Poland was a problematic issue for the Big Powers throughout the Second World War. For Britain, Poland was a major stumbling block in British-Soviet relations, as Polish-Soviet territorial disputes clashed with the needs of the British-Soviet-United States alliance. As the Polish government-in-exile attempted to obtain a guarantee of British support, and many thousands of Polish troops fought for the British cause, the perception grew that the Churchill government had a debt to pay. Ultimately, however, it was a debt which Britain could not discharge because of its dependence on Soviet participation in the war. In this book Anita Prazmowska looks at British policies from the point of view of wartime strategy, relating this to Polish government expectations and policies. She describes a tragic situation where Polish soldiers were trapped between the grandiose and unrealistic plans of their government and the harsh realities of a war which they fought with no prospect of a satisfactory outcome for them or their country. BRITAIN AND POLAND, 1939-1943 Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies: 97 Editorial Board Stephen White (General editor) Roy Allison Mary Buckley Saul Estrin Anthony Kemp-Welch Catherine Merridale Judith Shapiro Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies, under the auspices of Cambridge University Press and the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies (BASEES), promotes the publication of works presenting substantial and original research on the economics, politics, sociology and modern history of Russia, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies 97 ANITA J. PRAZMOWSKA Britain and Poland, 1939-1943 The betrayed ally 96 JOHN DOYLE KL1ER Imperial Russia's Jewish question 1855-1881 95 DON C. RAWSON Russian rightists and the revolution of 1905 94 GRAEME GILL The collapse of a single-party system The disintegration of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 93 DONALD FILTZER Soviet workers and the collapse of perestroika The Soviet labour process and Gorbachev's reforms, 1985-1991 92 PETER GATRELL Government, industry and rearmament in Russia, 1900-1914 The last argument of tsarism 91 LINDA RACIOPPI Soviet policy towards South Asia since 1970 90 WENDY GOLDMAN Women, the State and the family Soviet family policy and social life, 1917-1936 89 JONATHAN C. VALDEZ Internationalism and the ideology of Soviet influence in Eastern Europe 88 PETER RUTLAND The politics of economic stagnation in the Soviet Union The role of local party organs in economic management 87 DONALD FILTZER Soviet workers and de-Stalinization The consolidation of the modern system of Soviet production relations 1953-1964 86 M1LICA UVALIC Investment and property rights in Yugoslavia The long transition to a market economy 85 AVRIL PITTMAN From Ostpolitik to reunification: West German-Soviet political relations since 1974 84 GEORGE O. LIBER Soviet nationality policy and social change in the Ukrainian SSR 1923-1934 The urban harvest 83 CHRISTOPH BLUTH Soviet strategic arms policy before SALT 82 JOHN P. W1LLERTON Patronage and politics in the USSR Series list continues on page 234 BRITAIN AND POLAND, 1939-1943 The betrayed ally ANITA J. PRAZMOWSKA 1 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Published by the Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge CB2 1RP 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 10 Stamford Road, Oakleigh, Melbourne 3166, Australia © Cambridge University Press 1995 First published 1995 A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress cataloguing in publication data Prazmowska, Anita. Britain and Poland, 1939-1943: the betrayed ally/Anita J. Prazmowska. p. cm. - (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and post-Soviet studies; 97) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0 521 40309 X 1. World War, 1939-1945 - Diplomatic history. 2. Great Britain - Foreign relations - Poland. 3. Poland - Foreign relations - Great Britain. I. Title. II. Series. D750.B7 1995 940.53'2-dc20 94-26412 CIP ISBN 0 521 40309 X hardback ISBN 0 521 48385 9 paperback Transferred to digital printing 2003 Contents Preface page ix Map xii 1 The formation of the Polish government-in-exile: ideology and war plans 1 2 Britain and German expansion in Eastern and South-eastern Europe 28 3 Britain's only fighting ally 54 4 Britain, Poland and the Soviet Union: June-December 1941 82 5 1942, year of disappointments 114 6 The illusion of an alliance ends 139 7 1943, the end of Polish-Soviet co-operation 166 Conclusion 191 Notes 199 Bibliography 217 Index 224 Preface I would not wish to deny that I have come to this subject because of its deeply emotive nature. Most current analysis of contemporary Polish history seems inevitably to founder on the question of why it was that Poland neither obtained recognition for her suffering and sacrifices during the Second World War nor secured the return of her territories after the war. Thus the search for those who are in some way respon- sible for this disaster is a common theme in political and historical debates. This work has been my attempt to face some of the most puzzling and painful events in recent Polish history. I do not wish to seek those responsible for failures. In this enquiry into the nature of Polish-British relations during the years 1939-1943,1 did not find within the two governments' war aims areas of common concern going beyond their obvious wish to see Germany defeated. During the inter-war period, Polish territorial and political objectives had been different from those of the British govern- ment. While I do not claim that major issues separated the two from the first day of the war, I have found that little united the two Allies. The Polish government-in-exile set out for itself a programme of establishing for Poland a right at the end of the war to sit at the negotiating table as one of the key wartime Allies. The means of achieving this was to make a vital and credible military contribution to the joint war effort. It was inevitable that this programme would not be taken seriously by the British government. Britain's continental policy developed hesitantly during the course of 1939 and the first half of 1940. The need to secure imperial support and to guarantee commu- nication links was a powerful distraction from purely Central Euro- pean preoccupations. In addition to that the need to take into account the foreign policy objectives of the Roosevelt administration and to deal with the consequences of Japanese aggression became the top priorities by 1941. x Preface The German attack on the Soviet Union and the consequent drawing in of the Soviet Union into allied political negotiations was to confirm the incompatibility of Polish-British war aims. Henceforth the Poles would have to fight for British attention in the face of the increasingly important Soviet factor in British political and military considerations. The Polish government, in spite of offering increased numbers of men for co-operation with the British forces, became a potential source of embarrassment and a constraint on Churchill's dealings with the Soviet Union. By the beginning of 1943 the British need for Soviet co-operation was too important for the Poles to be able to compete with it. To Stalin, the Polish case became no more and no less than a test of British goodwill. Churchill understood this. While he strove to maintain Soviet co-operation it was inevitable that he should view the Polish issue as a source of possible embarrassment. While writing this book I have had to tackle assumptions which form part of my heritage. I hope that I have been successful in this and that I have by this process challenged some of those preconceptions, or at least signalled the need to challenge them. My work has been assisted throughout by grants from the British Academy. I have been fortunate in being granted access to most of the archives containing papers relating to the period. I am therefore grateful to the Public Records Office and the University of Birming- ham where I consulted the Neville Chamberlain papers. The Polish Institute and Sikorski Museum in London has been particularly gener- ous with their help. There I was guided and generously advised by Andrzej Suchcitz and Waclaw Milewski. The Pilsudski Institute in London and the Instytut im. Ossolinskich in Wroclaw allowed me to examine the General Sosnkowski archives in both institutions. The Archiwum Akt Nowych and the archives of the Archiwum Ruchu Ludowego, Warsaw made available to me the papers of Professor Kot. The Liddel Hart Centre for Military Archives at King's College London allowed me to consult the Alanbrooke papers. At the House of Lords I was allowed to look at the archives of Lord Beaverbrook. I am grateful to the librarians and archivists in all these institutions jor their assist- ance which was always generously given. Sir Edward Cazalet was particularly helpful in arranging for me to see the personal and private papers of Victor Cazalet. Friends and colleagues have offered their support and advice. Professor Gabriel Gorodetsky explained the context of Soviet-British co-operation in Iran to me. I remain grateful to him for allowing me to see his notes on Cripps' personal papers, which were not available to