Can War Foster Cooperation? Michal Bauer, Christopher Blattman, Julie Chytilová, Joseph Henrich, Edward Miguel, and Tamar Mitts Michal Bauer is Assistant Professor of Economics at CERGE-EI (a joint workplace of Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education and Economics Institute of Czech Academy of Sciences) and Charles University, both in Prague, Czech Republic. Christopher Blattman is Associate Professor of International Affairs & Political Science at Columbia University, New York City, New York, and Faculty Research Fellow, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Julie Chytilová is Assistant Professor of Economics, Charles University, and Researcher at CERGE-EI, both in Prague, Czech Republic. Joseph Henrich is Professor of Human Evolutionary Biology, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts and a fellow in CIFAR, Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Edward Miguel is Oxfam Professor in Environmental and Resource Economics, Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California, and Research Associate, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts. Tamar Mitts is a Ph.D. candidate in Political Science, Columbia University, New York City, New York. Their email addresses are [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], and [email protected]. Abstract: In the past decade, nearly 20 studies have found a strong, persistent pattern in surveys and behavioral experiments from over 40 countries: individual exposure to war violence tends to increase social cooperation at the local level, including community participation and prosocial behavior. Thus while war has many negative legacies for individuals and societies, it appears to leave a positive legacy in terms of local cooperation and civic engagement. We discuss, synthe- size and reanalyze the emerging body of evidence, and weigh alternative explanations. There is some indication that war violence especially enhances in-group or “parochial” norms and prefer- ences, a finding that, if true, suggests that the rising social cohesion we document need not pro- mote broader peace. 1 Warfare leaves terrible legacies, from raw physical destruction to shattered lives and families. Many international development researchers and policymakers describe war as “development in reverse” (Collier et al. 2003), having persistent adverse effects on all factors relevant for devel- opment: physical, human, and social capital. Yet a long history of scholarship from diverse disci- plines offers a different perspective on the legacies of war. Historians and anthropologists have noted how, in some instances, war fostered societal transitions from chiefdoms to states and fur- ther strengthened existing states (Carneiro 1970; Flannery and Marcus 2003; Tilly 1985; Choi and Bowles 2007; Morris 2014; Diamond 1999). Meanwhile, both economists and evolutionary biologists, in examining the long-run processes of institution building, have also argued that war has spurred the emergence of more complex forms of social organization, potentially by altering people’s psychology (Bowles 2008; Turchin 2015). In this article, we discuss and synthesize a rapidly growing body of research from which a new stylized fact has emerged: people exposed to war violence tend to behave more coopera- tively after war. We show the range of cases where this holds true, and persists, even many years after war. We can do so because of a wealth of new data. Until recently, a paucity of individual- level data from conflict and post-conflict societies prevented researchers from systematically ex- ploring the legacies of war on social and political behavior. In the last decade, however, interdis- ciplinary teams of researchers – mainly in economics, anthropology, political science, and psy- chology – have begun to design research projects specifically to understand how exposure to war violence affects collective action, fairness, cooperation and other important aspect of social be- havior among populations around the globe. In case after case, people exposed to war violence go on to behave more cooperatively and altruistically, what we will generally call “prosocial” behavior. Table 1 illustrates the breadth of 2 evidence, with references to 16 studies involving Sierra Leone, Uganda and Burundi in Africa, to the Republic of Georgia, Israel, Nepal, and many other societies. The data come from individual surveys collected in 10 countries, plus one paper with comparable data from 35 European coun- tries.1 This evidence covers both civil and interstate wars; and includes a wide array of wartime violence experiences, ranging from personal exposure, where individuals themselves were tar- geted or directly witnessed violence, to more indirect exposure, where family members were killed or injured. The evidence suggests that war affects behavior in a range of situations, real and experi- mental. People exposed to more war-related violence tend to increase their social participation, by joining more local social and civic groups or taking on more leadership roles in their commu- nities. They also take actions intended to benefit others in experimental laboratory games, such as altruistic giving. Our meta-analysis also suggests the effects of violence are persistent and fairly consistent across cases. Moreover, we see little systematic difference by the type of violence experienced (including in a related body of studies that estimate impacts of crime victimization), or across studies with different empirical strategies. The results appear to hold for men and women, as well as children and adults exposed to violence, and are remarkably similar for both the victims and perpetrators of violence. Finally, the impacts of exposure do not diminish with time; indeed, if anything, the opposite seems to be true. 1 These figures refer to the studies listed in Panels A and B of Table 1 only, meaning that they are studies that em- ploy war violence as an explanatory variable. Considering only studies that meet our inclusion criteria (described below), we focus on data from seven different countries in 15 studies, plus the 35-country European study. 3 Violence may also affect in-group prosocial behavior – namely, participation with, and altru- ism towards, members of one’s own village or identity group – most of all. Too few studies de- fine ‘out-groups’ consistently (or at all), so this in-group bias remains somewhat speculative. Nonetheless, it and some of the other patterns we observe is consistent with a broad literature on human behavior and evolutionary biology emphasizing that parochial altruism is a widespread evolved response to external threats. The increased local cooperation we document might help to explain why some post-conflict countries experience almost “miraculous” economic and social recoveries. Yet if people become more parochial and less cooperative with out-group members, this behavioral response could also harden social divisions, contribute to conflict cycles, and help explain the well-known pattern that many post-conflict countries soon return to violence. Understanding the effects of war in all its complexity, including on post-war patterns of indi- vidual behavior and institution-building, is of broad importance. Nearly half of all nations in the world have experienced some form of external or internal armed conflict in the past half century (Blattman and Miguel 2010). According to the World Bank, about two billion people live in countries deemed fragile or with high homicides rates (Burt, Hughes, and Milante 2014). The findings discussed here emphasize that war is not only one of the most consequential forces for economic development and the emergence of state institutions, but also appears to have complex and multifaceted effects on post-war populations, society and politics. Case Evidence on the Effects of Exposure to Wartime Violence To make the discussion more concrete, we highlight the case of Sierra Leone, a post-conflict so- ciety for which there is an unusual wealth of evidence: three studies by three sets of authors, each with different study populations. The Sierra Leone case also illustrates the synergy of diverse 4 measurement and research methods, including survey reports, behavior in lab experimental tasks, and observational data. The Sierra Leone Civil War A brutal, countrywide civil war afflicted Sierra Leone from 1991 to 2002. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF), a small group of militants who first entered Sierra Leone from Liberia, in- spired a violent rebellion which was nominally directed against the corruption and ineffective- ness of the government. The reach and duration of the war were fueled by access to alluvial dia- monds and opportunities to loot civilian property. Many communities organized local fighting groups to protect themselves from the violence of the rebels. Neither ethnic nor religious divi- sions played a central role in this war: both the RUF and the Sierra Leone army were explicitly multi-ethnic. An internationally-brokered peace agreement was signed in 2003 after a large de- ployment of United Kingdom and United Nations troops. The war killed more than 50,000 civilians and temporarily displaced roughly two million people—nearly half of the country’s population. Armed groups mutilated and raped thousands of civilians. Few people escaped some form of assault or other violence. Nonetheless, there was wide variation in the degree of exposure and victimization. The period since the end of the civil war has seen an almost miraculous recovery. While the country remains one of the poorest in the world, it has experienced over a decade of peace and has held several rounds of national and local elections, with alternation of political power among the major political parties at the national level. Until the Ebola outbreak during 2014, the local economy had improved in each year since the end of the conflict, often with very rapid growth rates and high levels of foreign direct investment (Casey, Glennerster, and Miguel 2015). 5 All three studies from Sierra Leone identified the same essential pattern: plausibly exogenous variation in exposure to war-related violence was associated with greater social participation and prosocial behavior. The earliest study in this literature, by Bellows and Miguel (2006, 2009), an- alyzed patterns of local collective action and individual political engagement using a large-scale nationally representative survey dataset on more than 10,000 Sierra Leone households gathered three to five years after the conflict’s end. To measure exposure to war-related violence, they constructed an index from responses to three questions: “Were any members of your household killed during the conflict?”, “Were any members injured or maimed during the conflict?”, and “Were any members made refugees during the war?”. Victimization rates were high; for in- stance, 44 percent of respondents reported a household member being killed during the conflict. They found that people whose households directly experienced war violence displayed much higher levels of civic and political engagement compared to non-victims: they were more likely to report attending community meetings (by 6.5 percentage points), to vote in elections (by 2.6 percentage points), to join social and political groups, and to participate in school committees and “road brushing”, a local infrastructure maintenance activity. To move past relying only on self-reports of behavior, researchers have also carried out in- centivized lab-in-field experimental games in Sierra Leone, in order to more directly assess whether war-related violence causes changes in social preferences or in beliefs about others’ be- havior, albeit in controlled and artificial situations. This lab experimental evidence complements observational survey evidence by helping to map out changes to economic primitives, and thus may contribute to a better understanding of competing theories. Table 1 summarizes the games that were implemented in each study. Different types of ex- perimental games help to distinguish between different factors. In simple allocation tasks, such 6 as a Dictator game or a Social Value Orientation experiment, decision-makers anonymously allo- cate rewards between themselves and another person. Because the recipient is passive and the interaction is one-shot and anonymous, beliefs about the reaction of the other player should not in principle affect sharing decisions. Choice situations in which participants not only maximize their own rewards but also take into account recipients’ welfare are taken as measures of social preferences, such as altruism, inequality aversion, or adherence to social norms. In a second class of games, including the Ultimatum game or Trust game, the recipient is not passive and choices are made sequentially. These tasks are designed to uncover willingness to reciprocate, by rewarding kind acts and punishing unfair behavior, as well as beliefs about coop- erative behavior of others. Specifically, in an Ultimatum game, the first player is given a sum of money to divide with another player. If the second player accepts the division, then both receive the money. But if the second player rejects the division, neither player receives anything. The second player’s choices, in particular rejections of low offers, reveal whether she is willing to sacrifice earnings in order to punish unfair behavior, while beliefs about whether others have such fairness motivations should be reflected in the choices of the first player. In a Trust game, the amount given by the first player to the second player is tripled, and then the second player can decide whether to give some of the money back to the first player. Transfers of the first player reveal trust, i.e., beliefs about whether other players will cooperate, while back transfers made by the second player provide a measure of reciprocity. Finally, a Public Goods game, multiple players decide simultaneously (without knowing about the choices of others) whether to contribute to a public good. The private return from con- tributing is negative but the total group payoff increases since the return to other players is sub- stantial. This game thus reveals individual willingness to cooperate or to free ride (i.e., hoping 7 that other players will contribute to the public good). The identities of the other players can also vary in these games, in particular by whether players are interacting with those from a group with whom they have some reason to identify, such as an ethnic or social group, or not.2 Bauer et al. (2014) ran various allocation games, sometimes referred to as mini-Dictator games, designed to distinguish selfishness from altruism and inequality aversion, in northwestern Sierra Leone. They experimentally manipulated the identity of an otherwise anonymous recipient to shed light on whether violence increases prosocial behavior only towards people at the local level, or whether the effects on prosocial behavior are more generalized. In the in-group condi- tion the partner was from the same village as the decision-maker, and in the out-group condition the partner was from a “distant village.” Compared to non-victims, people who were directly ex- posed to conflict-related violence were less selfish (by 23 percentage points) and more inequality averse (by 25 percentage points) towards in-group members as compared to non-victims, eight years after experiencing war-related violence. Effects were especially large among those exposed to violence during their childhood and adolescence. There were no comparable effects on behav- ior towards out-group members. Elsewhere in Sierra Leone, once again eight years post-conflict, Cecchi et al. (2015) found similar results among young street soccer players (aged 14-31 years) using both experimental and observational approaches. Players made anonymous choices in the Dictator game, and those 2 In considering the contribution of these behavioral experiments, an important question is the degree to which links between such measures and the formation of real world institutions and cooperation has been made. Work establish- ing these links is limited. However, in Ethiopia, Rustagi, Engel, and Kosfeld (2010) show that communities with more prosocial individuals, as measured using behavioral games, more effectively form real world cooperatives to monitor forest exploitation, more energetically monitor for free-riders (forest exploiters), and end up cooperating more effectively to manage harvests; these findings hold when the frequency of prosocial individuals is instru- mented using the distance from market towns. The results suggest that if these villages were 'shocked’ (e.g., by war) in a way that suddenly increased the frequency of prosocial individuals (as measured by experiments), they might become better at constructing local institutions to address real public goods problems. 8 who had been exposed to more intense conflict-related violence behaved more altruistically to- wards their teammates (the in-group) but not towards the out-group (their match opponents). Di- rect observation of behavior during soccer matches also revealed that the more violence-exposed players were more likely to receive a yellow or red foul card during the game, suggesting that a violent conflict not only elevated in-group prosocial behavior but may also have exacerbated out- group antagonism.3 Notice that a common feature of this body of research—for Sierra Leone and the other stud- ies discussed below—is that analysis is based on a comparison of individuals who suffered dif- ferent degrees of war violence. These data do not allow the estimation of impacts on society as a whole since no suitable counterfactual exists. Other Country Cases: Uganda, Burundi, Georgia, Nepal, and others Another much studied country case is Uganda, with six papers listed in Table 1. Blattman (2009) examines the case of northern Uganda, where for 20 years the rebel group the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) forcibly recruited tens of thousands of young people. The study attempted to ac- count for confounders and other econometric identification concerns, using rebel raiding patterns as a source of plausibly exogenous variation in armed recruitment. The paper used a pre-war sample, tracks survivors, and attempts to account for non-survivors, reducing concerns about bias due to selective attrition. An average of five years after temporary conscription into the 3 While not directly comparable due to a lack of data on in-group cooperation, Miguel, Saiegh, and Satyanath (2011) show that professional soccer players (in the major European leagues) who lived in conflict settings as children are also more prone to committing violent card fouls against the opposing team during matches. 9 LRA, the experience led to substantial increases in post-war participation in this case self-re- ported voting and community leadership (though not social group membership). Studies from other post-conflict societies in Africa and elsewhere have documented similar patterns. Notably, Voors et al. (2012) implemented a Social Value Orientation experiment among adults in rural Burundi to study consequences of the 1993-2003 civil conflict there be- tween the Tutsi-dominated army and Hutu rebels. Nine years after the war, individuals who per- sonally experienced war-related violence, or who lived in attacked communities, behaved more altruistically towards neighbors in the experimental tasks, and were also more likely to report be- ing involved in local community organizations. Beyond Africa, Bauer et al. (2014) conducted an experimental study in the Republic of Geor- gia that paralleled their Sierra Leone study. The data were gathered among a sample of children six months after the brief August 2008 war with Russia over South Ossetia. As in Sierra Leone, the authors found evidence of an in-group versus out-group gap: participants who were more af- fected by the conflict were less selfish and more inequality averse towards in-group members (their classmates) as compared to their less affected peers. In a study of Nepalese society, Gilligan, Pasquale, and Samii (2014) found that members of communities with greater exposure to violence during the 1996-2006 civil war, between govern- mental forces and Maoist revolutionaries, exhibited greater levels of cooperation when interact- ing with each other: three years post-conflict, they were more trustworthy in a Trust game, more willing to contribute to the common pot in the Public Goods game, and they reported being more active in community organizations. 10