The South African case of Harris v. (Donges) Ministers of the Interior was triggered by the South African government's attempt in the 1950's to disenfrachise non-white voters on th cape province. It is still referred to as the case that illustrates, as a matter of constitutionsl doctrine, it is not possible for the United kingdom Parliament to produce a staute which limits the powers of seccussive Parliaments. The purpose of this book is twofold. First it offers a fuller picture of the story lying behind the Harris litigation, and the process of British acquisition of and dis-engagement from the government of its 'white' colonies in southern Africa. Insight into the enfuing emegence and consolidation of apartheid as a system of political and social organization is also gained. Secondly, the book attempts to use the South African experience to address broader contemporary British concerns about the nature of the Constitution and the role of the courts and legislature in making the Constitution work. The Harris saga conveys better than any episode of British political history the enormous significance of the choices a country makes (or fails to make) when it embarks upon the task of creating or revising its constitutional arrangements. This, then, is a searching re-examination of the fundamentals of constitution-making, written in the light of the British government's commitment to promoting whole-sale reform.