Business and Populism Business and Populism The Odd Couple Editedby MAGNUS FELDMANN AND GLENN MORGAN GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,OX26dp, UnitedKingdom OxfordUniversityPressisadepartmentoftheUniversityofOxford. ItfurtherstheUniversity’sobjectiveofexcellenceinresearch,scholarship, andeducationbypublishingworldwide.Oxfordisaregisteredtrademarkof OxfordUniversityPressintheUKandincertainothercountries ©TheEditorsandContributors2023 Themoralrightsoftheauthorshavebeenasserted Impression:1 Allrightsreserved.Nopartofthispublicationmaybereproduced,storedin aretrievalsystem,ortransmitted,inanyformorbyanymeans,withoutthe priorpermissioninwritingofOxfordUniversityPress,orasexpresslypermitted bylaw,bylicence,orundertermsagreedwiththeappropriatereprographics rightsorganization.Enquiriesconcerningreproductionoutsidethescopeofthe aboveshouldbesenttotheRightsDepartment,OxfordUniversityPress,atthe addressabove Youmustnotcirculatethisworkinanyotherform andyoumustimposethissameconditiononanyacquirer PublishedintheUnitedStatesofAmericabyOxfordUniversityPress 198MadisonAvenue,NewYork,NY10016,UnitedStatesofAmerica BritishLibraryCataloguinginPublicationData Dataavailable LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2023930419 ISBN978–0–19–289433–5 DOI:10.1093/oso/9780192894335.001.0001 Printedandboundby CPIGroup(UK)Ltd,Croydon,CR04YY LinkstothirdpartywebsitesareprovidedbyOxfordingoodfaithand forinformationonly.Oxforddisclaimsanyresponsibilityforthematerials containedinanythirdpartywebsitereferencedinthiswork. Preface ThisbookarosefromconversationsbetweenthetwoeditorsduringtheBrexitref- erendumcampaignin2016andafterTrump’svictoryinthe2016presidentialcam- paign.Fromthestart,thesediscussionsreflectedoursharedinterestinpolitical economyandalsoourdifferentbutcomplementarydisciplinarybackgrounds—in businessandmanagementontheonehandandpoliticalscienceontheother.Asa result,theconversationsbegantofocusontheroleofbusinessinrelationtothese upheavalsinthepoliticsoftheUKandtheUS.Inbothcasesitwasclearthatcon- trarytotheexpectationsinmuchofthetheoreticalliteratureonthestructuraland instrumentalpowerofbusiness,businesshadbeenlargelyineffectiveinshaping theseprocesses,withmanybusinessesfailingtoachievetheirgoalsandleftsub- jecttotherisksanduncertaintiesthatpopulistleadershiptendstobring.Insome cases,thecontroversysurroundingpopulismalsosparkednewdivisionsbetween businesses. Once we explored these questions in more detail, it quickly became apparentthattherewereveryfewdiscussionsoftheinteractionofbusinessand populismintherelevantliterature.Wethereforedecidedtodrawtogethercontrib- utorsfromdifferentdisciplinestoprovidedetailedaccountsofthisrelationship in a range of countries and across a range of themes. We were able to convene amini-conferenceatthevirtualannualmeetingoftheSocietyfortheAdvance- mentofSocio-Economicsin2020,whereanumberofcontributorspresentedfirst draftsanddiscussedeachother’scontributions.Fromthispointaseriesofdrafts and redrafts followed as various common themes and issues emerged from dif- ferentdisciplinaryandgeographicalperspectives.Wewouldliketoacknowledge andthankmostsincerelythecontributorsfortheireffortsatworkingwithusand theirpatienceasthepandemicdisruptedourvarioustimetablesforcompletion. Wehopetheywillthinkthefinalvolumehasbeenworththeeffort. TheeditorswouldalsoliketothanktheUniversityofBristolandourrespec- tivedepartmentalhomes,theSchoolofManagementandtheSchoolofSociology, Politics,andInternationalStudiesfortheirsupport.GlennMorganwouldpartic- ularly like to thank Andrew Sturdy for his encouragement and support for this projectaswellasacknowledginghisintellectualdebtstohislong-standingcollab- orators,RichardWhitleyandPeerHullKristensen,bothofwhomwould,intheir differentways,nodoubtfindplentytodisagreewithinthisbook!MagnusFeld- mannwouldliketothankMichelleCiniandMarkWickham-JonesatBristolfor vi PREFACE theirsupport.HewouldalsoliketoacknowledgehisgratitudetoHonorataMaze- pus,MirceaPopa,andDanielKindermanforproductiveresearchcollaborations onrelatedtopics,whichhaveinfluencedhisthinkingontheseissues. Finally,wewouldliketoacknowledgethepatienceofoureditoratOxfordUni- versityPress,AdamSwallow,whohasshownwillingnesstoadjustourtimetable andthewordlengthastheprojecthasdevelopedandgrown. Contents ListofTables ix ListofFigures x ListofContributors xi PART 1. INTRODUCTION 1. BusinessandPopulism:ThePoliticalEconomyofthe‘OddCouple’ 3 MagnusFeldmannandGlennMorgan PART 2. COUNTRY STUDIES 2. TheTrumpPhenomenonandRight-wingExtremism:Is DonaldTrumpaPopulist? 39 MarkS.MizruchiandRaulGălan 3. ThreatsandOpportunities:ThePopulistChallengeto BusinessElitesinTrump’sAdministration 59 MatthewJ.Baltz 4. Brexit,PopulismandBusiness:TheBusinessEliteLosesControl? 79 MagnusFeldmannandGlennMorgan 5. BusinessReponsestoPopulisminDenmark:Between LoudVoiceandImplicitLoyalty 98 ChristianLyhneIbsen 6. Italy:PopulismandBusinessinaStagnantEconomy 118 DavideVampa 7. Rent-seekingBusinessElitesandPopulisminPolandandHungary 138 MiklósSzanyi 8. Business Factions, Populists, and the Social Bloc Perspective:TheCaseofFDI-ledGrowthRegimes 158 CornelBan 9. India:Populism,Personalism,andEconomicGovernance 181 AndrewWyatt viii CONTENTS 10. TechnocracyandPopulisminthePhilippines 202 YusukeTakagi 11. Populist‘OrderandProgress’:AuthoritarianismandLoyal BusinessElitesinBrazil 223 HeikeDoering,AmonBarros,MarcusGomes,andCaroline RodriguesSilva PART 3. THEMATIC ANALYSES 12. Right-wingPopulismvs.ClimateCapitalism:Climate ChangeGovernanceUnderScrutiny 245 MarcusGomesandSteffenBo¨hm 13. BusinessAssociationsandRight-wingPopulism 263 DanielKinderman 14. PopulistsinPower—theImpactonInterestRepresentation andFirm-levelNonmarketStrategies 285 DorottyaSallai 15. PopulismandTrade 307 LouiseCurranandJappeEckhardt 16. ThePopulismofTransnationalPlutocrats 326 BrookeHarrington PART 4. CONCLUSION 17. Populism,RiskandBusiness:PresentandFutureProspects 345 MagnusFeldmannandGlennMorgan Index 365 List of Tables 1.1. Initialvariantsofpopulism—fromthin-centeredideologiestospecific programmes. 10 1.2. Atypologyofbusinessresponsestopopulism. 29 5.1. OrganizedemployersinDenmark—inpercent. 99 5.2. Socio-demographicsofDPPvotersin2020. 104 6.1. TrustinEuropeanUnionInstitutionsin2019(%,differencewith2008in brackets). 124 6.2. Differencebetweenpartysupportinonecategoryandoverallpartysupport. 124 6.3. Isimmigrationpositiveornegativefortheeconomy(2017)? 125 10.1. Top10richestpeopleinthePhilippinesin2020,2010,and2006. 208 13.1. SwissEEC/EU-relatedReferendaandtheirOutcomes. 275 14.1. Typeofbargainingandbusinesspowerinthedifferentphasesofpopulism. 296 14.2. QuietCPAactivitiesinrelationtobufferingandbridgingstrategiesand monetarycontributions. 301 14.3. LegitimacyandquietCPAengagementoffirmsin‘bad’and‘good’FDIsectors. 302 15.1. Interviewsundertakenforthisproject. 322 17.1. Riskstobusinessfromright-wingpopulism:Scaleandscope. 351