CHRISTIAN HERMENEUTICS Paul Ricoenr and Rejig//ring ofT heology JAMES FODOR C L A R E N D O N P R E S S O X F O R D Christian Hermeneutics Christian Hermeneutics Paul Ricceur and the Refiguring of Theology JAMES FODOR CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD Oxford University Press, Walton Street, Oxford 0x2 6dp Oxford New York Athens Auckland Bangkok Bombay Calcutta Cape Town Dar es Salaam Delhi Florence Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kuala Lumpur Madras Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Nairobi Paris Singapore Taipei Tokyo Toronto and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan tyxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © James Fodor iggs All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press. 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BR118.F683 iggs 23o'.oi— dc20 gs~i2og3 ISBN o-ig-82634g-X 13 5 7 9 10 8642 Typeset by Best-set Typesetter Ltd., Hong Kong Transferred to Digital Print 2010 Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Antony Rowe, Chippenham and Eastbourne To my parents, William and Madeline Fodor, for their constant and quiet support. Preface The trouble with theology, many people think, is not so much that it is boring and irrelevant (although it can certainly be that!), or that it is unnecessarily abstruse and filled with technical jargon (although, again, it frequently suffers from those maladies), or even that it lacks significance and value. Indeed, theology is meaningful and helpful to a good number of folk; some may find theology interesting, edifying, even absorbing. The trouble with theology, rather, is that in the estimation of most people it has nothing to do with truth. Theology may serve any number of other­ wise useful, and perhaps even indispensable, functions for a particular group of people, namely, Christians, but it is thought to have no bearing at all on truth. For when Christians invoke language about God it seems that their discourse is simply idling. It does not really engage, make contact with, or refer to anything. Theological language, in short, appears to have gone on holiday.1 This all too common appraisal of theology’s apparent disconnection with truth conveniently sets forth a number of interrelated issues that constitute the focus of this investigation, namely, the conceptual affili­ ations between reference, truth, and language. By exploring the ways in which the referential dimensions of language bear upon the truthfulness and/or integrity of theological discourse, I will endeavour both to clarify some of the confusions and to dispel some of the erroneous assumptions surrounding the issue of theology’s relation to truth. The prime issue under consideration will centre on ‘the referential import’ of theological truth claims. Do theological affirmations actually refer to anything? Or are they simply projections of our wishes, desires, longings? What are theo­ logical claims about? In other words, to what do they refer and thus in what sense can they be said to be true? How might the notion of reference help us assess the truthfulness of theological claims? Implicit in all these questions is the rather widespread belief (reflected in the view expressed above about the seeming incompatibility between theology and truth) that truth involves some sort of correspondence be­ tween language and reality, that words—if they are to be received as true—must somehow correlate with or correspond to an extra-linguistic viii Preface state of affairs. This way of putting the matter will, no doubt, strike the reader as philosophically naive and conceptually unsophisticated, but it more or less captures the basic intuition, embraced by many, that truth and reference are intimately related notions. My aim is not to defend or endorse, let alone fully articulate, any particular philosophical theory of truth, reference, or language—as if such theories must be formally estab­ lished before any theological work can proceed. My objective, rather, is to show how the notions of truth and reference might help elucidate the task of theology, despite the fact that in recent times their indissociable con­ nections have come under increasing criticism. Indeed, the guiding as­ sumption throughout is that even though truth is not reducible to or finally explicable in terms of reference, these notions are nevertheless mutually illuminating because inextricably intertwined in the history of Western philosophy and theology. In undertaking this investigation, I have principally drawn on the hermeneutical reflections of Paul Ricoeur, whose abiding interest in mat­ ters ontological has served as both an impetus and a guide. Of necessity, a good portion of this inquiry will be devoted to an exposition of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics; nevertheless, my primary intent is not to offer a com­ mentary on his work but to explore the possibilities of a Ricoeurian hermeneutic for theology. Such a theological appropriation will no doubt generate tensions and difficulties of its own, but in a sense this is unavoid­ able. For the only way to remain faithful to Ricceur’s hermeneutical insights is precisely by reappropriating them differently. Ricoeur’s hermeneutical approach, then, serves more as a beacon by which to gain an orientation than as a model to slavishly imitate. Work on this project began several years ago in the form of a doctoral dissertation at the University of Cambridge. Its original orientation was more directly philosophical, so much so that the theological contours appeared, in comparison, subdued, tentative, and not very sharply de­ fined. Indeed, I more or less plunged into the philosophical and linguistic debates over reference, truth, and meaning without really being all that clear about what was at stake theologically, or exactly why the issue of reference should matter to Christian life. The intervening time, however, has afforded an opportunity to circumscribe the theological issues with greater attention and care. My revisions have, I hope, produced a more focused and theologically engaging study. This project was greatly assisted through the generous financial sup­ port, warm friendship, and intellectual guidance of the following persons, communities, and institutions. I gratefully acknowledge my indebtedness