UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI SKUPNI INTERDISCIPLINARNI PROGRAM DRUGE STOPNJE KOGNITIVNA ZNANOST V SODELOVANJU Z UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, UNIVERZITA KOMENSKÉHO V BRATISLAVE IN EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM Ema Demšar The circular character of the conceptual space of cognitive science: Between scientific and lived realities of the mind Krožnost konceptualnega prostora kognitivne znanosti: Med znanstvenimi in življenjskimi resničnostmi duševnosti MAGISTRSKO DELO Ljubljana, 2017 UNIVERSITY OF LJUBLJANA MIDDLE EUROPEAN INTERDISCIPLINARY MASTER PROGRAMME IN COGNITIVE SCIENCE IN ASSOCIATION WITH UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, UNIVERZITA KOMENSKÉHO V BRATISLAVE AND EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM Ema Demšar The circular character of the conceptual space of cognitive science: Between scientific and lived realities of the mind MASTER’S THESIS Supervisor: Univ. Prof. Dr. Urban Kordeš Co-supervisor: Univ. Prof. Dr. Matthew Ratcliffe Ljubljana, 2017 UNIVERZA V LJUBLJANI SKUPNI INTERDISCIPLINARNI PROGRAM DRUGE STOPNJE KOGNITIVNA ZNANOST V SODELOVANJU Z UNIVERSITÄT WIEN, UNIVERZITA KOMENSKÉHO V BRATISLAVE IN EÖTVÖS LORÁND TUDOMÁNYEGYETEM Ema Demšar Krožnost konceptualnega prostora kognitivne znanosti: Med znanstvenimi in življenjskimi resničnostmi duševnosti MAGISTRSKO DELO Mentor: univ. prof. dr. Urban Kordeš Somentor: univ. prof. dr. Matthew Ratcliffe Ljubljana, 2017 to mami who has been reading through my stories ever since she taught me how to write ACKNOWLEDGEMENT I am deeply grateful to Professor Urban Kordeš for his support and advice during the making of this thesis as well as for his encouragement and guidance throughout my years in cognitive science. Without his contagious enthusiasm it would not have been half as inspiring to study the mind, and I have been immensely lucky to have had a teacher who showed such interest and trust in my thought. I would like to sincerely thank Professor Matthew Ratcliffe for his supervision and valuable advice in my writing process. I am truly thankful for feeling welcome at the philosophy department of the University of Vienna and for being encouraged in my study of phenomenology. Many thanks to dear Åsa, whose generous help and kindness have greatly contributed to finishing this project. And, of course, to my mum for her open mind, her soft heart, and her resonant laughter, to my dad for all past and future vegetable stews, and for listening to my parallel realities, to Maja for our three-year journey through nearly-missed deadlines and sleepless nights, for our convergence in both fascination and critique, for inexhaustible discussions on everything from neurons to neighborhoods, and for her quiet shaping of the way I see the world, to Bálint for climbing trees and singing to the moon, and to Belén, Philipp, and Francie, who have infused my Viennese life-world with patient kindness, unforgettable laughter, and all kinds of kitchen wisdom: for coffee, dinners and neuroscience, for Alan Watts quotes, bike racing and everyday feminism, and for being there for me throughout my bitter-sweet struggles with philosophy and life. ZAHVALA Globoko se zahvaljujem profesorju Urbanu Kordešu tako za njegovo podporo in nasvete pri pisanju naloge kot tudi za njegovo mentorstvo skozi celoten čas mojega študija kognitivne znanosti. Brez njegove nalezljive navdahnjenosti bi bilo raziskovati duševnost veliko manj vznemirljivo. Hvala za zaupanje vame in potrpežljivo zanimanje za preplete mojih misli. Iskrena hvala profesorju Matthewu Ratcliffu za premišljeno usmerjanje in koristne nasvete med mojim pospešenim pisanjem, pa tudi za prijazno sprejetje na filozofskem oddelku Univerze na Dunaju ter vzpodbudo pri mojem študiju fenomenologije. Hvala dragi Åsi za vsestransko in velikodušno pomoč pri zaključevanju naloge. Pa seveda mami za njen zvenek smeh, odprte misli in mehko srce, atiju za vse pretekle in prihodnje zelenjavne čorbe in prisluh mojim vzporednim resničnostim, Maji za tri leta spotikanja prek neprespanih noči in skoraj zamujenih rokov, za skupno zorenje skozi radovednost in kritiko, za neusahljive razprave o vsem od nevronov do sosesk in za mehko sooblikovanje mojega zrenja v svet, Bálintu za polnočne serenade in plezanje po drevesih, ter Belén, Philippu in Francie, ki so mojemu dunajskemu življenjskemu svetu vdahnili potrpežljivo prijaznost, prepoznaven krohot in širen spekter kuhinjskih modrosti: za kavo, večerje in nevroznanost, za citate Alana Wattsa, kolesarske dirke in vsakodnevni feminizem, predvsem pa za oporo v mojih grenkosladkih spoprijemanjih s filozofijo in vsakdanom. Abstract The thesis puts forward an exploration of the relationship between two perspectives on the mind: the scientific perspective, through which the mind is described and explained by the disciplines of cognitive science, and the lived perspective, through which the mind is experienced and understood in the context of everyday life. In articulating this apparent duality of views I draw upon two influential philosophical accounts: Edmund Husserl’s (1970) investigation of the life-world and the world of science and Wilfrid Sellars’ (1963) analysis of the manifest and the scientific image of the human being in relation to the world. The presentation and juxtaposition of the two analyses opens a way to an exploration of the interdependence of science and the life-world. It also sets the stage for a critique of naturalism in mind sciences. Following Husserl, I show that the naturalistic attitude stems from forgetting that the idea of the objective scientific reality is but an abstraction from the concrete life-world of experience, value, and meaning. Surveying the conceptual space of philosophy of mind, I further challenge the naturalistic attitude by demonstrating the untenability of its metaphysical and epistemological assumptions. As I argue, naturalism amounts to a particularly inconsistent stance in studying human epistemic processes, where it must paradoxically presuppose the very aspects of the world that it set out to disclose. Concluding that cognitive science lacks absolute metaphysical or epistemological foundations, I suggest that studying the mind needs to recognize the importance of the lived perspective of being a mind. I explore the multifaceted ways in which the scientific perspective on the mind is both rooted in the life-world and shapes it in turn. I conceptualize two dimensions of this interrelatedness through the presentation of Varela et al.’s (1991) enactive approach to cognitive science and Ian Hacking’s (1995) theory of the looping of human kinds. I conclude by proposing that consistent study of mind which acknowledges the impossibility of separating the cognizing subject from her cognized world is bound to remain open to revision of its own foundations. Cognitive science is thus imbued with a demand for reflexivity towards its own theory and practice which would recognize the historical, experiential and socio-political embeddedness of its concepts as well as the role which cognitive science itself plays in shaping societal conceptions of the mind and the way in which the mind is concretely understood, experienced, lived, and acted upon in the context of everyday life. Keywords – cognitive science, naturalism, life-world, manifest image, enactivism, looping effects, critical neuroscience Povzetek V magistrskem delu raziskujem odnos med dvema pogledoma na človekovo duševnost: znanstvenim pogledom, skozi katerega duševnost opisujejo in razlagajo discipline kognitivne znanosti, in življenjskim pogledom, skozi katerega duševnost doživljamo in razumemo v kontekstu vsakdanjega življenja. Pri orisu teh dveh navidezno nasprotujočih si perspektiv izhajam iz dveh vplivnih filozofskih analiz: iz razprave o utemeljenosti konceptov objektivističnega sveta znanosti v t. i. “življenjskem svetu” vsakdanjega izkustva Edmunda Husserla (1970) ter iz razlikovanja med t. i. manifestno in znanstveno podobo človeka v svetu Wilfrida Sellarsa (1963). Predstavitev in primerjava Husserlove in Sellarsove pozicije odpreta prostor za razpravo o prepletenosti znanstvene in življenjske perspektive, obenem pa predstavljata izhodišče za kritiko naturalizma v raziskovanju duševnosti. Kot pokaže Husserl, naturalistična drža izvira iz pozabe, da je objektivistični svet znanosti zgolj od življenjskega sveta abstrahirana idealizacija, ki jo življenjski svet vseskozi navdaja s pomenom. Husserlovo kritiko naturalizma skozi pregled klasičnega konceptualnega prostora filozofije duha razširim v preizpraševanje osnovnih naturalističnih predpostavk o znanosti in svetu. Pokažem, da je naturalistična drža še posebej protislovna v preučevanju človeških spoznavnih procesov, kjer mora, da bi utemeljila svoje zaupanje v znanost, paradoksalno predpostaviti natanko tiste vidike sveta, ki naj bi jih preiskovala. V sklepu, da se kognitivna znanost ne more zanašati na absolutne metafizične ali epistemološke temelje, predlagam, da mora znanstveno preučevanje duševnosti pripoznati pomen izkustveno-življenjskega pogleda biti duševnost. Ob pregledu večplastne prepletenosti obeh perspektiv se izkaže, da je znanstveni pogled na duševnost utemeljen v življenjskem svetu, obenem pa ga na najrazličnejše načine spreminja in sooblikuje. V opori na udejanjeni pristop h kognitivni znanosti (Varela et al. 1991) in teorijo zankanja človeških vrst Iana Hackinga (1995) konceptualiziram dve dimenziji soodvisnosti znanstvenega in življenjskega pogleda na duševnost. Zaključim s predlogom, da je dosledna kognitivna znanost, ki upošteva nezmožnost ločitve spoznavnega subjekta od spoznanega sveta, primorana nenehoma dopuščati možnost predrugačenja lastnih predpostavk. Raziskovanje duševnosti je tako poklicano k refleksivnosti do svoje teorije in prakse, ki bi pripoznala zgodovinsko, doživljanjsko in družbeno-politično situiranost lastnih konceptov, obenem pa tudi vlogo in odgovornost kognitivne znanosti v oblikovanju družbenih koncepcij duševnosti ter povezanih načinov, na katere je duševnost razumljena, doživljana in živeta v kontekstu vsakdana. Ključne besede – kognitivna znanost, naturalizem, življenjski svet, manifestna podoba, enaktivizem, “looping effect”, kritična nevroznanost Table of contents 0 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................. 1 0.1 COGNITIVE SCIENCE BETWEEN NATURAL SCIENCES AND HUMAN LIFE ............................................... 1 0.2 ON THE CHOICE OF FOUNDATIONAL TEXTS ......................................................................................... 2 0.3 SOME REMARKS ON TERMINOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 3 0.4 THE PURPOSE AND THE THREE STEPS OF THE THESIS ........................................................................... 4 1 CHAPTER 1: SCIENTIFIC AND LIVED PERSPECTIVE ON THE MIND ................................ 7 1.1 BECOMING AWARE OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM ........................................................................................ 7 1.1.1 The first glimpse at the assumption of scientific realism ........................................................... 7 1.1.2 The strangeness of what a chemist takes for granted ................................................................ 8 1.2 HUSSERL ON THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC OBJECTIVISM ..................................... 9 1.2.1 Galileo’s discovery-concealment ............................................................................................. 10 1.2.2 Life-world and the world of science ......................................................................................... 12 1.3 UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN-IN-THE-WORLD: TWO PERSPECTIVES................................................ 13 1.3.1 Studying versus being mind ...................................................................................................... 13 1.3.2 Manifest and scientific image................................................................................................... 15 1.3.3 The duality of views .................................................................................................................. 17 1.3.4 Sellars’ stereoscopic vision ...................................................................................................... 18 1.3.5 Husserl’s epoché of objective sciences .................................................................................... 21 1.4 COMPARING THE TWO DICHOTOMIES: SIMILARITIES, PROBLEMS AND DIFFERENCES ........................ 23 1.4.1 Husserl and Sellars – an ontological antithesis? .................................................................... 25 1.4.2 Life-world as a horizon, and manifest image as a framework of objects ................................ 25 1.4.3 Husserl’s suspension of the question of realism ...................................................................... 27 1.5 THE CONTRAST AND THE INSEPARABLE UNION OF SCIENCE AND THE LIFE-WORLD .......................... 30 1.5.1 The ambiguity of the notion of the life-world........................................................................... 32 1.5.2 The way out of the enigma? ..................................................................................................... 34 1.6 THE EXISTENTIAL TASK OF PHILOSOPHY ........................................................................................... 35 1.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 1 ................................................................................................................... 36 1.8 UNIVERSAL KNOWLEDGE AS THE CONDITION FOR PHILOSOPHY ....................................................... 37 1.8.1 Universal knowledge and cognitive science ............................................................................ 39 2 CHAPTER 2: LIFE-WORLD, NATURALISM, AND PHILOSOPHY OF MIND ..................... 41 2.1 A HUSSERLIAN WINDOW ONTO THE PUZZLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS ..................................................... 41 2.1.1 The hard problem of consciousness ......................................................................................... 41 2.1.2 The origin story of the enigma of subjectivity .......................................................................... 43 2.1.3 Double realities ........................................................................................................................ 46 2.2 CLARIFYING NATURALISM ................................................................................................................. 47 2.3 GROUNDING SCIENCE IN METAPHYSICS AND METAPHYSICS IN SCIENCE ........................................... 49 2.3.1 Dualistic assumptions of modern materialism ......................................................................... 50 2.3.2 Omniscience as a heuristic device ........................................................................................... 53 2.3.3 The world as a mechanism: materialism, reductionism and causal determinism ................... 55 2.4 THE INCONSISTENCY OF A NATURALISTIC COGNITIVE SCIENCE ........................................................ 58 2.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 2 ................................................................................................................... 59 3 CHAPTER 3: TOWARDS A REFLEXIVE COGNITIVE SCIENCE .......................................... 61 3.1 SEARCHING FOR A GROUND ............................................................................................................... 61 3.1.1 Two ways of dealing with groundlessness ............................................................................... 61 3.1.2 Torn between science and experience ...................................................................................... 62 3.1.3 Divided state and self-interpreting animals ............................................................................. 64 3.1.4 Divided state and cognitive science ......................................................................................... 66 3.1.5 The third way of dealing with groundlessness ......................................................................... 67 3.2 THE ENACTIVE APPROACH TO COGNITION AND TO COGNITIVE SCIENCE ........................................... 67 3.2.1 Enactive approach to cognition ............................................................................................... 67 3.2.2 Enactive approach to cognitive science ................................................................................... 69 3.2.3 Cognitive science and the demand for reflexivity .................................................................... 70 3.3 WHAT DOES THE REFLEXIVITY PASS THROUGH? ............................................................................... 71 3.3.1 Reflexivity and lived experience ............................................................................................... 72 3.3.2 Reflexivity and the cultural life-world ..................................................................................... 73 3.4 COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND THE LOOPING EFFECTS .............................................................................. 75 3.4.1 The looping effects of human kinds .......................................................................................... 76 3.4.2 From the laboratory into the life-world ................................................................................... 80 3.4.3 From the life-world into the laboratory ................................................................................... 83 3.5 COGNITIVE SCIENCE AND SOCIO-POLITICAL REFLEXIVITY ................................................................ 88 3.5.1 Socio-political reflexivity as continuous with the demand for theoretical reflexivity in the field of cognitive science .......................................................................................................... 89 3.5.2 Critical neuroscience as an example of socio-political reflexivity .......................................... 90 3.6 SOCIO-POLITICAL IMPACT OF A NATURALISTIC COGNITIVE SCIENCE ................................................ 93 3.7 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 3 ................................................................................................................... 95 4 CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 96 5 REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 99 6 EXTENDED SUMMARY IN SLOVENIAN LANGUAGE / RAZŠIRJENI POVZETEK V SLOVENŠČINI .............................................................................. 104 0 Introduction 0.1 Cognitive science between natural sciences and human life The present thesis seeks to investigate the relationship between two seemingly disparate perspectives on the mind: that through which the mind is experienced and understood in everyday life, and that through which it is studied in the context of cognitive science. As everyday life encompasses a number of experiences and understandings, and as the field of cognitive science encompasses a number of theoretical and practical approaches to studying the mind, it will be all but easy to distinguish between the two perspectives – and, as it will turn out, even harder to account for the way in which they “hang together”. However, the task seems worth pursuing – for as I will argue, the recognition of the inseparability of scientific and everyday lived understanding of the mind is vital for a cognitive science that takes into account not only the mind’s abstracted cognitive processes, but the mind as the human being who always cognizes, experiences, and lives in relation to her world. It is only through acknowledging that mind sciences themselves depend on human epistemic processes and are as such historically and conceptually rooted in the world of experience and life, of value and meaning, that cognitive science can truly contribute to the overall contemporary understanding of mind, life, and experience. The interdisciplinary field of cognitive science is uniquely located at the junction of natural and humanistic sciences – not only in that it brings both types of investigation under the umbrella of the same subject matter, but also in that it seeks to look beyond the classical boundary between them. By approaching the human mind using the standpoint and tools of natural sciences, cognitive science addresses the realm of subjective experience with the kind of inquiry which has developed under the ideal of objectivity and remains guided by its demands, and which has in the past mostly been banned from talking about value and meaning. In attempting to capture the human mind through natural-scientific inquiry, the study of mind encounters what philosopher Evan Thompson describes as “one of the outstanding philosophical and scientific problems of our time” (2007: ix–x): the question of how subjective experience emerges from and relates to the biophysical processes of the human brain and body. Cognitive science has not yet offered a way to solve – or to even adequately address – this so-called explanatory gap (Levine 1983), and the question whether an account that could bridge it is even in principle possible remains to be answered by future theoretical and empirical endeavors. What is certain, however, is that “[a]t the present time, we not only lack such an account, but also are unsure about the form it would need to have in order to bridge the conceptual and epistemological gap between life and mind as objects of scientific investigation, and life and mind as we subjectively experience them.” (Thompson 2007: x) For many philosophers of mind, this epistemological problem has stiffened into an ontological puzzle about how to fit subjective experience into the purportedly objective world of nature. As I will suggest, however, this puzzle does not come ready-made, but is instead rooted in the history of ideas which purged nature of subjective experience by assuming as its true being 1