File No. 1-Off83 dl, S C l V f L AERONAUTICS BOARD *pr23/67-//6 AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT- ADOPTED: June 12, 1962 RELEASED: June 18, 1962 AIR LINES, INC , DC-8, N 8013U1 AND TRANS WORLD AIRLINES, INC., CONSTXLLATIDN l049A, N 6907Cj N W STATEN ISLAND, NEW TO?&, DECE@?m 16, 1960 SYNOPSIS On 3ecember 16, 1960, at 1053 e.s.t., a colllslon between Trans World Alriues Model 1049A Constellation, N 6907C, and a Unlted A l r Lmes DC-8, N 8017U, occurred near Miller krmy Air Field, Ststen Island, New York. Trans World A~rlmesF light 266 originated at aaytoc, Ohlo. The destination was LaGuardia Alrport, New Y@rk, with one en route stop at Columbus, Ohlo Unlted Alr Lmes Flight 826 was a non- stop se3lce originating at O'Hare Alrport, Chlcago, Illmols, wlth its destma- tlon New York International Airport, New Pork. Both aircraft were operating under Ins.f;rument Fllght Rules. Following the colllslon the Constellation f e l l on Mliler krmy Fzeid, and the DC-$ continued In a northeasterlg direction, crashing mto Sterirng ?lace near Seventh Avenue In Brooklyn, New York. Both alrcraft were totally destroyed. All 123 occqants of both azrcraft and 6 persons on the ground Brooklyn were fstaLl3 yi wured. There was considerable damage to property in the srea of the ground Impact of the DC4. TWA Fllght 266 departed Port Columbus Alrport st 0300, operating rou%mePj under A i r Trafflc Control 1nt.o the liew York area The New YorIc A= Route Traffic Z~n-i.r~l Center (ARTcc) subsequently advlsed tnat radar contact had been establlshed and cleared the fllght to the Llnden Intersection, Control of the flight d2S subse- quently transferred to LaCuardla Approach Coni,rol. 'hen the fllght was abcut.over the Llnden IntersectLon, LaGuardla Approach Control began vectormg TNA 256 by radar to the fsnal approach course for a landmg on runway 4 at LaZusrdia. Shortly thereafter T'd). 266 was cleai-ed co descend to 5,000 feet, and. ~ z tswice ajvrsed of treffrc In the vlclnlty on a northeasterly hehding. Following the trmsmlsslon of this informat~ont he radar targets appeared t o merge on the LaGaardla Approach Control radar scope, and coa.nu~~ca'-llownss th TWA 266 were lost. Unlted Arr Lmes Flignt 826 operates routinely between Chicago and the Yew Pork area, contactrng the New York ARTCC st 1012 Shortly thereafter the New 'iork Center cleared UAL 826 to proceed from the Allentown, Pa., very hsgk frequency omii dlrectlonai radio range station (VOR) dlrect to the RobSmsvlne, NE~'Zersey, VCR, and thence to the Preston In:erseci;lon vla Victor Almay 123. A t approximtely 1021, UW. 826 contacted Keronautlcal Radio, Inc. (ARINC) to advise their conpay that the No. 2 recelver accessory unit wss =op,eratlve, rihlch wonld zrdlcete tSat one of the alrcraft 's two V,HF radio rlavzgatlonel receivers was not functiorimg. & "fix,!1s established by the iritersectlon of two radials from two sepzraie rad;o range stations. With one moperfiti~et he cross-beamgs necessary CESI be taken by tunlng the remamlng recelver frm one stzzlon t o the other. Thzs procesq con- sumes considerable tme, however, and i s not as zcc,xate as the smultW~eousd l s p l ~ DsSCOOm-DC -i8235 - 2 - of lnf orrnatlon on two separate posltlon devratlon indicators Whle UAL 826 advised the company that one unlt was inoperative, Alr Trafflc Control was not advised. At 1025 the New York @;TCC issued a clearance for a new routlng whlch shortened the distance to Preston by approx~mately1 1mlles. ks a result, thls reduced the amount of tme available to ths crew to retune the sagle radlo recesver to either the Colt's Neck, New Jersey, or. Solberg, New Jersey, VOR m order to establish the cross-bearing with rllctor 123, which would ldentlfy the Preston Intersectlon. In the event the crew would not attempt t o retune the slngle VOR receiver, cross- bearlngs on the Scotland Low Frequency Radlobeacon could be taken wlth the aircraft dlrectlon flndlng (ADF) equlpment. Thls would be a means of ldentrfyrng the Preston Intersection but, under the clrcmstances, would requlre rapld mental calculation in the mterpretatlon of a display whlch could be easlly mzsread. Several factors support the conclusion that thls occurred. Instructions had been Issued to VAL 826 for holdlng at the Preston Intersection, the clearance lunlt, should holdlng be necessary. Clearance beyond Preston for an approach to Idlewlld Air?ort would be recelved from Idlewild Approach Control and the trmsfer of coctrol of the fllght from the New Pork Center to Idlewlld Approach Control would normally take place as the alrcraft was approachmg Preston. UhL 826 was not recelvlng radar vectors, but was provldlng its own navlgatlon. After the flight reported passing through 6,000 feet the New York Center advlsed that radu servlce was termmated and instructed the fllght to contact Idlewild Approach Control. UAL 826 then called Idlewrld Approach Control, stating "Un~tedt i26 approachlng Preston at 5,000." This was the last known transmission from UAL 826. A t the t m e UAL 826 advlsed it was approachlng Preston lt had In fact gone on by thls clearance lmit several seconds before and was severalmlles past the pout at whlch it should have turned lnto the holdlng pattern. Thls is conflrmed by the data obtalned from the fllght recorder whlch had been Installed u the UAL DC-8, as well as by analysis of the commun~catlont apes A t a pclnt approxlrnately 11m i l e s pas:, the Preston Intersectlon a collision occurred between TWA 266 and 'JkL 826. 'uiaather at the altltude of the coll~slonm d at the zme of the accldent was such as t o preclude flighz by vlsuzl meam. The Soard determines that the probable cause of thls accldent was that United Flight 826 proceeded beyond its clearance lmlt and the conflnes of the axrspace allocated t o the flight by Alr Iraffrc Control A contributing factor was the hlgh rate of speed of the Unl:ed DC-8 as ~t approached the Preston lntersectlon, coupled wlth the charge of clearvlce whlch reduced the enroute dlstance along VICTOR 123 by approxmately 11mlles Investlgaslon Hlstory of TliU Fl;ght (See Attachaen~1 as reference) Trans World ALrlmes Flight 266 was a scheduled passenger sel-vice orlgmatmg at Daycon, 0h:c. The desticatlon was LaGuardla Anport, New York, New York, with one en mute stop at Columbus, Ohlo. The crew cons;sted of Captam 3avld P.. Wollau, F b s t Off~cerD esc T. Bower., Fllgnt kgmeer LeKoy L Rosenthal, and Xostesses Margaret Gernat an6 Patrlcla Yost. Durrng the stopover a t Columbus a scheduled equlpment change was made. Flrght 2% departed Columbus with the prevlous llsted crew and 39 passengers, includini: two infants. Xx[;i..t 266 departed Port Colwnbus Ax-port at 0 9 0 d . The gross weight at takeoff was 10l,lJii~p ounds including 2,600 gallons or' fuel. Yne alrcrzft ~ 2 hsrl thLn and balance lmtatlonr sn accord -mth current procedures. The tme en route to LaGuardia was estmated to be one kiour and 32 mnlites. The fllght plan speclfled Instrument Flrght Rules 1 at 7,000 feet aliL-1- hde. The clearance was t o -,he LaGuardla Airport via dlrect Appleton, Chlo, Vlctor 12 Johnstown, Pennsylvania, TJlctor 106 Selmserove, Pennsirlvanla, Vlctor 6 Dlctor 123 to LaCiuardla hrport. Subsequent clearances changed the altitude to 17,000 feet, then to 19,000 feet. The filght was rw~tlnea s it progressed toward the ;Jew York area. A t appromnately 1005, PlljJht 266 reported to the blew York A l r Route Traffic Control Center over Sel~nsgrovea t .t9,OOO feet. Shortly thereafter the York Center cleared Flight 266 t o descend in stages, and to cross Allentown, ?enr.sylvanla, a t 11,000 feet. kt 10x9 TiJA 266 reported to the Mew York Center on 125.3 mcs. that 1%Was Pass2.n:: Allentown, at 11,000 feet. In response, the New York Center adnsed 'chat radar contact had been established, cleared We fligttt to Llnden Intersection, and requested it to stand by for descent. At 1021, the New York Center Zsrther cleared TkJA 266 to descend to and rnalntaln 10,000 feet. The fllght acknowledged this clearance and reported leaving 11,000 feet. kt 1023, the New York Center advised the fllght of the current LaGuardla weather Measured 500 overcast; one m1.le ~ ~ s l b l l lmt y ilgh', snow, surface mnd northwest 15 knots; altimeter setting 29.56. The rfllght acknowledged this weather and requested the runway in use. The Lenter advlseci that Instrument Landing System (ILS) approaches were bemg made tc runway h and that %he locallzer was moperatlve. Flight 266 acknowledged. Between l02L and 1026, the New York Center cleared Ta.266 t o descend t o and malntam 9,000 and to report leavrng 10,000 feet. T h ~ swas acknowledged. At 1027, 266 adnsed the Center that it was past the Solberg, New Jersey V3R. ?he Cenier acknowledged. Shortly thereafter, the New York Center advlsed :hat radar sermce was termnated and to contact LaGuardia Approach Control on 125.7 ncs. T;.+!:i 266 acknowledged by repeating the frequency. 266 reported to LaGuardla Approach Con901 on 125.7 mcs. that it had passed Solberg at an altitude of 9,000 feet. The tlme, correlated wzti tile Center tape, was 1026 22. SaGuardla Approach Control acknowledged, and xssded Kpe follohring clearance; "Xasia._ntz;_nSijOOO; report the zero one zero ?.obblnsv:ilezj Z S m wa-y L, 4, landxng r?mVIsay no deiay expected. The mnd is noriheast a t 1;; al.tmeter 23-65. LaGuardla weather: Measured 500 overcast, vlslbl11t7{ one mlle; ilght snow; shard 'q-." 'ITIP. 266 acknowledged the clearance. A t 1023, TiJA 266 reported passxng tne zero one zero degree radlal of Robbinsvllle and rev-ested ~nfomationo n ;he La2uard;a locallzer. Lahardla Approach Control adnsed that ti?e glide slope rather t'narr the LaGuardla local~zerw as inoperatxve as had been previousl3- reporte2 by a :\J(;Tb37 m-6 cleared the flight to 8,000 feet. T'JA 260 achoi.rledgea md reported leavmg 9,030 feet. A t i029, LaGuarda Approach Control cleared %A 266 %o Cescend to 6,000 feet and to advise passlng tlhrough 8,000 feet. The transmssion was ackn~-~;le@-d x t 1029:L9, TcJA 260 reported "passing 8,000. LaCuarrila Nproach Control achowled,:sd and adi.~.sed the flight to maintain present heabng for a radar vector to tne final approach course. 9.IA 266 acknowlecgea. A t 10?c:4$, LaGu7aa;s Approach Control advised TXA 2266 to reduce to approach speed. "he flignt achowleaged. At 1032 CS, 1/All,trrnes nereln are Eastern Standard based on t'qe 2L-how clock. --2/ Zero one zero degree radial of Yobbmsvllle, Yew terse), om: 3ange. TuaGuarala Approach Control advlsed TWA 266 t o turn rlght to a heading of 130 degrees. The trarisrmsslon was ackno-dedged by repeatxng the heading. LaCuardla Approach Control agazn advlsed that thls would be a radar vector to the final approach course. W.4 266 acknowledged. LaGuarha Approach Con-,rol zhen requested! the flight' s altitude. A t 1032: 20, the fllght adnsed "6,000." At 1032.22, LaGuardla Approach Control acknowledged and cleared the flight to contlnue descezt t o 5,000. Thls clearance was acknowl- edged by the fllght which then reported leavlng 6,000 feet. Approach control acknowledged. A t 1032:37, LaGuardla Approach Control advlsed the fllght to turn r q h t to 150 degrees. The transmission was acknowledged by repeating the headlng. A t 1032:b7, LaGuardsa Approach Control advlsed "traffic a t 2:30, slx rmles northeast- bound." At 1032~51,T WA 266 achowledged. A t 1033.05, LaGuardra Approach . Control reauested the fllghtrs altxtude. TWA 266 replxed, ..sOO.l' LaGuardla Approach Control asked if 5,500 was correct TWA 266 replred in the affirmative. A t 1033:1L, LaCuarha Approach Control issued clearance t o continue descent to 1,500. A t 1033:18, this was acknowledged. A t 1033:21, LaGilardia Approach Control adnsed to "turn left now headmg l3b.11 A t 1033:23, TGIA 266 acknowledged by repeatxng the heading. A t 1033 26, LaGuarha Approach Control adnsed. "Roger, that appears to be jet traffic off y o n rlght now 3 04clock at " one mle, northeast-bound, Folloxang thls transnusslon, a t 1033: 33, a nolse s m l a r to that caused by an open rmcrophone was heard for ssx seconds duration. LaGuardla App-oach Control then transmtted the follomng a t 1033:43' "Trans World 266, turn further left one zero zero." Subsequently, LaG~lardlaA pproach Control made numerous attempts to establish comunlcst~onsm th TWA 266 untxl 1036:21, none of whlch was successful and dulzng which time contact was established mth &,-,other arcraft. Hrstory of United Fllght Urated Alr Ldes Fllght 826 was a scheduled nonstop passenger servlce orlgmat- mg at @!Hare Alrport, Chscago, Illlnols, n t h ~ t dsestinatxon New York Internatloxal Auport, New Yorit, !dew Xork. The crew consrsted of Captaln Robert H. Sawyer, Flrst Officer Robert if. .Piebmg, Second Offleer Richard E. Prultt, Stewardesses Xa1y J. Mahoney, Augustlne L. Ferrar, Anne M. Bouthen, and Pa:rlcia A. Keiler. The crew normaily departed ios kngeles, Callforma, as Unlted Fllght 856, mth a two-hour szopover in Chlcago and departing Chicago as United Blight 826. Captaln Sawyer, ?lrst Of_"lcer fiebmg, and Second Ofzxcer Pruitt had flown Fkght 856 from ios Angeles to Chicago. They departed Los Angeles at appromately 0320 on December 16, 1960, and arrlved in Chlcago at approxmately 0656. The stewardesses boarded TJnited Fllght 826 at Chlcago. Fl~ght8 26 depsrted OlHare :.=port n t h the prevxously h s t e d crex and 76 passengers. The actual takeoff welght was 2 h , 790 pounds whlch rncluded 63,700 pounds of fuel, 6,450 poun& of cargo, and he passengers. The mruamum allowable takeoff weight was computed as 217,200 pounds. The arcraft was m%m welght and balance luriltatlons m accord mth current procedures. The flight? lan specifled IFR a t a fhght level of 27,000 feat. The clearance was ma Victor 5 and Jet 60 Victor t o New York. The estunated tune en route ms one hour and 29 mutes; true airspeed 478 knots; ground speed 530 knots. )luted 826 departed at 0911. crulslng flight level of 27,000 feet attaxned at 0936. Tne fllght to the New York area was normal. At approxlmately 1012 Piew York Alr Route Traffic Control Center was contacted by FLlght 5€ 26. The Center answered "Umted 826, New york Center, Roger, have your progress, radar servlce not ava~lable,d escend t o and mamta1.n flight level 250, over." Fllght 826 reported leavlng flaght level 270 at approxmately 1014. ~tapprcxlmateljr 1015 New york Center advised 'Vnlted 826, clearance 2-t is weston Interrsectlori ma Jet 60 V' i cim r to Allentown to Robb~nsv~llem, a Victor 123. mamtaln fllght level '' 250. "light 826 acknowledged. kt approxlmately 1021, TJmted 826 called A R ~ C(keronautlcal Radlo, In~o-p0+2te~, operator of Uiuted h r Lines aeronaut1ca.l commnications system) and reported "NO. 2 navlqatlon receiver accessory unlt inoperative. m's transrr;isslon was acknowledged 11 by ANINC and relayed to Unlted klr Llnes. At apprownately 1021, New York Ce.nte.r issued further clearance t.o de.s cend to 13,000 feet. Unlted 826 replied Veld ratker hold upstalrs Sub- fl. I' sequent to thrs transmsslon the Umted fLlght was ~nstructedt o change to 123.6 mess, the frequency of another center sector controller. A t approxlmately 1022:kl the Center called Flight 876: l'unlted 826 New Ycrk Center, radu. ~ontact.~U' nlted 826 replled, IfRoger, .we're cleared to 13,000 t o malntaln 25,000 until we had con- versatlon wrth you. If wetre gorng to have a delay we would rather hold upstalrs than down. We're golng to need 3/& of a mle, do you have the weather handy?" The Center replled, but I'il get it, there have been no delays until now." A t TINO., approxmately 1023.30, Uruted 826 reported over Allentown at f k @ t level 250. The Ce.n t.er .a cknowledged. At 102h:37 the Center acivrsed +hat the Idlemld weather " uas 1,500 feet overcast; 1/2 mle; lxgh.t r.a i.n ;. fog; alturreter settrng 29.65.!' Shortly thereafter the fllght stated we're starting cicwn." 4.t '! apprownately 1025:09 the Center mended the 4-TC ciearznoe as follows: "826 cleared %C proceed on Victor 30 wtll lnterceptlng kctor 123 and that way to Preston. it'll be a llttle blt qucker." (The new routing shortened the distance to the ?reston Intersection by approxmtelg ll~lles.) Thls wzs acknowledged a t 1025:20. kt approxmately 1026:Ag t'ne flight was cleared t o descend to and na7ntain U,W feet. The clearance was acknowledged and the. f.l xght reported leavxng 21,000 feet at 1026:SL. Then the Center advised at 1028:U , "826, I snow you crosslng "he centerllne Qxctor 30 at thls tlme." United 826 confirmed that it was established on Vlclor 30 asnadld r equ.e s.t e.dI h sihso wd lysotaun 1ce5 , frmoamke V1ltc t1o6r m12l3e.s , AVt lacptoprr o1x2lm3.a tely8 261 0a2~8:~56o wthlee dCgeenatdned r then the Center a h s e d "right now you're about 2 mles from crosslng Vlctor hrwzy lL33." A t approxmately 1030:07, Unrted 826 was cleared +a)!descend to and roantam 5,300 feet." Th-is was acknowledged and 826 reported leaving 1h,003 feet. The Center then asked, "Look llke you'll be able t o make Preston at 5,0007" Tne answer was that they would try. A t approxlrrately 1032:16 the Center stated "Umted 8.2 6., .ifholdlng 1s necessary at Preston, southwest one mnuie pattern right tupns the only delay 1,111 be m descent." The flight repl~ed" Xoger, no delay, we're cut of seven." A t approxmately 1033:01 the i?lghtreported pesslng 6,000 feet, k t a:)proxmately 1033.08, the Centes called, ' 826, Ilm sorry. i broke you: up, was that you reporting leavmg 6,000 for 5,0007" The night replie6 liafflsn;ati~e," The Center at approximately 1033:20 instructed: "e26, Roger, anti you reoeloed the h o l h g lnstructlo.n s. a.t Preston, radar senlce is temnated. Contact Idiledd Approach Control Flight 826 achouledged IIGood dayt1 at apprcwtely 1033.27. In accordance mth the terms of the then-current Umted States Standard TiIa1ud of Radar Jar Trafflc Control Procedures, paragraph 1.3, the responslblllty of the controller IS defined as foliows, "A mnmun of three mlles separation shall be malntalned between alrcraft belng controlled i n accordance wlth the procedures authorized i n this Eanual znd between such radar-controlled aircraft and other traffic berng controlled in accordance m t.h. t he ?nstrumenL Fl'llght Rules unless stancard non-radar separation -is provlded , His area of responslbllltT 'I 1s clrcanscrlbed by other promslons of the same paragraph as follows: lliilr traffic control is not respcnsxble for dev3,atzons from these standards h i c h result from the falure of the pllot to respond to the measures taken to control them." With respect to the separation afforded TAJ. 826, provls3on of a t least the r3nrmum requlred longxtudlnal separatron was effected bv the Issuance of a clearance to a hololng fuc located at a polnt consxstent mth the rnmimum dlstance requlred betiieen hoidxng pattern airspace areas. A t approxmately 1033.28 itlmed from Idlemid Approach Control tape ) Flxght 826 called: "Idlemlc Approach Control, Unlted 826, approaching Preston a t j,000." Thls 1s the last !mom transmss;on from she 2~gnt. The transmlsslon was acknowl- edged begmning at approx~ma~e1ly0 33:33: "Unlted 826, th;s is Idlemld A?proach Control, malntain 5,000. Llttle or no delay a: Preston. Idlemld landing runhay four right. ILS in use. Idlemld weather 600 scattered, estimated 1,500 overcast; vlsrb?llty 1/2 mlie, light ram and :og. Altunt'ter 29-63 over." The trans~sslon was com2leted at approximately 1033 jh. it was not acknowledged. Subsequent attempts to contac~ii nited 826 were unsuccessful. Radio c~mm~lcakonwslt h other awcrart, during this period were normal. It was testlfled at the hearlng that Unltea 826 was not observed on the radar by any Idlewlld Approach Control personnel. Cit;l0XSLOGIC& SEQIiENCE OF EVENTS IjPL Flight 826 Current iaGuarba \"!eather Over Allentown at 25,000 ft. ---------------+----------------------- Over Solberg at 9,000 ft. --------------------------------------- Crossing center l?ne of br2ctor 30 L,eaving 9,003 ft. --------------------------------------- 16 miles west of Victor 123 Leavlng 8,000 ft. --------------------------------------- Leav~ngl &,000 ft. -3educe to approach speed --------------------------------------- Leavlng 7,000 ft. Leaving 6,000 ft. - -------------------------------------- Leavlng 6,000 ft. . At 5,500 f t --------------------------------------- Approaching Preston a t 5,000 ft. Sound of the open mcrophone i 1,atiua:cha radar observatlocs inacated Lhat the two targets merged approximately over Eilier j,r-qr Llr Field, New Dorp, Staten Island, Yew York. After the merged vlot, one target oroke akay to continue northeast for a dlstance of 8 to 10 mles. The other *arges appomea moment.irily nearly statlonary and then commenced a slow r q h t turn t o a south-~esterlyh eadlng, drsappearlng from the scope. The target which continued northeast was Smted i;lip>;,ht 026. T t renamed arrborne luntll crashlng 8-1/2 miles ncrt'neast of Ihller neid at the lnter- Section of Sterling Place and Seventh Avenue in Brooklyn, Uew York. bhtnesses m the area of ;mpact stated that tne DC-8 was headed in a northeasterly chrection. !h'ey testxf3ed tiat one of the right englnes was rmssmg. The target whlch coritlnued in a slow right turn and drsappeared from the scope in the vlclmty of ?idler Field was the T'JA irilght. The wreckage of the l?dk. Constellatxon was chs8,rlbuted about IQlier Flel'd. Several pleces of DC-8 structure and fragnents of a jet englne were interspersed n t h the Constel?atlon wreckage, confirmng the collision of the aircraft. Alr T:-afAc Control 'Jnlted Flqht 826 expressed a desire on two occasions to remaln at altltude if weather or t r a f i ~ cr equred holdrng prior to landlng clearance. The .Zlght was advlsed %hat traffic delays had not been encountered. 'Jnited 826 started a descent in accord m t h the clearance given by A l r Route Trafflc Con~rcl. kt 1022:hl the controller advlsed 826 that the fllght was m radar contact. The flight progress was followed by a "shr- 50a;"3/ marker. Radar separation w2s mantained between TJnlted 826 and foilmnng flxzhts. Fol?omng the Allentown report the radar controller changed the clearance to a shorter routlng so as to Intersect Victor 30 anway and proceed n a V lctor 123. The purpose of the change Ir, routlng was to increase longltudlnal separation between TJnlted 926 and the succeeding aircraft which were cleared to Preston at hsg1;er altlt~~aethsan the Bnlted Flight. This change ln routlng was not made knom to the Idlemld Approach Controller, nor was it reflected on the Idletnln fllght progress strip by way of advancmg his e,qecte6 tine of arrival over Preston by approxmatel; five minutes, 'JAL 826 was previously estmat~ngo ver Preston a t 1039. A t an Approach Coatrol fix where a transfer o: control i s taking place the estmated time of arrloal over that f-ai s used prinarlly for radio iallure and also for sequencing purposes. Separation at each feeder p& 1s not base6 on an estimated 5-me of a?r;vd, bat rather on the basls of vertlcd separztlon effected through dlscreet altltude assignment. The Center Controller advised linlted 826 at 1328.Ll hat it was crossing ?he centerllne of Vlctor 30. Thls position was acknowledged zn3 xhe dis:ance from Vlctor 123 was requested. A t 1028.56 the center controller advised Vnited 326 %hat it was then 16 mles west of ;ilctor 123 and s'qortly thereafter adnsed that it was two mles west of Vlctor 123. The controller stated at the hearing that he ~bservedU nited 820 one to three mlles sout3west of Preston at the t i ~ eth e flig';t reported out of 6,000 feet. Thls was between 1033-01 and 1033 1h. 4% 1033-2C t'ne center controller instructed ?l:ght 826 to contact Tdlemld Approach 2oontrol and advlsed "radar semce terminated." A t 1033.28, TJnlted 826 called Idlemla 4.pprozch Conrrol and stated "approazb- lng Preston a t 5,000 feet. 11 Tne Tdlemld Approach Con%rollers tesklfied t v a t t -ey ara not o;serve 'Tnlted 826 m the Preston area. Ialehriii Approac:? Conzroi ach.0-6ledged tie cd: -atk weather and runway 1rSornation. - -3/ Transparent maricer used to record identlt z horlzon-lal radar display. ~t the tune of %he communication between Unlted 826 and Idlemld Approach Control, the only informatlon whxch had been received from the Few York Center wnlch would have lndacated a transfer of control was the estlmate whlch was forwarded a t 1029. The Interphone was not used nor was a light recelved on the General 2211- way Slgnal dtltude lnterloc~s ystem. Slnce only one alrcraft was lnvolved at the tlme of transfer of control of 1;AL 626 from the ;Jew vork Center to Idlemld Approach Control, the use of the General hI.lway Slgnal (GP5) altxtude Interlock lights was not rewired. Therefore, the falure of tne Center Controller t o 1nd;cate change of control by actzvatlng the amber CiS transfer llghi had no slgnlfxcant meanlng, as VAL 826 had ween afforded standard non-radar separation from a l l other known I n trafflc. Had several alrcraft been cleared to the Preston flx m t h dlscreet altitude assignments, lt lrould then have been inc'mbent upon the Center Controller to indicate, by the use of the GRS lights, the control of whlch of these alrcraft were aelng transferred and at what altztude. A t appraxmately 1029 the Center advlsed Idlemld P.pproach Control that bnlted Flight 826 was estimated over Preston at 1039 vla Colts Neck. Zdlemld Approach Control received the 1033.28 transrmss-,on stating, "approachmg Preston at 5,000," from :;nited 826 about ii-1/2 mnutes prior to the estunated tme of arrival. . Flight 526 was operatlni: the transponder whlch was properly recelved as a target on ?Jew York C;-intertss cope. There was no evldence that the transponder signal appeared on Idlek-xld Approach Control eqnpment. Thls sltuatlon, however, 1s nut abnomsil since a nomial method of operation of the secondiiri rada- rece;vlng equipment associated mth an approach control radar requlres that tine aircraft's transponder be set t o an assignee select code i n order t'nat its response t o an snterrogatlon from a speclflc ground locatlon -rill appear on the prurYlry radar lndlcator as a coded target. In order to accoinpllsh this settlng the pllot must be lnstmictea to change hhls egupment to the sesrrea code assigned t o the next subse inen; control functlon. This actlon was not a part of the routxne transfer of control functlon between the Center and idlemld Approach Control and was not accomplrshed rn conncctlon mth thls fllght. kring the time Umted 825 was progressing toward and beyond Preston, Trars Liorlc .L.irllnes Fllght 266 was under control of L&uar&a Approach Control. A series of radar vectors was ;;1ven to TWk. 266, and apparently properly executed. The controller observed a target approaching from the southwest and lnfonned T1@- 266 or"the target informatlon on two occasxons. The Xeather A snnsry of rnfllgnt reports Tram 51 arcraft wlllch had operated mthln a 33 nautlcal mlle radlus of the accident slte mthrn one hour or" the tune of the acclrient, shows that 45 fllghts were ul clouds at altxtudes rangmi; from 300 feet to 18,MG feet. One p l o t rsportec? on top of a l l clouds a t 31,003 feet. Four of the flve remanlng reports inkcated sone ground contact up to altitudes ranging from L,000 ,o 5,000 feet. fine pilot reported '>etween la-ere iron L,000 to 5,000 feet and from 13,WG to 15,000 feet. Flight Recorder Readout The Waste Krng Fllght Recorder aboard the Iinlted DC-8was read out under the supemslon oiC the Clvll Aeronautics Board. The parameters recorded rebatlng Lo an elapsed Llme base are- alt~tuae,a rspeed, heahilg, and vertlcal acceleration. Some degree of flre and unpact damage was present al~houg5t he last part of the record foll was covered m t h prod~ctso f combustion and cnemlcal reactlon. All measurements along the lensh of the tape (tlme base) were made n t h respect to a hole corresponding i n tlme t o just prlor to takeoff m Chicago. The average &stance between the adzacent holes was determined from measurements of the length composed of 36 holes. One mlluneter of lengtn along the tape i s equal t o 0.19661 of a mlnute of tlme. Thls factor was used i n computing the tlme for all events. The data obtaned relatlve t o altitudes, ~ndlcatedairspeeds, and headlngs u e lllustrated In Attachment 2. The flight recorder values between 72 mmutes after takeoff and the tlme of coLilslon are plotted as a track proflle i n Attach- ment 1. Thls track was plotted in reverse from the polnt of colllslon deterrmned L 0:r a trajectory study of the DC-8 No. eng:ne and the TvJA Constellatlon No. 3 englne. The englnes were detached i n illght upon collxslon and lmpacted on Staten Island. Analysis of the trajectory of DC-8 onglne lndlcated a fall of 5,575 feet on a course of 050 degrees magnetlc. Analysis of the Constellatlon No. 3 englne lndlcated a 3,b70-foot fall on an estunazed course of between 110 degrees t o 130 degrees magnetlc. The intersection of the two tra;ectorles deterrmned the coll~slona rea of approx- mately 1,200 square feet, the center of wiilch is located on a 315-degree magnetic bearing of 6,555 feet from the center of Ellller Fleld. The altltude at the lnstant of collision was computed t o be 5,175 to 5,250 feet above mean sea level as wo~dabe lndlcated by an altimeter settmg of 29.65 lnches of mercury. Tne lndlcated alrspeed of the DC-8 at the p o ~ n to f colllslon was 101knots. This was the lowest alrspeed subsequent to passing Uentown, Pennsylvma. The elapsed tlme of Xllght 826 from "wheels up" ln Ghlcago to colllsror! was 82 rmnutes and 32 seconds. i'rilted's time of "wheels off" a t O'Hare k ~ ? o r twas 0911. kdbng the elapsed time of 82 mmutes and 32 seconds, t:?e tlme of colllslon as deterrmned by the flight recorder readout was 1033 32. As previously stated, the indicated airspeed of iinlted at the p o u t of collision was computed as 301 hots. Ike reductlon ln auspeed over a '(0-seconci period prior to colllslon 1s lllustrated below: - Tune Lapse Speed Speed Reductlor. 1032.22 356 knots 1032:55 33 seconds 338 hots 18 h o t s L033:0k 9 seconds 332 hots 6 h o t s 1033:12 8 seconds 325 knots 7 knots l03::20 8 seconds 3 8 knots 7 knots 1033:29 9 seconds 309 knots 9 knots 1033:32 3 seconds 301 knots 8 knots TOT& 55 knots - Structures TiiA Constellatlon The majorlty of the force ox colllslon lmpact on the Constellatron was centered on the follok~sngp ornts. Upper rlght sectlon of passenger compartment betiieen kselage. Statlons 1030 and 1060. Ylght vertlcal fsn, rudder, and rlght o-~tboardp ortaon of the r ~ g h th orzzontal stabilizer. Right rang flap. .Sight mng between the engmes. The Constellatlon broke Into three maln sections following the collision an lmpacted lnto the Mrller Fleld area. The aft sectlon, lncludrng the empenrage, separated from the forward portlon of the awcraft. This sectlon lmpacted in a flat attxtude rrght slde up. The center vertlcal stabilrzer bore evldence of unpact force resultvlg i n bendlng &jdegrees to the left approx~matelyt wo feet from the top. The rlght vertical rudder and stabilizer and 12 feet of tne rlght horizontal stabllrzer were torn free. Inflight fire was evidenced by soot and scorchrng. There was no evrdence of ground flre about the aft fuselage. There was, however, evrdence of flre in Interior of the aft fuselage sectlon. The L rrght wmg and No. engrne separated at Wmg Statlon 2112 and lmpacted 600 feet east of the aft fuseiage section. This iring section e=denced severe fire and explosion damage. No. 3 englne and nacelle detached and fell about 600 feet northwest of the aft fuselage. The forward section of the fuselage and the left mng, includmg the two engmes, lmpacted approx~mately1 ,100 feet north of the aft fuselage. Numerous aleces of alrcraft structwe were strewn over a mde area ln the vlcrmty of lhker Tleld. :lay of these pleces were ldentlfied as parts of a DC-8. Nos. 1and 2 birlght C18CB-1 powerplants were located i n therr normal posltlons relatlve to the wlng spar. The Vo. 3 powerplaat had separated from the wing. No, i~ powerplant remalned attached to the mng ijhlch had separated from the amcraft. 1)etaded examrnatlon was conducted after removal o' the powerplants to LaGuardla Axport. There was evidence of ground impact damage on all powerplants. Some evldence of ground fire damage was noted only on Wo. k. internal exarmnatlo? of the powerplants revealed no evldence of frlctlonal overheat, lack of lubrlcatlon or internal fallure. m-8 Structures mif*isre uere s x general areas of the T)C-3 which furillshed evldence of a co1;isson: 1. Left mng leadlng edge. . 2. ieftiand2ng gear door