BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS The Royal Institute of International Affairs is an unofficial hody which promotes the scientific study of international questions and does not express opinions of its own. The opinions expressed in this publication are the responsibility of the author. By the same author US INTELLIGENCE AND THE SOVIET STRATEGIC THREAT EVOLUTION OF NUCLEAR STRATEGY (forthcoming) (Studies in International Security) BRITAIN AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS Lawrence Freedman M Published for Palgrave Macmillan © Royal Institute of International Affairs I g80 All rights reseIVed. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission Firstpublished 1980 by THE MACMILLAN PRESS LTD London and Basingstoke Companies and representatives throughout the world Filmset by Vantage Photosetting Co. Ltd, Southampton and London British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Freedman, Lawrence Britain and nuclear weapons I. Great Britain - Military policy 2. Atomic weapons I. Title II. Royal Institute of International Affairs 355.03'35' 4I UA647 ISBN 978-0-333-30511-9 ISBN 978-1-349-16388-5 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-16388-5 The paperback edition of this book is sold subject to the condition that it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be lent, resold, hired out, or otherwise circulated without the publisher's prior consent, in any form of binding or.cover other than that in which it is published and without a similar condition including this condition being imposed on the subsequent purchaser Contents Vll Acknowledgements IX Lift ofA bbreviations Xl Introduction The Nuclear Bias 10 2 From Skybolt to Polaris 3 The Problem of Strategy 4 The Labour Government and Nuclear Weapons 1964-70 31 5 Chevaline 41 6 The Problem of Replacement 52 7 Cruise Missiles versus Ballistic Missiles 69 8 Defence Priorities 79 9 Arms Control 86 IO The Strategic Context IO 1 II Nuclear Politics in Europe 114 12 Rationales 127 v VI Britain and Nuclear Weapons Appendices Submarines 2 Characteristics of SLBMs '43 3 Expenditure on Nuclear Weapons (current £m) '44 4 Breakdown of Costs of Nuclear Strategic Forces '45 5 Manpower '46 6 Pola Tis Missile T es ts '47 7 Underground Nuclear Tests '48 Notes '49 Index '54 Acknowledgemen ts It is not possible to thank all those who have helped me with this book, but I would like to express particular gratitude to Charles Douglas-Home, Rear-Admiral Edward Gueritz, Professor Michael Howard, Professor Peter Nailor, Ian Smart and, as ever, my wife for their encouragement and advice. This book is in part a result of work undertaken for Chatham House's British Foreign Policy Project, which was funded by the Leverhulme Trust. LAWRENCE FREEDMAN List of Abbreviations ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile ALCM Air-Launched Cruise Missile ANF Atlantic Nuclear Force BAOR British Army of the Rhine ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty GLCM Ground-Launched Cruise Missile ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies IRBM Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile MIRV Multiple Independently-Targetable Re-entry Vehicle MLF Multilateral Force MOD Minis try of Defence MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile MRV Multiple Re-entry Vehicle NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NPG Nuclear Planning Group NPT Non-Proliferation Treaty PTBT Partial Test Ban Treaty SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SlOP Single Integrated Operations Plan SLBM Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile SLCM Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile TERCOM Terrain Contour Matching TNF Theatre Nuclear Forces UN United Nations IX Introduction I Plans for a future war assume that, if it should 'go nuclear', Britain could within one day suffer attack from 200 warheads each with an explosive yield equivalent to one million tons of TNT (one megaton). Around the centre of each explosion would be miles of complete devastation, with fire and radiation effects persisting after the blast effects had run their course. Crude calculations can be made of an individual's chances of surviving such an explosion - 20 per cent at a mile from the centre, 40 per cent after three miles and so on, but the margin of error is enormous. The long-term consequences, of lingering radiation or social and economic dis ruption, are even harder to predict. The question of whether the Government could do more to improve the survival chances of the population has become a matter of some controversy. After optimism over the potential for Civil Defence in the early 1950S, confidence began to wane in its value until the organisation was virtually disbanded in 1968. What remains is an impressive ability to sound the alarm and monitor the effects of an attack, a capacity to maintain a function ing administrative apparatus, a modicum of law and order in the aftermath and some stockpiles of foodstuffs and other com modities. The controversy surrounds the question of whether much can be done for the population at large. The official line is that protection should be on a do-it-yourself basis. With some justice it is pointed out that mass evacuations would gain little, because there would be no guaranteed 'safe' place to which to go. People would be encouraged to stay at home and do the best they could in constructing a makeshift shelter in which to stay until the danger Xl