Chapter 9 Bhaskar and Critical Realism Steve Fleetwood Introduction In the late 1970s Roy Bhaskar initiated a meta-theoretical perspective, critical realism (CR)1 that subsequently went on to influence sociology, social theory (ST), and organi- zation studies (OS). Because the nature of this influence is complex, it is sensible to start with a (four-point) clarification. (i) CR is a meta-theory rooted explicitly in ontology—i.e. the study of being, exist- ence, or more simply the study of the way the world is. CR ontology is char- acterized by stratified, emergent, and transformational entities, relations, and processes. As a meta-theory, CR did not influence sociology, ST, and OS substan- tively: there is, for example, no such thing as a ‘CR theory of worker resistance’.2 (ii) CR influence went beyond ontology because one’s ontology influences one’s aetiology, epistemology, methodology, choice of research techniques, mode of inference, the objectives one seeks, and the concepts of explana- tion, prediction, and theory one adopts. I refer to this as a ‘chain of meta- theoretical concepts’. (iii) CR also highlighted the existence of two rival ontologies in sociology, ST. and OS: (i) an empirical realist ontology, characterized by observed, atomic events; and an idealist ontology, characterized by entities constituted entirely by dis- course (etc.). (iv) CR offered an interpretation, and critical evaluation, of empirical realist and ide- alist ontologies, and their associated chains of meta-theoretical concepts. This chapter has five parts.3 The first section shows how CR moved from philosophy to sociology and ST, and from there to OS. It also clears some ground for what is to Adler180214OUK.indb 182 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM Bhaskar and Critical Realism 183 come later. The second and third sections are CR interpretations, and critical evalu- ations, of empirical realist and idealist ontologies and their associated chains of meta-theoretical concepts. The fourth section elaborates upon CR’s ontology and its associated chain of meta-theoretical concepts. The conclusion shows that differing defi- nitions of organizations are influenced by different ontologies and their associated chain of meta-theoretical concepts. Critical Realism: From Philosophy to Sociology and ST While Bhaskar was instrumental in advocating a (re)turn to realism in the 1970s and 1980s he was not the only advocate. Indeed, he was one of several.4 Bhaskar’s work was distinctive, however, because while others applied realism to particular issues (e.g. the environment),5 Bhaskar (intentionally or otherwise) applied it to the develop- ment of a meta-theory for social science in general. This made it groundbreaking. Many philosophers began to recognize the importance of Bhaskar’s work for social science and Collier (1994) published an important simplification of Bhaskar’s (often difficult) writing. Simultaneously, realist ideas, many extremely close to critical realism, were being developed by thinkers working on the terrain where philosophy and ST meet.6 All this helped to nudge CR from philosophy to sociology and ST where it found a small but highly receptive audience. There are three main reasons why the audience was so receptive. (i) Sociology and ST were dominated by structural functionalism. While CRs were not alone in criticizing functionalism, Bhaskar and STs like Archer were instrumental in developing a critique of, and an alternative to, its structural determinism. (ii) Sociology and ST were also dominated by a positivist philosophy of science. Bhaskar and STs like Sayer were instrumental in developing a sophisticated and thoroughgoing critique of positivism that was lacking in the alternatives that were beginning to emerge. (iii) The dominance of structural functionalism and positivism was challenged by the emergence of ‘interpretivism’ and later by ‘postmodernism (etc.)’— both defined below. Unfortunately, interpretivism and postmodernism (etc.) had serious shortcomings, leaving many sociologists and STs facing Hobson’s Choice. They could reject positivism and structural functionalism, but only by accepting interpretivism or postmodernism (etc.), with their shortcomings. CR offered an alternative to positivism, structural functionalism, interpretivism, and postmodernism (etc.)—although some caveats need to be added in the lat- ter two cases. Adler180214OUK.indb 183 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM 184 Steve Fleetwood Structural Functionalism Structural functionalism was sufficiently dominant in the 1970s and 1980s for Burrell and Morgan (1979) to include as one of the four main sociological para- digms. Structural functionalism conceived of society as a system, the parts of which (i.e. norms, customs and institutions, and the people) are structured, and function to maintain the system’s overall ability and cohesion—with a degree of disequilibrium and conflict. It was a macro-social approach. While it recognized that agents have roles, as well as a degree of autonomy in executing the actions associated with these roles, agents were severely constrained, if not determined, by the structure of the system. Effectively, agency disappeared as agents became puppets, acting out a role determined by society’s structure. One of the main problems facing structural func- tionalism, then, was its inability to reconcile agency and structure, resulting in struc- tural determinism. Positivism For much of the twentieth century, philosophy of science was dominated by positiv- ism and its associated methods and research techniques. Popper’s influential work did not so much overturn positivism as shift the focus from confirmation to falsification, without significantly altering the basic approach to doing science. In social science, objective, true, and scientific knowledge could (allegedly) be gained by studying social behaviour from the ‘outside’—i.e. ‘outside’ of the thoughts and beliefs of people. It did not so much matter what people thought or believed, but what they did—or could be measured doing. If, for example, productivity increased following the introduction of performance management (PM), then knowledge of this could be obtained by develop- ing a theory, using it to make a prediction in the form of a hypothesis, and then testing the hypothesis. If the hypothesis was not falsified, the theory (or part of it) was objective and true. Dissenting voices were, however, emerging. Interpretivism From the 1960s onwards, some sociologists and STs had begun to advocate interpre- tive, verstehen, subjectivist, interactionist, hermeneutic, and ethnomethodological approaches—hereafter referred to as interpretivist. Interpretivists rejected the idea that knowledge could be gained from the ‘outside’, arguing that knowledge could only be obtained by studying behaviour from the ‘inside’—i.e. via the thoughts, beliefs, inten- sions, and interpretations of people. The basic idea was that human beings act in a social world that they must first interpret—something not necessary for gases and atoms. This in turn meant that the objective of social science was to uncover the subjective meanings held by those under investigation. This knowledge was believed to be subjective.7 It was, Adler180214OUK.indb 184 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM Bhaskar and Critical Realism 185 therefore, via interpretivism that relativism, in the guise of epistemic relativism (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]: 5 passim), entered into sociology and ST. Epistemic relativism holds that one’s social position (e.g. class, gender, race, being a researcher, being researched) influ- ences the way one interprets the world, formulates concepts, and made claims about it. While epistemic relativism became widely accepted in social science, it opened the door to debilitating forms of relativism, which are better discussed in a later section. Postmodernism (etc.) From the 1980s onwards, a set of (ambiguously related) ideas took sociology and ST by storm, ideas known via terminology like ‘postmodernism’, ‘post-structuralism’, ‘social constructionism’, ‘relativism’, ‘continental philosophy’, ‘pragmatism’, or the ‘linguistic’, ‘cultural’, or ‘relativistic’ turn. For convenience, these ideas will be referred to as post- modernism (etc.). These ideas had several (often overlapping) origins. In Anglo-Saxon literature they came from Wittgenstein, via STs like Winch (1959). In continental lit- erature they came from Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida. They also had origins in the philosophy of science (Kuhn, 1970; Feyerabend, 1993), and in the sociology of science (Latour, 1987). It is vital to understand two things about postmodernism (etc.). First, the ver- sion of postmodernism (etc.) that took sociology, ST (and OS) by storm, was sometimes implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, rooted in an ontology of idealism. Idealism comes in several guises, but the guise that entered sociology, ST (and OS) held that the (social and/or natural) world could not exist independently of its iden- tification. That is, the world could not exist without someone observing it, know- ing about it (tacitly or non-tacitly), or socially constructing it. The world was made, fabricated, or constructed, entirely from discourse, language, signs, or texts. ‘Reality’ (now with scare quotes) could not exist independently of discourse, language, signs, or texts. The term ‘entirely’ is crucial: it implies that there are no extra-discursive, extra-linguistic, extra-semiotic, or extra-textual entities. I will abbreviate all this and write, variously, of the world, reality, or entities, being ‘constructed entirely via dis- course (etc.)’. Knowledge could not, qua positivism, be objective. Indeed, knowledge now had little or nothing to do with entities existing independently of agents and became entirely dependent upon them (Fleetwood, 2005). Second, postmodernism (etc.) is not necessarily synonymous with idealism and one can be a postmodernist (etc.) without being an idealist. Idealism, Postmodernism (etc.), and Interpretivism At this point, it becomes easier to understand the particular shortcomings facing inter- pretivism and postmodernism (etc.) introduced by idealism. If, as idealism implies, knowledge has little or nothing to do with entities existing independently of agents, but Adler180214OUK.indb 185 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM 186 Steve Fleetwood is entirely dependent upon them, this has implications for ontology and epistemology. The implication is the disappearance of the distinction between entities and our knowl- edge of entities and the collapse of ontology into epistemology. What there is to know, collapses into what can be known, a position Bhaskar (1998 [1979]: 16 passim) refers to as the ‘epistemic fallacy’. Moreover, epistemic relativism often collapses into judgemen- tal relativism (Bhaskar, 1998 [1979]: 57–8)—i.e. the belief that it is impossible to judge between competing claims. If the social world is constructed entirely via discourse (etc.), i.e. constructed out of agents’ meanings and interpretations, then there is no independ- ent entity with which to compare agents’ meanings and interpretations. Claims about ‘objective’ knowledge and ‘truth’ became unsustainable. Many of those sociologists and STs eager to reject positivism and structural func- tionalism, and embrace interpretivism or postmodernism (etc.), ended up being blown off-course by idealism. They could not accept interpretivism or postmodernism (etc.) because idealist inroads had made it appear that a commitment to interpretivism or postmodernism (etc.) demanded a commitment to idealism. Many were not commit- ted to idealism, and some even had a loose commitment to some kind of realism. But the versions of realism available to them in the 1970s and 1980s were often forms of crude materialism and, therefore, not much of an alternative. How could a sociologist or social theorist interested in (say) discourse, ideology, or culture, accept realism when realism appeared to accommodate only ‘hard bits of stuff’, or worse still, when realism was taken as synonymous with empirical realism—the ontology underpinning positiv- ism? CR allowed sociologists and STs to reject positivism and struc tural functionalism, and embrace aspects of interpretivism or postmodernism (etc.), without being blown off-course by idealism. A Closer Look at Ontology Ontology is crucial to sociology and ST for two (main) reasons. First, everyone has an ontology—a set of beliefs about the way the world is—and if it is not explicit then an implicit ontology will necessarily be ‘smuggled in’ as a presupposition. CR and Idealists are explicit ontologists, while empirical realists presuppose their ontology—deriving it from epistemology. Second, to say that one’s ontology influences one’s chain of meta-theoretical concepts, is not to say there is no room for variation between ontology and aetiology, epistemol- ogy, methodology, research techniques, objectives, modes of inference, and conceptions of explanation, prediction, and theory. Knight (2002: 33) writes of an association (or ‘congregation’) between ontology and other meta-theoretical concepts, while recogniz- ing that the latter are not ‘bonded to ontologies’. To exemplify ontology’s influencing role, consider the case of methodology, and the (retroductive) question: what ontology must be presupposed for a deconstruc- tive method to be employed? The term ‘must’ caries no empirical force and the ques- tion means something like: what ontological presupposition is sustainable, defensible, Adler180214OUK.indb 186 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM Bhaskar and Critical Realism 187 sensible, plausible, logical, consistent, or intelligible with the use of a deconstructive method? Consider two claims: (1) ‘because I believe it is raining outside I will take an umbrella’ (2) ‘because I believe organizations are socially constructed via discourse (etc.) I will employ a method that deconstructs this discourse’ One does not believe it is raining because one takes an umbrella; and one does not believe organizations are socially constructed because one employs a deconstructive method. One takes an umbrella and one employs a deconstructive method because these are consistent and intelligible things to do given one’s ontology. Furthermore, reversing the direction of influence, running from methodology to ontology, would be tantamount to adopting a belief about the way the world is for methodological convenience: the tail would be wagging the dog. In short, if one’s ontology influences one’s aetiology, episte- mology, methodology, research techniques, objectives, modes of inference, and concep- tions of explanation, prediction, and theory, then a mistaken ontology, however derived, is a meta-theoretical disaster. Critical Realism, Ontology, and Organization Theory During the late 1970s and 1980s CR not only found a small and highly receptive audience in sociology and ST, it found a similar audience in OS. At this time, a minor diaspora from sociology departments into the business and management schools was under- way, bringing with it substantive developments in disciplines like industrial relations, industrial sociology, organizational behaviour, and labour process theory. While many of these substantive developments were implicitly realist, at the time virtually no one thought to make their underlying commitments to realism explicit. When, therefore, CR finally emerged in OS, many easily accepted it.8 CR is now considered a legitimate perspective in OS, attracting critical evaluation (Contu & Willmott, 2005; Al Amoudi & Willmott, 2011; Willmott, 2005) and symposia (Newton, Deetz, & Reed, 2011). As I write, an article by CR O’Mahoney (2011) has just appeared in the journal Organisation. So how did CR influence OS? A good place to start is with the bewildering tangle of ‘positions’ found in the OS literature, such as: actor-network theory, critical theory, dialogicism, discourse theory/analysis, empiricism, ethnomethodology, functionalism, grounded theory, hermeneuticism, humanism, ideographic, institutionalism, interpre- tivism, modernism, narratology, normative, nominalism, nomothetic, phenomenol- ogy, positivism, relativism, social constructionism/constructivism, socio-materialism, structuralism (radical and functionalism), structuration, subjectivism, sym- bolic interactionism, objectivism, population ecology, positivism, anti-positivism, post-positivism, pragmatism, various realisms (e.g. empirical, naïve, scientific, struc- tural, and relational), and verstehen, not to mention positions grounded in theorists such as Marx, Weber, and Foucault. Adler180214OUK.indb 187 7/17/2014 1:57:49 PM 188 Steve Fleetwood There have been several attempts to untangle these positions, the following four being, arguably, the most well-known. Burrell and Morgan (1979) present four ‘para- digms’, divided into two ‘approaches’: • Radical humanism. • Radical structuralism. • Functionalist sociology. • Interpretive sociology. • Subjectivist approach—nominalist ontology, anti-positivist epistemology, vol- untarist understanding of human nature and ideographic methodology. • Objectivist approaches—realist ontology, positivist epistemology, deterministic understanding of human nature, and nomothetic methodology. Deetz (2000) presents four ‘discourses’: • Dialogic (postmodern and deconstructionism). • Critical (late modern, reformist). • Normative (modern, progressive). • Interpretive (premodern, traditional). Guba and Lincoln (1994) present four ‘basic belief systems’ about ontology, epistemol- ogy and methodology: • Positivism. • Post-positivism. • Constructivism. • Critical theory et al.—being a ‘blanket term’ exemplified by neo-Marxism, femi- nism, materialism, and participatory inquiry, and divided into ‘post-structuralism, postmodernism and a blending of these two’ (Guba & Lincoln, 1994: 109). Knight (2002: 27–32) presents three paradigms: • Realism and positivism. • CR and pragmatism. • Anti-realism and post-structuralism. While these observations were useful in ‘mapping’ the OS terrain, they suffer from (at least) three shortcomings. First, they attempt to ‘compare apples and oranges’—i.e. by comparing meta-theoretical concepts to theoretical ones, theoretical concepts to sub- stantive concepts, and so on. Second, they do not sufficiently differentiate between vari- eties of realism—and critical realism is rarely mentioned. Third, postmodernism (etc.) (e.g. postmodernism, post-structuralism, constructivism) are often treated as varieties of idealism. Adler180214OUK.indb 188 7/17/2014 1:57:50 PM Bhaskar and Critical Realism 189 CR avoids the first two shortcomings by offering a three-fold division of these posi- tions based upon ontology, and then tracing the chain of meta-theoretical concepts rooted in these ontologies. CR avoids the third shortcoming by exposing, as an ontolog- ical misconception, the view that all postmodernists (etc.) are ontological idealists. This is not the case—as the following comments, from three well-known postmodernists (etc.) make clear: This position is unacceptably idealist because it is understood to conflate discourse with an ‘extra-discursive’ realm, so that changing the world is conceived to be equiv- alent to changing the discourse. Such a position may be held by some, perhaps many, constructionist and discourse analysts. (Willmott, 2005: 748) The constant tendency was that postmodernism was rendered as entailing a par- ticular set of epistemological and ontological commitments. Postmodernists, appar- ently, hold a relativist or conventionalist epistemology and an antirealist or idealist ontology. (Jones, 2008: 1245) Social constructionism could be placed close to critical realism . . . Although there are explicitly idealist strains within constructionism, the latter does not usually pro- test realism, but essentialism, the ‘things per se’, the world that does not need the work to exist in order to be real. (Czarniawska, 2003: 132–1) In their initial, and quite understandable, enthusiasm to reject empirical realism (and positivism), many early postmodernists (etc.) took an antirealist and idealist position. Although this idealism has since waned, some postmodernists (etc.) remain committed to it. It is, however, often difficult to interpret their commitments because what looks like idealism is sometimes merely a flirtation with antirealist or idealist language. Others affirm a commitment to realism, sometimes unconditionally and sometimes condition- ally. An example of the latter is when reality is said to exist, but a condition is added that one cannot know anything about it—i.e. ‘empty’ or ‘fig leaf’ realism (Kukla, 2000; Fleetwood, 2005). Clarifying this misconception, as CR does, has two very important consequences: one for postmodernism (etc.) and another beyond. First if some postmodernists (etc.) are idealists, some merely flirt with it, some reject it, and some are conditional or uncon- ditional realists, then postmodernists (etc.) cannot, unequivocally, be labelled idealists. This is not so difficult to understand once it is realized that here are many reasons for accepting the label ‘postmodernism (etc.)’ (e.g. culture, ethics, gender, history, knowl- edge, politics, and power), reasons that have little or nothing to do with ontology. This means that postmodernists (etc.) could accept idealist or CR ontologies and many of the concepts in their associated meta-theoretical chains. Moreover, once the CR ontology is clearly spelled out, and its differences and similarities with empirical realism and ideal- ism are made clear, many postmodernists (etc.) will realize that they have little to lose, and a lot to gain, by accepting it—or at least something like it. Second, this argument can be extended to (virtually) all the positions noted above,, although three brief examples will have to suffice. If, as appears to be the case, some ethnomethodologists, some actor-network theorists, and some discourse theorists are Adler180214OUK.indb 189 7/17/2014 1:57:50 PM 190 Steve Fleetwood idealists, some merely flirt with it, some reject it, and some are conditional or uncon- ditional realists, then ethnomethodologists, actor-network theorists, and discourse theorists cannot, unequivocally, be labelled idealists. This means ethnomethodologists, actor-network theorists, and discourse theorists/analysts could accept idealist or CR ontologies and many of the concepts in their associated meta-theoretical chains. They would, however, be unlikely to accept an empirical realist ontology. An ethnomethod- ologist, for example, committed to studying people from the ‘inside’, would not adopt methods and techniques that only allow people to be studied from the ‘outside’—which is all an ontology of observed atomistic events permits. Unfortunately, this misconception often appears in contemporary OS literature as a two-way fissure between postmodernism (etc.) and an (often under-elaborated) real- ism—exemplified in Westwood and Cleggs’s excellent collection: Debating Organisatio ns: Point-Counterpoint in Organisation Studies. Westwood and Clegg (2003: 8–9) reflect this misconception when they observe that the ‘most recent fissure’ in OS has emerged from the ‘postmodern turn’, adding that postmodernism is ‘antithetical to the episte- mology of positivism, neopositivism and all forms of naive realism’. Indeed, with a few exceptions, the rest of the collection accepts this two-way fissure. CR avoids this misconception and, thereby, offers OS a different way of ‘mapping’ the terrain. CR replaces this two-way fissure with a three-way fissure, based firmly on ontol- ogy, between: • Idealism. • Realism—of which there are two main strands: • Empirical realism—encapsulating scientific and structural realism. • Critical realism—encapsulating relational and processual realism. More precisely, the three ontologies are: • Idealist ontology, characterized by entities constituted entirely by discourse (etc.). • Empirical realist ontology, characterized by observed, atomistic events. • Critical realist ontology, characterized by stratified, emergent, and transforma- tional entities, and relations and processes. At this point the reader might wish to glance at Table 9.1 which highlights the three dis- tinct ontological paradigms and their associated chain of meta-theoretical concepts. This table can be returned to later when all the concepts have been elaborated. The fol- lowing two sections present CR interpretations, and critical evaluations, of empirical realist and idealist ontologies and their associated chains of meta-theoretical concepts. Before proceeding, please note the following caveat. Many newcomers to meta-theory will find the following sections rather heavy going. In an effort to keep the exposition as ‘uncluttered’ as possible, extensive quotations and references to Bhaskar (and other CRs) are avoided. Each section is, however, firmly based upon Bhaskar’s (and other CRs) work, and references are provided for the interested reader. Adler180214OUK.indb 190 7/17/2014 1:57:50 PM Table 9.1 Ontological paradigms for organization studies Critical realist ontology Idealist ontology of stratified, emergent, exhausted by and transformational Empirical realist ontology of discourse, language, entities, relations, and atomistic, observable events signs, symbols, texts processes Associated Positivism or ‘scientism’. Various. Critical realism. meta-theory Ontology Atomistic, observable, Entities cannot exist Some entities exist events. independently of independently of their No recognition of social their identification identification because construction. because all entities not all are constructed are constructed from from discourse— No agency-structure discourse (etc.). some entities are approach, only rational agents as individuals. ‘Reality’ is entirely extra-discursive. socially constructed. Single reality ‘Reality’ is but multiple problematized, interpretations. doubted, and Four modes of sometimes denied. reality: materially, ‘Reality’ is multiple. artefactually, ideally, and socially real. ‘Reality’ is becoming and processual. Reality is stratified, emergent, Agents: decentred transformational, subjects constructed systemically via discourse. open, becoming, No agency-structure processual, and often approach relational. Agents and structures: distinct but related. Scope of Avoids virtually all Replaces philosophy Explicitly reflects upon philosophy discussion of meta-theory. of science with meta-theory. of science Gets on with applying its socio-politics of Engages with the other meta-theory method and ‘doing’ O&M science. ontologies. science. Offers a socio-political Accepts critique of socio-political critique meta-theory. of meta-theory. As yet little Retains both engagement with CR. philosophy of science and socio-politics of science. (continued) Adler180214OUK.indb 191 7/17/2014 1:57:50 PM