinosaurs. It will, however, appear in the geological record as an event comparable to such major events as the onset or termination of an ice age or the transition to the hot, relatively ice- free climates that prevailed seventy million years ago when dinosaurs roamed the Earth. It will be all the more cataclysmic for having taken place in the span of one or a few centuries, rather than millennia or millions of years. Humans have become a major geological force with the power to commit future millennia to practically irreversible changes in global conditions. This is what Bill McKibben refers to as "The End of Nature."' As an example of the impact life has on global climate, the imminent global warming caused by humans does not stand out as unique or even unusually impressive. When oxygen-generating photosynthetic algae evolved between one and two-and-one- The author has been Professor in Geophysical Sciences at the University of Chicago since 1989, having earlier served on the faculties of MIT and Princeton, and has been a John Simon Guggenheim fellow. He was a lead author of chapter 7 of the IntergovernmentalP anel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scentific Basis Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (cited in note 4) and a co-author of the National Research Council study on abrupt climate change. See R.B. Alley, et al, Abrupt Climate Change: Inevitable Surprises (Nail Acad 2002). I See William McKibben, The End of Nature (Random House 1989). ChicagoJ ournalo f InternationalL aw half billion years ago, they changed the composition of one-fifth of the atmosphere, poisoned much of the previous ecosystem, and more or less terminated the dominant role of methane as a greenhouse gas (oxygenation also, to be fair, set the stage for evolution of multi-celled organisms-the animals and plants we know and love). And when plants colonized land half a billion years ago, they vastly increased the rate at which atmospheric carbon dioxide is converted to limestone in the soil, leading to severe global cooling. One hardly wants to contemplate the kind of environmental impact statement that would have to be filed for either of these innovations. What makes global warming unique in the four billion year history of the planet is that the causative agents-humans-are sentient. We can foresee the consequences of our actions, albeit imperfectly, and we have the power, if not necessarily the will, to change our behavior so as to effectuate a different future. The conjuncture of foresight and unprecedented willful power over the global future thrusts the matter onto the stage where notions of responsibility, culpability, and ethics come into play. The philosopher Hans Jonas finds in this "imperative of responsibility" a need for a fundamentally new formulation of ethics-one that takes greater cognizance of future generations and of the biosphere at large.2 It is against this backdrop that the foundation of international institutions capable of dealing with the catastrophe of global warming must be seen. II. UNIQUE PHYSICAL ASPECTS OF THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM: IMPOSING OUR WILL ON THE NEXT 5000 GENERATIONS In this section I will review the basic physical features that make global warming fundamentally different from all other pollution problems faced by humans. The problem of ozone destruction by chlorofluorocarbons (the "ozone hole" problem) was a small warm-up act sharing some characteristics with the global warming problem. But because the ozone hole problem was somewhat more limited in scope, and abatement of chlorofluorocarbons did not force society to confront any really difficult economic decisions, it is in a qualitatively different class. Human-induced emissions of several gases other than carbon dioxide also contribute to global warming, but in the long run, carbon dioxide is by far the biggest player and the most embedded in economic activity. I will thus restrict my discussion to this gas alone. Carbon dioxide is present only in very low concentrations in the atmosphere. Immediately before the beginning of the industrial era, you would 2 See Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (Chicago 1985). Vol. 6 No. 2 Climate Change: A Catastrophei n Slow Motion Pierrehumbert have needed to sift through a million molecules of air to find 280 molecules of carbon dioxide. If all of the carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were gathered together into a layer near the ground, the layer would be about two meters deep. Most of us would have to stand on a chair to breathe. It is because there is relatively little carbon dioxide in the atmosphere that human economic activity has the prospect of doubling its concentration within the twenty-first century, with greater increases in sight thereafter. It would be much harder for anything we do to significantly change the atmosphere's oxygen content, which makes up about a fifth of the atmosphere. Despite its low concentration, carbon dioxide plays a key role in determining the Earth's climate because this gas greatly retards the efficiency with which the planet loses energy to space by infrared (heat) radiation. The major constituents of the atmosphere are essentially transparent to infrared radiation. Carbon dioxide warms the Earth in the same way a sleeping bag or down comforter warms a person-by reducing the rate of heat loss. For the Earth, this additional blanketing allows the planet to maintain a higher temperature than would otherwise be possible, given the rate of solar energy input from the Sun. Water vapor is the other major player in the Earth's energy budget, but its concentration in the atmosphere is buffered on a time scale of weeks by the huge oceanic reservoir of water, which can rapidly evaporate into the atmosphere and equally rapidly rain out. Water vapor thus adjusts in response to other changes in climate (principally temperature); rather than being a prime mover, it is a feedback amplifying other causes of climate change, including carbon dioxide increase. This is why water vapor, though an important greenhouse gas, is not regulated under the Kyoto Protocol3 or under proposed California state-level climate control regulations. Carbon dioxide, in contrast, has a very long lifetime in the atmosphere and very weak natural sources; therefore, changes in the rate at which carbon dioxide is put into the atmosphere have great leverage over the atmosphere's carbon dioxide content. Carbon dioxide is implicated in virtually all of the great climate shifts in Earth's history, including the coming and going of the Ice Ages; the eons of warm ice-free states that the dinosaurs lived in some seventy million years ago; the collapse of the Earth into a globally frozen state in the Neoproterozoic era some six hundred million years ago; and the maintenance of conditions favorable to life on the very young Earth, when the Sun was much fainter than it is today. We know from Earth's history that carbon dioxide has an enormous impact on the habitability of our planet, but history also humbles us by revealing major gaps in our understanding of the nature and severity of the 3 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (1997), 37 ILM (1998). Winter 2006 ChicagoJ ournalo f InternationalL aw impact. For a geologist, the idea of doubling the atmosphere's carbon dioxide concentration is outright terrifying, akin to closing one's eyes and spinning a thermostat dial that has not been touched in a long time, and without even the benefit of knowing quite whether it is a gas furnace or a hydrogen bomb at the nether end of the thermostat's wires. The unique character of the challenge posed by carbon dioxide pollution derives from a triad of properties. First, human-induced emissions of carbon dioxide constitute a huge disturbance of the natural carbon cycle, causing changes in the atmosphere's carbon dioxide concentration that are large and of unprecedented speed in the annals of geological history. In the absence of fossil fuel burning, the natural carbon dioxide level is maintained by volcanic activity, specifically an escape of about five hundred million metric tons of carbon per year into the atmosphere from the Earth's interior. Fossil fuel burning currently puts about fifteen times this amount into the atmosphere annually, and the rate is increasing exponentially. As a result, the atmospheric carbon dioxide level has already increased from its pre-industrial value of 280 molecules per million to a present value of 370 molecules per million, and this level is expected to reach twice the pre-industrial value before the end of the current century.4 By way of comparison, carbon dioxide concentration during the two million years prior to the industrial era, encompassing the entire history of the human species, had fluctuated between a low of 180 molecules per million during the Ice Ages and a high of about 300 molecules per million during the inter-glacial periods. One has to go back perhaps ten million years to find another time when the carbon dioxide concentration was as high as we will make it during the next century. Looking a little further into the future, fossil fuel burning could quadruple the pre-industrial concentration within four hundred years under a business-as-usual scenario. This is comparable to the values that climate modelers use to reproduce the steamy, ice-free climate of the Cretaceous that existed some seventy million years ago.5 To turn back the climate clock seventy million years in the course of a few centuries is not a thing to be undertaken lightly. Second, the expected changes in temperature caused by the increase of carbon dioxide are of a direction and magnitude unprecedented in the past two million years. During that time, the climate has fluctuated from a maximum global mean warmth approximating values prevailing around 1950 to 4 Houghton, et al, eds, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2001: The Scientific Basis: Contribution of Working Group I to the Third Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ch 3 (Cambridge 2001) (hereinafter Climate Change 2001). 5 Bette L. Otto-Bliesner, Esther C. Brady, and Christine Shields, Late Cretaceous Ocean: Coupled Simulations with the National Centerf or Atmosheric Research Cmate System Model, 107 J Geophysical Res (Atmospheres) ACL 11-1 (2002). Vol. 6 No. 2 Climate Change:A Catastrophei n Slow Motion Pierrehumbert temperatures about six degrees colder during the major Ice Ages.6 Simulations of global mean warming associated with a doubling of carbon dioxide lie in the range of two to four degrees Centigrade,' with no guarantee that the higher figure truly represents the worst possible case. At the high end of this range, we are talking about a climate change two-thirds as big as the transition to an ice age but with this important difference: the expected warming would be added on top of the maximum temperatures experienced in the past two million years. Therefore, we have no natural analogues to tell us how the complex web of physical and biological interactions would respond to such a drastic climate change. We are driving into unknown territory, and, given the present imperfect state of physical and especially ecological simulations, with a windshield heavily encrusted with mud. Third, and most significant, the excess carbon dioxide we put in the atmosphere today is removed exceedingly slowly, meaning that the carbon dioxide we emit in the next half-century will alter the climate for millennia to come; even if we wholly ceased using fossil fuels after fifty years, the harm could not be undone. The lifetime of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is often mistakenly quoted as being on the order of a hundred years; this figure is actually the result of a fallacious and largely meaningless method of aggregating the many physical processes that operate on widely differing time scales into a single number which is supposed to represent the amount of time some extra added carbon dioxide will stay in the atmosphere. The fact is that for each kilogram of carbon dioxide put into the atmosphere today, only a small portion will be rapidly absorbed into the ocean. After five hundred to one thousand years of slow uptake by the ocean, fully one-quarter of that kilogram will remain in the atmosphere. A portion of that will be taken up by the ocean over the next ten thousand years by slow processes related to ocean sediments, but fully 7 percent of our initial kilogram will stick around for hundreds of thousands of years.8 It has been estimated that fossil fuel exploitation could eliminate the natural ice age cycle for the next half-million years, with presently unforeseeable consequences for the storing and catastrophic release of exotic methane-bearing ices in the ocean.9 The long reach of our actions over the eons gives us unprecedented power over the future, and with that power comes unprecedented responsibility. 6 Thomas J. Crowley and Gerald North, Paleoclimatologv 110-32 (Oxford 1991). 7 C'mate Change 2001 at ch 9 (cited in note 4). 8 David Archer, Fate of FossilF uel C02 in Geologic Time, 110 J Geophysical Res C09S05 at 5 (2005). 9 David Archer and Andrey Ganopolski, A Movable Trigger Fossil Fuel C02 and the Onset of the Next Gladation, 6 Geochemistry, Geophysics, and Geosystems Q05003 (2005), available online at <http://www.agu.org/journals/gc> (visited Nov 11, 2005). Winter 2006 ChicagoJ ournal ofI nternationalL aw An innocuous-sounding two to four degree Centigrade increase in average global temperature carries along with it much larger regional changes in temperature and precipitation, which can in turn have profound consequences. Polar regions warm more than the average, and already, at the present early stage of warming, one-fifth of Arctic summer sea ice has disappeared. Arctic summer ice may be gone in fifty years,'° which will have dire consequences for polar bears and other marine mammals. The opening of arctic ports and shipping routes may well prove to be a boon for the market economy (as well as a source of political conflict and territorial disputes), but the increasingly intensive exploitation of the area is hardly likely to be good for natural ecosystems. We are learning, too, that land ice can respond more rapidly to climate than previously thought. The Greenland summer melt zone has expanded dramatically and many of the Greenland glaciers are surging into the ocean. At the opposite pole, the Larsen B ice shelf in the Antarctic has collapsed for the first time in ten millennia."' The success of the documentary film March of the Penguins, a straightforward account of a year in the life of the Antarctic's emperor penguins, is a testament to the deep affinity people feel for these brave creatures. Emperor penguins adapted over millions of years to life on the ice. Their life cycle is intimately tied up with the long inland march along sea ice and shelf ice, undertaken to protect their newborns from oceanic predators. The penguins would struggle mightily to undo ten million years of evolution in a century. In the tropics, temperature changes little in the normal course of the year. How will the Amazon ecosystem respond to the extensive warming and drying predicted by some models? Warm water holds less oxygen than cold water. Throughout the world, then, global warming will stress sensitive freshwater fish living in shallow streams; coastal saltwater shellfish will likely also be affected by the heat. Agricultural diseases, human diseases, and parasite infestations (including potato blight, bark beetles, West Nile, and malaria) can expand their range with warming. Summer heat waves will become more severe, placing particular stress on places that are already barely tolerable during the summer. Some regions will experience extensive droughts, and if the monsoons should cease, the results will be catastrophic for countries such as India. Also, hurricanes draw their energy from warm water, so the intensity (and perhaps also the number) of hurricanes is likely to increase in the future. There are indications that the expected increase in the destructive power of hurricanes is already 10 J. Overpeck, et al, Arctic System on Trajectoy to New Seasonally Ice-Free State, 86 EOS 309, 309 (Transactions of the American Geophysical Union 2005). 11 Paul R. Epstein and James J. McCarthy, Assessing Ckmate Stabiliy, 85 Bull Am Meteorological Soc 1863, 1863-70 (2004). Vol. 6 No. 2 Climate Change: A Catastrophei n Slow Motion Pierrehumbert underway.'2 The impact in low-lying coastal regions may be exacerbated by a sea level rise even greater than currently forecast, if glaciers should prove more responsive to temperature increases than conventionally thought. Major ocean circulations are also likely to change, with uncertain consequences for the Earth's climate and its oceanic ecosystems. Carbon dioxide becomes an acid when it dissolves in water; the resulting acidification of the ocean will make it harder for coral to form their skeletons. While carbon dioxide in the air acts as a fertilizer for many kinds of plants, meaning that an increase in its concentration could have limited beneficial effects on agricultural plants, this increase could also have adverse and unexpected consequences for land ecosystems Oust as dumping phosphate and nitrate fertilizer into the Gulf of Mexico has not proved beneficial for the environment). In addition, historical evidence shows that the climate system has abrupt switches built into it, and that climate changes in fits and starts rather than along a smooth, gentle curve.'3 Notwithstanding the movie The Day After Tomorrow, this does not mean that global warming risks bringing on an ice age. Rather, what we risk is a switch to a climate that has much more dramatic swings in it from one decade to the next, making adaptation much more difficult. The last ten thousand years, which embrace the entire history of civilization, have had an unusually steady climate, and we are uncertain about what it would take to disrupt this happy state of affairs. Many of the above impacts are in the realm of the possible rather than the probable, and it is presently difficult to say how large such impacts would be, or even how probable they are. However, a cogent case has been made that one should pay more attention to low-risk but potentially catastrophic events, as opposed to the current focus on the "most probable" case. 4 Those who would sneer that such an application of the "precautionary principle" would lead to paralysis are relying on an extreme caricature of the principle that has little resemblance to the way it is used in practice. For example, if one is thinking about driving down a mountain road at night and has faulty headlights, knows that the ravine ahead has a rickety bridge over it, and has heard that there has been a storm that may have washed the bridge away, one would be quite justified in driving slowly or perhaps even postponing the trip, even if it was not known for certain that the bridge had been swept away. No doubt, those who disdain the "precautionary principle" would be quite happy to load their whole family in the car and put the pedal to the floor. 12 K.A. Emanuel, Increasing Destructiveness of Tropical Cyclones over the Past 30 Years, 436 Nature 686, 686-88 (2005). 13 R.B. Alley, et al, Abrupt Climate Change, 299 Science 2005, 2005-10 (2003). 14 See Richard Posner, Catastrophe:R isk and Response (Oxford 2004); Jonas, Imperative (cited in note 2). Winter 2006 ChicagoJ ournalo f InternationalL aw The global nature of the climate change problem has some novel policy implications and also creates some opportunities. The atmosphere is well-mixed with regard to carbon dioxide. From the standpoint of climate change, carbon dioxide released in Sydney, Australia is in every regard interchangeable with carbon dioxide released in Beijing, China or Edmonton, Canada. The atmosphere truly is a global commons with respect to carbon dioxide, making emissions trading schemes far more benign than would be the case for pollutants, such as mercury, which have locally lethal impacts. The harm caused by the emission of carbon dioxide in Edmonton is not felt primarily, if at all, in Edmonton. This scenario means that one is confronted with an especially severe form of the free rider problem. A particularly unstable situation is created when a major emitter like the United States perceives (foolishly) that it will suffer minimal harm from the impacts of climate change and perceives (also foolishly) that actions taken to reduce emissions will derail its economy. Because of the extremely long-term impact of each additional year's carbon dioxide emissions, the calculus of delay is completely changed as compared to other pollution problems. Ordinarily, in the face of uncertainty, a certain amount of delay could be justified; technology improves so as to make abatement cheaper, and one could wait to get a peek at the growing impacts to see just how deleterious they actually are. For many kinds of pollution, bad decisions are, to some extent, reversible. For example, suppose that at some point society has decided that it can no longer afford stringent restrictions on particulate emissions by power plants. It holds to this decision despite the possibility that a rather modest rollback in tax cuts for the wealthy could easily cover the costs. Such a society, in essence, places a higher value on the ability of wealthy individuals to afford new Hummers than it does on the health of children and other vulnerable populations. A future generation with different values may ultimately have to live with the guilt of a large number of preventable deaths of children from asthma and other respiratory ailments. However, a feeling of guilt is all that future generations are burdened with since the adverse impacts will disappear within a few years of action taken by more enlightened leaders. We do not have even this dubious luxury with respect to global warming. If we wait forty or fifty years before taking serious action, the die will have been cast and a thousand generations of our descendants will have to live with the consequences of the climate we bequeathed them. The problem of long-term consequences is compounded by the long lead time for developing new energy infrastructure and technology and by the long capital life-well over a half-century-of newly built electric power plants. Investments being made today, investments that the coming generation will be reluctant to write down, are committing the world economy to another half- century of runaway carbon dioxide emissions. We are, in fact, rapidly running out of time to act. Vol. 6No. 2 Climate Change:A Catastrophei n Slow Motion Pierrehumbert III. FRAMEWORKS FOR DECISION: THE BANKRUPTCY OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS Analyses of market-based economic impacts of doubling carbon dioxide suggest that losses could amount to perhaps a few percent of the world's gross domestic product ("GDP") annually. If that were the whole story, there would be little cause for alarm. The most comprehensive studies are those carried out by Nordhaus, 5 but the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Second Assessment Report (Working Group III) quotes similar figures for aggregate damage to the market economy.6 How can it be that the enormous and consequential changes to the Earth wrought by global warming appear to be a matter of at best mild concern when seen through the lens of the typical well- meaning economist's analytical apparatus? An estimate like this coming from the office of Senator Inhofe, or from Bjorn Lomborg, would obviously be suspect, but here we have no case for liberal or conservative bias; Nordhaus was the same economist who concluded that the economic costs of the Second Iraq War could run to nearly a trillion dollars. Rather, what we have is a case of a typical economist's biases with regard to methodology and valuation, and a certain hubris and unsalutary lack of skepticism regarding the precision of the field's tools, both with regard to estimating the economic harm wrought by global warming and the economic cost of abatement.7 The projected economic harm is low because the world economy is dominated by the developed world and only a small proportion of market traded goods and services in the economies of developed nations are directly affected by climate. Agricultural goods comprise under 1 percent of the United States's GDP, so even if the United States's entire agriculture output were utterly wiped out by global warming, it would amount to hardly a blip in the market-based cost estimates. One should not draw much comfort from Nordhaus' numbers, though, because of the many factors that have been excluded from the analysis. Some of these factors are left out because they are hard to quantify with current scientific is See generally William D. Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World (MIT 2000); Rudiger Dornbusch and James M. Poterba, eds, Global Warming: Economic Poligy Responses (MIT 1991). 16 J.P. Bruce, et al, eds, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 1995: Economic and Cross-Cutting Issues. The Contribuion of Working Group III to the Second Assessment Report of the IntergovernmentalP anelo n Climate Change ch 9 (Cambridge 1996). 17 To be fair, Nordhaus himself has never oversold the implications of his analysis. It is those, such as Lomborg, who have uncritically quoted his numbers as representing the full impact of global warming, who are at fault. It should also be noted that despite the limitations of his damage analysis, Nordhaus nonetheless concludes that substantial carbon taxes would more than pay for themselves in damage averted. His principal criticism is of the inefficiency of the Kyoto Protocol as a mechanism for buying climate protection, not of the general necessity of taking action to combat global warming. Winter 2006