CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY: DEAD OR ALIVE? A Monograph by Major Kenneth Algreen Starskov Danish Army School of Advanced Military Studies United States Army Command and General Staff College Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2013-01 Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. Form Approved REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE OMB No. 0704-0188 Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing this collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202- 4302. 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DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. 13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES 14. ABSTRACT Prussian Carl von Clausewitz’s meta-theoretical concept known as the Trinity has the potential to serve as an analytical vehicle to understand war in both a historical and contemporary context. An inherent historical misconception, however, restrains the Trinity from reaching its full potential. One of the three elements, policy, refers directly to the form of government represented by the nation state. Thus, critics argue, the Trinity’s only relevance exists in state on state warfare. Clausewitz possessed a highly sophisticated mind and it seems unlikely to many that he meant to constrain his theory to the nation-state model of governance. In fact, many scholars have argued for the relevance of his theory in non-state situations. Nevertheless, he lacked the ability to articulate his thoughts in a contemporarily acceptable way, leaving his theory open for criticism, particularly by specialists in irregular or guerilla war. This monograph contemporizes Clausewitz’s Trinity by replacing policy with the more general concept of ideology, thus demonstrating a clear means to establish the Trinity’s relevance for twenty-first century warfare. To illustrate the argument, one case study each from the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries illustrates the role of ideology’s in each conflict, and shows how this term can replace “policy” in the traditional Clausewitzian trinity, broadening the theorist’s own ideological view of nationalism and state policy to the more general concept of ideology and its various applications that serve essentially the same role as policy in practice. 15. SUBJECT TERMS 16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON OF ABSTRACT OF PAGES a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area Unclassified Unclassified Unclassified UU code) 60 pages Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98) Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18 MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE Name of Candidate: Major Kenneth Algreen Starskov Monograph Title: Clausewitz’s Trinity: Dead or Alive? Approved by: , Monograph Director Mark Calhoun, Ph.D. , Seminar Leader Darrel Benfield, LtCol , Director, School of Advanced Military Studies Thomas C. Graves, COL Accepted this 23rd day of May 2013 by: , Director, Graduate Degree Programs Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.) ii ABSTRACT CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY: DEAD OR ALIVE? By Major Kenneth Algreen Starskov, Danish Army, 60 pages. Prussian Carl von Clausewitz’s meta-theoretical concept known as the Trinity has the potential to serve as an analytical vehicle to understand war in both a historical and contemporary context. An inherent historical misconception, however, restrains the Trinity from reaching its full potential. One of the three elements, policy, refers directly to the form of government represented by the nation state. Thus, critics argue, the Trinity’s only relevance exists in state on state warfare. Clausewitz possessed a highly sophisticated mind and it seems unlikely to many that he meant to constrain his theory to the nation-state model of governance. In fact, many scholars have argued for the relevance of his theory in non-state situations. Nevertheless, he lacked the ability to articulate his thoughts in a contemporarily acceptable way, leaving his theory open for criticism, particularly by specialists in irregular or guerilla war. This monograph contemporizes Clausewitz’s Trinity by replacing policy with the more general concept of ideology, thus demonstrating a clear means to establish the Trinity’s relevance for twenty-first century warfare. To illustrate the argument, one case study each from the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries illustrates the role of ideology’s in each conflict, and shows how this term can replace “policy” in the traditional Clausewitzian trinity, broadening the theorist’s own ideological view of nationalism and state policy to the more general concept of ideology and its various applications that serve essentially the same role as policy in practice. iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This monograph is based on a genuine interest and fascination with General Carl von Clausewitz; specifically, his meta-theoretical concept, the Trinity. This is a fascination I share with Dr. Mark Calhoun, to whom I owe much thanks. Not only did Dr. Calhoun serve as my monograph director with great distinction, he also very much encouraged me to pursue this topic to begin with. Furthermore, Dr. Calhoun provided invaluable feedback and suggestions for both editing, further research, and construction of the monograph’s argument. As always, a military officer is nothing without his family. My lovely wife, Rikke, and my son, Storm, are model examples of an encouraging and supportive military family. I could not have finished this monograph, much less live the Army life, without their unflagging love and support. I owe them everything. iv TABLE OF CONTENTS Page MONOGRAPH APPROVAL PAGE .............................................................................................. ii ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................... iii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ............................................................................................................... iv TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................................. v ILLUSTRATIONS .......................................................................................................................... vi CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY – DEAD OR ALIVE? ........................................................................ 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1 On Theory ................................................................................................................................. 18 Methodology ............................................................................................................................. 20 Historical Background and Context .......................................................................................... 21 Case Studies .............................................................................................................................. 28 The Napoleonic Wars: The Spanish Insurrection ................................................................. 28 World War II: The Pacific Theater of Operations ................................................................ 34 The Global War on Terror: Combatting Militant Islamists .................................................. 42 Conclusion ................................................................................................................................ 49 Application and Implications .................................................................................................... 51 BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 57 v ILLUSTRATIONS Page Figure 1. Clausewitz’s Trinity. ......................................................................................................... 5 Figure 2. Clausewitz’s primary, secondary, and tertiary Trinity. ..................................................... 6 Figure 3. Meta-theory’s implication for application of military force. .......................................... 19 Figure 4. General Petraeus’ 2008 Anaconda Strategy against Al Qaeda in Iraq. ........................... 27 Figure 5. Examples of American World War II Posters with anti-Japanese messages. ................. 37 Figure 6. The operations process .................................................................................................... 52 Figure 7. The current state linked to the end state by the operational approach ............................ 53 Figure 8. The Army design methodology ....................................................................................... 54 vi CLAUSEWITZ’S TRINITY – DEAD OR ALIVE? War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity - composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. ―Carl von Clausewitz, On War Introduction Prussian Carl von Clausewitz’s meta-theoretical concept known as the Trinity has the potential to serve as an analytical vehicle to understand war in both a historical and contemporary context. An inherent historical misconception, however, restrains the Trinity from reaching its full potential. One of the three elements, policy, refers directly to the form of government represented by the nation state.1 Thus, critics argue, the Trinity’s only relevance exists in state on state warfare. Clausewitz possessed a highly sophisticated mind and it seems unlikely to many that he meant to constrain his theory to the nation-state model of governance. In fact, many scholars have argued for the relevance of his theory in non-state situations. Nevertheless, he lacked the ability to articulate his thoughts in a contemporarily acceptable way, leaving his theory open for criticism, particularly by specialists in irregular or guerilla war.2 1The Trinity's three elements are: (1) primordial violence and enmity, (2) chance and probability, and (3) an element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, 1984 ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976/1984), 89. See also figure 1, page 3. 2Mary Kaldor, New and Old Wars (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999), 13- 30; John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1993), 23-28; Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 35-42; Bart Schuurman, "Clausewitz and the “New Wars” Scholars," Parameters XXXX, no. 2; Christopher Bassford, "Teaching the Clausewitzian Trinity, 1 A fairly simple solution exists that can solve this conundrum – although it has so far gone unnoticed by any of Clausewitz’s modern-day interpreters or critics. By replacing the term “policy” with the more general concept of “ideology,” one can update Clausewitz’s Trinity so that it can reach its full potential. Ideology, as a more abstract and general concept than policy, can serve the purpose Clausewitz intended for that part of the Trinity while avoiding the problem of confining it to a specific era or form of warfare. Clausewitz has acquired numerous personas since the publication in 1832 of On War, his masterwork of military theory: universal and timeless military genius; outdated and self-absorbed nineteenth century relic; father of modern military thinking and theory; or the main source of contemporary operational art. Historians, social scientists, strategists, and international relations theorists alike compete to distinguish themselves as a champion of translating, interpreting, and understanding Clausewitz. Some seek to prove his eternal relevance, while others attempt to deprive Clausewitz of his legendary status – that of a military theorist possessing timeless relevance to all aspects of the phenomenon of war. For twenty-first century military practitioners reading Clausewitz’s magnum opus (Vom Kriege in the original German, or On War in English) the obvious issue is his theory’s relevance for today’s military operations.3 It seems that the military practitioner must also choose to view Clausewitz either as a dinosaur, interesting merely with respect to his historical relevance, or alternatively to consider Clausewitz’s theories as timeless gospel. The United States Army largely appears to have chosen the latter interpretation, "http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/TrinityTeachingNote.htm (accessed 4 November, 2012); Bassford, "Tip-Toe through the Trinity or the Strange Persistence of Trinitarian Warfare," http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/Bassford/Trinity/Trinity8.htm#Range (accessed 13 October 2012); Christopher Bassford and Edward J.Villacres, "Reclaiming the Clausewitzian Trinity," Parameters; Antulio J. Echevarria, Clausewitz and Contemporary War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz's Puzzle (Oxford: Oxford University Press,, 2007); Beatrice Heuser, Reading Clausewitz (London: Pimlico, 2002). 3Clausewitz, On War, 89; Carl von Clausewitz, "Vom Kriege," http://www.clausewitz.com/readings/VomKriege1832/TOC.htm (accessed 8 December, 2012). 2 inculcating Clausewitz and viewing his writings as a central element of the curriculum for field grade officers, operational level planners, commanders, and future general officers.4 One observer, Assistant Professor Stephen L. Melton from U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, even credits Clausewitz with what Melton identifies as recent failures of the U.S. Army and U.S. Foreign policy in general.5 Before him, others, like the British officers Captain and military thinker Basel Henry Liddell Hart, Major-General John Fredrick Charles Fuller, and historian John Keegan, have attributed the horrors of World War I to Clausewitzian thinking and concepts.6 Indeed, military practitioners experience the full effect of key Clausewitzian concepts and theories such as friction, uncertainty, military genius, center of gravity, chance, and danger. Those who serve in the military, particularly combat veterans, usually have a deep respect and appreciation for the historical and contextual origin of the military profession as they honor the sacrifices made by their predecessors. Inevitably, though, the irreversible effect and nature of combat tends to stimulate military practitioners to focus on theories and principles that possess relevance to the application of military force in their own time. Clausewitz did not attempt to derive a prescriptive theory of warfare; he sought to identify universal truths about the phenomenon of war even as he emphasized its ever-changing and unpredictable nature.7 In his 4Christopher Bassford, "John Keegan and the Grand Tradition of Trashing Clausewitz," War and History 1, no. 3. 5Stephen L. Melton, The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (Minneapolis, MN: Zenith Press, 2009), 3; For a critical review of Melton's book see John T. Kuehn, "Book Review: The Clausewitz Delusion: How the American Army Screwed up the Wars in Iraq and Afghanistan (a Way Forward)," Joint Force Quarterly, no. 64: 146. 6Keegan, A History of Warfare, 3-38; Sir Basel Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy (London: Penguin Group, 1967), 228-32; Major-General John Frederick Charles Fuller, The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1961), 59-61. 7Clausewitz, On War, 75-89, 140-41; Clausewitz critizied his contemporaries, Prussian 3