BORIS GODUNOV RUSLAN G. SKRYNNIKOV BORIS GODUNOV Edited and Translated by Hugh F. Graham Academic International Press tgSz THE RUSSIAN SERIES/Volume 35 Ruslan G. Skrynnikov, Boris Godunov Translation of Boris Godunov (Moscow, 1978) English translation and special contents of this book Copyright © 1982 by Academic International Press. All rights reserved. The reproduction or utilization of this work in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including xerography, photocopying, and recording, and in any information storage and retrieval system, by any individual, institution or library, is forbidden under law without the written permission of the publisher. ISBN: 0-87569-046-7 Composition by Jayne Berndsen Title page by King & Queen Press Illustrations courtesy of the author Printed in the United States of America A list of Academic International Press publications is found at the end of this volume. ACADEMIC INTERNATIONAL PRESS Box 1111 Gulf Breeze FL 32561 CONTENTS Editor’s Introduction xi Author’s Introduction xviii I The Beginning 1 II A Time of Testing 11 III Boyar Persecution 27 IV Establishment of the Patriarchate 38 V Foreign Policy 46 VI Drama in Uglich 51 vn Crown Regent 66 VIII Forbidden and Fixed Years 70 IX The Land Assembly of 1598 80 X Illness 105 XI The Great Famine 115 XII Grigorii Otrepev 126 XIII Disaster 146 Notes 155 Author’s Bibliography 169 Index 170 The Author 176 EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION Professor Ruslan Grigorevich Skrynnikov has established an enviable reputation as a leading authority on the history of Russia in the six­ teenth century, the field he teaches at Leningrad State University. He also has made a commitment to bring serious history to the atjpfi- tion of the general public. To further this aim he lectures to numerous groups and has written scholarly works on early Russian history in a popular format. The present volume, one in his series, sheds new light on an epoch, the treatment of which in the past has been marred by sensationalism. It is appropriate to comment on certain aspects of the narrative. The first chapter supplies background and discusses the reign of Ivan the Terrible. The tsar had divided Russia into an oprichnina (crown lands) which was a sprawling appanage he ruled without con­ straint, and a zemshchina (the realm) which was the remainder of the realm administered in the traditional way by prominent boyars. The oprichnina had its own court, council, chanceries and army. The suspicious ruler needed new men he felt he could trust to staff them. The Godunov family’s fortunes recently had been in decline but the oprichnina revived them. Boris’ uncle obtained a high position in the royal retinue and was able to advance his nephew’s interests. Boris avoided the capricious tsar’s official displeasure, which might mean exile, confiscation of estates, or even death, and took advantage of his court service, which provided him with a valuable political education. Professor Skrynnikov disposes of persistent legends that Boris was of Tatar origin and illiterate. Professor Skrynnikov emphasizes that a connection with the royal house was a passport to power. Keenly aware of this the Godunov family strove to forge such a link, an effort crowned with success when Boris’ sister Irina was married to Fedor, Ivan’s second son. The tsar’s rash act-killing his elder son—cleared the way for the latter to succeed to the throne, and since Fedor was not in full possession of his faculties and was incapable of ruling chance seemed to have fur­ nished Boris a splendid opportunity. However, Professor Skrynnikov points out that in spite of the marriage connection Boris’ position was weaker than has often been supposed. He was neither president of a regency council Ivan had decreed should act in Fedor’s name EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION vii nor even a member of it. This explains why Godunov initially pro­ ceeded against leading figures like Prince Mstislavskii and the Shuiskii brothers. He wanted to eliminate members of the regency council who barred his way, and he quietly succeeded. He soon established an ascendancy over Fedor and became de facto head of the govern­ ment. Professor Skrynnikov stresses the major role rumor played in shaping the course of events as soon as Godunov’s star began to rise. Many unfounded stories and gossip eventually found their way into historical literature, were accepted as fact, and have been repeated over and over again from the seventeenth century to the present. One of Boris’ first accomplishments was to make the Moscow metropolitanate a patriarchal see, as churchmen had long craved. He devised an ingenious stratagem to outwit Jeremiah, the credulous patriarch of Constantinople. This achievement won him popularity and increased support. The chapter on this topic closes with a useful dissection of the theory of Moscow the Third Rome. It was a defen­ sive ideology, designed merely to enhance Russia’s status in the Or­ thodox hierarchy. Professor Skrynnikov conducts a detailed analysis of the Uglich affair, central to any estimate of Godunov’s character, and clearly demonstrates that young Prince Dmitrii, an epileptic, accidentally caused his own death. The Nagoi family was responsible for the riot and lynchings in Uglich and the later arson in Moscow. Boris was not involved in any way; in fact, Dmitrii’s death was disadvantageous be­ cause rumor inevitably linked him to the deed. If Boris’ complicity had been palpable he might well have been driven from office. In this connection Professor Skrynnikov plausibly argues that Boris formed no plans to acquire the throne himself until some six years later. The repressions he carried out in Uglich were motivated by fear, not anger. A key chapter investigates the involved question of forbidden and fixed years, essential to any inquiry into the root causes of serfdom in Russia. This has been an issue of exceptional importance and con­ cern to historians. Professor Skrynnikov has given a succinct outline of a very complex topic. He is a member of the nonjuridical school that considers circumstance created a particular climate to which government statutes responded by tying peasants to the land, al­ though Koretskii1 has shown that Soviet historians may hold other views. The primary concern was to shore up the tax base, which was threatened by increasing problems occurring during the two weeks before and after St. George’s Day in November when peasants tradi­ tionally enjoyed the right (known technically as departure) to leave viii EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION one landlord for another. Historians generally have held that the origin of serfdom should be sought in a rescript abrogating the right of St. George’s Day issued by Tsar Ivan in 1581, but Professor Skryn- nikov flies in the face of tradition, contending no such rescript ever was promulgated for the simple reason that one has never been found and later references to it are equivocal. This means Boris Godunov, not Tsar Ivan, was primarily responsible for establishing serfdom in Russia, but he was not deliberately scheming to deny peasants free­ dom of movement in an effort to curry favor with the lesser gentry (with the advancement of whose interests he has been identified)Jme was anxious merely to solve immediate financial problems. No one foresaw what the long range results of this measure to stabilize govern­ ment revenues would be nor that temporary, transient expedients would become permanent and legally binding on the majority of the population. The long chapter describing Boris’ successive maneuvers to be elected tsar in the teeth of aristocratic opposition affords ample in­ sights into this dramatic event, showing that Godunov had consider­ able support among the people, and was a master at organizing and manipulating street demonstrations and other agitational techniques. When these alone proved ineffective he ingeniously contrived the Serpukhov campaign to repel a nonexistent Tatar threat. The land assembly of 1598 that ratified his election was duly constituted and fully representative for its time. Professor Skrynnikov shows that once Godunov came to power he recognized the futility of trying to rule effectively without the sup­ port of the boyars and awarded honors and conciliar rank to many of them. He could not, and so he did not, base his regime exclusively on the gentry. An intriguing question has been why in 1600 Boris moved against Bogdan Belskii and members of the Romanov family, claiming they were practising witchcraft, a serious charge at the time. He believes Boris’ chronically poor health was the reason. Godunov was taken ill in 1599 and again the following year; rumor, his nemesis, immediately exaggerated his disability and created an artificial dy­ nastic crisis. His rivals were encouraged to position themselves to struggle for the throne. Boris managed to survive by banishing (not executing) his opponents and was free for a short while to pursue his own policies before disaster overtook him. Professor Skrynnikov ap­ plauds Boris’ building program, his interest in western technology and culture, and his concern for education, which was ahead of its time. He concludes that on balance Boris was a talented ruler, a fact con­ temporaries failed to appreciate until after the Time of Troubles. EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION IX Analyzing Godunov’s debacle, Professor Skrynnikov develops a fundamental thesis—the commons encompassed Boris’ ruin. The events of this period, in which Marxists detect evidence of the class struggle, have provided materials that have been enticing to Soviet historians, and Professor Skrynnikov has marshaled an impressive ar­ ray of facts to buttress his opinion. This approach to Boris’ mis­ fortunes has often been ignored; the usual reasons given for his fall are opposition from boyars and princes or from chancery officials, False Dmitrii’s cunning, the intrusion of Poland, or Boris’ lack of moral qualities. It is stimulating to consider the present concept. Boris was a victim of sheer bad luck. No sooner had he consoli­ dated his position than Russia was assailed by protracted crop failures that induced hardship and ultimately caused famine and mass starva­ tion. The government did what it could to alleviate suffering, but its relief measures were concentrated in the towns because Boris was trying to stimulate their growth and expand their capacity to pay taxes—his so-called “town edifice.” Peasants received comparatively little assistance; the harsh fiscal policy was making their life more difficult, and the bondage statutes encouraged landlords to increase their exactions. Discontent festered in the countryside. Fearing a mass rising, Boris reinstituted the right of peasant de­ parture at St. George’s Day in 1601, but, significantly enough, did not extend the provision to include estates belonging to great nobles and monasteries, crown lands, or the regions around Moscow. This serves as a clear indication that Boris now had become a champion of the upper strata of society, whose wrath he feared, but was not afraid to provoke the lesser gentry. His move failed to achieve its objective. Peasants interpreted his statutes to mean they might de­ part whenever they pleased, and they refused to render service for or pay imposts and fees either to the crown or their landlords. The latter, faced with ruin, retaliated swiftly with intensified repression. In 1603 the growing confrontation led to an outbreak of large scale violence, headed by a certain Khlopko, which engulfed the central region of the country and spilled over into Moscow. When Khlopko’s capture and execution failed to abate the rioting the government realized it could not prevail without help from the lesser gentry. The price Boris had to pay for their support was annulment of the right of departure. Repeal of the statute understandably aroused the peas­ ants further and created an even more volatile situation, especially when it is remembered that the cossacks in the southern borderland were in ferment. Boris constantly harassed them because he knew EDITOR’S INTRODUCTION that their enclaves, which attracted runaway peasants, were a potent force for destabilizing the center. It is against this background that the career of the pretender must be set. Professor Skrynnikov believes the Muscovite boyars sponsored the pretender. He was unquestionably the Yurii Otrepev the authorities claimed him to be, who had served in the course of his variegated career as a courtier in the Romanov establishment before Boris shat­ tered its power in 1600. Yurii (Grigorii after he became a monk) had fascinating adventures. Using contemporary sources that previously have been largely ignored, Professor Skrynnikov traces Otrep^rs activities in detail and shows that he was a man of skill, ability and tenacity, as well as a consummate opportunist, who while intriguing in Poland maintained contact with the cossacks. In desperation they turned to him as a feasible alternative to the hated Godunov; thus, False Dmitrii was given a chance to lead a broad-based peasant revolt, but his temperament made him reluctant to commit himself to such a course and he preferred to negotiate with his Polish patrons. This combination of factors spelled disaster for Boris and ruin for Russia. Although Otrepev promised the king of Poland lavish awards of Russian territory if he should succeed, the royal council was divided as to the wisdom of backing a pretender and at best he received luke­ warm support. The small mercenary army he recruited in Poland was defeated, but Godunov’s commanders were slow to follow up their victory. This respite gave peasants and cossacks time to rally to Otrepev, in whom they sensed a leader capable of formulating the goals of their spontaneous movement. Principal figures in Moscow felt obliged to close ranks around the tsar, but the residue of ill will towards him remained such that re­ sistance to Otrepev’s peasant and cossack army was feeble and some officers went over with their men. As the situation deteriorated Boris stepped up repression, further alienating society as denunciations multiplied and his government carried out summary reprisals. Boris withdrew to the Kremlin and gave himself over to the sorcery and divination to which he always had been prone. He died suddenly in April 1605, thereby ensuring False Dmitrii’s triumph. The narrative closes with the murder of Godunov’s wife and son. His dynasty was extinct and its collapse was the prologue to a massive peasant war that shook Russia to its foundations. No previous discussion of Boris Godunov has provided such a co­ hesive explanation of the ramifications of his career. The justice of this observation becomes clear when available literature on the topic