INTRODUCTION THE OPPOSING SIDES Origins and doctrine • Recruitment, morale and logistics • Training, tactics and weapons • Command and control GINKEL HEATH AND LZ L 18–20 September 1944 THE UTRECHTSEWEG 19 September 1944 CONTESTING THE PERIMETER 19–23 September 1944 ANALYSIS AFTERMATH UNIT ORGANIZATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY Introduction In September 1944 the remnants of the German forces that had escaped from Normandy were hastily withdrawing through France and Belgium. Lieutenant General George S. Patton’s US Third Army was advancing on a broad front towards the borders of Germany and the fortifications of the Siegfried Line. Lieutenant-General Miles C. Dempsey’s British Second Army had captured the port of Antwerp in Belgium, but the Germans retained Walcheren Island in the Scheldt Estuary and were able to prevent the Allies from using the port to bring in supplies. General Bernard L. Montgomery, GOC 21st Army Group (British Second and Canadian First armies), persuaded General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in the European theatre, that the use of airborne forces could assist British armoured divisions in breaking through the fragile defensive line that guarded the approaches to the Dutch ports; occupation of the Netherlands would also place the Allies in a position to outflank the Siegfried Line. Three airborne divisions would be used to capture numerous bridges over rivers, including the Rhine: the British 1st Airborne Division would seize Arnhem Bridge and the American 101st and 82d Airborne divisions would capture those closer to the front line, including Nijmegen Bridge. The operation, which included an attack by ground forces to relieve the airborne soldiers, was given the name Market Garden. The Allied shortage of transport aircraft meant that the decision was made to land 1st Airborne Division in three separate lifts over three consecutive days (17–19 September). The cautiousness of Allied air force officers led them to suggest a landing area that was 11km from the centre of Arnhem; they were worried about German anti-aircraft positions at Deelen Airfield, north of Arnhem, which Allied aircraft would have to fly over if a closer area to the town was chosen. While the presence of marshy ground would have ruled out a large- scale glider landing close to Arnhem, the larger parachute element of the division could have landed nearer Arnhem Bridge, as 1st Polish Airborne Brigade proved when its forces landed at Driel on 21 September. By that date the German defences were formidable, but a surprise landing earlier would have encountered less resistance. The dangers presented to gliders by the marshy ground close to Arnhem made the employment of the airlanding brigade a risky prospect, but the importance the Allied senior commanders placed upon having 1st Airborne Division land as a single entity made them accept the landing grounds the air force commanders suggested, despite the protestations of the parachute battalion commanders. If the parachute battalions had landed near Driel, the glider troops would not have been needed for the initial attack. The officers commanding the Waffen-SS soldiers that fought the glider infantrymen had diverse backgrounds and reputations. Here, an SS-Untersturmführer is depicted in 1944. Convinced of their racial superiority, Waffen-SS personnel cultivated a high opinion of their own military prowess; but once they discovered the unforgiving nature of the battlefield environment, younger recruits found it difficult to adjust their mindset and sometimes took their frustration out on prisoners of war. The soldiers’ ideological training made them aware that a strict military code of honour would be enforced, with harsh punishments for those who broke the rules. Recruits were exhorted to seek a hero’s death on the battlefield. (ullstein bild/ullstein bild via Getty Images) During Operation Market Garden, the Allied effort relied upon 1st Airlanding Brigade to maintain the integrity of the Oosterbeek perimeter. The leadership qualities of junior officers in charge of the platoons would prove invaluable, but they suffered heavy casualties. By 24 September, only one platoon commander in 7 KOSB remained unwounded. Because the airlanding battalions had limited training in street fighting and had to operate with too few heavy weapons compared with their opponents, junior officers often found they had to provide inspiration in a series of tough situations. (Haywood Magee/Picture Post/Hulton Archive/Getty Images) During Operation Market Garden the glider troops of Britain’s 1st Airlanding Brigade played a crucial role in securing and defending the perimeter that developed when 1st Airborne Division was on the defensive. Facing them were understrength Waffen-SS units that were hastily formed into ad hoc battle groups, some supported by armour. The troops on both sides would have their tactical flexibility and powers of endurance tested to the limit in the bitter battles that ensued. Traditionally, the focus of studies looking at the Arnhem landings is the battles of the two parachute brigades of 1st Airborne Division when they tried and mostly failed to fight their way into Arnhem. Less well known are operations of 1st Airlanding Brigade that predominantly involved the securing of the Oosterbeek perimeter. Without these operations 1st Airborne Division would have ceased to exist altogether. 1st Airborne Division during Operation Market Garden, 17–26 September 1944 MAP KEY 1 1330hrs, 17 September: 1st Airlanding Brigade lands on LZ S. The brigade’s 2 S Staffs has only half a battalion and digs in; 7 KOSB starts to move to Ginkel Heath, and 1 Border heads to LZ Z. 2 18 September: 2 S Staffs is ordered to assist 1st Parachute Brigade’s advance into Arnhem. The battalion takes 7 hours to cover 8.5km to St Elisabeth’s Hospital. In the afternoon the second half of the battalion lands and is also sent into town. 3 18 September: SS-Wach-Bataillon 3 attacks 7 KOSB on Ginkel Heath. Captain Gourlay with 19 Pl, 7 KOSB, occupying a work camp, is overwhelmed by 5./SS-WachBtl 3. B Coy, 7 KOSB drives off two companies of Sicherungs-Regiment 26 using the road from Ede. At 1509hrs the second lift arrives and completes the defeat of SS-Wach-Bataillon 3. 4 18 September: B Coy, 1 Border ambushes the initial attack by 10. Schiffs-Stamm-Abteilung into Renkum. SS-Bataillon Schulz then provides heavy weapons and the German attack succeeds. 5 Early morning, 19 September: 2 S Staffs advances along the Utrechtseweg and reaches the municipal museum. The battalion encounters Kampfgruppe Möller; with the arrival of 3./StuGBrig 280 later in the morning, 2 S Staffs is pushed back and suffers severe casualties. The survivors capture the high ground on Den Brink in the afternoon, but then retreat to eastern Oosterbeek. 6 Afternoon, 19 September: 7 KOSB on LZ L initially defeats the attacks by Kampfgruppe Krafft. The third lift then arrives. With mounting pressure on the landing zone, 7 KOSB is ordered to cover the retreat south of the railway line. A Coy, the furthest north, is caught in the open and surrenders to Kampfgruppe Krafft. 7 Morning, 20 September: C Coy, 1 Border on the Koude Herberg junction is attacked by elements of SS-Bataillon Eberwein with support from tanks of Panzer-Abteilung 224. The British knock out two tanks and the German attack is repulsed. 8 Morning, 21 September: B Coy, 1 Border is attacked by Oberleutnant Artur Wossowski’s 3./FSPzAuERgt Hermann Göring supported by a platoon from Panzer-Abteilung 224. Airborne soldiers armed with PIATs knock out three German tanks, but the British lose the Westerbouwing Heights. A counter-attack results in heavy British casualties and the capture of Major T.W.W. Armstrong, OC A Coy. The Germans are now in a position to dominate the Driel Ferry. 9 22 September: Elements of XXX Corps link up with the Poles who landed near Driel the previous day. The Allied advance to Arnhem Bridge is blocked because the structure had been retaken by the Germans the previous day. 10 Night, 25/26 September: After a failed attempt by Allied ground forces to reach the airborne forces from the south bank the previous night, the survivors of 1st Airborne Division make a withdrawal from the perimeter and cross the river in boats. Of 10,000 personnel that landed, fewer than 3,000 escape. 1st Airlanding Brigade was formed in November 1941 from four regular infantry battalions and lost two battalions in May 1943, although another – 7th Battalion, The King’s Own Scottish Borderers (7 KOSB) – was incorporated in November 1943. The main units of the brigade in September 1944 were: 2nd Battalion, The South Staffordshire Regiment (2 S Staffs), 7 KOSB and 1st Battalion, The Border Regiment (1 Border). They were transported in Horsa gliders piloted by members of the Glider Pilot Regiment, whose personnel trained to fight as infantry. Along with what remained of 1st and 3rd battalions, The Parachute Regiment (1 Para and 3 Para), 2 S Staffs participated during the early hours of 19 September in the attempt to enter Arnhem to relieve the soldiers of 1st Parachute Brigade who had reached the bridge. 2 S Staffs then assisted in the defence of the eastern sector of the Oosterbeek perimeter. 7 KOSB initially secured the landing grounds for the second and third lifts and then helped 4th Parachute Brigade, following that brigade’s unsuccessful attack into north Arnhem on 19 September, to withdraw across the railway line into the Oosterbeek perimeter, and were responsible for holding the northern sector. 1 Border defended the long western sector. The German armed forces in Western Europe were in a parlous state following the retreat from Normandy. On 7 September 1944 the vehicles of 9. SS-Panzer-Division Hohenstaufen clattered along the road from Nijmegen to Arnhem. The division’s retreat from Normandy, starting on 22 August, was a confused action that changed by the hour. By early September the division had only 3,500 of the 15,898 men on establishment in June. SS- Hauptsturmführer Hans Möller, commanding SS-Panzer-Pionier-Bataillon 9, the designated rearguard, described the withdrawal; he was dependent on hearsay and rumour because radios worked only rarely, and felt uncertain about where the enemy was and the safest route to take to avoid them (Kershaw 2004: 16). Allied air strikes were an ever-present danger in good weather and resistance fighters made frequent attempts to ambush the retreating Germans. The divisional headquarters unit found itself behind the