NOTE TO USERS This reproduction is the best copy available. UMI - CIVIL DEFENCE IN CANADA, 1939 1965: GARNERING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WAR AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE MYTH OF PROTECTION A thesis presented to the Department of History Lakehead University In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree Master of Arts in History by Anne Fisher @ May 1999 National Library BibliotTn ationale du Cana Acquisitions and Acquisitions et Bbliiraphic Sewiccw services bibliographiques The author has granted a non- L'auteur a accorde une licence non exclusive licence dowing the exclusive pennettant a la National Library of Canada to Bibliotheque nationale du Canada de reproduce, loan, distribute or sell copies of this thesis in microform, vendre des copies de cette these SOW paper or electronic formats. la fonne de microfiche/film, de reproduction sur papier ou sur fonnat electronique. The author retains ownership of the L'auteur c o m e l a propriete du copyright in this thesis. Neither the droit d'auteur qui protege cette thise. thesis nor substantial extracts &om it Ni la these ni des extraits substantiels may be printed or otherwise de celleci w doivent &re imprimis reproduced without the author's ou autrement reproduits sans son permission. autorisation. The Canadian federal government used a civil defence program to sustain public support for World War Two and afterwards for a defence policy based on nuclear weapons. The successful implementation of civil defence measures depended upon the public's perception of their credibility. During the Second World War, enduring and widespread participation in Canadian civil defence activities suffered because the likelihood of an enemy attack was perceived as being too remote. As Allied victory became more apparent, civil defence was dropped from the government agenda and did not re-emerge until after 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb. Civil defence, responding to the perceived threat of an enemy attack, was practiced during the Cold War as part of the military' s strategy of nuclear deterrence. Three reasons are identified for public acquiescence and support for a defence policy based on nuclear weapons: censorship of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, political restructuring of the post-war international order, and public association of communism with "the enemy." These three issues provided a rationale for a re-emergence of civil defence measures in Canada. An analysis of civil defence pamphlets, municipal survival plans, and mock attack exercises show how civil defence helped convince people that it was possible to survive a nuclear war by minimizing the danger from radioactive fallout and its associated health hazards. However, the credibility of civil defence measures was undermined by the 1954 hydrogen bomb detonation, code named BRAVO, which declassified the occurrence of widespread radioactive fallout. As the dangers of radioactive fallout became better known the federal government increasingly emphasized the individual's responsibility to provide for his or her own survival. A review of civil defence policies in Canadian news magazines (1950-1965) shows a growing public resistance for evacuation and shelters as radioactivity weakens the belief in the possibility of surviving a nuclear war. Canada's civil defence programme was carefully manufactured for very purposeful utilitarian reasons; to demystify an atomic bombing without discussing the human cost. Civil defence strengthened the idea that nuclear weapons could provide for - national security. Through civil defence organizations and preparations, public participation was co-opted in favour of nuclear war. By appearing to provide civilians with the means to protect themselves during an attack and the resources to meet their needs in the aftermath of a nuclear war, support was increased for nuclear deterrence. I am especially grateful to the History Department for their financial support of this project through the Vast and Magnificent Landw historical research grant. I would like to extend a warm thank you to my thesis advisor Dr. Tory Tronrud, for giving me the confidence to "stay the courseugo f my own determination. Thank you to Dr. Bruce Muirhead and Dr. Ernie Epp, for improving the clarity of this paper. And a kind thank you to Dr. Steven Hugh Lee, for accepting to be my external examiner. Last but not least, to Claude, Ursula and Wanda for just being there...thank you. ................................................. Acknowledgements ii Table of Contents...............................................iii The first wave of public interest in civil defence The second wave of public interest in civil defence Observations on the air raid precaution program Chapter Two .. POST WORLD WAR II ISSUES: LAYING THE GROUND FOR CIVIL DEFENCE. .28 Initial censorship of the atomic bomb in Canada A new system of international order Creating the enemy in the public mind Chapter Three THE RE-EMERGENCE OF CIVIL DEFENCE IN CANADA..,...................46 Planning for survival: post World War I1 civil defence in Canada Municipal implementation of the civil defence program: the example of the city of Fort William The subject of radiation in civil defence planning Chapter Four FEDERAL CIVIL DEFENCE POLICIES FOR CIVILIAN PROTECTION...........83 The policy of evacuation The policy of home shelters The policy of public shelters The policy of government shelters Conclusion to Federal Civil Defence Policies Chapter Five C0NCLUS10N......................................................106 iii As an instrument of war, the new but still frail aircraft had proven its effectiveness during the First World War, when German air raids over London had significantly upset British morale. Initially, the public responded to aerial bombardments with poor worker efficiency, mass hysteria, and rioting. The devastating effects of air raids was re-affirmed during the 1930s with Japan's bombing of China, Italyfs bombing of Ethiopia, Germany's bombing of Spain and Britain's bombing of Somalia and Iraq. Those who became adults during the 193 0s tlexpectednwla r to include the aeroplane dropping bombs onto cities.' The impact of the warplane on society was adeptly described by philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in The Re~rieve,t he second volume of his trilogy Roads to Freedom. Sartre noted that both psychologically and physically, the bomber had taken away the medieval impenetrability of the stone wall. Against tmten-thousand-pounderb ombs, no one could feel secure. For the urban dweller, security had "vanished" under the cityrs I1hundred tons of stone.I1 As Sartre was quick to realize, people were "wandering about among poised avalanche^.^^ The city had become a trap. From a military perspective, countering speculative fears and sustaining public support for a war was deemed possible by keeping morale high. The morale factor was not a new concept in war plans. As military historian Lawrence Freedman noted, the importance of l~ricH obsbawm, The Aae of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Centurv 1914-199t (London: Abacus, 1994), p. 35. '~ean-~aulS artre, The Roads to Freedom, vol. 2 : The Re~rieve, trans. Eric Sutton (Suffolk: The Chaucer Press, 1945), p. 21. 2 es~ritd e corns had long been recognized, but aerial warfare was dimming the distinction between military and civilian society. Victory was no longer simply a test of military strength and morale now that the civilian population could be threatened with indiscriminate death. Militarists such as Italy's Giulo Douhet (1869-1930) reasoned that if people could be brought to suffer from a complete societal breakdown, then, acting from the instinct of self-preservation, they would rebel against their government and demand an end to the war.3 Under such circumstances, I1[c]i vilian - suffering might be a cause of defeat not just a consequence.114 Maintaining public morale in the face of terror bombing was the objective of civil defence measures. Civil defence consisted of municipal preparations which would facilitate the protection of the public in anticipation of an aerial attack. Known to some as the ltfourth armw of the military, civil defence was intended to mitigate terror by teaching people what to expect and how to respond. The success of civil defence ultimately rested with individuals who were expected voluntarily to adopt civil defence measures for the safety of their own life and property. Assistance would come from ordinary municipal -services such as fire, police, health, public utility, welfare and transportation; but it was the duty of individuals to arrange for their own personal survival. Civil defence was premised on 3 ~ o ran overview of the early developments to the theory of strategic bombardment see Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of f (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), pp. 7-9. 3 protecting the public before an attack occurred and as such was known as a passive defence. Defence of the country from an attack was the responsibility of the armed forces and was known as active . defence In this thesis I argue that civil defence was used by the Canadian federal government to sustain public support for World War Two and afterwards for a defence policy based on nuclear weapons. The successful implementation of civil defence measures depended upon the public's perception of their credibility. In Chapter One, I argue that during the Second World War, enduring and widespread participation in Canadian civil defence activities suffered because the likelihood of an enemy attack was perceived as being too remote. In the public's mind, the need to implement protective measures could not be rationalized by the threat of an aerial attack. As Allied victory became more apparent, civil defence was dropped from the government agenda and did not re-emerge until after 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first atomic bomb and the notion of immense physical destruction inflicted unexpectedly upon a defenseless people caught in horror-struck panic became a possibility. Civil defence, responding to the perceived threat of an enemy attack, was practiced during the Cold War as part of the military's strategy of nuclear deterrence. Preparatory measures were expected to boost the morale of the civilian population and dampen the resolve of the enemy to launch an attack on city centers. Nuclear deterrence ultimately rested on the plausible risk of a nuclear