InG clusioIGA W n of aorkin pag P pa ep r iners the W serve orking to dis Pse am pein LegitimaGcyI GanAd R Eeffisecairecnhc yP roofg Proamlitmicael: Systems rs series date the res ___________________________ oeea s nrch ot co resu nslts Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”: titute of w Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule? puork blica in p No 177 Marco Bünte August 2011 tion and should not limrogress prior to publica it publication intion to encoura any oge the th e ex r vch ea nn ug ee . Copyrigh of ideas a t remnd a aincad se wm ith thic de eb auate th. o rs . www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers GIGA WP 177/2011 GIGA Working Papers Edited by the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien The GIGA Working Papers series serves to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. Inclusion of a paper in the GIGA Working Papers series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. Copyright remains with the authors. When working papers are eventually accepted by or published in a journal or book, the correct citation reference and, if possible, the corresponding link will then be included on the GIGA Working Papers website at <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>. GIGA research unit responsible for this issue: GIGA Research Programme 1: “Legitimacy and Efficiency of Political Systems” Editor of the GIGA Working Papers series: Bert Hoffmann <[email protected]> Copyright for this issue: © Marco Bünte English copy editor: Meenakshi Preisser Editorial assistant and production: Ellen Baumann All GIGA Working Papers are available online and free of charge on the website <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers>. For any requests please contact: E-mail: <[email protected]> The GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies cannot be held responsible for errors or any consequences arising from the use of information contained in this Working Paper; the views and opinions expressed are solely those of the author or authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institute. GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien Neuer Jungfernstieg 21 20354 Hamburg Germany E-mail: <[email protected]> Website: <www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers> GIGA WP 177/2011 Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”: Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule? Abstract Direct military rule has become rare in world politics. Today, most military regimes have either given way to some form of democracy or been transformed into another form of authoritarianism. This article formulates an analytical framework for the detachment of militaries from politics and identifies positive and negative factors for a withdrawal. It then applies this framework to the case of Burma/Myanmar, which is an example of deeply entrenched military rule. It is argued that the retreat from direct rule has brought with it a further institutionalization of military rule in politics, since the military was able to safeguard its interests and design the new electoral authoritarian regime according to its own purposes. The article identifies the internal dynamics within the military regime as a prime motive for a reform of the military regime. Although the external environment has completely changed over the last two decades, this had only a minor impact on military politics. The opposition could not profit from the regime’s factionalization and external sanctions and pressure have been undermined by Asian engagement. Keywords: military regime, civilian control, external influences, internal influences, competitive authoritarianism, Burma/Myanmar Dr. Marco Bünte is is a political scientist and a senior researcher at the GIGA Institute of Asian Studies. His most recent publication is The Crisis of Democracy in Southeast Asia, Palgrave: Houndsmills, Basingstoke 2011 (with Aurel Croissant). Contact: <[email protected]> Website: <http://staff.en.giga-hamburg.de/buente> Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy”: Abdication or Institutionalization of Military Rule? Marco Bünte Article Outline 1 Introduction 2 Military Regimes and Military Intervention in Politics 3 Conducive and Unfavourable Conditions for Military Withdrawal 4 The Military in Burmese Politics 1948–2010 5 From Direct Rule to Military Control: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 6 Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in the Military’s Withdrawal (1988–2011) 7 Summary and Conclusion Bibliography 1 Introduction Direct military rule has become rare in world politics. In March 2011 the Burmese military regime dissolved the ruling junta, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), and handed over power to a newly elected civilian government. Due to these circumstances, Burma can no longer be classified as a case of direct military rule. This process illustrates a gradual decline of military regimes worldwide in the last two decades. This phenomenon has been especially virulent in Asia, where in 1987 half of the continent’s countries still lived under military or military-backed rule. Since then, democracy has replaced many military or Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 5 quasi-military regimes in Bangladesh, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand and Pakistan.1 This, however, is by no means a linear process, as the military coups in Pakistan 1999 and in Thai- land 2006 demonstrated. Moreover, recent studies have also shown that in many newly de- mocratized nations the military enjoys considerable political prerogatives and a great deal of institutional autonomy (Alagappa 2001; Beeson/Bellamy 2006; Croissant et al. 2011a). Why do militaries withdraw from power? How can we assess the military’s role in a “civilian state”? Does the military still wield power behind the scenes, making direct rule unnecessary? This paper adds to the literature on civil military relations in several ways: First, it con- structs a concept of military participation in politics that goes beyond the recent emphasis on coup politics. Traditionally, the detachment of military from politics and the establishment of civilian control has been defined as the lack of military coups and military rule (Nordlinger 1977). In contrast to this dichotomous perspective, I use a gradual concept of military involve- ment whose polar opposites are civilian supremacy/civilian control on one side and military control/military rule on the other. Second, I construct a framework that discusses various pos- itive and negative factors for a detachment of the military from politics. This framework suc- ceeds in overcoming the traditional limitations of the dominance of either internal or external factors found in the literature on civil–military relations. Third, this paper brings attention to the outlier Burma/Myanmar,2 which is an example of extreme persistence of military rule and thus contradicts the overall diagnosis of extreme instability of military regimes found in the general literature on authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999; Hadenius/Teorell 2007). Burma is generally regarded as the most durable military regime worldwide. Soon after independence from Great Britain in 1948, the military became the most powerful institution in the country with a huge impact on society and the economy. Confronted with a number of countrywide insurgencies after the departure of the British, the military initiated a rapid modernization of the armed forces that by far overtook the institutional development of the Burmese state. The consequence was a “military aggrandizement of resources, responsibili- ties and powers in traditional non-military realms” (Callahan 2003: 18). After General Ne Win’s coup against the civilian government of U Nu in 1962, the coun- try has oscillated between direct and indirect forms of military rule. General Ne Win and his 1 Quasi-military regimes are military regimes with a civilian façade (such as a constitution, civilian president, semi-competitive elections). These regimes, however, are military in substance, since the military holds a po- litical hegemony (Finer 1962). 2 The military regime changed the name of the country in July 1989 from Burma to Myanmar. At the same time, a number of other titles and places were changed in an attempt to remove any traces of the colonial era. In the subsequent years, the new name was accepted by the UN and other states and institutions. A number of coun- tries and pro-democracy groups have, however, refused to acknowledge the new name as a protest against the human rights abuses of the military and its refusal to hand over power to an elected civilian government. Throughout this paper, “Burma” is employed in preference to “Myanmar”, though this is highly contested terrain. The name “Burma” is less obviously associated with the dominant ethnic group. For more on these is- sues see Dittmer (2008). 6 Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” Revolutionary Council ruled Burma directly until 1974, when the country was transformed into a military-backed, socialist one-party state under the leadership of Ne Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party (BSPP). The “Burmese Way to Socialism”, however, led to a se- vere economic crisis at the end of the 1980s. Confronted with massive pro-democracy demonstrations in the wake of the economic crisis, Ne Win decided to resign in July 1988. The military, however, managed to reconsolidate its power, after it cracked down on pro-de- mocracy demonstrations in August 1988, killing several thousand protestors. The coup by the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) on 18 August 1988 re-established direct military rule, which continued for over 21 years until 30 March 2011, when the military dis- solved the ruling body, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC, the SLORC’s suc- cessor), and handed over power to the newly elected President Thein Sein. Military rule in Burma has been especially contested over the last two decades: After the military promised to hand over power to an elected government in 1988, it did not acknowledge the results of the elections in May 1990, which ended in a landslide victory for the oppositional National League for Democracy (NLD). Acting in the manner of a caretaker government, the military argued that the country lacked a constitution for transferring pow- er to a new government. What followed was a decade of confrontations – on one side be- tween the military, the NLD and the ethnic groups, and on the other side between the mili- tary and the Western countries, which supported the opposition’s call for an acknowledg- ment of the results of the 1990s elections. Finally, in September 2003, the military announced its roadmap to “disciplined democracy”, which promised to transfer power to an elected government again. After the military managed to write a new constitution and to hold multi- party elections, in which the playing field was heavily tilted toward the military-dominated party, it handed over power to the new civilian government in March 2011. In the following section, I give a definition of military regimes and discuss the various ways militaries can be involved in politics. I then go on to formulate a framework for dis- cussing various preconditions and reasons for militaries to disengage from politics. Then I elucidate the evolution and state of military involvement in politics in Burma from 1948 till 2011 and discuss reasons for the military’s withdrawal from direct rule. In the last section, I offer some conclusions based on the case of Burma. 2 Military Regimes and Military Intervention in Politics Military regimes, which can be defined as a “system of government by the military” (Perlmut- ter 1980: 96), are a special form of authoritarian rule. As such, they have to be distinguished from both democracies and other forms of authoritarian rule. Following Dahl’s concept of pol- yarchy, scholars have adopted a “procedural minimum” definition of democracy that includes four key attributes: free, fair and competitive elections, full adult suffrage, broad protection of civil liberties (freedom of speech, press and association) and the absence of non-elected “tute- Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 7 lary authorities” that limit the governing power of elected officials (Dahl 1971; Diamond 1999: 7–15).3 If militaries wield these “tutelary powers” or “reserved domains” but still accept the democratic game, a “tutelary democracy” evolves (Collier/Levitsky 1997; Merkel 2004). In the- se “democracies with adjectives” (Collier/Levitsky 1997), the problem of military involvement in politics and the establishment of “civilian control”4 become some of the main challenges of democratic consolidation, since liberal democracies require the civilian control of the armed forces as a necessary condition (Croissant et al. 2011b). At the other end of the political spectrum, we find closed authoritarian regimes, in which no channels exist for oppositional forces to legally contest for executive power (Levitsky/Way 2010: 7; Snyder 2006). This type includes two subcategories: closed regimes, in which we find no democratic institutions, and hegemonic regimes, in which formal democratic institutions exist on paper but are nothing more than a façade (Schedler 2002). Military regimes, in which “military officers are major or predominant political actors by virtue of their actual or threat- ened use of force” (Nordlinger 1977: 2), may fall into either category. We can distinguish be- tween direct military regimes, in which the military forms the government, and quasi-civil- ian regimes, which are military regimes with a civilian window dressing (civilian president, constitution, semi-competitive elections). The latter are military regimes in substance in the sense that the military holds political hegemony (Finer 1962). Moreover, the armed forces may also be part of the regime coalition in other forms of closed authoritarian regimes such as monarchies, Sultanistic regimes (e.g. the Philippines under Ferdinand Marcos 1972–1986) and single-party regimes (North Korea). These different forms of regimes can frequently not be categorized accurately, although they “draw on different groups to staff government of- fices and different segments of society for support. They have different procedures for mak- ing decisions, different ways of handling their choice of leaders and succession, and different ways of responding to society and opponents” (Geddes 1999: 121). Moreover, there are often amalgams or hybrids of these diverse regime types. In general, military regimes are considered the weakest form of authoritarianism. Accord- ing to Barbara Geddes, who analysed the stability of 163 authoritarian regimes from 1945– 1998, military regimes have an average lifespan of only seven years, while single-party re- gimes have an average lifespan of 35 years (Geddes 1999: 121). Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s military regimes were the most common form of authoritarian government, they have increasingly been transformed into “limited multiparty systems” since then (Hadenius/Teo- rell 2007: 152). Despite these developments, the military often wields enormous influence be- hind the scenes of these regimes. The problem of “civil–military relations” and “civilian con- 3 Other scholars, such as Przeworski, employ a more minimalist definition that centres on contested elections (Przeworski et al. 2000). 4 In civilian regimes, the armed forces are under the supremacy of the civilian government. In a democratic state, civilian control means that civilian authorities are responsible for making political decisions, and the military is responsible for implementing them. 8 Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” trol” of the military has often been the focus of studies in post-authoritarian contexts, as civil- ian control has often been considered a necessary condition for democratic rule. For liberal democracies to persist, the armed forces must be subordinate to democratically elected civil- ian authorities (Diamond 1999; Croissant et al. 2011b). Earlier research on military rule has worked out various subtypes that draw on the social foundations of military rule, its class background and its role in economic development: The most important forms have been market-bureaucratic regimes, monarchic military regimes, single party (often socialist) military regimes, and oligarchic military regimes (Janowitz 1964; Huntington 1968; O’Donnell 1973; Perlmutter 1980; Remmer 1989). With the growing extinc- tion of direct military regimes from the political scene, these concepts fall short of delineating the extent of military power in politics. According to Nordlinger, there are two factors that define the level of military intervention: the extent of power of the armed forces and their po- litical and economic goals (Nordlinger 1977: 22). Nordlinger distinguishes three ideal types of military rule: rulers, guardians and moderators. As rulers, militaries dominate the regime and attempt to control large segments of society and the economy. They “intend to bring basic changes in the distribution of power by eliminating all existing power centres” (Nordlinger 1977: 22). In both other regime types, militaries aim to preserve the status quo. Guardians control the government from backstage; they have not taken over the government by them- selves but control the government informally. Moderators leave the most important positions in the government to civilians, but the military maintains veto power over certain policies (Nordlinger 1977: 22). The problem with Nordlinger’s theory is that some hidden forms of military rule cannot be separated clearly from civilian autocracies. It is, therefore, necessary to identify the exact relationship between civilian and military authorities in these regimes. Finer distinguishes three modes of military intervention in civil politics (Finer 1962): black- mailing, displacement and supplantment. First, the military pressures or blackmails civilian authorities. The military intervenes in decision-making by threatening to withdraw its sup- port for the regime coalition or by supporting groups that agitate against the government. Second, the military attempts to displace members of the cabinet. The third mode of inter- vention is supplantment: either the military or factions within the military support rebel groups fighting against the government or threaten to stage a military coup. The problem with both Finer’s and Nordlinger’s theories is that they do not give exact criteria for delineat- ing military intervention into politics. Recent innovative approaches have proposed conceptualizing military intervention in politics along a spectrum of military influence, military participation and military control of government (Welch/Smith 1974; Siaroff 2009; Croissant et al. 2011b). Siaroff designed a con- tinuum for measuring the degree of military intervention into the political and civilian affairs of the state. He accounted for eleven indicators that are used to categorize the military’s inter- vention. Siaroff envisions a continuum of civil–military relations that ranges from “civilian su- Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” 9 premacy” and “civilian control”,5 across the middle categories of conditional subordination and military tutelage to military control and military rule. He uses several criteria such as in- fluence on policy-making in certain fields, representation in government, right to intervention, accountability for past human rights violations and autonomy over resources and processes.6 Figure 1: Degree of Military Intervention Regime Type Liberal Democracy Electoral Democracy Autocracy Degree of military Civilian Civilian Conditional Military Military Military intervention supremacy control subordination tutelage control rule Siaroff 2009: 90. However, as Croissant et al. rightly argue, civilian control also exists in autocracies. Conse- quently, we see that regime type is not a good predictor of the type of civil–military relations (Croissant et al. 2011a: 194). Military officers play a decisive role in all regimes, since they are either part of the ruling coalition or heavily influence policy decisions in certain fields. Most of these regimes also depend on the military for their very survival. In some cases, they act as veto actors. Regime transitions within authoritarian regimes thus often lead to a different role for the military – it is shifted away “from the driver’s seat” to a more backseat role (Finer 1985: 18). It is, therefore, always necessary to contextualize the military’s role in politics, along with its reasons for intervention, instruments and scope of power (Snyder 2006: 220). It is also necessary to delineate conditions for a withdrawal of the military from politics, i.e. a change in the degree of military intervention. In order to do this, it is necessary to identify factors that explain the motives for military interventions. 3 Conducive and Unfavourable Conditions for Military Withdrawal In general, two theoretical schools can be identified within the research on civil–military rela- tions (Kennedy/Louscher 1991; Nordlinger 1977: 1; Sundhaussen 1985; Croissant 2004). The first relies on internal military variables to explain various degrees of military intervention; the second points to external factors. However, neither approach is all-encompassing (Sundhaussen 1985: 272; Croissant 2004). Sundhaussen, who attempts to explore factors that facilitate a withdrawal of militaries from office, suggests combining these different theorems. According to Sundhaussen, the degree of military intervention into politics is the outcome of several mutually interdependent endogenous and extraneous factors. Departing from Finer’s 5 In contrast to the first category, civilians lack expertise in military affairs, do not hold the military to account for past human rights violations, and cannot control its internal affairs. 6 Siaroff’s classification is based on a set of eleven indicators that are measured on a scale of 1 to 10. The higher the numerical score, the more comprehensive the civilian control. 10 Marco Bünte: Burma’s Transition to “Disciplined Democracy” distinction of the military’s disposition to intervene and their social opportunity structures (“mood” vs. “motive”), Sundhaussen argues that a withdrawal from politics is the outcome of two interdependent concurrent factors: the dynamics within the internal organization of the military itself and the political, cultural, economic and international environment that in- fluence the military’s actions (Sundhaussen 1985: 271). The strategic options of the armed forces are therefore shaped by two structuralist factors: a) endogenous factors, which shape the disposition and ability of the military to intervene into or withdraw from politics and b) extraneous factors, which form conducive or unfavourable opportunity structures for the military’s intervention or withdrawal. Examples of extraneous factors include the inability of civilian governments to control political violence and attempts of political groups to draw the military into the political arena. Croissant argues that these two factors act as “pull fac- tors” for the military by pulling the armed forces into the terrain of civil politics, while endoge- nous factors operate as “push factors” by affecting the cohesion, coherence, internal resources, moods and organizational motives of military action (Croissant 2004: 360). Military regimes disengage from politics if the military’s cohesion is threatened by ideological polarization or if increased factionalism endangers the unity of the armed forces (Nordlinger 1977: 144; Hun- tington 1968: 252–260; Finer 1962: 173–186): The withdrawal of the military from the political arena depends on the interplay of both endogenous and exogenous factors. These two sets of variables can be further broken down into eight variables: 1. personal interests of the mili- tary; 2. corporate interests of the military; 3. military ideology; 4. military cohesion; 5. con- figuration of the civilian sphere (strength of parties and civil society); 6. economic develop- ment; 7. internal security (e.g. secessionist movements); and 8. external security (Albright 1980: 575; Finer 1962; Sundhaussen 1985; Croissant 2004). Figure 2: Determinants of Military Interventions ENDOGENOUS FACTORS EXOGENOUS FACTORS 1. Personal interests 1. Civilian sphere 2. Corporate interests 2. Internal security 3. Ideology 3. Economy 4. Cohesion 4. External security DEGREE OF MILITARY INTERVENTION (MILITARY RULE, MILITARY CONTROL, MILITARY TUTELAGE, CONDITIONAL SUBORDINATION, CIVILIAN CONTROL, CIVILIAN SUPREMACY)