This article was downloaded by: [77.101.140.25] On: 30 May 2012, At: 13:58 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Journal of Media and Religion Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/hjmr20 Beyond “Angry Muslims”? Reporting Muslim Voices in the British Press Nasar Meer a , Claire Dwyer b & Tariq Modood c a University of Northumbria b University College London c University of Bristol Available online: 19 Nov 2010 To cite this article: Nasar Meer, Claire Dwyer & Tariq Modood (2010): Beyond “Angry Muslims”? 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The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings, demand, or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with or arising out of the use of this material. JournalofMediaandReligion,9:216–231,2010 Copyright©Taylor&FrancisGroup,LLC ISSN:1534-8423print/1534-7701online DOI:10.1080/15348423.2010.521090 Beyond “Angry Muslims”? Reporting Muslim Voices in the British Press Nasar Meer University of Northumbria 2 1 Claire Dwyer 0 2 y University College London a M 0 Tariq Modood 3 8 University of Bristol 5 3: 1 at ] 5 Inthisarticlewediscussthesignificanceofhowavarietyofself-consciouslyMuslimactorshave 2 0. becomeincreasinglydiscernablein publicand mediadiscoursesin Britain. We showhow within 4 1 news reporting itself there is an observable variety of Muslim perspectives and that this marks 1. 0 a positive contrast with the more limited range of argumentation (publicly reported at least) at 1 7. an earlier period in the emergence of British Muslim identities in the late 1980s at the time of [7 the Rushdie affair. We maintain that a discussion of these developments would benefit from a by vocabularythatcananalyticallydescribetheboundariesbetween,andcontentwithin, avarietyof d Muslim voices, as well as evaluate what their inclusion in mainstream public discoursesimplies e ad for an understanding of more macro concerns around citizenship and nationhood. This article o nl makesatentativecontributiontothisgoalbycritically evaluatingtheinclusionandrepresentation w in the national press of British Muslim voices. We wish to draw attention to the ways in which o D the British caseillustrates how relational notionsof Muslim “fundamentalism”and“moderation” are presentwithin the inclusionand representationof Muslim voiceswithin newsreporting. This can be illustrated by how Muslim actors are characterized as angry, ambiguous, and approving. What is crucial to note is that this amounts to more than simply including Muslim voices of fundamentalistanger. Over the last decade or so, the voices of a variety of self-consciously Muslim actors have become increasingly discernable in public and media discourses in Britain. Often invoked in mattersof“integration”andcitizenshipinBritain,thesevoicesarenotonlythoseofprofessional Muslimcommentatorsorjournalists.Withinnewsreportingitselfthereisanobservablepattern ofMuslimperspectives, andwe argue thatthismarks a positivecontrastwiththemore limited Correspondenceshould be sent to Nasar Meer, School of Arts & Social Sciences, University of Northumbria, LipmanBuilding,Newcastle,NE18ST,UnitedKingdom.E-mail:[email protected] 216 217 REPORTING MUSLIM VOICES IN THE BRITISH PRESS range of argumentation (publicly reported at least) at an earlier period in the emergence of British Muslim identities in the late 1980s at the time of the Rushdie affair (Appignanesi & Maitland, 1989). At this earlier stage, Muslim perspectives were either largely ignored or monochromatic. That is to say that the more nuanced—though still outwardly religiously conservative—Muslim opposition to the publication of the Satantic Verses remained in the shadow of a public discourse oriented according to vectors of liberal-good and Muslim-bad positions. A display and discussion of these developments would benefit from a vocabulary that can analytically describe the boundaries between, and content within, a variety of Muslim voices, as wellas evaluatewhattheirinclusioninmainstreampublicdiscoursesimpliesforthe understandingofmoremacro concerns aroundcitizenship.Thisarticlecouldnotpossiblyseek to provide this in any comprehensive fashion. Such a task would be patterned by numerous differences among a variety of British Muslim actors or spokespeople in civil society, each 2 of whom may lay claim to authenticity in the representation of British Muslim life. What is 1 20 required, therefore, is an incremental approach that may be developed and modified by other y authors in additionto ourselves. a M Thisarticlemakesatentativecontributiontothisgoalbygaugingtheinclusionandrepresen- 0 3 tationinthenationalpress, asa keyconstituentofthepublicsphere, ofBritishMuslimvoices. 8 5 Whereas literatureontheidea ofthepublicsphere islengthyandcomplex, forthepurposesof 3: 1 our discussion it will be conceived as two interdependent possibilities of a “communicative” at and “institutional” space (Habermas, 1974/2004; Dahlgren, 1991), where democracy can be ] 5 expressed and civic engagement practiced. While the notion of the public sphere might be 2 0. traced to Kant’s essay on Enlightenment, it is in Habermas that we find the most widely 4 1 1. discussed modern formulation.For Habermas (1974/2004)thepublicsphere refers toan arena 10 thatissimultaneouslyinsideandoutsidecivilsociety.Thisisbecause itisnotadirectfunction 77. of the State yet is open to debate on the nature of public issues on which state policy might [ y be exercised. He thus characterized itas b d e ad a sphere which mediates between society and state, in which the public organises itself as the o nl bearer of public opinion, accordswith the principle of the public sphere-that principle of public w information whichoncehadto befoughtfor againstthearcanepoliticsof monarchiesandwhich o D sincethattimehasmadepossiblethedemocraticcontrolofstateactivities.(Habermas,1974/2004, p. 351) There is, of course, both a descriptive and normative dimension to Habermas’ account, and it is the descriptive dimension that we are utilizinghere. The normative function in Habermas’ account conceives of the public sphere as based upon notions of public good as distinct from private interest and forms of private life (notably families) (see Calhoun, 2000, p. 533). This has been widely criticized by a variety of authors including Fraser (1995) and Cassonova (1994), who either insist that it is undesirable to have public debate confined to a single, overarching sphere orthat Habermas ignoreshowmatters ofbothprivateand publiclife,such as religion, have historicallyplayed an importantrole in constitutingnotions of the public. In either case what is most important to note for the purposes of this article is how the mass media have become central tomost formulationsof the publicsphere because of the ways the media distributeinformationtocitizens and,at least intheory, facilitatepublicdebate (Curran, 218 MEER, DWYER, AND MODOOD 1991)—even while this relationshipis subject to a variety of well established and compelling critical readings (Nightingale& Ross, 2003). TonarrowourfocusonthestudyofMuslimvoices inthepublicsphere,we have selected a case from the printmedia that concerns the national press reaction to comments made by the former British Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, the Leader of the House at the time of his comments, and later Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, detailing how he asked Muslim women to remove theirface veilsduringconsultationsinhisconstituencyoffice. Thisarticlereportsona contentanalysisofthenationalpressreactiontothesecommentsanddiscussesspecificallyhow Muslim voices were invoked during the coverage. The central issue we wish to stress is how thiscase isillustrativeoftherelationalnotionsofMuslimfundamentalismandmoderationthat are present within the inclusion and representation of Muslim voices within news reporting. This can be illustrated by how Muslim actors are characterized as angry, ambiguous, and approving of Straw’s comments. What is crucial to note is that this amounts to more than 2 simply including Muslim voices of fundamentalist-anger, which in a partisan manner might 1 20 reflect thepoliticalorientationsofavarietyofpublications(see Meer &Modood,2009b,fora y qualitativediscussionwithseniorjournalistsonthispoint).Thissupportsourgeneralthesisthat a M within the news reporting of issues affecting Muslims there is a proliferationin the inclusion 0 3 ofMuslimvoicesinBritain,andthisisaprogressivedevelopmentwhere itopensupthepublic 8 5 sphere to the expression of a variety of Muslim“differences.” 3: 1 Before we elaborate, we return to Jack Straw’s originalstatement and remind ourselves of at thetwo-foldrationaleheoutlined.Whilethisarticleisprimarilyconcernedwiththedelineation ] 5 of Muslimvoices withinthe press reaction tohis comments and notthe motivationbehindhis 2 0. intervention,we are interestedinthe waysinwhichhecharacterized hisconcerns forthisand, 4 1 1. in turn, framed some of the ensuing reportage. 0 1 7. 7 [ READING MUSLIMS y b d e In his weekly column in the Lancashire Telegraph (October 5, 2006), Straw described how d a o he asks Muslim women wearing face veils (niqab) to remove them when meeting him in his nl w Blackburn constituency office. In the article he gave two reasons for this. First, he suggested Do that the removal of the face veil would enable him to engage more effectively in a “face-to- face” conversationsinceitwouldpermithimto“see whattheotherpersonmeans, andnotjust hear what they say,” stressingthe value of beingable tosee someone’s face ina conversation. He then moved from a focus on the interpersonal to the societal, by describing face veils as “a visiblestatement ofseparationand difference” thatmade “better, positiverelationsbetween the twocommunities more difficult.”1 He continued: ItwasnotthefirsttimeIhadconductedaninterviewwithsomeoneinafullveil,butthisparticular encounter,thoughverypoliteandrespectfulonbothsides,gotmethinking.Inpart,thiswasbecause oftheapparentincongruitybetweenthesignalswhichindicatecommonbonds—theentirelyEnglish accent,thecouple’seducation(whollyintheUK)—andthefactoftheveil.Aboveall,itwasbecause Ifeltuncomfortableabouttalkingtosomeone“face-to-face”whoIcouldnotsee.(Straw,2006,n.p.) 1Throughoutthearticleandsubsequentinterviews,Straw continuallydistinguishedbetweenthefullfaceveilor niqabandothertypesofMuslimcoveringssuchastheheadscarforhijab. 219 REPORTING MUSLIM VOICES IN THE BRITISH PRESS It is worth reflecting on the context in which this issue was raised prior to embarking upon the media analysis thatforms the main part ofthisarticle. This is because thepublicpresence of Muslim “difference” in Britain has become increasingly conspicuous. This is not limited to problematizing episodes of violent extremism that have made Muslims a more “visible” minority. The latter of course inevitably informs part of a broader picture but should not obscure what Modood (1988) once characterized as an “ethnic assertiveness” among Mus- lims themselves. Over the last two decades, this assertiveness has translated into forms of mobilization and claims-making which have challenged British citizenship to accommodate Muslimparticularities,specificallybycontestingthesecularandnarrowlyracialfocusofBritish multiculturalistapproaches (Meer & Modood, 2009a). This was perhaps symbolized by the way in which the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) developed and emerged as the main interlocutor in State–Muslim engagement and how it achieved some success in establishing a Muslim voice in the corridors of power (Radcliffe, 2 2004). The creation of a religion question on the national Census (Aspinall, 2000), achieving 1 20 state funding for the first Muslim schools (Meer, 2009), and more broadly having socio- y economic policiestargeted at severely deprived Muslimgroups(PolicyInnovationUnit,2001; a M Abrams & Houston, 2006) illustrate these successes. Simultaneously, and while these modifi- 0 3 cationsofBritishmulticulturalismhavebeen importantinprojectingasymbolicmeaning, they 8 5 remain comparatively modest when compared with the race-equality components of British 3: 1 multiculturalism.It is curious then, given the longevityof its ethnic and racial focus, that the at fate of multiculturalism in Britain should have come to be so intertwined with the political ] 5 identities of Muslims (Dwyer & Uberoi, 2008). 2 0. This intertwining corresponds with how the preeminence of the MCB waned in the mid- 4 1 1. 2000sas itgrewcriticalof theIraq warand the socalled “war onterrorism.” Ithas also faced 10 considerablepubliccriticismfrombothgovernmentandcivilsocietybodies(particularlyofthe 77. centre-right) for allegedly failingto reject extremism clearly and decisively.2 Indeed, while in [ y opposition, Prime Minister David Cameron likened the MCB to the far-right British National b d Party (BNP) (Cameron, 2007). e d Perhaps most importantly for our discussion is that allied to these complaints has been a nlo the issue of how “representative” of BritishMuslims the organization actually is—a question w that has plagued it since the early days but which had a more damaging impact upon its o D credibilitywhenalliedtoahandfulofothercomplaints.3 Oneoutcomeofthispoliticalcritique has been the invitationto represent BritishMuslims in matters of consultationas stakeholders to a plethora of other, paradoxically less representative Muslim organizations (such as the Sufi MuslimCouncil(SMC)and the Al-KhoieFoundation).Atthesame time, newer advisory groups (such as the Mosques and Imams National AdvisoryBody (MINAB)) do not seek the same remit of representationas the MCB, whileother older bodies such as the Islamic Sharia Council (ISC) continue to maintain an affiliate membership of the MCB. Muslim assertiveness, therefore, has proven to be patterned by a number of internaldiffer- entiations among different Muslim actors, which can be intertwined with external discourses 2SuchchargesarelargelycircumstantialowingtothelinksbetweentheMCBmembersandtheIslamistorganisation Jamat-e-IslamiwhichwasfoundedinnorthernIndiainthe1930sbyAbuA’laMawdudi. 3Thoughinterestingly,its regionalaffiliates such as the MuslimCouncil of Wales (MCW) havenot facedsuch criticism. 220 MEER, DWYER, AND MODOOD concerning the ascriptionof names and labels. A goodillustrationofthismay be foundinthe notion of “moderate” Muslim (Modood & Ahmad, 2007). As one Muslim civil society actor has put it: I think those are labels which are imposed on us. How can you be a moderate Muslim—you’re eitheraMuslimoryou’renot.[:::]IregardmyselfasafundamentalistMuslimbecauseIbelievein thefundamentalsofIslam,butI’mnotwhatpeopleunderstandasafundamentalist.Soifweaccept that languagethenweacceptthelabelswhich areput uponus.(AbdullahTrevathan,interviewed byMeer,March6,2006) Indeed, termssuch as “moderate” and “fundamentalism”are among many thatare enormously contested and relational and, therefore, demand qualification and contextualization.This point is convincingly made in Denoeux’s (2002) insistence that fundamentalism can be a highly 2 problematic concept because of the connotations derived from its origins in early twentieth 1 0 century American Protestantism, such that it is not easily applied to Islam and Muslims in 2 y Britain (see Modood, 1990, for an early conceptual delineation). Nevertheless, and despite its a M origins, it is often the case that fundamentalism is made flesh by drawing upon examples of 0 3 “Islamicfundamentalism”withtheeffectthat“Islamicfundamentalismhasbecomeametaphor 8 5 for fundamentalism in general” (Sayyid, 1997, pp. 7–8). 13: Of course, the dividinglinebetween categories such as fundamentalistand moderate is not at only context-specific but also highly porous and dependent upon subjective value judgments ] 5 (Jackson, 2008). Nevertheless, descriptive terms are required and may be appropriated in full 2 0. knowledge of their contested nature. For example, Modood and Ahmad (2007, pp. 191–192) 4 1.1 maintainthat“moderateMuslimisobviouslya relationalterm:itonlymakessense interms of 0 acontrastwithnon-moderates,asisalwaysthecaseinamoderate-radicalcouplet(cf.moderate 1 7. feminist and radical feminist).” What, then, of its antithesis? 7 [ y b d Non-moderate Islam can be seen as ahistorical and making no concessionsto interpretation and e d context. Actions that are prescribed in the Qur’an (e.g., compassionate treatment of slaves) are a o taken to be equally appropriate today, a time when slavery has no moral justification. Similarly, nl w theharshpunishmentsof hudod,suchasthecuttingoff of thehandof athief, arereadasif they o D applytoalltimesandplaces,withoutregardtolevelsofpovertyandwelfare,andtheachievement of social justice that the Qur’an exhorts. The Qur’an and Shariah are thus read as not primarily enunciatingandillustrating principles for correctaction but asconcreteandfixedsetsof actions. ProminentthemesandprincipleswithintheQur’an,andreiteratedinShariahandtheHadith,such asmercy,compassionandsocialjustice,arerelegatedtothebackgroundinfavourofnarrow,rigid interpretations andextreme actions. No room for critical reasoningand interpretation (ijtihad) is allowed but a particular dogmatic interpretation is asserted to be the only one possible. Added to this is a concept of ‘jihad’ in which military action—rather than spiritual, ethical or even political struggle—is given primacy and is seen as most apposite in the world today. It is this narrow, reductionistview of Islam andhumanconduct,without afull understandingof thescope of Qur’anicteachingsandprinciples:::: (Modood& Ahmad,2007,p. 192) It is our argument that the salience of discourses of nonmoderate or fundamentalist Islam has furnished critics with the means to characterize Muslims as difficult to accommodate (Joppke, 2009; Policy Exchange, 2007; Moore, 2006). This is particularly the case when 221 REPORTING MUSLIM VOICES IN THE BRITISH PRESS Muslimsare currentlyperceived tobe, oftenuniquely,incontraventionofliberaldiscoursesof individual rights and secularism that are at risk of being surrendered by concessions implied in multiculturalistapproaches (Hutton, 2007;Hansen, 2006; Toynbee, 2005). It is exemplified by the way in which visibleMuslim practices such as veiling4 have in publicdiscourses been reducedtoandconflatedwithallegedMuslimpracticessuchasforcedmarriages,femalegential mutilation,arejectionofpositivelawinfavorofcriminalshar’ialaw,andsoon(Meer, Dwyer, & Modood,2010).Each suggestsaradical“otherness” aboutMuslimsandanilliberalityabout multiculturalism.Sincethelatterisallegedtolicensethesepractices,oppositiontothepractice, it is argued, necessarily invalidates the policy.5 Arelateddevelopmentderivesfromglobaleventsandnotnecessarilyfromtheactsofterror- ism undertakenbyprotagonistsproclaimingaMuslimagenda(whichare routinelycondemned by leading British-Muslimbodies), but from the subsequent conflation of a criminal minority with an assumed tendency inherent to the many. Indeed, in a post-9/11 and 7/7 climate, the 2 explanatory purchase of Muslimculturaldysfunctionalityhas generated a profitablediscursive 1 20 economy in accounting for what has been described as “Islamic terrorism” (Phillips, 2006; y Gove, 2006; Cohen, 2007). The net outcome of these issues is a coupling of diversity and a M anti-terrorismagendas thathas implicatedcontemporaryBritishmulticulturalismas theculprit 0 3 of Britain’ssecurity woes (see Modood’s [2008]response to this charge). 8 5 3: 1 at THE METHODOLOGICAL RATIONALE ] 5 2 0. ThiswasthecontextinwhichStraw’scommentswerereceivedinthepress.Yetsimultaneously, 4 1.1 in terms of the “presentational devices” the newspapers enlisted (Van Emerson & Houtlosser, 10 1999, p. 484), Straw was frequently characterized as an “ally” of Muslims. To explore this 7. further,wesearchedtheLexisNexusdatabaseofnationalnewspaperarchiveswiththekeywords 7 [ y “Straw” and “Veil” and identified 497 items in total. We purposefully limited the timeframe b d to data produced during a 10-day period in which the issue dominated the news agenda e d (October 5–15, 2006), and with the use of Atlas Ti we coded this data in two stages: first, a nlo according to whether they comprised 1-Newspaper Editorials or Leaders, 2-News Items or w News Features, 3-Letters, and 4-Columnist Opinion or Comment; and second, according to o D a coding schedule devised to tap key words such as “reaction,” “agreement,” “disagreement,” “leader,” “representative,” “anger,” “support,” and so forth, before qualitatively tracing the relationships between the ways in which these newspaper items invoked or made reference to Muslim actors therein. This generated a considerable amount of data that cannot all be summarized here, so this discussionwillbelimitedtoacross-sectionoffindingsfromNewsItemsorNewsFeaturesand Letters.6 One important rationale for limiting our analysis to these items concerns the ways in which the currency of different types of press discourse is sometimes overlooked, which means that the content of newspapers can be homogenized in a manner that ignores internal variations between different sections. For example, van Dijk (1999, quoted in Richardson, 4Includingtheheadscarforhijab,fullfaceveilorniqab,orfullbodygarmentssuchasthejilbab. 5SeeMeerandModood’s(2009a)critiqueofJoppke(2004)onthispoint. 6Meer,Dwyer,andModood(2010)exploretheLeadersandCommentseparately. 222 MEER, DWYER, AND MODOOD 2001, p. 148)has argued that “speakers routinelyrefer to ::: newspapers as their source (and authority) of knowledge or opinions about ethnic minorities.” At the same time, he is unable todiscern the differentrolesplayed bypublicintellectualsand opinion-formingcommentators or columnists (Meer, 2006), as well as editorials and leaders, that consistently propagate the social and politicaloutlooksof a variety of publications(Franklin, 2008). Two examples illustrate this point. During the 1999 NATO-led intervention in Kosovo, columnistJulieBurchill,thenofTheGuardian,wasopenlyandconsistentlyhostiletothepro- interventionstanceadvancedbyherpaper.Fouryearslater,asherpaperadoptedabroadlyanti- warstanceontheU.S.-ledinvasionofIraq,shedeployedanaggressivelypro-warargument(see Burchill,1999a, 1999b, 2003a, 2003b). However, Sam Kiley of The Times resigned in protest at what he described as being forced to adhere to the newspaper line on Israeli–Palestinian relations, statingthat “the Times foreigneditorand other middlemanagers flew intohysterical terror every time a pro-Israel lobbying group wrote in with a quibble or complaint and then 2 usually took their side against their writers. I was told I should not refer to ‘assassinations’ 1 20 of Israel’sopponentsnorto‘extrajudicialkillingsor executions’” (see the Evening Standard’s y “Kileyattacks,” 2001).Thismeans thatwhilenewspapersare capable of“influencingaudience a M attitudes, values and beliefs” (Richardson, 2001, p. 148), they may do so in different ways. 0 3 Focusing on news items in contrast to leaders or opinionpieces is one means of opening this 8 5 up(see alsoMeer &Mouristen,2009),andsoovercomingtheaprioriassumptionthatasingle 3: 1 publicationcontains no significant internal variation(Khiabany & Williamson, 2008). at ] 5 2 0. MUSLIM VOICES IN NEWS ITEMS OR NEWS FEATURES 4 1 1. 10 Turning now to the context of the press reaction, most of the initial news items followed 77. a similar sequence in drawing upon Straw’s credibility as a long-time, anti-racist, friendly [ y politician with a significant Muslim electorate within his own constituency. This rhetorical b d maneuver frequentlyredeployedStraw’s(2006)ownstatement(“ifnotme, thenwho?”)onthe e d appropriateness of his raisingthe issue. Many news items quotedfrom Straw’s originalarticle a nlo hisownretellingofa conversationhe hadwitha Muslimwomanwhoexpressed how“she felt w more comfortable wearing the veil. People botheredher less. I [Straw] said I wouldreflect on o D what she had said. Would she think hard about what I had said?” (n.p.). This rationale would benefit from a critical reading that is attuned to a variety of feminist critiques, specifically surrounding the veil as a contested signifier (Dwyer, 1999). This article touches upon this below, and a theoretical discussion of contemporary implications of the veil and issues of gender is offered elsewhere (Meer, Dwyer, & Modood, 2010; Dwyer, 2008), and so we will not repeat it here. The focus instead will remain upon the variety of Muslim voices that were invoked in the press reaction to these comments. IndrawinguponStraw’sframing,nearlyallnewsitemsonFriday,October6,andSaturday, October 7, 2006(one and twodays after hisoriginalarticle intheLancashire Evening Times), moved from Straw’s question to detail the reactions amongst Muslim spokespeople. This proceeded through at least two means. The first and immediate coverage reported a general MuslimreactiongaugedbyspeakingtoMuslimfiguresthatpossessed some nationalstanding. This was followed by more specific reporting on the reaction from local Muslims in Straw’s Blackburn constituency. 223 REPORTING MUSLIM VOICES IN THE BRITISH PRESS The immediate news items framed a spectrum of Muslim spokespeople voicing “anger,” “ambivalence,” and“approval”inreactiontoStraw’scomments, albeitwithdifferentemphases and permutations. It is worth reflecting on how these might overlap with or deviate from the characterizations of Muslim fundamentalism or moderation elaborated earlier. Following Modood and Ahmed’s (2007, p. 121) reflexive consideration of these terms, a notion of the former would conceive Islam as a-historical by making no concessions to interpretation and context. Itwouldlimitspace forcriticalreasoningandinterpretation(ijtihad)inthepromotion of a dogmatic interpretation.The latter, relationally,wouldbe its opposite. These notions do indeed map onto characterizations of Muslim responses in the news items. For example, the Sun (“Lift Your Veils,” 2006) structured its reportingwith a half-way subheadingentitled“anger,” whichincludedcomments fromHamidQuereshi, chairman ofthe LancashireCouncilofMosques:“Thishasthepotentialtocauseanger.Womenbelievewearing a veil is God’s command.” The Sun also detailed comments by Massoud Shadjareh of Islamic 2 Human Rights “Foundation” (sic) (the Islamic Human Rights Commission[IHRC]) that “it is 1 20 astonishing Mr. Straw chose to selectively discriminate on the basis of religion.” So there are y two sources of Muslim “anger” here. The first may be characterized as typical fundamentalist a M response, while the latter is suspicious of selective discriminationagainst Muslims. 0 3 The titlesoftheimmediate newsitemsillustratethis.Interestingly,atleasthalfoftheSun’s 8 5 entire news item incorporated comments from different Muslim figures. These included the 3: 1 “ambivalent” admission from Dr. Daud Abdullah of the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB): at “The veil does cause some discomfort to non-Muslims. Muslim scholars are divided over ] 5 whether a woman should cover her face. It is up to the woman to choose.” It also included 2 0. GhayasuddinSiddiqui,leaderoftheMuslimParliamentofGreatBritain,who,asanexemplarof 4 1 1. Muslim“approval,” wasdescribedas “welcomingMr.Straw’scomments” beforebeingquoted 10 as stating:“Muslimsshouldrecognizethatwearingtheniqabwasaculturalrequirementrather 77. than a religiousone.” The Sun interpreted this as evidence that “a small Muslim minorityare [ y pressing their views on others [other Muslims].” The crucial point to note is that more than b d Muslim voices of “fundamentalist-anger” are being invoked, and this includes quite a sober e d disavowal of Straw’s criticisms, as well as something in between. This supports the general a nlo thesis of this article that not only sensationalist Muslim voices are being distilled in news w reportingon Muslims and that this is worthregistering. o D During the following day’s coverage the Sun (“Muslim Fury,” 2006) opened with the statement: “Jack Straw faced a bitter backlash yesterday as he said ALL British Muslim women should stop wearing veils. Angry Asian groups claimed his remarks were divisive andprovocative.”7 Itisdifficulttodiscernfromtherestofthenewsitemwhetherthereference to“Asiangroups”betraysaconsciousattempttodifferentiatesomeMuslimgroupsfromothers, or whether it is due more to slippage. Nevertheless, the Sun (“Muslim Fury,” 2006) justified its account withsome on thegroundreportingfrom Blackburnina way thatmost newspapers 7During a BBC Radio Lancashire interview that followed his newspaperarticle, Straw said: “Communities are boundtogetherpartlybyinformalchancerelationsbetweenstrangerspeoplebeingabletoacknowledgeeachotherin thestreetorbeingabletopassthetimeofday.That’smademoredifficultifpeoplearewearingaveil.That’sjusta factoflife.IunderstandtheconcernsbutIhopetherecanbeamaturedebate.”Whenaskedifhewouldratherthat veilsbediscarded,hereplied:“Yes.ItneedstobemadeclearIamnottalkingaboutbeingprescriptivebutwithall caveats,yes,Iwouldrather”(October6,2006,availablefromhttp://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/5410472.stm). 224 MEER, DWYER, AND MODOOD soughttodetailinthedays after the initialreaction. These includedthe followingtestimonies, attributedto Muslim women in Straw’s constituency: ShaziaAhmed,19: Muslimwomendon’thavetowearveilsbuttherearedeepreligiousreasons whytheydo.WhatbusinesshasJackStrawtosayweshouldnotwearthem? Ihavenevermetanyonewhohasconsidereditaproblem.Hiscommentsare misjudgedandarenot helpfulinthecurrent climate. BaksedhaKhan,34: I would refuse to take off my veil if I visited Mr. Straw’s surgery. We are supposedtoliveinafreecountry.Ireservemyrighttobefullyclothedfrom headtotoe.Mr.Straw’sbeentheMPinthisareaforalongtimesoheshould knowfullwellwhyveilsareworn.Whyishemakingabigissueofthisnow? Doeshehaveanulterior motive?Thisisall abouthispoliticalfutureandhe islookingfor publicity. FauziaAli, 23: Ichoosenottowearaveiloraheadscarf.Iknowsomewomenwouldrefuse 12 to leave the house if they had to remove them. It is trivial to suggest that 0 2 you need to see someone’s face to speak to them freely. People can still y communicatewithaveil on. a M 0 3 The length of each extract is worth noting, especially as they were published in a tabloid 8 5 newspaper and give a degree of nuanced voice to Muslim women who hold broadly critical 3: 1 perspectives of Straw’s comments. As such, this highlights a remarkable contrast with how at newspaper editorials broadly cast the veil as an impediment to Muslim women’s autonomy ] 25 (Meer et al., 2010). In the latter case, what was observable was a paradoxical tendency to 0. simultaneously cast Muslim women as the main vehicles of integration as well as the first 4 1 1. victims of the failure of integration. In this context, freely choosing to wear the veil is, in 0 1 some ways, a greater offence than being forced to wear it, or as Khibany and Williamson 77. (2008, p. 69) put it: “Veiled women are considered to be ungrateful subjects who have failed [ y to assimilate and are deemed to threaten the British way of life.” Yet in these news items b d the reporting of Muslim women’s voices lends support to what Malik (2009) conceives as an e d “iteration of agency” in that Muslim women challenge the assumption of subordination by a o nl speaking for themselves. w Further evidence of the tendency within news coverage to frame Muslim voices within a o D matrix of anger, ambivalence, and support is found in the Mirror’s (“‘Face to Face,’ Muslim Anger,” 2006) use of Ghayasuddin Siddiqui’spositionin full: WhatIthinkweneedtorecognizeisonlyaverysmallnumberofMuslimwomenputontheveil. It is not an Islamic requirement—it’s a cultural thing. A womanwho doesn’t cover herself is as goodawomanasawomanwhodoes.TheyareequallygoodMuslims. The MirrorcontrastedthiswithcommentsattributedtotheMCB:“If anything,thisisgoingto alienate Muslim women and be a catalyst for more to wear the veil. This country is meant to celebrate diversity” (based upon other sources, it transpires that these words were specifically spoken by Sheik Ibrahim Dogra). The only exception to the pattern delineated above and elaborated further below was the Daily Star (“These Veils,” 2006), which focused exclusively upon the “angry” variety of Muslim responses. These included Muhammed Umar, chairman of the Ramadhan Foundation, who the paper described as having “hit out” in stating that: