Chile Earthquake and Tsunami of 2010 Performance of Coastal Infrastructure COPRI Chile Earthquake Investigation Team EDITED BY Billy L. Edge, Ph.D., P.E. Published by the American Society of Civil Engineers Cataloging-in-Publication Data on file with the Library of Congress. Published by American Society of Civil Engineers 1801 Alexander Bell Drive Reston, Virginia, 20191-4400 www.asce.org/pubs Any statements expressed in these materials are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of ASCE, which takes no responsibility for any statement made herein. No reference made in this publication to any specific method, product, process, or service constitutes or implies an endorsement, recommendation, or warranty thereof by ASCE. The materials are for general information only and do not represent a standard of ASCE, nor are they intended as a reference in purchase specifications, contracts, regulations, statutes, or any other legal document. 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Contents Acknowledgments ........................................................................................................ v 1 Introduction ......................................................................................................... 1 1.1 Description of Earthquake ......................................................................... 1 1.2 Objectives of This Study ........................................................................... 3 1.3 Site Investigation ....................................................................................... 3 1.4 The COPRI Investigation Team ................................................................ 7 2 Seismic Ground Motion ...................................................................................... 9 2.1 Available Acceleration Records .............................................................. 10 2.2 Tectonic Plate Permanent Displacements ............................................... 12 3 Tsunami Characteristics ................................................................................... 13 3.1 Observations ............................................................................................ 14 3.2 Tsunami Predictions ................................................................................ 19 3.3 Summary .................................................................................................. 20 4 Site Investigations .............................................................................................. 22 4.1 Port of Talcahuano .................................................................................. 22 4.2 Port of San Vicente .................................................................................. 32 4.3 San Vicente Gas Terminal ....................................................................... 38 4.4 Dichato .................................................................................................... 42 4.5 Lirquen .................................................................................................... 46 4.6 Port of Coronel ........................................................................................ 51 4.7 Santa Maria Island ................................................................................... 65 4.8 Caleta Tumbes ......................................................................................... 72 4.9 Valparaiso ................................................................................................ 75 4.10 San Antonio ............................................................................................. 83 5 Interviews ........................................................................................................... 93 5.1 University of Valparaiso .......................................................................... 93 5.2 Ministry of Public Works ........................................................................ 94 5.3 University of Chile .................................................................................. 95 5.4 UNESCO ................................................................................................. 97 6 Lessons Learned and General Recommendations .......................................... 99 6.1 Lessons Learned ...................................................................................... 99 6.2 General Recommendations .................................................................... 100 iii iv CHILE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF 2010 Appendix: Detailed Existing Facility Data ........................................................... 103 A-1 Port of Talcahuano ................................................................................ 103 A-2 Port of San Vicente ................................................................................ 112 A-3 Port of Valparaiso .................................................................................. 118 A-4 Port of San Antonio ............................................................................... 123 References ............................................................................................................... 131 Index ............................................................................................................... 133 Acknowledgments This report would not have been possible without the support of many individuals, companies and agencies that also felt a strong interest in the importance of observing the effects of the February 27, 2010 earthquake and tsunami. Support received by the Team allowed a rapid reconnaissance effort to obtain and evaluate perishable data and to obtain immediate impressions from those working on or near the waterfront. Below are listed those who were instrumental in the success of the overall efforts of the Team. In addition, the special efforts of individuals are recognized in the individual site visit sections. The Team is indebted to our employers for their support and contribution of time and, in several cases, travel finances. COPRI and ASCE staff were very helpful in gaining the approval from the ASCE Board of Direction for funding this trip. COPRI staff was also very helpful in making local arrangements. Alvaro Diaz and John Headland from Moffatt & Nichol were extremely helpful in making local contacts with engineers and port facilities in Chile. In particular, they made arrangements with Jaime Serrano of GSI, Viña del Mar, and Hugo Baesler, Director of PM Ingenieros, Santiago. Both of these engineers were very helpful in organizing meetings with port engineers and visits with universities and the Ministry of Public Works. Professor Jaime Baeza, Director of Research at the Universidad de Concepción, was very helpful in arranging for visits with faculty at the University and providing travel to Talcahuano, Dichato and Caleta Tumbes. Professor Victor Ariel Gallardo, Department of Oceanography and Center for Biotechnology, guided the tours to Dichato and Caleta Tumbes. Alejandro Labbe and Debora Riquelme from Halcrow, Santiago, were able to join the Team for several site visits. Their follow up assistance with additional information is very much appreciated. We would like to acknowledge the support of Tom Chase of COPRI throughout the preparation of the trip, reporting of these observations and arranging for publication at ASCE. Also, we want to thank Veronica Chocholek, Moffatt & Nichol, for turning the Team’s drafted report into a polished and coherent document. Veronica also kept the team focused on the report and the story it tells. Initially, Jaime Serrano was making arrangements and providing supporting information to the Team. However, after his successful efforts in the field and supporting this document with innumerable requests for information, the Team confirmed him as a member of the COPRI Chile Investigation Team. v This page intentionally left blank Chapter 1 Introduction On February 27, 2010 a magnitude (Mw) 8.8 earthquake struck off the coast of South- Central Chile, resulting in significant loss of life and property. The Coasts Oceans Ports and Rivers Institute (COPRI) of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE) deployed a team including coastal, structural and geotechnical engineers to investigate the coastal impacts of the earthquake and tsunami. The first objective of the Team’s reconnaissance was to identify infrastructure that performed poorly as well as that which performed as intended. The second objective was to compare the performance of older systems that were not designed using current methods with systems that were designed with Chile’s modern codes. This report is intended for the practicing engineer to use in better understanding the requirements of designing, constructing and maintaining marine facilities. 1.1 Description of Earthquake The February 27, 2010 earthquake epicenter was located about 35 km out to sea from Maule, Chile (at latitude 35.909S, longitude 72.733W), which is nearly 105 km north of the population center of Concepción and about half way between Concepción and Constitución. Santiago, Chile’s capitol and largest city, is approximately 330 km northeast of the epicenter. The earthquake was immediately to the north of the rupture zone of the Mw 9.5 Chilean earthquake of 1960 (the largest earthquake recorded to date at Valdivia). It had a plate rupture estimated to be about 550 km long by 150 km wide. It was felt over the entire country, affecting nearly 80 percent of Chile’s population. Numerous, significant (Mw 6 or higher) aftershocks occurred over the following weeks. The earthquake created intense shaking for a period as long as three minutes and a tsunami was generated and spread across the Pacific Ocean. This tsunami (and follow- on waves) generated by the earthquake created a run-up of approximately 10m within a 200 km radius of the epicenter. It was reported by other teams that a tsunami run-up of 30m was measured in Tirua, approximately 350 km south of the epicenter. This tsunami produced extensive damage to coastal communities and facilities. The 2010 earthquake is the fifth largest ever recorded to date. Although this event was much stronger than the 2010 Haiti earthquake with an Mw 7.0, it caused substantially less damage due to the more earthquake-resistant infrastructure and lower population density of the affected area. Due to the extreme magnitude of the Chile event, significant damage to ports, buildings, roads, bridges and other modern lifeline facilities were reported throughout central Chile. An example of significant damage to the waterfront observed in Talcahuano is shown in Figure 1.1. 1 2 CHILE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF 2010 According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS, 2010), at least 521 people were killed, with 56 missing, and about 12,000 injured during the earthquake or tsunami. In addition, it was noted that about 800,000 people were displaced and at least 370,000 houses, 4,013 schools, 79 hospitals and 4,200 boats were damaged or destroyed by the earthquake and tsunami in the Valparaiso-Concepción-Temuco area. Figure 1.1 Damage to the Waterfront Observed in Talcahuano The total economic loss in Chile was estimated by Chilean President Sebastian Pinera at 30 billion U.S. dollars immediately after assuming office (BBC, 2010). In many areas the electricity, telecommunications and water supplies were disrupted and the airports at Concepción and Santiago had minor damage. The tsunami damaged or destroyed many buildings and roads at coastal towns such as Dichato, Talcahuano, Constitución, Concepción and Pichilemu. It also created damage as far away as San Diego, California and created a small seiche in Lake Pontchartrain, Louisiana. A maximum Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) of 0.65g was recorded at Concepción (USGS, 2010); and readings closer to the epicenter suggest PGA over 1g (Boroschek, 2010). There was also damage to port and harbor infrastructure in several locations. Some of the ports were able to return to full operations within days while others had not returned to full operations at the time of the COPRI Team visit. Port damage included subsidence, container crane failure, foundation damage, and a multitude of other modes of failure. Several early field investigations with documented water levels from the tsunami were published by GEER (2010) and JRC (2010) of the European Commission. CHILE EARTHQUAKE AND TSUNAMI OF 2010 3 1.2 Objectives of this Study COPRI of ASCE deployed a team including coastal, structural and geotechnical engineers to assess and learn from the effects of the February 27, 2010 earthquake and subsequent tsunami which struck off the coast of South-Central Chile. ASCE and COPRI have been very active over the past ten years investigating damage to coastal and port infrastructure associated with earthquakes, tsunamis, hurricanes (typhoons) and other natural disasters. A parallel investigation by Technical Council on Lifelines and Earthquake Engineering (TCLEE) of ASCE investigated damages to primary infrastructure, including support facilities for major ports (TCLEE, 2010). The primary purpose of this COPRI Investigation was to assess and learn from the performance of port infrastructure including waterfront, storage and protective structures, handling equipment, foundations and utilities. It is important for COPRI to learn from the performance of these systems, provide recommendations, and, based on these findings, reassess the effectiveness of design guidelines and repair recommendations in both Chile and the U.S. In addition, the Team investigated the tsunami-impacted areas to assess the run-up heights, performance of coastal structures, and scour and deposition of sediments. Before, during and after the visit by the COPRI Team to the sites, there were as many as thirty other investigation teams working. Therefore, the confined focus of this study remained on harbor structures affected by the earthquake and related tsunami impacts. It is COPRI and ASCE’s intent that by performing this assessment and working with pertinent organizations in both countries, a significant reduction in future loss of lives and lifeline services may be possible. 1.3 Site Investigation There are 37 commercial ports in Chile, with the largest facilities supporting mining in the north and container import and export at major population centers. A summary of foreign cargo passing through visited ports is included in Table 1-1. Table 1-1. Total Cargo in Foreign Trade Passing through Ports Visited by Team Total Cargo Percent of Port (MT)* National Talcahuano 283,880 0.4 Terminal Gasero ABAS 95,713 0.1 Lirquen 4,010,319 5.1 Coronel 3,343,591 4.2 Valparaiso 6,342,893 8.0 San Antonio 8,970,758 11.3 National Total 79,154,264 41.3% *Note: the cargo at Terminal Gasero ABAS is liquefied gas and the use of metric tons (MT) can be misleading. Source: Data from Camara Maritima y Portuaria de Chile A.G.